By Yair Ramati

Israeli defense delegations did not attend Abu Dhabi’s IDEX international defense exhibition in late February as they had planned to, and although pandemic-related flight restrictions were cited by the Israeli government as the reason, another possible reason for this may have been due to security concerns.

IDEX is testimony to the United Arab Emirate’s policy of investment in order to promote its own defense industry, and its growing success in developing significant defense products.

The Emirati Edge advanced technology group for defense products, which recently announced a memorandum of understanding with Israel Aerospace Industries for the development of a counter-UAV system tailored to the UAE market, is the latest signal that the UAE, like Saudi Arabia, is determined to build an independent defense industry, which includes independent production capabilities.

Israel too could find a significant role to play in this market, despite the damage that was caused by the absence of Israeli defense companies from IDEX.

Part of what will determine Israel’s involvement in this market will be the openness of the Israeli defense establishment toward the UAE, and its willingness to share technology with the Emiratis.

The more Israel travels down the road of cooperation and moves away from traditional buyer – seller relations, the more likely Israel will be able to establish an important defense industry presence in the UAE and in the Gulf region.

The remaining open question is how long it will take the UAE to reach advanced indigenous defense production capabilities. The UAE has likely been observing other models of domestic defense industries in the region, such as Turkey, Israel, and Iran, and will draw inspiration from those models.  

What begins with maintenance can evolve within years into licensed production.

The UAE appears particularly keen to produce its own drones, and has brought in companies that build aircraft to learn from them.

The Chinese defense industry model can also serve as a valuable lesson for the UAE, since China did not start off by producing high quality drones as it does today, but gradually built up to this level of production with time.

An additional impetus for the UAE is the American decision to reevaluate the decision to sell it and Saudi Arabia air-to-ground munitions, as well as the U.S. reassessment of a decision to sell the UAE Reaper drones and F-35 fighter jets in a deal signed with the Trump administration.

 The UAE is already home to multiple international arms exporters. The country’s navy, ground forces, and air forces all have a combination of European and American equipment. For some platforms, like the fifth-generation fighter jet, the U.S.-made F-35 is the only game in town. In the field of armed drones and missile defense, Europe has little to offer the Emiratis, meaning that should the U.S. decline to sell these products, the UAE (like Saudi Arabia) will run into trouble.

Yet the UAE also cooperates with China and Russia. It has in the past purchased 50 Russian-made Pantsir medium-range ground-based air defense systems and upgraded them, as well armed drones from China. The latter were used to strike the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and for air strikes in Libya.

The UAE has even purchased missiles from North Korea to support its operations in Yemen.

During the IDEX conference, representatives from across the Russian and Chinese defense industries were present, as well as a high number of representatives from Germany. The UAE is teaming up with German company Rheinmetall Defense for the joint production of shore-to-sea missiles.

Looking ahead, the UAE is interested in gaining the ability to produce its own loitering attack systems, and an array of bombs. The Halcon Emirati defense company is expanding its production program of the Desert Sting 16 precision guided glide weapons, launched from aircraft at ground targets.

Going forward, it is fair to expect the UAE to condition future acquisitions with foreign defense companies on close cooperation and technology sharing, and not to expect traditional buyer- seller relations.

Potential shifts in America’s defense policy toward Gulf states can be expected to create pressure on all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – and not only the UAE. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are also bracing for changes, and pressure on these states appears to be highly problematic from their perspective.

The reassessment by the Biden administration on munitions sales is merely one aspect of an American shift, and the decision not to sell air-to-ground bombs for use in Yemen should be seen as a litmus test on future American steps.

Much like Israel greatly expanded its domestic defense industry following the French arms embargo on it in 1967, the same response could happen among Gulf states.

This could act as an invitation for China and Russia to expand their pre-existing involvement in the Gulf defense market through new acquisitions – while also creating potential space for Israel.  

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.