By Yochai Guiski

Two separate high-stakes showdowns have been played out in recent months on the world stage: The first concerns the Iranian nuclear program, while the second is between Russia and the United States and European countries concerning Ukraine.

In the showdown over the Iranian nuclear program, Tehran has been pushing hard against U.S. and European demands to return to the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and presented (at least initially) hardline negotiating demands. All the while, Iran’s continued non-compliance with the deal and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have raised the specter of conflict arising from an attempt to delay the program by military means.

In the Ukraine, Western countries have seen Russia amass significant military forces (over 100 thousand troops and military equipment), threaten Kiev with military attack, and produce false narratives about Western aggression that requires a Russian response.

Moscow is already under sanctions for occupying and annexing the Crimean Peninsula and has received warnings from the U.S. about stiff sanctions should it initiate a military operation.

At first glance, these two issues seem unrelated: One is a multilateral nonproliferation negotiation regarding return to a nuclear deal that was abandoned by the Trump administration, and Iran’s noncompliance with the terms of the deal in response; the second is a potential war on European soil, which may lead to a crisis between two nuclear-armed great powers.

But at a closer look, the similarities begin to emerge:

1. Iran and Russia are both belligerent actors in their respective arenas:

a. The Kremlin and its allies are continuously intervening (through various tools - diplomatic, economic, covert, information, military) in the affairs of former Soviet republics, attempting to stifle pro-democracy dissent and prop up pro-Russian leaders, while supporting separatist pro-Russian groups.

b. Iran is also employing various tools to undermine the governments of Middle Eastern countries while funding and arming proxies who serve as its long arm. Iranian involvement perpetuated governance crises in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, and has exacerbated the humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria.

2. Iran and Russia have both increased their belligerence in response to sanctions that sought to deal with their behavior. They are also willing to use capabilities that are deemed unacceptable by the West such as assassinations (including using chemical agents), supporting terror groups, and developing various WMD capabilities.

3. Both Iran and Russia do not shy from sending forces to prop up authoritarian allies or from the use of force to quash popular demands, such as in Syria, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.

4. Iran and Russia see themselves as victims of the current situation or at least adopt these positions outwardly:   

a. Iran depicts itself as a victim of Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on Tehran. However, the “Nuclear Archives” showed that Iran had manifestly violated the JCPOA and the NPT by holding on to the blueprints and components of a military nuclear program, and it has violated NPT safeguards by holding and hiding enriched uranium. Iran has also leveraged the West’s interest in IAEA monitoring of its nuclear sites to prevent any meaningful investigation by the agency into its numerous violations.

b. Iran has also expanded its support for militias and terror groups around the Middle East that have targeted U.S. forces and their allies while claiming the U.S. is violating the nuclear agreement by sanctioning it for those behaviors.

c. Russia also sees itself as a victim of western interference. It sees the 20+ years of NATO enlargement to the east as an encroachment on its borders by a military alliance that primarily views Russia as its enemy. All the while remembering that the wars Russia fought in Europe were instigated by European nations.

d. It also views the development and deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe over the past decade as a significantly destabilizing development as these can reduce the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence.

e. Russia viewed the political change in Ukraine with genuine alarm, as its territory plays host to vital military installations (such as the only exit to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean) whose loss would have significant strategic implications. It reacted swiftly by seizing and annexing Crimea. Moscow also sees the NATO presence in Ukraine as an unacceptable risk to its national security (the distance between Moscow and the Ukrainian border is only about 500 Km of relatively open terrain).   

5. Conspicuously, both Iran and Russia seek guarantees from the U.S. and its allies that they would refrain from actions that could inhibit their ability to exercise their power in their respective (contested) spheres of influence (Russia provided treaty suggestions to the U.S. and Iran demands guarantees as part of the nuclear negotiations). They seek these guarantees knowing full well that their demands are near impossible to accept and even agreeing to discuss them might be interpreted as selling out U.S. partners in the region.

As the U.S. seeks to reinforce the notion of a rules-based international order, it is of paramount importance that regional bullies do not get a free pass on their behavior. Even if the U.S. and its allies might have done better in dealing with both nations, it is ultimately their aggressive policies that bear most of the responsibility for their current predicament.

Accepting the narrative that Iran or Russia are victims who just seek to have some protection from bullying U.S. policies would be counterproductive and an open invitation to aggression, which would also be closely monitored by an attentive Beijing.

Even if diplomacy is still the best road to address most of the issues between the U.S., Russia, and Iran, it would be foolhardy to attempt to kick the can down the road by acquiescing to unacceptable demands. Accepting them in diplomatic discourse with one actor would surely embolden the other to seek the same.

Even if the U.S. and Israel cannot fully agree on the nuclear negotiations with Iran, this should be a point they are united on. 

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.