By Eitan Barak

A recent report that Israel gave the United States less than two-hours’ notice prior to its alleged April 11 sabotage attack on the underground Natanz uranium enrichment site , thereby leaving U.S. intelligence agencies with insufficient time to respond, has drawn attention to the relationship between then Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the newly elected Biden administration. Yet its greater importance lies in the fact that Israel, in the view of the administration, was required by “longstanding, unwritten agreement to at least advise the United States of covert operations, giving Washington a chance to object”.

Irrespective of the embarrassment, the affair should cheer Israeli readers.

Such a tacit agreement means that the U.S. condoned, if not cooperated in, previous alleged Israeli sabotage actions targeting Iran’s nuclear program, at least since May 2018. In other words, both sides’ cost-benefit calculations suggest that this is the “right thing to do” given the absence of a diplomatic solution (i.e., a viable, effective agreement), the immense difficulties for Israel in executing a military solution, and the U.S. reluctance to push for such a solution.

Indeed, from the Israeli perspective, even tactical actions are preferable to doing nothing in the face of Iran’s increasing efforts in the nuclear realm. Furthermore, due to many factors, including the parties’ avoidance of declaring responsibility, this policy has so far not triggered a full-scale war between the two sides.

In conclusion, it is hard to challenge Israel’s adoption of this tactic as long as Iran refrains from abiding by any international agreement (e.g., the JCPOA) aiming to curb its nuclear program.

After all, Israel’s resort to sabotage attacks is a long-standing practice. In the early 1960s, for instance, Israel launched “Operation Damocles”, in which sabotage attacks, including targeted killings, were directed at the German scientists and technicians developing rockets for Egypt up to the end of 1963.

Although used against most of Israel’s enemies, this practice represents an important stage in implementing the so-called “Sharon/Begin Doctrine”, specifically, in Sharon’s words, that “Israel cannot permit the introduction of nuclear weapons [to the Middle East-E.B.]. For us, this is not a question of the balance of terror but our continued existence. So, it will be our duty to nip this danger in the bud”.

Under this doctrine’s umbrella, Israel carried out “Operation Opera” in Iraq (June 1981) and “Operation Outside the Box” in Syria (September 2007). In both cases, the aerial strikes were considered a “last resort”, after exhaustion of all other tools (i.e., diplomatic pressuring of supplier states, sabotage actions and, finally, an implicit appeal to the US to execute the military strike that, although rejected as expected, was considered as providing a “green light” for Israeli actions). 

To illustrate, only three months ago, in June 2021, a sort of formal confirmation was received that two years prior to the 1981 attack on the Iraqi reactor, Israel had sabotaged, on French soil, a shipment of materials destined for the Iraqi facility. As in the 1960s, the action followed multiple phone calls to French and Italian workers in the involved companies at the sites “advising” them to avoid any connection with Iraq and the reactor’s construction. Research has since suggested, however,  that this military strike was somewhat counterproductive as, inter alia, it triggered a new covert program that, despite gross inefficiencies, placed Iraq at the threshold of nuclear weapons capability a decade later.

In the present case, given the prevailing estimates that Iran had reached self-reliance in its nuclear program after 2010, no third parties are available as targets for diplomatic pressures and sabotage actions. Furthermore, giving the immense difficulties involved in executing a successful military strike against Iranian nuclear installations, in the absence of a diplomatic solution Israel sees few options available beyond continuing sabotage attacks that can – at best – delay the program while gaining time to reach a diplomatic solution.

Unfortunately, all the historical lessons suggest that sabotage attacks can do little other than slowing the pace of state-initiated military nuclear programs. This view seems to be shared by Israel’s defense establishment, to the point where it ascribes the Iranian slowdown in its nuclear race during the last three months solely to renewal of the Vienna talks.

After numerous sabotage attacks, it seems clear that diplomacy is the best if not the only solution to Israel’s predicament vis-a-vis Iran’s nuclear program.

Dr. Eitan Barak is a senior researcher at the International Relations Department, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Prior to joining the Department, Dr. Barak was a Fulbright postdoctoral grantee in the International Security Program at Harvard. Read full bio here.