BY Daniel Calbi and Abdulsalam Kako

In light of the Biden Administration’s announcement of the complete withdrawal of the United States military from Afghanistan, we have identified several areas that we believe could necessitate concern for Israel at some time in the future. Although we believe that the withdrawal of U.S. forces presents no immediate security concern for Israel, several threats could arise within the next five years, and their emergence depends upon whether or not the current Afghan government will be successful in maintaining stability within the country. However, if the Afghan government fails, the outcomes that may result from that scenario will likely present both direct and indirect threats to Israel. 

The Biden administration’s hope is that talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban will result in a lasting peace. However, if there is a successful deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban, some sort of an integration of the Taliban into parts of the government is likely. If the proposed peace deals between the Taliban and Afghan government are not successful, then the ongoing conflict is likely to worsen and in that event the Taliban may overthrow the Afghan government. Because the Afghan government (GIRoA) has focused most of its efforts on the defense of Kabul and other contested regions, there is a good possibility that GIRoA will not be able to maintain the bandwidth to protect the entire country and will inevitably prove to be incapable of fending off the Taliban in the long term. A full out civil war in Afghanistan where there is no U.S. military presence also provides an ideal scenario for international terrorist organizations like ISIS to gain increased influence and regional control. ISIS and Al Qaeda already utilize destabilized regions such as Afghanistan to recruit, train and fund their missions.

There are two specific reasons the U.S. withdrawal may provide an increased incentive for an international terrorist organization to gain influence within Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan is arguably the most well-funded conflict in modern history and has an entire ecosystem that exists solely to support the coalition war effort. Due to the fact that the logistical support system that spans central Asia will no longer exist, there will be a negative economic impact on Afghan businesses who rely heavily on the war effort, and to the local economies that support the various bases throughout the country. This will leave many individuals without jobs, or at a minimum with less ability to support themselves and their families. Another issue - one that also arose when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 and subsequently when it departed in 2011 - is a massive military force of young men that are essentially jobless, or who work for a meager military force at best. This will be far more prevalent in Afghanistan and as the Taliban gain further control of the country, young Afghan men who work for the government as police, military or special operations will face exceedingly difficult situations at home and in the workplace. GIRoA lacks the leadership and support to fully maintain its police and military forces and due to this impending failure young men serving GIRoA will have two options: Fight for a losing cause, or abandon GIRoA and join groups like the Taliban, AQIS, or ISIS-K in order to survive and protect their families.

If later on the United States decides that there is a reason to take new military actions throughout the region such as in the event that an international terrorist organization gains regional control as ISIS was able to do in Iraq and then Syria, there will be a less of an ability for the U.S. to conduct deep strikes within contested regions, and future missions in the region will be more complicated. Even though the U.S. and its allies have established multiple air bases throughout Afghanistan, coalition forces will now abandon these bases. Thus, a coalition element would first have to secure an airfield, maintain its security, bring forth follow-on forces to conduct an over the horizon assault and establish a logistical support hub. These additional layers to an operation introduce a significant amount of additional planning and contingency preparation that will undoubtedly complicate, convolute and lengthen the United States ability to conduct special operations missions in the region.

It is also likely that Iran’s influence in Afghanistan will increase in any scenario. The U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan will also be itself a win for Iran because Iran will no longer have to look to its eastern border to “defend” itself from the presence of U.S. ground forces in the region. The significant presence of U.S. military personnel, the infrastructure to support them, the aerial resupply capability, and the ability to conduct strikes in the region from land and sea has helped to deter opponents of the West, such as Iran, from acting in overt manners. Iran has made considerable financial investments in Western Afghanistan over the past two decades and there is no reason to doubt that Iran will seek to expand upon these efforts throughout the region in the future. Additionally, there is considerable evidence that throughout the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Iran has helped not only the Afghan government, but also the Taliban. If the planned peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government are successful, then Iran has already established influence with both sides of the “government” that will emerge. 

Regardless of the relationship that will result between Iran and an integrated Afghan government, or a Taliban controlled one, it is very likely that Iran will seek to gain even greater influence among the Shiite minority population. This is because Iran made efforts to position itself as the regional provider of security to the Shiite minority in Afghanistan and in particular the Hazara ethnic group. Historically the Hazara have faced persecution from members of the Sunni Pashtun majority, which has  dominated the governments of Afghanistan throughout its history and currently make up a large portion of the Taliban. In more recent times, the Taliban has made some efforts to stop its own members from persecuting the Hazara; it is unclear if this will be a trend that lasts. Prior to the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, Iran trained and funded Shiite Hazara militias that were used both in the Iran-Iraq war, and against the Taliban during their original reign. More recently Iran’s Quds Force trained a Shiite militia force made up of Hazara and known as the “Fatemiyoun,” which it employed as a proxy force in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The use of these militias in Syria provides the most direct threat to Israel, as it increases the number of militant forces near Israel’s border that are taking direction from Iran. In the event that the Taliban gets close to achieving victory in an Afghan civil war, or if an international terrorist organization is able to take advantage of the situation, then it is certainly a possibility that the Afghan government or the Shiite minority population may turn to Iran for help and request military intervention on their behalf. 

The three discussed outcomes all present challenges to Israel. The Taliban, Iran, and international terrorist organizations such as ISIS have all made it clear that Israel is a threat and thus a viable target. Of the outcomes, the most dangerous and most likely is from the spread of Iran’s influence into Afghanistan. This is a threat to Israel because Iran has fought, and will continue to fight, proxy wars for decades. More specifically Iran has long backed groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah by providing weaponry, training, and monetary support. In the case that the Taliban retake Afghanistan and overthrow the current government, it’s prudent to remember the old saying, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.  

Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. He deployed multiple times to combat where he led special operations teams combating ISIS, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Read full bio here.

Abdulsalam Kako is a U.S. military officer and current student at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States Naval Academy and is working on an additional Master’s degree from the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Read full bio here.