By Chuck Freilich

Three months ago, Israel’s economy was booming. Israel still faced severe threats from Iran and Hezbollah, and there had been an increase in Palestinian terrorism, but overall Israel was never more secure. Its ties with states around the world were expanding and hopes for near-term normalization with the Saudis and others abounded. Israel was a vibrant democracy and viewed its approaching 75th anniversary with optimism.

Israel is now convulsed by self-inflicted divisions that are wracking its society and economy, undermining its democracy and threatening the pillars of its national security. Reservists from Israel’s most hallowed military units are in a state of near rebellion and what starts in the reserves will rapidly spill over into the regular army. Israel is on the verge of coming apart.

With international attention focused on Ukraine and the US-Chinese global rivalry, Iran is making steady progress towards a nuclear capability. In essence, it already is a nuclear threshold state, with sufficient fissile material for some five bombs and more soon. The only thing preventing Iran from weaponizing a nuclear warhead, the final hurdle to an operational capability, is its ongoing fear of the international and Israeli response. With both the international community and Israel focused elsewhere, this fear has greatly diminished and a nuclear Iran is an increasingly real possibility.

Moreover, the recent agreement between Iran and its arch-rival, Saudi Arabia, was a significant achievement for the former, that may signal an important realignment of regional forces. The agreement provides for a restoration of diplomatic relations, after a seven-year hiatus, and renewed economic and even military cooperation. Assuming that it is actually implemented - not a foregone conclusion – the agreement would give Iran three important wins: a reduction in regional tensions; a weakening of the American-led regional coalition; and, at a minimum, a blow both to Israel’s hopes of building a military alignment against Iran and for further regional normalization.

Further complicating the picture, the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement was brokered by China, not the US. For decades, China has become an increasingly important economic player in the region, buying vast quantities of oil from both the Saudis and Iran, but it had yet to turn its economic prowess into diplomatic and military might. In recent years, this has begun changing, as China deployed limited forces in the region (Djibouti), conducted repeated naval exercises with Iran and Russia, signed a 25-year strategic agreement with Iran, and now, for the first time, led a major strategic development in the region. The US still remains the preeminent power in the region, especially militarily, but the big question is whether the agreement signifies the beginning of the Chinese era in the Middle East.

The Saudis and Emirates, who also recently renewed ties with Iran, are engaging in classic hedging behavior. Driven by an ongoing loss of confidence in the US guarantee for their security, they are seeking other means of ensuring it, first by expanding ties with Israel, now by reducing hostilities with Iran. One can agree with their thinking, or not, but it is important to understand their mindset.

The Gulf and other Sunni states’ loss of faith in the US guarantee began with the Second Gulf War, in which egregious American miscalculations, in their view, greatly empowered Iran. The US then “abandoned” Egyptian President Mubarak, ostensibly its leading Arab ally. The US negotiated a flawed nuclear deal with Iran, but abruptly withdrew from it, without a Plan B, and failed to respond to a major Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities and to a subsequent attack against the UAE. Ongoing US pressure for human rights reforms, snubbing of the Saudi crown prince, and pressure to end the war in Yemen, added to the sense of animosity. Statements that the US no longer needed Mideast oil, true in a narrow sense, ignored the reality of one global energy market, further heightening Gulf insecurity.

The glitter is also off the Abraham Accords with Israel and the Arab signatories - extent and potential - are re-evaluating their positions. This dramatic breakthrough in relations, which had the potential to transform the region and Israel’s place in it, was driven first and foremost by the common fear of Iran and growing doubts about American resolve to prevent a nuclear Iran. The UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval, sought to build an undeclared alliance with Israel, signed defense cooperation agreements and even began making major purchases of Israeli weapons. The UAE warmly embraced Israel, in dramatic and heretofore unimaginable ways.

Israel could never constitute a substitute for the US, of course, but its ongoing political crisis, with five rounds of elections in three years and now almost complete meltdown, have clearly demonstrated its limitations as a reliable strategic partner for the Gulf states and led to growing disaffection. The Emiratis have reportedly already cancelled weapon sales, Prime Minister Netanyahu has pointedly not been invited to visit, and there is palpable concern among the Abraham Accords states over the directions being taken by the new government, especially regarding the Palestinians.

The breakthrough with Israel was also driven by the Abraham Accords states’ interest in access to Israeli high-tech, especially cyber, and the belief that Israel’s integration into the region would help moderate its policies towards the Palestinians. In both areas, they have been disappointed. The international uproar over Israel’s cyber exports, stemming primarily from the NSO affair, caused Israel to greatly scale back sales to nondemocratic states. The new government’s ultra-hard right composition and de facto intention to annex the West Bank, contradict the hopes of all Gulf states, as well as assurances given to the UAE at the time.

The Middle Eastern landscape is changing before our eyes. Unsurprisingly, neither friend nor foe are sitting back and graciously waiting for Israel to get its house in order. As has long been known, a house divided cannot stand. 

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.