By David Hacham

After a five year moratorium, Israel's targeted killings reemerged in November of last year when the IDF conducted a missile strike against the Northern Brigade commander of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Bahaa Abu Al-Ata, in Gaza. 

The IDF emphasized that Al-Ata had become a ticking time bomb who refused to respond to prior warnings. The strike led to a 48-hour round of intense escalation.

The use of targeted killings has stirred animated controversies, and has led many, particularly overseas human rights organizations, to criticize Israel's policy. Such organizations perceive it as an illegitimate and immoral policy, describing it as "an execution without trial." 

Yet, in the conditions of today, targeted killings remain a vital part of Israel's ongoing strategy, one which will likely be used again in the future in order to maintain our clear-cut advantage in the war against terrorism. 

Israel's advanced operational and intelligence capabilities, and determination to implement surgical killings, constitute a source of constant threat to those seeking to harm it's security. 

One need only look at the list of those targeted for killing in order to understand the anxiety the practice causes among Israel's enemies.   

Hamas founder and leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza on March 22, 2004, while his successor, Dr. Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi, was killed weeks later, on April 17, 2004. On April 16, 1988, an elite IDF unit assassinated one of Fatah's key founders in Tunis, Khalil Al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad. 

Sheikh Yassin played a central role in the founding of Hamas. I knew him - personally - and held many meetings with him, both in my office and in his Gazan home, when I served as head of the Arab Affairs Department in the IDF's Military Administration of Gaza during the years of the First Intifada, from 1987 to 1993. 

Despite his total physical disability, Yassin was able to ingeniously seize upon a grave strategic error committed by Israel in 1987, when it approved the founding of the Al-Mujama Al-Islami religious charity association. Throughout the 1980s, Yassin consolidated his position in Gaza through the use of 'Da'wa' - establishing a wide Islamist religious civilian infrastructure, and using it to take over institutions and associations for the purpose of boosting his status as a rival to the nationalist Fatah movement.  

Yassin was laying down the building blocks for what would evolve into Hamas. Hamas officially came into being during the early days of the First Intifada, which erupted on December 9, 1987. 

Rantisi, a pediatrician by profession, replaced Sheikh Yassin as Hamas leader. Like Yassin, I knew Rantisi well from my military service in Gaza. It was impossible to miss his burning hatred of Israel and Jews. Each time we'd meet, I'd feel his hateful gaze upon me. Rantisi was also a founding member of Hamas, and he was one of the 415 Hamas and Palestinian (PIJ) terrorists deported to Lebanon in December 1992 by the Rabin government in response to the kidnapping and murder of Israeli Border Policeman Nissim Toledano. Rantisi spent a year in a southern Lebanese camp, during which time he stood out as a leader and a speaker, and rose to a senior, unshakeable position within the organization. 

Another senior terror figure who was eliminated from the scene through a targeted operation was Fathi Al-Shkaki, a founder and first operational head of PIJ. He was killed in Malta on October 26, 1995, in a Mossad special operation. I knew Shkaki very well. He studied medicine in Egypt, where he was first exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Upon his return to Gaza, he became active in PIJ. He was arrested by Israel in 1986, and expelled to Lebanon in 1988 during the First Intifada. After his expulsion, Shkaki was able to reorganize PIJ into a deadly terror group, and assume the role of its exclusive leader. 

An additional prominent figure targeted by Israel for assassination was Yahya Ayash, also known as 'the engineer,' a senior Hamas operative who masterminded many deadly suicide bombings against Israelis in the 1990s. Yahya's killing occurred on January 5, 1996, through a boobytrapped cell phone, in which 50 grams of explosives had been planted. Ayash was in a hideout apartment in Bet Lahiya in northern Gaza when he received the phone from a Shin Bet Palestinian agent. The killing was the product of a complex and sophisticated operation, which included meticulous planning, and outside-of-the-box thinking.

In December 2006, the High Court of Israel ruled that striking those taking a direct part in hostile, violent activities is a legitimate tool, but can only be used in order to prevent future attacks, rather than as retribution, revenge, punishment, or deterrence.  

The ruling also said that the harm to noncombatants has to meet standards of proportionality to the military value of the target. Many bitter arguments in Israel arose over targeted killings, most prominently, after the July 2002 air strike that killed Hamas operative Salah Shhada, alongside 14 civilians in a Gazan residential building. 

The Israeli government set up a committee to check the IDF's conduct in that incident, and found that no criminal offenses were committed. But it did find that an intelligence failure had occurred causing disproportionate harm to civilians. 

Looking back, there can be no dispute that targeted killings form one of the most critical and important methods Israel has in its long-term war against terrorism. The end objective is to minimize the scope of terror attacks by removing those who plot and initiate operations from the scene. Such strikes cause significant harm to operational terror capabilities, morale, and future motivation to implement terror attacks. 

Targeted killings stir fear among those terrorists seeking to do harm. Their use pushes terror organizations into defensive positions. They have a paralyzing effect, at least temporarily. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the influence of this tool is ultimately limited and short-term. 

After the initial shock, new operatives rise up and fill the ranks, but the very real threat of their removal, as was the case with Rantisi, successor to Sheikh Yassin, looms large; as it is intended to do.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.