By Yair Golan

The killing of Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani will have some short-term effect on Iran's regional malign activity, but it will not cause Iran to stop its aggressive efforts to create a Shi'ite crescent in the Middle East. 

Soleimani had the same role for 21 years and, as a result, he was able to develop a large network of ties, while amassing much knowledge in his role of spreading Iranian influence. This may cause some to believe that he is irreplaceable. It is an illusion. 

Soleimani was never Iran's leader, and did not determine the Islamic Republic's course. Iran is not like a small terror organization, and eliminating a senior figure will not cut down its operational capability, as with a terrorist or non-state actor. 

Iran is an organized, massive state, with its own bureaucracy, long list of functionaries, a large-military, and the Islamic Republican Guards Corps (IRGC) functioning on a large scale. 

Hence, the tendency to place all of Iran's capabilities on Soleimani's shoulders is a mistaken notion. To claim that his removal from the arena will lead to a comprehensive change to Iran's regional strategy is a wild exaggeration. 

Iran's policy will not change following Soleimani's' assassination any more than striking an Iranian weapons convoy delivering weapons from Syria to Lebanon will cause Iran to stop trying to traffic weapons to its proxies. 

Iran will continue to build up regional forces. The Iranian leadership wants to turn the Fertile Crescent into the Shi'ite Crescent, based upon its recognition that it can exploit the mostly Shi'ite population bases in Iraq and Lebanon to spread its influence. 

Prior to the outbreak of the 2011 civil war, Syria once had a minority Alawite population–closely affiliated with Shi'ites, and forming the ruling regime–of between 10% and 12%, out of a population of 22.5 million Syrians. An additional 250,000 Shi'ites lived in Syria on top of the Alawites. Today, some five million Syrian refugees–almost all Sunnis–have fled the country, changing the sectarian ratio in favor of the Alawite-Shi'ite population. 

In light of these trends, Iran has no intention of giving up on its ambition to dominate Syria, despite the loss of Soleimani. Believing otherwise amounts to trivializing Iran, a highly capable adversary. 

Soleimani was a serious leader who displayed audacity and cunning, and he was not frightened of showing up at the most dangerous battle zones in Syria to rally the fighters in the Iranian-Shi'ite camp. By Middle Eastern standards, he was no more or less brutal than other regional actors, and aligned with local norms. 

The network of connections and knowledge he amassed can be assumed by others, such as Esmail Qa’ani, the deputy who replaced him. Qa'ani was Soleimani's subordinate throughout this entire time, meaning that he has plenty of his own knowledge and ties, even if he is less impressive as a leader.  

Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was personally very fond of Soleimani, and the assassination is no doubt a blow to his morale. But this does not mean that Soleimani’s replacement, Qa'ani, cannot take over and be supported by a highly-developed IRGC mechanism operating in support. In much the same way that killing the chief of staff of a military does not destroy a country's ability to act militarily, Soleimani's termination will not put an end to Iran's activities in the Middle East. 

EXAGGERATING THE THREAT

In Israel, there is unfortunately a tendency to exaggerate the scope of the threat posed by Iran's malign regional conduct. While Iran poses a real threat, it has not created a network of endless rocket and missile arsenals that can silence Israel in minutes, as some Israeli officials tend to claim. 

Israel has built enormous military power. Minimizing Israeli deterrence by presenting the threat to Israel in exaggerated terms is a big mistake. 

Why haven't Israel's enemies unleashed their rockets and missiles? The simple answer is that Israel deters them. Every hostile entity in this region understands that it will pay a very heavy price if its launches major attacks on Israel. 

Even Hamas in the Gaza Strip, which sometimes runs “violent negotiations” with Israel by asking Palestinian Islamic Jihad to fire on it, does not nonchalantly unleash its full firepower on Israeli cities. For years, Hezbollah too has kept the situation calm. Israel's foes have significant offensive capabilities, but no intention of using them.  Soleimani helped build up Hezbollah's arsenal of rockets, but the extent of this arsenal is often mischaracterized, even by those who should know better. 

Out of the approximate 150,000 projectiles, a small number–approximately 200–are long-range missiles that can hit all of Israel with warheads weighing half a ton. Some 3500 rockets and missiles are of medium-range, meaning they can hit the Tel Aviv metropolitan area, and have 150-kilogram warheads. All of the remaining projectiles are unguided short-range Katyusha rockets of various types.

Certainly, for civilians, the threat is frightening. But Israel's highly developed civil defenses, responsible conduct by civilians, the early alert system, all combined with Israel's active air defense layers mean the chances of civilians being hurt in the event of a war are very low. 

Out of Hezbollah's entire stockpile, some 4,000 rocket and missiles form a real threat, but Israel's air defense systems can neutralize approximately 90% of them.

Cruise missiles, with which Iran is also trying to threaten Israel, have unpredictable paths, but are slower, and Israel's air defenses will detect them. 

Ultimately, Iran has built Hezbollah as a stick with which to threaten Israel. It is a stick that can cause harm and distress, but one that Israel can deal with, and it is a threat that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is fully capable of destroying if necessary. 

THE IRANIAN STRATEGY: A WAR OF ATTRITION

Iran's strategy is a war of attrition, based on the idea of getting those around Israel to rise-up against it, and getting the Arab population inside Israel to attack it, leading, in the Iranian vision, to a crumbling of the “Zionist entity.” 

The Iranians hope to break the spirit of the Israeli people. On the military front, there is no reason why the IDF cannot take on and reasonably defeat such threats. It seems as if many have forgotten the real power ratio between the IDF and Hezbollah, which, on a good day, can count some 40,000 operatives. 

Even in a multi-arena conflict scenario involving Hezbollah, 15,000 Syrian militia members in Syria, and Gaza's terror factions, the IDF is large enough to defeat these enemies. One need look no further than the 1967 Six Day War to understand that the IDF is large enough for the task. 

With the many thousands of accurate munitions in the possession of the IDF, its top-line battle tanks, armored vehicles, field intelligence, and command and control, the fear that has gripped some in Israel is truly baseless. 

Iran should be treated as a serious adversary, with many natural resources and highly developed human personnel, including scientists and engineers. 

But it is difficult and expensive for Iran to operate far from home. The Iranian people are protesting Iran's huge investments and adventurism overseas, and its national economy is in a bad state. Shi'ite Arabs in its zone of influence are unhappy with the exaggerated Iranian-Persian dominance. 

Iran's attempt to recruit the region to its struggle against the “big and little Satan” is falling short. In Syria, the Russians, who are there to stay, have no intention of allowing Iran to take over the country. 

As a result, it is vital that Israelis do not exaggerate the threat posed by Iran and demoralize themselves in the process. While the Iranians undoubtedly have hostile intentions, they cannot realize them with ease, either before or after the “Soleimani Era.”