By Yair Ramati

The recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which began on September 27 and ended on November 10, lasted six weeks. It offers valuable lessons for militaries worldwide.

The clash was the latest in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, but ended this time with an overwhelming Azerbaijani victory, an outcome that is a far cry from the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994), which ended in a stinging Azeri defeat. 

The history of the conflict goes all the way back to the period following World War One. During the Soviet era, Nagorno-Karabakh, despite having an ethnic Armenian majority, was governed as an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The disintegration of the Soviet Union opened the door for severe fighting that ended in 1994 through international mediation. 

The initial Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in 30,000 deaths, the displacement of approximately 725,000 Azerbaijanis and between 300,000–500,000 Armenians from both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The terms of the end of that war reflected Armenia’s victory. 

Azerbaijan covers a geographical area more than two-and-a-half times greater than Armenia, and its population is more than three times the size of Armenia’s. Azerbaijan has the larger standing army and the larger number of reserves. Both sides rely mainly on Russian equipment. The armored forces of the two countries are nearly even in terms of main battle tanks. In the areas of artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sensors, precision-guided missiles, and air defense - the Azeri side enjoys superiority.

It now appears safe to conclude that Azerbaijan’s preparations for the 2020 conflict succeeded in giving it a significant qualitative edge. Baku achieved this by diversifying its military procurement. In recent years, Azerbaijan has sought multiple partners rather than rely on Russia as a sole supplier for technological arms purchases. It has reached out to Europe, Turkey, China, Israel, and others. 

Baku's focus was on purchasing high-tech weaponry required for battlefield superiority. Its superior resources and strategic insights gave it a significant qualitative technological edge over Armenia. 

The latest conflict can be divided into four consecutive phases. In the first phase, both sides inflicted mutual blows in a relatively balanced fight. The Armenian forces destroyed dozens of Azerbaijani tanks and APCs while their air defenses downed aircraft, UAV, and commando helicopters. The Azeris, on the other hand, used armed UAVs and loitering munitions to fight back, but made little, if any, progress on the ground.

In the second phase, which followed a successful Azerbaijani suppression of Armenian front-line air defense assets, the dominant battle pattern emerged. Armed Azerbaijani UAVs, loitering munitions, and attack helicopters were able to implement their close-air support plan and effectively target Armenian ground forces, while Azerbaijani ground forces made some advances. 

In the third phase, Armenia began launching a barrage of inaccurate ballistic missiles toward major cities in Azerbaijan out of frustration, as the Azerbaijanis used their armed UAV and loitering munitions for the systematic attrition of Armenian forces while their ground forces continued to make initial gains. 

In the fourth and final phase, high intensity fire was used by both sides. The Armenians fired rockets and missiles at Azerbaijani cities, while the Azerbaijani army continued with its advances from the north (minimal) and the deep penetration in the south of Nagorno-Karabakh, along the border with Iran. 

Precision-guided weapons played a key role in the battlefield, including short and long-range anti-tank guided missiles, loitering munitions, guided rockets ,and tactical missiles. 

The fighting also demonstrated that drone (UAV) warfare is an essential element in the art of modern warfare. It was Azerbaijan that deployed most of the drones in the war, with its military reportedly operating drones purchased from Turkey, and Israeli Harop suicide drones (loitering munitions). Armenian armed forces could only defend against these using their limited number of modern surface-to-air missiles. 

While Armenia was able to shoot down 25 Azerbaijani drones, the attrition rate was in favor of Azerbaijan, due to its combined use of drones and loitering munitions. 

Both sides used heavy artillery rockets as well as tactical missiles. Armenia's arsenal included Russian-made SCUD-B, SS-21 and Iskander tactical missiles, while the Azerbaijanis, according to reports, used Soviet-made Smerch 300 mm rockets and precision guided projectiles, including Israeli EXTRA long-range rockets and LORA high precision missiles.

Most of the Armenian long-range strikes targeted civilian centers while the Azerbaijanis used their precision arsenal for deep strikes against military infrastructure targets, such as S-300 air defense batteries. Azerbaijan did not have any alert system in place for its civilian population prior to hostile projectile impact, nor did it possess any intercept capabilities.

During the second, third and fourth phase of the fighting, the Armenians used (either directly or via Russian proxies) modern electronic countermeasure equipment. 

In addition, the entire battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh experienced severe satellite GPS/GLONASS signal denial. This combination had an adverse impact on various precision-guided weapon systems that rely on continuous GPS signals and data-links. This may have contributed to the relatively high number of lost UAVs and loitering munitions.  

Hackers from Armenia, Azerbaijan and their respective allies actively participated in the cyber arena, targeting official sites, posting misinformation, or even trying to attack defense sites. 

Azerbaijan was able to suppress the mobile Armenian air defense force, but this took at least four days and came at the cost of significant losses. Once this was achieved, the picture on the battlefield changed dramatically, presenting a clear Azerbaijani advantage. 

In summary, small-scale conflicts such as the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war can tell other militaries a lot about preparations and operational implementation. 

A robust procurement strategy, along with state-of-the-art technology, the approach adopted by Azerbaijan, pays off. 

The conflict also demonstrated how new media and extensive propaganda campaigns are an integral aspect of 21st century armed conflicts. 

Finally,  the conflict exposed the fact that without effective and modern 360-degree air defense, all ground forces are subject to a high rate of attrition. Countries that wish to secure their ground forces must procure modern air defenses capable of handling the precision threats of the new battlefield.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel.