HOW ISRAEL CAN ANSWER THE CHINA QUESTION

By Efraim Chalamish

Pompeo’s recent visit to Israel during the Covid-19 pandemic and the public controversy surrounding Chinese involvement in Israel’s companies and infrastructure have intensified the discussion about the way Israel balances U.S. and Chinese interests in the region.

There is no doubt that China’s engagement with Israel has been on the rise for a few years now on all levels, including: a 5 times increase of Israeli export to China this past decade, the rising Chinese capital flows into Israel’s tech and innovation ecosystem, and the intense participation of Chinese companies in pubic tenders and key infrastructure projects.

The Israel-China economic renaissance has been driven by a well-designed government-to-government dialogue alongside strategic initiatives among public and private entities in academia, business, and NGOs.  

Yet, very little attention has been paid to the need to balance the multiple interests in the region. The Israel-US unique nexus and the Israel-China track have been perceived as parallel, with limited points of intersection. However, this might have to change as the Trump Administration perceives China as a strategic threat and as China’s involvement in Israel expands to include Israeli strategic assets, such as its ports.

The growing calls from Washington and other parts of the international security community to reduce Israel’s dependence on China have been characterized as a zero-sum game. 

That said, recent experience shows that Israel can navigate this potential crisis well and should continue the constructive dialogue with both nations concurrently.

First, Israel is not the first nation to chart these waters and should learn from the experiences of others. The EU and its member states are facing similar dilemmas. When Mathias Dopfner, the CEO of influential media conglomerate Axel Springer, called for an economic and tech ‘de-coupling’ from China post-Covid19, many European politicians and business leaders criticized him for picking a side.

On a related note, various countries had to decide if and how to implement Chinese 5G technology, while the U.S. administration has been trying to prevent such adoption. 

Most countries found a middle ground by allowing Chinese 5G technology in certain parts of the market that are more secured. The British government, for one, announced at the beginning of 2020 that it would cap Huawei’s market share at 35% and exclude the vendor from sensitive locations. 

That decision was criticized by a Chinese PR campaign and is under review by the UK government for security reasons. While Chinese companies are currently excluded from Israel’s 5G technology push, a similar, more balanced approach, may be needed with respect to other aspects of Israel’s tech environment. 

Second, the Israeli government adopted a screening mechanism for foreign investments for national security purposes. Unlike the U.S., Canada and other nations, the Israeli mechanism has been kept secret with limited execution. The ramifications are significant. The lack of transparency creates uncertainty in the market, both in Israel and China, and imposes constraints on capital flows. It also gives the impression that Israel doesn’t do enough to consider security interests and US-Israel bilateral relations.

Israel needs to open the process, engage the private sector more closely, and develop a reporting mechanism which would give the process the credibility and legitimacy necessary for its success. 

Third, significant parts of the current Israel-US tension surrounding the ‘Chinese Question’ result from Trump’s specific take on trade and investment protectionist measures and the Chinese threat to U.S. allies. It is not unreasonable to think that some of these policies may change during a Biden Administration following the upcoming November 2020 elections. Many of the Israeli projects being criticized by the U.S. government are long-term and it would be prudent to re-assess them following the U.S. election season.

Fourth, several sectors in the Israeli market are lacking major U.S. participation, such as construction. The construction and renewables sectors have been dominated by European and Asian players in recent years. The U.S. government should do more to bring American players to Israel’s infrastructure space.

Fifth, as more military technologies globally are being used for civilian purposes and vice versa, there is a growing connection between ‘dual use’ export-control regime and screening of foreign investment for national security risks. The U.S. is going through a similar transition. Israel has a sophisticated export control mechanism but a very limited review process of foreign investors. Israel should bring these 2 regimes closer to each other. The tech industry has rejected the government’s review of tech investments, while embracing a careful approach to the export of sensitive technologies. 

The time for change has come.

Also, any review of Chinese commercial activity should be conducted via intra-disciplinary lenses, including diplomatic, commercial, and civic factors. Israel’s National Security Council (NSC), currently responsible to execute Israel-China strategy on this matter, has been historically lacking the resources and the capabilities to support such a review. 

Incidents like the military action against the Turkish flotilla in 2010 that reshaped Israel-Turkey relations emphasize the risk of over-reliance on security concerns. Empowering and strengthening the Israeli NSC should be part of the new Israel-US-China balancing act.

Finally, international trade has been shifting directions. Asian international trade, mostly from China, is now more than twice as big as America’s international trade. Israel cannot ignore the changing economic reality, and ‘de-coupling’ is less attractive in the Israeli unique economic context. 

Yet, Chinese bidders have lost major tenders in Israel lately, such as the world’s largest desalination plant and Ramat Hovav’s power plant. It reflects both Israel’s policy preferences as well as new commercial and financial constraints in China. But while Israel tends to think about the here and now, China has a very long-term view on global and local markets. 

Israel should show China that it knows how to address real security concerns while keeping the critical flow of inbound capital. 

Balancing US and Chinese interests in the region is not an impossible task and the benefits are compelling.

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Dr. Efraim Chalamish is an international economic law professor, advisor, and media commentator. He has been involved in international legal practice in New York, Paris and Israel, along with research in, and analysis of, cutting edge areas in public and private international economic law. Dr. Chalamish teaches at NYU Law School.

Annexation Would Undermine 70 Years of Israeli Foreign Policy

By Zachary Shapiro

As the July 1 annexation deadline looms, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a fateful opportunity to write his foreign policy legacy. Should he decide to annex even part of the West Bank, he will jeopardize his own foreign policy strategy—as well as over seven decades of the Israeli doctrine.

Despite the many variations in policy between successive prime ministers, Israeli foreign policy has consistently revolved around five overarching goals: normalization; pursuing or maintaining regional stability through cold peace with Jordan; improving Israel’s standing at the United Nations; sustaining strong alliances with Western powers; and finally, cultivating a strong and bipartisan strategic partnership with the United States. A decision to annex would undermine each of these objectives and do lasting damage to Israel overseas.

Israeli leaders have long sought normalized ties with various countries. Netanyahu has made marked progress in Israel’s quest for normalization in the Middle East. He has carefully cultivated ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Annexation in July would render Israel politically radioactive in the eyes of these new partners, halting and likely reversing Netanyahu and his predecessors’progress on this front. In a recent op-ed in Yedioth Aharonoth, Yousef Al-Otaiba, Emirati Ambassador to the United States,warned that “Israeli plans for annexation and talk of normalization are a contradiction.” He added that “Annexation will certainly and immediately upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and with the UAE.” Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Zayed tweeted a pointed rejection of annexation, calling it an “illegal move.” 

Applying sovereignty in the West Bank would similarly imperil the stability of Israel’s cold peace with Jordan. Israel sought a détente with Jordan for decades and has enjoyed the comforts of cold peace since 1994. Despite some challenging moments, Israel has maintained its relationship with the Hashemite Kingdom. Yet King Abdullah recently stated that “If Israel really annexed the West Bank in July, it would lead to a massive conflict” with Jordan.

All the while, annexation would set back Israel’s hard work at the United Nations by decades. In recent years, Israel’s emissaries to the UN have labored to narrow the margins of defeat on anti-Israel measures while cultivating quiet ties with unexpected partners. Outgoing Ambassador Danny Danon is proud of this recent trend in voting patterns and has touted it as one of his accomplishments. Applying sovereignty would all-but guarantee a rapid reversal of that shift, along with a litany of measures against Israel in various committees. 

Annexation would sabotage Israel’s longstanding interest in maintaining solid alliances with Western powers. Israeli ties with Germany and France in particular have been useful; both countries have sold crucial military equipment to Israel and been important trade partners. 

But the specter of annexation means Jerusalem can no longer count on Berlin or Paris. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas released a joint statement with Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh opposing Netanyahu’s possible plan. Adding insult to injury, a statement from the French Foreign Ministry cautioned that “This could not be without consequences for the European Union’s relations with Israel.”

Finally, a decision to apply sovereignty in the West Bank would create unprecedented instability with Israel’s most important partner, the United States. That relationship has withstood tumultuous moments under Democratic and Republican presidents alike. However, the bipartisan foundations of the relationship have shown cracks in recent years.  

Since the Obama administration’s pursuit of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, the relationship has become increasingly partisan. And the Trump administration has politicized its ties with Israel like no prior presidency. Coupled with anti-Israel trends within the Democratic Party, annexation could accelerate and strengthen these political forces. Multiple Democratic presidential candidates floated the possibility of conditioning aid to Israel—a paradigm shift away from decades of liberal policy. 

Prime Minister Netanyahu is a polarizing figure, but he clearly is a shrewd strategist. He has embraced all five of these strategic goals in his career. He has touted progress towards each as major achievements and has even used them in campaigns. He is clearly aware of the many drawbacks of annexation.  

Critics argue that annexation will unfold like U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Many pundits predicted major political consequences that never came to fruition. But annexation is more than a de jure recognition of a de facto reality. It is a statement about the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Ultimately, threatening any one of the five tenets of Israeli foreign policy on its own could be seen as a reasonable, calculated risk—even for a prime minister who is extremely risk-averse. Taken together, they amount to an overwhelming case against annexation. 

At its core, Netanyahu’s talk of annexation is political gamesmanship. That is a dangerous game for Israel to play, one that may jeopardize 72 years of Israeli strategy and tireless efforts by its diplomats.

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Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

VIDEO: SIX DAYS AND D-DAY - Roundtable With Senior Israeli, US And British Commanders

THE SIX DAY WAR: A PARADIGM FROM A PREVIOUS CENTURY

By Gershon Hacohen

Following the publication of the Trump peace plan, scores of retired senior members of Israel’s defense establishment campaigned in opposition to the application of Israeli sovereignty over areas that are vital to Israel's security in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley. 

They assert that Israel will retain its ability to defend itself even if it withdraws from most of the territories conquered during the Six Day War, believing that the IDF can replicate its 1967 achievements, on demand. 

Such perspectives reflect a blindness and obliviousness to the changes that have taken place over the course of several decades in the area of warfare - both in Israel, and generally. 

They overestimate the IDF's power and grossly underestimate the capabilities of Israel's enemies. 

The storied successes of the Six Day War resulted from unique military phenomena that nobody should reasonably expect to be repeated.

On both the Israeli Right and Left, Israel’s success continues to stir an expectation of a future ‘victory’ to which the IDF is unrealistically held.

Those former generals and commanders who took part in the 1967 conflict who still expect the IDF to achieve a victory similar to the one it did then fail to realize how fundamental the changes are between the 1967 battlefield and the theatre of today. 

The Six Day War was the last military clash that occurred along the patterns of the Second World War.   

The IDF operated against conventional, regular militaries that fought on the basis of British or Soviet doctrines, with full symmetry. That enabled Israel to achieve tactical and operational supremacy at every encounter. 

Mechanized combat in desert surroundings, or in the open settings of the Golan Heights, enabled the IDF to identify a clear advantage over its adversaries - despite the odds it faced. 

The lightning attack against the Jordanian Legion in Judea and Samaria followed similar patterns. Using a moderate number of armored and mechanized brigades, made up of conscripted and reserve forces and backed by outstanding air power, the State of Israel maximized the potency of a powerful military force, suited to the arenas in which it fought, drawn from a society of some two million citizens. 

The IDF's armored formations channeled the swift offensive tactic of the German blitzkrieg of the Second World War. In the open areas of Sinai and the Golan Heights, the IDF overcame its adversaries by using modern, mechanized combat. 

Since that time, Arab militaries have metamorphosized, something first demonstrated during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, under the direction of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Just a few years after The Six Day War, Arab militaries had adapted to a military process better suited to them. 

Anti-tank missiles were widely distributed among infantry units - and a dense air defense system based on surface-to-air missiles, combined to create a significant obstacle that blocked and impeded a swift IDF offensive; by air, or on land. 

These challenges and adaptations, designed to blunt the momentum of Israeli maneuvers, have only mutated and intensified since then. 

In the modern era, and particularly after the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah has played an important role in the overall conceptual upgrade undertaken by Israel's enemies. The creativity used by Hezbollah to design its operations, out of a cognizance of where it is inferior to the IDF, is a strong example of organizational adaptation, both at the tactical and the operational levels.

Hezbollah's unique system of organization was demonstrated in its force build-up and actions; something particularly visible in the realm of widespread, unprecedented rocket fire, and its use of dense defensive systems that are dug into bunkers. 

These rockets and bunkers were placed in villages, both above and below ground, and in mountainous terrain. Such diversity demonstrates their ability to exploit the environment in which it seeks to achieve its objectives, while reducing and even overcoming the IDF's areas of supremacy. 

Such thinking, adapted for the environment at play, has also been applied in the Gaza Strip since 2006. 

In the past three rounds of conflict between the IDF and Hamas, two core components - rocket fire and defensive strongholds - challenged the IDF and drew it into broad, multi-domain conflicts. 

Israel's adversaries have traded open terrain for urban battlefields. A tank brigade is now forced to adapt itself to warfare in built-up areas and to function as a combined force with the infantry and engineering units. But unlike in the open, an infantry battalion consisting of over 400 soldiers can be swallowed whole by a single street as it tries to cleanse it of combatants. That reality has dulled the IDF’s abilities. 

Additionally, as radical Islamic forces grow in numbers, so too does the fierce belief of Islamist fighters, who demonstrate a willingness and readiness to die for their cause; a reality with which we must contend in the modern battlefield.

None of these factors was at play during the Six Day War.

Each of these developments lead directly back to the heart of Israel’s domestic division over the application of sovereignty to the vital areas obtained during the Six Day War. 

Those who support the traditional two-state solution do so based upon a totally false assumption; namely that Israel will be able to defend itself, by itself despite a withdrawal to pre-1967 armistice lines, something they recommend albeit with minor adaptations, and despite the surrender of any strategic depth. 

Supporters of the two state solution evoke the victory of the Six Day War in order to support their position, while ignoring the massive changes that have occurred since then.

Expecting a victory similar to one Israel won in 1967 is akin to expecting a second parting of the Red Sea. 

The Six Day War configuration cannot be replicated, nor can the advantageous conditions enjoyed by the IDF in 1967. 

Those circumstances, and the crushing victories that resulted, belong in the previous century - as does the two state solution, for which too many commanders of the past continue to call!

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Major General Gershon Hacohen served as Commander of the Northern Corps of the IDF. He previously held various positions, including Commander of the IDF Colleges, Head of Training & Doctrine Division in the General Staff, Reserve Division Commander of the Northern Command and Commander of the 7th Brigade of the IDF Armor Division.

THE SIX DAY WAR: INFLECTION POINT FOR NATIONAL AND REGIONAL TRENDS

By Yair Golan

The Six Day War of 1967 was undoubtedly a great military victory. Israel's maneuvers were mostly successful, and while no war is perfect, most battles were well-fought and won; on the northern, eastern, and southern fronts. 

Tactically, at the command level – from the platoon and company level, to the division level, and beyond - were exemplary, as was Southern Command's handling of the Egyptian front. The war represented the height of the IDF's tactical success. 

Those tactical victories combined to form a strategic vector, marked by significant short and long-term ramifications for the State of Israel. 

In the short-term, the war led to the rise of a dangerous arrogance among the Israeli defense establishment, and a complacency that enabled Egypt and Syria to surprise Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 

The Six Day war led to the idea, among the military establishment and wider society, that Israel was invincible and to the trivialization of our adversaries. In the run-up to the 1973 war, Israeli leaders stated that there was no chance of another war breaking out. 

Israel paid a very heavy price for that complacency.

In the longer-term, the Six Day War represented a watershed moment for Israeli society. It went on to shape the entire political map; from that day to this. 

ISRAEL IN THE TERRITORIES

Our presence in the territories, which was originally intended to be short-term, and to serve as a strong bargaining chip, turned into a long-term occupation. In 1968, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol talked about returning the territories, once negotiations with Arab states ripened, but that day never came. 

Instead, in Israel, a messianic movement arose. It viewed the Six Day War as the continuation of a messianic process, one which began in the 1948 War of Independence.

For religious Zionists, this chain of seminal events represented an inevitable process of divine redemption. That led to large-scale settlement construction, beginning in Gush Etzion and Hebron, and spreading out from there. 

The Gush Emunim movement fueled this process further, and rightwing governments accelerated the construction. 

Our presence in these territories constitutes Israel’s greatest strategic challenge; above Iran, Hezbollah or Hamas. What is at stake is Israel's identity, and the ability of different components of our society to live together. 

Today, the political system is aligned along a deep fault line, created in 1967, between the pro-annexation camp and the camp that favors a separation from the Palestinians. 

The long-term impact of the Six Day War continues to confound Israeli opinion. On both sides of the fault line, whether one listens to those coming from the messianic bloc or the Israeli bloc that opposes annexation, one notes that both trace their roots and rationale back to the outcome of the war, pinning their logic upon the lessons they each draw from the same events. In simple terms, the Six Day War has directly shaped our contemporary, political reality. 

PALESTINIANS & PAN-ARABISM

For the Palestinians, the war demolished the hope that Arab states would come to the assistance of the Palestinian-Arabs, invade Israel, and turn back the clock. 

The war represents a breaking point in the Palestinian experience. It ended their trust in Arab states, birthing a new ethos of self-reliance. 

Prior to the Six Day War, Fatah was a small clique with limited resources, mostly relying upon Syrian support. After the Six Day War, it became the central Palestinian movement, and launched a series of terror attacks against Israel throughout the 1970s and 80s. 

The two intifadas that occurred in recent decades directly result from the Palestinian shift, toward a mindset of handling the conflict with Israel independently; one shocked into existence after the Six Day War.

In the Arab world, the war destroyed the Pan-Arab movement, which peaked under the leadership of Egyptian President Gammal Abdel Nasser. After the resounding defeat of 1967, and the death of Nasser in 1970, Pan-Arabism lost its influence in the Middle East. 

IMPACT ON THE IDF

Prior to 1967, the IDF enjoyed a healthy equilibrium among its air, land, and sea branches, and well-organized reconnaissance, artillery, and intelligence units. 

As a result, it fought well. 

That was undone after 1967. Based on the flawed conclusion that the tank is the most important element in the arsenal of victory, other sections of the ground forces – the infantry, artillery, and engineering – were allowed to erode.

As the IDF faced an entirely new kind of conflict – the War of Attrition launched by Arab states, with new forms of violent clashes, decision makers struggled to form clear objectives or to define what victory meant under the circumstances of attrition. 

Prior to the conflict, the IDF was almost constantly training. A mere eight companies was all it dedicated to continuous security missions. 

But following the conflict, the number of companies engaged in ongoing security and counter-insurgency missions grew to 66 by the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur war.

Constant training was a thing of the past.

The burden continuous security missions place upon the IDF is a negative consequence of the war. Lacking warfare training, the IDF's combat readiness has been eroded.

While continuous security missions do instill some operational capabilities, they are no replacement for training for actual war.

The situation following the Six Day War enabled Israel's enemies to support Palestinian terrorism and insurgency, rather than seeking to tackle Israel directly; a new phenomenon that took the IDF many years to internalize and adapt to. 

Despite two Palestinian uprisings and waves of terror attacks, the area of counter-insurgency still remains underdeveloped as a professional military field in the IDF. 

Given the likelihood that Israel’s future generations will also have to engage in counter-insurgency missions, our military must increase its professional knowledge of this area.

The legacy of the Six Day War and the military victory that it was, looms large today. Whether we categorize those as an asset or a liability in terms of Israel’s long term future, depends on how we affix policy in the territories today.

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Yair Golan is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute, a serving Member of Knesset and the immediate past Deputy Chief Of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces.

THE SIX DAY WAR: ISRAEL'S AIR FORCE SEIZES THE ADVANTAGE

By Avishai Levi

The Six Day War presents an exceptional case study of the Israeli Air Force’s ethos of military planning and preparation - something that resulted from the clear understanding that the country’s very existence rested - in no small part - upon the shoulders of its pilots, air crew and ground crews.

On land, tens of thousands of graves had been dug to be filled by the anticipated casualties of war. Our young nation felt like it was on the edge of the abyss, with powerful enemies rounding upon it in the form of several Arab militaries.

The sense throughout the defense establishment was that if Israel was to avoid what it perceived to be a looming second Holocaust, it must capitalize upon the first opportunity to push back the threats massing against it to the north and, much more forebodingly, to the south. Primary among those threats was the mighty Egyptian Air Force. 

A failure to preempt those dangers would have left us imperiled. 

It would rely upon intelligence gathering, doctrinal contrarianism, logistical daring, the exploitation of the mundane and communications discipline.

INTELLIGENCE

Israel acquired and deciphered detailed intelligence as it studied its enemies. As they built up their military forces and declared their intention to eliminate the Jewish state, Israel observed.  

In 1967, Arab militaries based much of their strategy and battle doctrine on Soviet concepts; a doctrine Israel closely studied. Combined with the ongoing intelligence effort, Israel came to receive rivers of information on the military capabilities of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan - both in the air and on land. 

As a result, we deduced the tactical and strategic calculations of enemy commanders, turning that information to our advantage. 

This was particularly true in the case of Nasser's Egypt; the leader of the Arab world. 

Compared to the air forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the IAF had to concede that it suffered from a massive shortage of planes. 

Because our forces were so scant, a strict prioritization of targets was required and priority number one was hitting the Egyptian Air Force - before it left the runway - in a daring mission known as Operation Moked. 

DOCTRINAL CONTRARIANISM 

Calibrated to a precision of seconds and meters, the strike required the dispatch of the maximum number of planes possible for a wave of attacks against the Egyptian Air Force; the first wave of which had to massively impede the Egyptian takeoff capabilities. 

If that first wave failed, Israel would have been exposed to painful aerial attacks at home. Israel’s need to incapacitate enemy aircraft meant very few planes were reserved for defense; far fewer than is endorsed by any known military defense doctrine. Israel went all in.

Every individual, from the mechanic to the pilot, knew their role - precisely. In most combat sorties, pilots typically learn of their destination just prior to take off. Every pilot in Operation Moked knew their precise location in the attack formation, and where they would be flying to, well in advance. 

LOGISTICAL DARING

The distance between Israel’s airfields and the more distant Egyptian Air Force bases made fuel efficiency a priority. Israel’s pilots had to practically drain their supplies in order to target Egypt’s Soviet supplied strategic bombers, which had the ability to reach Tel Aviv.  

Attack planes would need rapid turn around as well.

They had to land, rearm, refuel, and be airborne for the next wave, without delay, to avoid retaliatory air raids. 

The ground crew’s ability to rearm and repair aircraft had to be as rapid and efficient as possible. 

Because Israel needed the maximum number of planes possible for the purposes of the  bombings, while planning the mission, it logged the precise details of when enemy air forces conducted routine defense air patrols, and when those patrols changed over. It did so not with a view to downing those patrols, but to avoiding them and preventing dog fights, freeing up Israeli aircraft to concentrate on bombing stationery targets on the ground. After many months of surveillance, the IAF had a clear idea of the optimal time to strike.

EXPLOITING THE MUNDANE: RUSH-HOUR IN CAIRO

Even rush hour traffic in Cairo was exploited to Israel’s advantage. The first strike took place at the point when the Egyptian Chief of Staff and Air Force command officers left their homes bound for their offices. Israel thus maximized the length of time they would be in transition, without direct contact with their forces. 

Egyptian decision-making was effectively paralyzed, allowing additional time for the bombing waves to take place.

COMMUNICATIONS DISCIPLINE

On the morning of the attack, the IAF's flight school conducted training flights, creating a veil of normality for the watching Egyptians. 

To lull Egypt’s defense systems into a further sense of security, Israel’s June 5th air force radio transmissions were pre-recorded and transmitted over the airwaves as decoy communications for the consumption of Egyptian surveillance.

Radio silence was so strictly adhered to that Israeli air crews maintained absolute radio silence even as they conducted the initial bombing run.

In case of mid air malfunction, Israeli crews were instructed to leave their formations in silence, fly back to base at low altitude, and, if necessary, to eject. 

The attack squadrons flew toward Egypt at a sufficiently low altitude so as to evade Egyptian radar. 

Incredibly, every formation reached its target without a word being uttered over the radio. 

Israel’s planning, daring and clear understanding of the threats it faced resulted in the successful bombing raids it needed against Egypt, and set the stage for the remainder of the war and the lightning fast Israeli victory that ensued, one studied by militaries throughout the globe to this day. 

With Egypt firmly on the back foot, the IAF crippled the Syrian Air Force, and destroyed targets in Iraq after the Iraqis entered the fray. 

Those same attitudes and principles remain essential for victory in the modern era and will play a crucial role in combating enemies that threaten Israel today. 

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Brigadier General Avishai Levi served for 30 years in the Israeli Air Force (IAF), a career that culminated as the Head of Intelligence and Reconnaissance for the IAF from 2007-2010. It was during his tenure that the Israeli Air Force successfully detonated the Syrian nuclear reactor.

ISRAEL MUST PRIORITIZE AMERICA OVER CHINA

By Oded Gour-Lavie

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently made an unusual visit to Israel to warn against extending economic cooperation with China. Israel should not require such pressure in order to formulate an independent policy that is cautious of China, while at the same time, safely engages Beijing. 

The decision by the Israeli government to allow a Chinese state-owned company to build and operate a privately owned port in Haifa, constitutes a significant security issue. 

It represents a narrow, economics-based form of decision making, which conceded a strategic asset. 

A U.S. built port in Haifa, would have been far more preferable.  

It has also angered Israel's principal and most powerful ally, the United States, which will remain Israel's top ally, at least for the coming decades. Unlike China, the U.S.'s values closely match and mirror those of Israel.

Long-term strategic thinking should have been what did and what will inform the core considerations and decisions surrounding the granting of such contracts. Such considerations should trump economic incentives.

Israeli governments have a duty to consider every such contract first and foremost through the lens of geo-strategic considerations. Awaiting American pressure in order to do so is a mistake. 

Mike Pompeo's visit, alongside public statements by Chinese and American leaders, has caused some observers to wonder whether the U.S. and China are on a path to economic decoupling and a new escalation in their rivalry. 

In the current global order, with its complex economic systems and interdependency, a full decoupling is not an inevitability. Even prior to the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic, China and the U.S. were engaged in a global struggle over their economic interests and their international influence. The U.S.'s strategy includes regaining its lost manufacturing power, and getting China to pay for that shift to the extent that it can do so. 

The current conditions will very likely intensify this preexisting struggle. 

China has been steadily using its economic, regional development and diplomatic capabilities, to buy and take over industries in multiple locations; an approach that very much strengthens China's international trade infrastructure, economy, manufacturing, and ability to boost its GNP. 

Taking advantage of the Trump Administration's 'America First' approach, which has reduced American participation abroad and assistance to other countries, China has moved into vacuums and open spaces in order to increase its influence. 

That maneuver is natural and practical for a massive state that requires a growing quantity of supplies and capabilities. 

The U.S. may now seek to recruit countries to its struggle against China, a struggle which, until now, it was waging unilaterally. Israel's own role in this epic struggle is small. It must prioritize and protect the strategic anchor that is the alliance with Washington which is the highest strategic order for Jerusalem. 

China, with its technology and economic prowess, has been keen to invest in infrastructure projects in Israel, and to gain access to Israeli technology. Israel must always keep its finger on the pulse of such investments, keeping investment beating, but never garroting its vital strategic interests in the process. 

Allowing China to take control of Israel's 5G cellular network, for example, would mean ceding control of the information being relayed on the network to someone else. 

While it's true that networks can be hacked regardless of who built them, it is easier for a global power to control and bring down a network it built on its own.

Similarly, a highly strategic seaport should not be in the hands of a power that can quickly change its views on Israeli interests, and which lacks common values with Israel. 

Again, a U.S. built port in Haifa, would have been far more preferable. 

Ultimately, the time has come for Israel to minimize Chinese involvement in strategic infrastructure projects, as quickly as possible, and to decrease the amount of time that Israel is committed to pre-existing projects. 

Several papers produced by the Haifa Maritime Policy and Strategy center (HMS) have laid out the argument for such an approach.

The matter at hand is one to be played out delicately. 

On the one hand. Foreign investment on sensitive projects should be the preserve of the strongest of allies. When Israel purchases submarines from Germany, for example, it does so knowing that it can rely on the German government for parts in the hour of need. 

On the other hand, Significant caution must be applied to any suggested breaking of ties with China. Beijing is a highly significant power, with many advantages for those who engage with it. Those include production and manufacturing abilities, efficient implementation, economic investment opportunities, and a desire to work with Israel.

Those assets are not to be casually discarded. 

Diplomatically, Israel must also take care not to be dragged into anti-Chinese sentiments or statements. It need not take up a frontline position in the campaign against China, and it is not in a position that justifies or requires it taking on such a role. 

The struggle against China is not an Israeli one, but in the coming months, Israel must monitor the global U.S. – Chinese struggle while making its own decisions in accordance with its own strategic imperatives; something that inherently mandates China’s subjugation to America in the mindset of Israeli policy makers. 

A clear line on where and when to engage with China - or not - should be drawn at vulnerable, strategic sites. Vulnerability and strategy should serve as the guiding lighthouses for Israel’s future engagement with China, and Israel's relationship with America must remain the clearcut priority.

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Rear Admiral Oded Gour-Lavie (Ret.) is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. He concluded his career in 2014 as the Head of the IDF’s Legal & Strategic Policy Team. Prior to that, he served as Head of Naval Operations and was Commander of a submarine flotilla.

SIX DAYS & THE FOREVER WAR

By Frank Sobchak

This June marks the 53rd anniversary of Israel’s lightning victory in the 1967 Six Day War when the Israel Defense Forces defeated the combined militaries of several of its neighbors.  

Israel’s decisive military victory is often studied by the armed forces of other nations and many have applied its lessons in other conflicts. 

This year also marks eighteenth year of constant conflict for the U.S. in what was originally named the global war on terrorism. The juxtaposition of these two conflicts brings pause to military strategists and begs the question if Israel’s success in 1967 could ever be repeated, there or elsewhere.

In the U.S., children who were not born at the time of the 9/11attacks are now old enough to fight in the seemingly never ending conflict, an all too common situation amongst members of the military whose offspring are statistically more likely to follow in their parent’s footsteps.  

It is a situation that Israel is also familiar with, having seen the success of 1967 dissipate into a protracted conflict against amorphous terrorist groups, guerrillas, and extremist organizations after the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 

Pundits of all political persuasions in both countries have bemoaned this parallel development, arguing that such a perpetual “Forever War” threatens the fabric of democratic governments, erodes societal civil military relations, creates too many casualties to bear, and generates costs that destroy opportunities for future generations. Yet is this seemingly everlasting struggle as bad as they make out? 

It is important to note that I am not advocating that war is a good thing. I have lost friends, classmates, subordinates, and students to the unforgiving scythe of battle and wish that we all could live out the rest of our days in peace. But I also recognize their sacrifices have tamped down war’s natural tendencies to escalate and expand and that these seemingly endless conflicts have prevented much larger and much bloodier wars from developing. 

This is also not to say that both countries have always fought their conflicts intelligently. The Iraq War will probably go down in U.S. history as one of the worst foreign policy blunders in the history of the Republic. 

Yet although the prolonged fighting has been devastating at the individual and family level, we should recognize two facts. First, that the conflict both nations are engaged in is a war of ideas against nebulous transnational actors, a struggle that is not likely to be won decisively. 

Second, that the current era of conflict, by comparison to other time periods in history and other wars, is far less destructive than almost all the wars of the past.

One of the main reasons why we should not be deceived into assuming that either country could safely walk away from conflict without it boomeranging back is because we are in a war of ideas against a loosely aligned set of violent extremist organizations. 

The U.S. has fought ideologies before and won great victories: against slavery and white supremacy in the U.S. Civil War, Nazism and Fascism World War II, and Communism during the Cold War. 

Israel has had to fight the very notion that it should not be allowed to exist. 

Yet even in those conflicts, the core ideology of each group sadly persists today and we still have to fight neo-Nazis, white supremacists, anti-Semites, and other villainy. Destroying an ideology is nearly impossible, even after defeating it on the field of battle and discrediting its supporters.  

Furthermore, because we are fighting a networked non-state actor spread across the globe that hides amongst the population, rooting out their poisonous creed is much more difficult.  

In this struggle, there will be no surrender by our enemies under the guns of the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay.  Hamas, Hezballah, Al Qai’da, and ISIS will not be giving up anytime soon. To force those organizations to capitulate would require such horrors that we should thank providence that we are in a forever war rather than a traditional conflict. 

In World War II, the allies had to resort to firebombing cities and dropping atomic bombs to convince Germany and Japan to surrender, even though rationally there was no pathway to victory for either of those nations after mid-1944 (at the latest). Unfortunately, human beings will continue to fight, suffer, and die far past the point when they should logically give up.  

This point brings out a larger fact- that as horrible as the post 9/11 wars have been, they have been much less devastating than conventional wars. This is a truism of wars which have been called “low intensity conflicts” because casualties are often a fraction of what they are in larger struggles. 

American losses in more traditional forms of warfare include 405,000 killed in World War II, 58,000 in Vietnam, and 36,000 in Korea. Israel lost nearly 3,000 soldiers during the Yom Kippur War, and 1,000 during the Six Day War. By contrast, the two decade long “Global War on Terrorism” has claimed roughly 7,000 American combatants. 

By comparison, the U.S. lost roughly the same number of soldiers in one month during the battle of Iwo Jima, as it did during the Forever War. 

As painful as the losses were, Israel’s casualties amounted to under 100 soldiers killed during the 2014 invasion of Gaza and approximately 200 in all the conflicts with Lebanon and Hizbollah since the year 2000. 

Those losses occurred in the prevention of amorphous groups from coalescing into powerful nation states against which any campaign would be much bloodier. 

Warfare has changed, as noted by military theorists and scholars such as Rupert Smith, Martin Van Creveld, and Sean McFate. 

In this new paradigm, conflict is timeless, almost unending and the venue of fighting has shifted from a traditional battlefield to one where parties operate amongst civilian populations.  

Rather than deny that these changes have occurred, we should recognize and accept them for what they are. We must live in the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. And in that world, the best option might just be the military equivalent of “mowing the lawn” every few years. 

When fighting a virulent ideology, an outcome of a protracted conflict where we endure a never-ending drip of a handful of losses a year is still better than the alternative of facing off against a well-armed, industrialized, and tech-savvy nation state. 

In such a context, the Forever War is likely the best that we can hope for.  While it is hard to stomach, such a truism reinforces the ancient wisdom: Only the dead have seen the end of war.

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Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. Read full bio here.

Women Must Play an Equal Role in Israeli and Global Policymaking

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

For Israel and other countries to improve their response to national challenges, an increased presence of women in leadership positions is required.  

Many of Israel's political leaders are former generals, and while the Israel Defense Forces has recently realized the importance of integrating women, its effort to do so remains incomplete, despite the positive changes that have been made in a number of combat units. 

While they understandably attract the attention and faith of many voters, former generals are not necessarily the leaders that we need today in order to deal with the multitude of acute public-civilian problems that stand before us. In our political system, women constitute an unacceptably small percentage of Knesset Members. 

In March 2020, at the time of the national elections for the 23rd Knesset, a mere 5.5% of elected MK’s were women. The senior echelons of Israeli leadership are almost exclusively composed of men. The National Security Council, which is the official advisory body guiding the government's responses to the Coronavirus pandemic, does not include a single woman. 

The same was true of the experts committee established by the National Security Council, which at first included two female research assistants but no female experts. Only after a series of protest letters was sent by organizations and women, and a petition was submitted to the High Court of Israel, did the committee include a small number of female experts.    

A century ago, the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO) was established in Britain because the Zionist Congress had not incorporated women. Despite that effort, a look back over the last 100 years shows that little has changed. That realization should serve as a red flag and a call to action. Israel is filled with inspirational women, just as it has many inspirational men. The question remains as to why, time and again, we return to the default position of women being excluded.  

One of the answers lies in the socialization of society. Since our founding, Israel has been dominated by a militaristic worldview, necessarily so; but that has resulted in a near automatic tendency to push women to the sidelines. Despite the fact that Israel had a female prime minister relatively soon after its establishment, Golda Meir’s rise is reflective of an anomaly, not a trend.

As in many countries, exclusion is based on the false notion that only men can manage matters of state effectively. When I ran in the last round of elections in the Women's Voice party, I received criticism from the left, center, and right. All of them repeatedly asked why I was taking votes away from their cause. The notion that women's equality was a cause worthy of a voting constituency was one they automatically dismissed. The time has come to change that. That change must begin with women themselves. 

Women must first believe in their own abilities and capacity to contribute. We must operate with the understanding that achieving true equality is to the benefit everyone; men, women, society, the economy, the private sector, and many other sectors. Any field that has gender equality will be all the enriched by way of it.  

Israel’s National Women's Council For Civil Security, We Power, founded by Dr. Mazal Shaul, an organization of which I am proud to be a part, was established in response to the absence of female experts on the National Security Council. Its 150 members have created a unique strategic model for alternative ways of tackling challenges. 

The government's efforts to bring civilian life back to a functioning routine in the wake of COVID-19 has revealed many societal sub-stratas, including families that lack the computers needed to enable children to participate in remote learning. Decision makers overlooked that sub-strata. They correctly identified remote learning at the macro level but failed to cater to the need to find solutions for those who lack the resources at home.The education system is comprised mostly of women, who skillfully juggle their home and career demands. Their perspective and expertise are of the kind that could combine macro and micro aspects of remote learning participation when formulating government responses. 

Female leaders in the education system have found many creative solutions to enable children to return to schools and kindergartens. Combining a macro and micro approach, something embodied within women's perspectives, would have been of real assistance to the communications campaigns of the government as they sought to reach out to various strands of society during the pandemic response.

The Haredi community, for example, which is not online and does not watch television, did not always receive guidelines with sufficient time remaining for implementation. As a result, the government had to reconfigure the way in which it reached out to them, something that resulted in actual discord between the government and the ultra orthodox community and a perception of an even greater discord than was the reality among Israeli society, generally.

The same is true for the Israel’s Arab population, which struggled to buy food for Ramadan when stores were required to close early. These groups required a detail-oriented response, something at which women excel. Had more of us been at the heart of legislating, these scenarios would have been better managed.

The United Nations has called for women to make up 50 percent of international leadership by the year 2030. This is a welcome call, but alongside it, I would add my call for the establishment of an international women's leadership council. This body could address many crises around the world, offering much needed, new perspectives as they do so. 

Examples of successful female leadership are growing, but it’s only a beginning and must be built upon. They include the prime minister of New Zealand and Denmark and the former president of South Korea, but there is more to be done.A passing glance at Israel’s new governing coalition, less than a quarter of which are women, is sufficient proof of the fact that the path toward adequate female representation remains long, and that legislative initiatives and committees focused upon gender equality do not play a significant role in the complex coalition agreements. 

The establishment of an international council would go some way to promoting this change, and Israel would have many wonderful women that it could contribute to such an organization.

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Sharon Roffe Ofir is deputy Mayor of Kiriyat Tivon, in the Haifa region. She is in charge of government relations and gender equality and is a member of WCCS (Women's Council for Civil Security) strategy group.

APPLYING SOVEREIGNTY IS IN ISRAEL'S SECURITY INTEREST

By Amir Avivi

When assessing Israel’s core national security interests, applying Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley fits squarely within the list of Israeli needs.

Our nation, with its ancient past, must take an equally long view of it’s future, particularly given the many security challenges that likely await us in the near and more distant term.  

Israel must act to solidify its key needs in the fields of security, economy, and development and must not hesitate when doing so. 

In just fifty years from now our population is projected to exceed 20 million people. In order to thrive, not just survive, we must have a minimally defensible eastern border, located in the Jordan Valley, and it must retain control of the eastern mountain ridge.

Yitzhak Rabin, architect of the Oslo Accords, in the eponymous ‘Rabin parameters’ included full Israeli security control over Jewish cities in Judea and Samaria/the West Bank, and full freedom of maneuver for Israelis along the main roads of the area, within those parameters. He did so based on the need to protect the large Israeli communities of Judea and Samaria known today as the ‘Settlement blocs.’

But Israel's civilian presence in Judea and Samaria extends far beyond those blocs, and retaining control over those additional areas in perpetuity is a puzzle we finally have an opportunity to solve. 

The Trump peace plan, with its endorsement of the application of Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, accurately reflects the Rabin parameters. It also calls for a two-state solution, and a demilitarized Palestinian state, with Israeli security control over the entire area between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean sea, along with a permanent presence in the Jordan Valley. 

The surprising alignment between these two plans begets a moment in time not to be missed by Israel. The reasons to proceed with sovereignty go beyond the commonality of Rabin’s and Trump’s visions, however; in ways that ought to temper the panic and pessimism disseminated by those who portray Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley as a portent for catastrophe.  

The Trump peace plan was coordinated with Sunni states, Israel and the US Administration.

That coordination is the result of the Sunni view that an alliance with Israel is an existential imperative in their fight against Iran, something that is of far greater significance to them than the Palestinian-Arab cause.

Economically, the dependence of these states upon economic aid and ties to the U.S. render any frantic statements of what awaits following the application of sovereignty just that - statements.  

In particular, Jordan, despite its rhetoric, is unlikely to cancel its peace treaty with Israel. It is Israel and the U.S. that stabilize Jordan, not the other way around. There is no Jordanian interest in having a Palestinian military presence on their western border. 

The primary, essential distinction between the Trump plan and the Rabin parameters is one that ought to be welcomed; the demand for the Palestinians to meet their responsibilities, come to the negotiating table and fashion a way forward.

Some, particularly on the Israeli Left, who are concerned about the potential for a deterioration in our security situation if sovereignty is applied, endorse ideas that are counter-strategic. They advocate for short-term arrangements for an Israeli presence on the Jordan Valley and in Judea and Samaria, to be assessed and reassessed in increments of ten to fifteen years.  

But the question of what happens beyond that timeframe will have to be revisited, regularly and often. If we wait, the opportunity to apply sovereignty may no longer enjoy the backing of the world’s only superpower.

Neither a spike in Palestinian violence, nor rocket fire from Hamas, nor a rupture in Israel’s relationship with Jordan – nor a combination of all three; all of which are held up as reasons not to apply sovereignty, should deter us from advancing our vital interests.   

A cursory glance at our history helps to outline the importance of pursuing such interests.

In 1948, Israel concluded the War of Independence with extended control over territory that expanded beyond the areas given to it by the UN partition plan, including approximately half of the Sinai Peninsula. 

Significant pressure, emanating from the U.S. and Russia, was applied to Israel to withdraw. David Ben Gurion, Israel’s Prime Minister at the time and a master strategist, was prepared to return the land captured in the Sinai, but was unwilling to do so with regard to any other area of land. 

Ben Gurion, leader of what was then a small, young and relatively weak country, stood firm in the face of pressure from the world's superpowers, prioritizing strategy over tactics as he did so.  

Today’s Israel is incomparably more powerful than it was during those founding years.

The scare tactics employed to decry the virtue of applying sovereignty ought to be recognized as the hollow cat-calls that they are. Such pessimistic tales of woe were employed in advance of the U.S. recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights and Washington’s relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem. Those predictions failed to materialize, however.  

The region did not catch fire. Those who thought it would, or who fear that it will if Israel applies sovereignty, fail to realize that the region has changed beyond recognition. 

The Palestinian public in Judea and Samaria, for its part, has demonstrated that it is primarily interested in its economic wellbeing. Not only has the Palestinian-Arab street shown little appetite to return to the days of the Second Intifada, if it did, Israel's security control renders it almost impossible for a full-scale uprising to erupt. 

Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley should be applied, swiftly - the stars are finally aligned for Israel to not only affix its eastern border, but to cement a secure future for itself. 

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Brigadier General Amir Avivi concluded his service as the Head of the Auditing and Consulting Department of the Israeli Defense Establishment, (including the Israel Defense Force, the Ministry of Defense and Israeli Military Industries).

NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT IS A DELICATE MISSION

By Benjamin Anthony, Richard Kemp, & Cade Spivey

Following the brutal killing of George Floyd, demonstrations and peaceful protests have taken place throughout the United States in a legitimate expression of deep grievances and suffering felt by members of Black America and those who stand in solidarity with their cause.

Separate to those, gangs of violent, thuggish, rioting looters and agitators are now engaged in a rash of dangerous, criminal behavior spreading throughout America.

As a result, the security role of the National Guard, originally confined during the COVID-19 era to "support for warehouse and commodity management and distribution," "conducting logistics missions in support of the state response at warehouse locations," and "advising and assisting, logistics, transportation, traffic control…" is now very likely to become vital, central, and extremely complex, deployed as they will be to not only disperse those gangs, but also to protect the business owners and homeowners threatened by these violent mobs.

As veterans of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the United States Navy (USN) and the British Army, respectively, we are well aware of the complexities regarding the implementation of the use of force for the sake of crowd control, across a range of missions; from dispersal, to anti-terror measures. 

We understand the complexities of a military deploying and operating among and alongside a host nation's citizenry against threats emanating from non-citizens. While conducting those operations, we found that the greatest asset to hand was a population of willing supporters – people that saw us not as occupiers or tyrants, but as colleagues, partners, and even family.

Those operations were not nearly as complex or as fraught an undertaking as the deployment of what is essentially a military, to restrain its own citizenry. The British Army conducted such operations in Northern Ireland beginning in the late 1960s and their actions are still being fought out in the courts half a century later.

Yet that very task could soon become the priority of the Guard.

Mission: Delicate!

Boundaries between residential areas and districts are non-existent. If the looting and violence continues, these riots are liable to spread to municipalities, towns and villages upstream from where they are currently taking place. Absent territorial enforcement, there is little reason to expect a slowing of the geographical spread of these events.

In a polarized America, uniformed law enforcement has often proven to be an incendiary presence; the very touch paper needed to ignite a storm of civil unrest, even as it comes in service of the citizenry. In the wake of the horrific videos of a uniformed officer denying the circulation of blood and oxygen to the brain of a detained, handcuffed, black American, members of that community will be further incensed by the increased appearance of uniformed personnel; whether that uniform is one worn by the police or a guardsman, in the event that the National Guard is deployed.

If the Guard is charged with restricting the movement of populations between areas, or dispersing those who seek to assemble, both of which are essentially law enforcement roles, the means of enforcement are inherently problematic.

Firstly, the use of non-lethal methods results in unintended lethal outcomes across a long enough timeline. Asphyxiation, a rubber bullet that impacts upon the temple instead of the leg or abdomen, a rushing crowd that tramples an individual to death; all of these realities exist.

Secondly, and of even greater concern, is what can occur if the restricted population senses that those sent as enforcers are unwilling to carry out their task because of concern over the aforementioned outcomes. Examples of such a dynamic are already taking place in Minneapolis, where police recently fled the scene of a riot.

Thirdly, the National Guard’s raison d’être is not policing a domestic populace. Striking the requisite balance of security enforcement and engagement with the citizenry will be a tremendous challenge, undertaken beneath an intensive media glare.

Sustained, district-wide riots and mob violence could serve as the gasoline poured onto the domestic fire currently fueled by the combination of coronavirus pandemic, political division, and socioeconomic inequality.

Upping the ante here is the fact that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of young Americans, particularly men aged 18-35, are currently out of work, unengaged, restless and have little to no commitments preventing them from joining these riots. The added financial insecurity attendant the shelter in place orders that are still in effect, not only serve to further stir the impulse to steal and to loot - which is nonetheless unacceptable - but also increases the availability of bodies for the purpose of protest and, in turn, the number of individuals who can potentially cause, and be the victims of, harm; something that will reignite a cycle of violence and further rioting with each passing incident.

The unrest that could occur in the coming days and weeks may well be met with a police and National Guard presence that most Americans have never seen before. The societal tensions in the U.S. could well be exacerbated by an increased domestic military/law enforcement presence and the headlines that emanate from the scene will make for troubling viewing.

A tear gas canister fired toward a crowd for the sake of dispersal in order to avoid death does not constitute a headline. A child trampled during the course of that dispersal, very much does. Such can be the unintended outcome of massive guard deployment at this time.

And yet, without the safety provided by the Guard the anarchy and violence that could occur in their absence would surely make for even more troubling images, headlines, videos, tweets and posts. 

In order to succeed, it is essential that the Guard and the American citizenry receive strong, moral and clear leadership from elected officials and community leaders at the local, state and federal levels throughout their deployment.

As they are sent forward to confront this coming crisis, the National Guard may become the savior America needs, even if not the one she wants. Their task is not a simple one.

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Richard Kemp, former Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan, was a member of the UK’s national crisis management committee, COBRA, and commanded British troops in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, often working alongside US forces. He completed eight tours of duty in Northern Ireland dealing with riot control, counter-terrorism and intelligence.

Benjamin Anthony is an IDF veteran and the co-founder & CEO of The MirYam Institute. He served in the Second Lebanon War, 2006, Operation Pillar of Defense, 2012, Operation Protective Edge, 2014. He has served in Judea and Samaria / The West Bank and along Israel’s northern border.

Cade Spivey is a publishing Adjunct at The MirYam Institute. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and served three tours in the Navy as a Gunnery/Antiterrorism Officer, Damage Control Assistant, and Counter-Piracy Evaluator. He is currently a student at the Wake Forest University School of Law.

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IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, FACTS ON THE GROUND ARE WHAT WE NEED, NOT ANNEXATION

By Pinhas Avivi

The Jordan Valley must be Israel's eastern border; yet the question remains how best to achieve that outcome.

Momentum is growing for an Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and areas of Judea and Samaria. However, the fact that the Netanyahu government has, for more than ten years, refrained from taking that step at the practical level suggests that the potential consequences of annexation are significant.

Most Israelis, from Left to Right, believe that there are some places in the territories that must remain under Israeli control. But many are opposed to the idea of Israel becoming a binational Jewish–Palestinian state. The majority of Israelis, whether on the Right, Left, or Center, do not wish to see all of the residents of the West Bank become Israeli citizens, therefore. 

This consensus attitude views ongoing Israeli control of the Jordan Valley as critical. The dramatic changes that have swept the Middle East; including the revolutions in Arab states, the rise of radical Islam, and the danger posed by Iran's regional conduct, have forged the consensus that the Jordan Valley must be Israel's eastern border. 

But that is where the agreement ends. The manner in which Israel should secure the Jordan Valley is in dispute within Israel, as is the fate of other areas of the West Bank. 

Case studies around the world, as well as Israel's own experience, show that in order to control territory, a state must firstly have a firm civilian presence embedded therein. 

In the previous century, Chile conquered a northern area previously controlled by Peru and Bolivia. To this day, Chilean control of the area remains disputed. Yet Chile created facts on the ground within that territory, and today, no one expects it to relinquish control.  

Closer to home, no one, on the Right or Left of the political spectrum, thinks the major settlement blocs can be transferred over to a future Palestinian state for the same reason – facts on the ground preclude that from happening; specifically, communities of significant size. Whether Israel annexes these blocs or not, it exercises control over them in a de facto manner.

Israel has not created the same type of de facto reality in the Jordan Valley, despite the existence of opportunities to do so. Developments could include a new, central, north-south highway that runs parallel to Route 6, and which would connect Jerusalem to the Golan Heights. That highway would promote industry in the Jordan Valley, potentially in cooperation with Jordan. A far broader Israeli agricultural presence is also badly needed in the Jordan Valley and should be developed. 

Those are the efforts that should be undertaken and they are of significantly greater importance than the pursuit of de jure annexation measures. 

In addition, negative ramifications resulting from annexation cannot be ignored. Jordan relinquished its designs for the West Bank in favor of establishing a Palestinian state there, because it has a core, existential interest in preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state in its own territory, which would endanger its very existence. As a result, any de jure annexation steps would alarm the Hashemite Kingdom. Israel's has thus far avoided annexation, in part because it understands that problem. 

Meanwhile, Israel has made major progress developing strategic ties with regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. These Arab states develop such ties, not only because it helps them form a defensive wall against Iranian aggression, but also because the Palestinian issue is not a live discussion at this time. Annexation would change all of that, and place the Palestinian issue firmly back in the spotlight. Returning it to prominence is not an Israeli interest. 

As soon as de jure annexation is initiated, sleeping bears will stir. It would practically force the Gulf states to take up a position that will not be a sympathetic to Israel. 

As a result, Israeli interests would be served far more effectively by de facto development of the Jordan Valley, through the growth of communities, infrastructure, industry, and agriculture, rather than Knesset decisions on annexation. 

In the meantime, signs are growing that the Trump Administration is changing its tune regarding the prospect of a broad annexation. The voices coming out of Washington on the matter are divergent from those originally heard. 

Israelis who insist upon seizing this historic moment for annexation point out that Iran is of greater concern to Arab states than the Palestinian issue. They argue that the world is preoccupied with dealing with the Coronavirus crisis. Both points are valid points – but annexation remains likely to renew opposition to Israel, both in the region and beyond. 

None of this is to say that Israel should be passive in shaping its borders. The option of de facto steps on the ground is available, essential - and preferable. 

Even on the Israeli Right, most prefer to avoid a situation that would drag Israel into a binational reality. Annexation opens the door to that. Caution is vital. The Palestinian Authority may not survive a large-scale annexation, and that would leave Israel in charge of directly running the affairs of 2.5 million West Bank Palestinians, creating a de facto binational reality. Israel needs to avoid that path. 

The dormant status of the Palestinian issue is to Israel’s benefit - a situation that should be preserved. De jure Annexation could spark a new intifada, or foment a situation where Turkey is able to challenge and decry the improving state of Arab links with the state of Israel.  

To promote Israel's long-term interests, the facts on the ground are what matter. De jure annexation now could undercut the progress made by such facts - needlessly so. 

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

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Is love for the people of Israel sufficient to overcome hatred of the state of Israel?

By Grant Newman

All of Christendom fasted this year on Good Friday for relief from the Coronavirus, and Providence responded with an Israeli research institute based in Galilee that is working on a vaccine for the virus and with the release of the third season of “Fauda” on Netflix.  And Christians once again found salvation in Israel.

The Recent Increase in Anti-Semitism.

Alas, not all communities are similarly philo-Semitic.  Indeed, the past six months have seen a spike in anti-Semitism in the New York Metro Area.  In early December 2019, two members of the Black Hebrew Israelites murdered a police officer before entering a kosher delicatessen in Jersey City and killing five patrons.  There is reason to believe that their initial target was actually the Yeshiva next door.  In late December 2019, a man entered a rabbi’s home in Monsey, New Jersey, and began stabbing people gathered for Hanukkah celebrations.  These two events took place amidst a broader uptick in anti-Semitic attacks in Brooklyn.  Most notably was an incident where a woman assaulted three Jewish women while spewing anti-Semitic slurs.  Because of recent reforms to the criminal justice system in New York, the woman was released from police custody without bail, whereupon she immediately proceeded to assault another woman.

A chilling aspect of these attacks is the response of neighboring communities.  Rather than condemn the attackers, local residents instead cited reasons why an individual might be understandably angered unto violence against the local Jewish community and expressed sentiments that have been common whenever anti-Semitism has been en vogue throughout history.

New York City’s municipal government has been anything but philo-Semitic.  In late April 2020, after learning that Orthodox Jews had gathered in Brooklyn at a rabbi’s funeral, Mayor Bill De Blasio publicly threatened the Jewish community with arrests for violating social distancing guidelines.  During New York’s darkest hour, De Blasio identified a scapegoat and characterized the entire Jewish community as lawbreakers who are unconcerned with public health, as though the Jewish community alone — and not De Blasio’s own failed leadership — should be blamed for New York’s prolonged Coronavirus pandemic.  As Ronald Lauder, the president of the World Jewish Congress, noted, “Every time a leader like [De Blasio] stereotypes the ‘Jewish community,’ he feeds into the dangerous agenda of white supremacists and anti-Semites around the world.”

The Need for Philo-Semitism.

It is on this background that Robert Nicholson and Rabbi Meir Y. Soloveichik introduced the need for philo-Semitism.  According to Nicholson, anti-Semitism grows from a resentment of “chosennes” — resentment that G-d chose the nation of Israel to play a special role in history.  Anti-Semitism “turns Jewish chosenness on its head and assigns to the people of Israel responsibility for all the world’s ills.”  Nicholson suggests that calling out anti-Semitism is not enough and posits that the best response to anti-Semitism isn’t anti-anti-Semitism, but rather philo-Semitism — or love of the Jewish people.  Rabbi Soloveichick cites the welcoming of public displays of the menorah and other public celebrations of Jewish chosenness as examples of philo-Semitism among gentiles in America.  Surely philo-Semitism, including acknowledgement of the contribution that the Jewish community and its members make to society, can do much to change the hearts and minds of local residents who might otherwise harbor anti-Semitic animosity.

The Limits of Philo-Semitism.

However, regardless of its capacity to do good at a local level, it is unlikely that philo-Semitism is sufficient to reverse institutionalized anti-Semitism at a global level.  Commenting on the difficulty of changing a global institution with anti-Semitic tendencies, John Podhoretz recently said of the United Nations, “I am skeptical that you can fix what’s broken in an endemically anti-Semitic institution simply by dint of the fact that it is endemically anti-Semitic and therefore in its DNA has a conspiratorial and conspiracist worldview that will distort every decision that the institution makes.”

Examples of institutionalized hatred towards Israel abound.  For instance, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is a founding legal instrument of the African Union, includes as an organizing principle the elimination of “colonialism, neo-colonialism, apartheid, [and] zionism.”  That a founding document of a political union encompassing 1.2 billion people includes zionism as an existential threat against which the union and its subjects must organize their resources suggests the extent to which hatred of Israel has become normalized in global institutions.  Anti-Semitism has become yet another piece of furniture in the moral universe of international governing bodies.

Furthermore, just as a general must tailor an army’s attack to match the enemy’s defense, so too the methods used to eradicate anti-Semitism must be tailored so as to effectively combat anti-Semitism in the places where anti-Semitism lives.  The case of the African Charter indicates that anti-Semitism lives not just in the hearts and minds of anti-Semites, but also in the founding documents of global organizations.  Thus, displaying a menorah in an American neighborhood and otherwise promoting philo-Semitism, while undoubtedly having a positive impact in that neighborhood, will probably do little to remove hatred of Israel from the founding documents of global institutions.  As such, purging anti-Semitism from these institutions will require instruments that have a legal effect that is at least as legally binding as the instruments used to institutionalize anti-Semitism in the first place.

Still another example of institutionalized hatred can be seen in the response of the BDS movement to news that Israel is developing a vaccine for the Coronavirus.  According to Omar Barghouti, cooperating with Israel to fight Coronavirus does not constitute a normalization of Israeli evil and therefore one may take advantage of a future Israeli vaccine without violating tenets of the BDS movement.  But at no point does Barghouti express gratitude towards Israel for working to develop a vaccine.  In other words, the development of a vaccine is neither a normalization event nor a reason to shed even the smallest amount of anti-Semitism.  Creating a vaccine to save the world from the worst health pandemic since the bubonic plague is perhaps the most tangible and irrefutable philo-Semitic argument one could ever hope to make, and yet even the production of this life-saving nectar is not enough to cure certain institutions of their institutionalized anti-Semitism.

Anti-Semitism must be attacked at both the local and international levels, and philo-Semitism should play an important role in a broader strategy to do so.  However, if implemented on its own, it is unlikely that philo-Semitism will be enough to effectively fight anti-Semitism at international levels, especially where such anti-Semitism is legally institutionalized.

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Grant Newman graduated from Harvard Law School where he was an executive editor of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. Grant was the recipient of the Federalist Society’s James Madison Award in 2019, and was active in the Alliance for Israel. Prior to law school, Grant graduated from Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, with a degree in Business Strategy. He worked for several years at a major university in Moscow, Russia, and spent two years in Siberia dedicated to church service.