By Shmuel Tzuker

The question of how one measures the military strength and the deterring power of a country is up for debate. Are strength and deterrence measured though the size of weapons arsenals, jet fleets, or tank formations? Past experience tells us that possessing major military capabilities is an insufficient indicator of strength, or of a country's ability to deter determined enemies.

The real test of strength comes from the willingness of decision makers to activate the capabilities that they have at their disposal. Under this criteria, Israel's recent history of its dealings with adversaries leaves disturbing questions unanswered about Israeli deterrence and strength.

In June 2019, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired some 700 rockets at Israeli cities during a flare-up. They fired rockets at a country with the most powerful military and the most modern weapons in the region. Can a country that enjoys real deterrence fall prey to such a dynamic? Who is deterred by whom in this situation? 

Hamas, in recent weeks, has been launching explosive balloons into southern Israel. An entire population in the Gaza-border region is raising traumatized children. Could this occur to a country that has true deterrent power?

The explicit conclusion that can be drawn from these incidents is that the claim that Israel's adversaries are deterred is utterly unconvincing. While the adversaries of Israel may not wish to enter into a state of war with us, they don't hesitate when it comes to firing projectiles either, because they are highly aware of Israel's own desire to avoid war.

Israel does not lack planes, tanks, or other advanced military forces. The problem does not lie in its physical capabilities, but rather, in its decision-making. Israel's decision makers are highly disturbed by the prospect of entanglement in wars. What will the world say? How will the electorate respond to ugly incidents? As a result, our ground forces are barely used.

In the past, every Israeli soldier knew how to define a military triumph; conquer the enemy's ground with one's boots, plant the flag, and reach the target. When was the last time Israel achieved such a triumph?

Today, triumphant outcomes are lacking. The IDF prefers to use airpower and artillery to strike targets. During the last major armed conflict in 2014, Israel sought ceasefires, not a military knock out.

While Israel possesses powerful military capabilities, it places restrictions upon itself when it comes to using those capabilities. The prospect of Israel's leadership freezing a conflict soon after it begins, because of unfortunate but commonplace aspects of war, such as an armored vehicle driving over a landmine, or the kidnapping of soldiers, remains very real and very troubling.

The lack of resolve to gain a definitive win undermines our military prowess. 

Past experience has shown that as soon as the media broadcasts of unfortunate images and casualties of war begin, Israel's decision makers look for the nearest off ramp.

In addition, the fixation of Israeli leaders upon maintaining 'quiet' means that Gazan terror factions know they can fire a thousand rockets at southern Israel, and as long as a kindergarten is not hit, for example, they can get away with with minimal damage in return. As a result, the smaller armed factions in the Gaza Strip do as they please.

Hezbollah, for its part, has not reached the point at which it wants to fire on Israel, but that doesn't mean it won't reach that stage in the future. Hezbollah existed long before Iran's nuclear program did, and its role as an Iranian proxy, designed to exhaust Israel in battles of attrition, predates its role of deterring Israel from conducting strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.

In addition, Iran has directly entered Israel's arena, changing from distant adversary to a present and visible enemy. Iran no longer makes do with proxy activation - It is directly present in Syria, pointing cruise missiles at Israel.

There is, unfortunately, no guarantee that Israel's leaders will act any differently in the future than they have in the past. The 2014 Gaza conflict was against an enemy locked into an isolated area, closed off by the sea, Israel and Egypt, and there were no secondary fronts to deal with.

Yet the mighty IDF took more than 50 days to reach a truce there, and it saved the most effective maneuvers – toppling multi-story Gazan buildings used by Hamas – for the last week of the conflict. This conduct was all driven by Israel's thirst for quiet, and by concerns over what decision makers would tell the media, or the United Nations when asked for comment.

KILLING SOLEIMANI: A CASE STUDY IN DETERRENCE 

For recent examples on how vital it is to activate military force, rather than merely possess it, one need look no further than the U.S. drone strike on Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani.

Soleimani's entire agenda was about generating terrorism, and creating attack opportunities against American forces, the State of Israel, and pro-Western Arab countries. 

A central aspect of combating terrorism involves targeting primary instigators. While replacements take the place of those eliminated, they need time to fill the boots of their predecessor. So targeted killings disrupt day-to-day operations.

Those who replace those targeted for killing understand that they could meet with the same fate, a realization that significantly inhibits their operations. They maneuver with less freedom, meetings and travel are more difficult to arrange and their operational capability is reduced.

The Soleimani assassination will not cause Iran to withdraw from the region, or to cease arming its proxies such as Hezbollah or the Iraqi-Shite militias. But it is a perfect example of how to act in the face of terrorist entities. The strike is a significant blow to Iran. Eliminating a key figure such as Soleimani was an essential act, a deterrence booster, and will possibly delay or impede attacks that were in the pipeline. 

Counter-terrorism necessitates the elimination of high profile figures who have acquired experience, who influence their organizations, and who are perceived to be extraordinary operators. Those who replace them understand that they are not immune from the same end.

An increase in targeted killings would thus be a good beginning point for the IDF in its quest to restore actual deterrence.