By Shmuel Tzuker

The questions surrounding Israel’s readiness for a potential strike on Iran should go beyond the discussion over whether its military capabilities can adequately damage the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program.

Any strike plan must first answer the following questions: Will Hezbollah automatically retaliate on Iran’s behalf, and if so, has Israel fully taken into account the scenario of activating two fronts at the same time – Iran, and Hezbollah in Lebanon – not to mention a third possible arena, Gaza? And finally, is the Israeli home front ready for such a scenario?

Simply put, if, following a strike on Iran, Hezbollah attacks Israel with everything it has, Israel will have to deal with not only over 150,000 unguided projectiles but also hundreds of precise missiles.

These precision missiles can significantly harm Israel’s ability to be able to maintain a continuously functioning government. It would therefore be a mistake to ask whether Israel can delay Iran’s nuclear capabilities without asking in the same breath whether the Israeli home front is prepared for Hezbollah’s firepower.

Hezbollah's arsenal is extensive, and Israel’s air defenses are insufficient. 

It can be argued that Hezbollah’s conventional arsenal and its precise missiles can disrupt state functions to a degree that make them as severe as a nuclear threat. The meaning of government functionality disrupted is that Israel would be unable to activate its military capabilities in fronts that develop after an Iran strike, that command and control would be disrupted, and that Israel would struggle to evacuate its civilians from areas under heavy fire in the north of the country.

Israeli authorities need to be sure, today, that they know how to evacuate some 30,000 people from the northern border area. That means knowing which hotels or accommodation centers will absorb them, which hospitals will take in the wounded, and which evacuation routes to use.  

In addition, and due to the above, Israel also needs to consider the option of a preemptive strike on Hezbollah’s firepower prior to attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.

The strategic logic of such action rests with the assumption that some time afterward, whether six months, a year, or more, with Hezbollah struggling to rebuild its capabilities after a massive Israeli blow, Israel will be free to focus on the Iranian threat without simultaneously dealing with Hezbollah.

While a preemptive war is illegal under international law, a pre-emptive strike is a different matter. How Hezbollah responds to such a strike will determine the course of events and whether they snowball into a war.

In either scenario – an attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, or a pre-emptive strike on Hezbollah – Israel must prepare its civilian sphere appropriately. If there is a good chance that some 10,000 residential buildings in Israel will be damaged, and that northern communities will come under a level of fire never previously experienced, a population evacuation would be mandatory. The alternative, of failing to prepare for evacuations, would mean that any strike on either adversary would be carried out without the suitable planning for vulnerable civilians.

Whichever course is decided upon by the Israeli cabinet, time is of the essence to begin preparing the soft underbelly of the country, the civilian front. It is vital that the government is already now made fully cognizant of the fallout scenarios of such actions.

Preparation will, among other steps, require stocking up on air defense interceptors, ensuring the readiness of emergency supplies for the civilian sector, and stress testing civilian command and control systems. The fact of the matter is that as of today, the Israeli home front is not ready for this scenario. It is not ready to face Hezbollah, even as a single front.

On the offensive front, the government must already grapple with the serious dilemmas it would likely face in Lebanon in the event of war. 

There will be widespread destruction in the country, but the government will have to decide whether or not to target Lebanese state infrastructures. Even under intense fire, the IDF will continue to be a moral military, meaning that not all in Lebanon will be targeted, and Israel will make every effort to distinguish civilians from non-combatants.

Another imperative that the government needs to prepare for is making sure it knows not to stop the conflict once it starts.

Unfortunately, past experience has shown that in the event of conflict, distressing events such as the accidental killing of civilians in Lebanon, or media images of the capture or death of IDF soldiers leads governments to hit the brakes. Yet if Israel ends up in a war of no-choice, it cannot let its war efforts be held hostage by such events. Israeli decision makers already now must get used to the idea that in the event of war, they will need to clench their teeth in the face of such developments, and not disrupt the Israeli war effort.

The same is true of disturbing events that could well happen on the Israeli side of the border, such as a very large quantity of enemy explosives falling on a town in northern Israel and killing many civilians. An event like that will cause significant demoralization and distress – but that is not a reason to freeze the war effort.

The damages absorbed by Israel following a strike on Iran could be enormous. As a result, under no circumstances should Hezbollah's possible response not be taken into consideration when weighing a strike on Iran.

The question of whether Israel has the capability to strike Iran must no longer be asked in isolation from the question of whether Israel is ready for full-scale conflict with Hezbollah. 

Brigadier General Shmuel Tzuker is the former Deputy Director General of the Directorate of Production and Procurement in the Ministry of Defense, Israel. Read full bio here.