By eitan dangot

A possible agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia that would involve Saudi- Israeli normalization, is above all a maneuver that is designed to strengthen Washington’s global strategic policy. Israel plays a minor consideration in this potential arrangement, but its results could nevertheless challenge the current Israeli government to the point of bringing about its dissolution.

The U.S.’s primary considerations are the Chinese and Russian challenges to its already degraded status in the Middle East. In this context and on the eve of an American election year, the Biden administration understands that it needs a regional agreement with the Saudis to stabilize the Middle East and give Biden a boost ahead of his bid to retain the presidency.

Moreover, Washington, as it observes the Chinese infiltration of its alliance with Saudi Arabia, does not want to be drawn into instability in the region.

Under the proposed agreement, Saudi Arabia will be formally recognized as a new and primary member of the Abraham Accords bloc, which is designed to create a check against Iran. An agreement would also create a status quo against Russian penetration, which often goes hand in hand with Chinese infiltration. As far as the U.S. is concerned, this is the ultimate goal of the agreement, and hence Israel itself is not the most important element. But as part of a deal, normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia can also boost American policy in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Israel is in the second circle of Washington’s considerations.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is looking on with obvious displeasure at the deterioration of relations between the Israeli leadership and Washington that is taking place against the background of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions, as head of the ‘all right-wing’ government.

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement is designed to boost its regional and global status. This follows a Saudi policy of continued dependence on the United States, while at the same time opening channels in the opposite direction, reflecting the lack of Saudi confidence in the U.S.

Riyadh wants a deal to affirm its place as a prestigious and valuable U.S. ally, in a reversal of the current American attitude to it. The Saudis also want a deal to include a U.S. commitment to a strategic defense alliance, similar to the U.S. commitment to NATO.

As Saudi Arabia looks a decade or two ahead at a changing world, against the backdrop of Iran's provocations, it also sees in the deal an opportunity to gain early nuclear technological know-how. And this signifies a challenge for the future Middle East.

Saudi Arabia would also receive advanced military technology platforms and capabilities that put it in the first class of powers, and through sales of F-35 and air defense systems, give it capabilities against the Iranian axis. This will also give the Saudis confidence in facing the Houthis in Yemen.

Israel will have to deal with the risk of losing regional aerial superiority due to Saudi Arabia acquiring F-35s, and Riyadh’s planned nuclear program, will also see a major erosion of Israel’s qualitative military qualitative edge.

Perhaps, as a compromise solution, the U.S. will agree to the first civilian nuclear steps over a longer timeline, with other steps put on hold. We cannot ignore the risk of an unconventional arms race developing, with additional countries following the Saudis, like Egypt and Turkey. And this dilemma is something the US and Israel will have to seriously discuss.

Yet for Riyadh, all of this will give the Kingdom the security to continue with its economic plans to become a global superpower with the confidence to navigate threats.

Israel, therefore, does not form the premise of the three-way Saudi – American – Israeli deal. It is more like a distinguished passenger who is invited to the business train car and is able to take advantage of what is on offer.

Israel’s involvement will make it easier for Biden to get the deal approved in Congress, where both Democrats and Republicans have raised objections to Saudi Arabia over human rights and extremism, issues that have prevented better U.S. ties with Riyadh.

Regionally speaking, Saudi-Israeli normalization will create a high wall and underground barrier to fortify the Abraham Accords in the coming years, creating a new bloc in the Middle East in the face of the Iranian threat.

Implications for Israeli politics

Neither Saudi Arabia nor the U.S. are happy about the political situation in Israel or about the risk of policies that could lead to a multi-arena escalation event. The common interest of the US and Saudi Arabia is regional quiet.

Saudi Arabia will demand significant changes from Israel. As the leading Muslim state, it will not be able to afford to give up the Palestinian issue. Normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will not be served without Israeli concessions, including an Israeli commitment to a concept that falls within the space of the two-state idea.

In practice, Israel will be required to take steps such as the cessation of annexation of territories for several years in the West Bank, to make land available to the Palestinian Authority in Area C and to promote Palestinian economic projects. Saudi Arabia may demand a renewed and approved mechanism to keep the Al Aqsa Mosque quiet as well.

Israel will be required to transfer funds to the Palestinian Authority. It may also be time for Israel to request Saudi financial involvement in the development of infrastructure in the West Bank.

The Saudis can also provide jobs outside of the West Bank to Palestinian tech personnel and academics, some of whom were employed in the Gulf in the past but have returned to unemployment in the West Bank.

Therefore, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have to take critical decisions ahead of his meeting with President Biden in September. Does he want to return to being a legitimate leader on the international stage? If he accepts the terms of normalization, this could speed up the departure of the Ben Gvir-Smotrich alliance from his coalition and the demise of the full right-wing government, leading to the formation of a new government that could deal with these issues in a matter-of-fact manner.

Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.