RIGHT OF REPLY: ISRAEL'S ECONOMY IN THE COVID-19 ERA: AN UPDATE

By Itai Ater

I listened with interest to the MirYam Institute Podcast discussion between Pinchas Landau and Allan Marks on July 31st, regarding Israel's Economy in the Covid-19 era. I want to briefly touch upon two points that were raised in the conversation, and then discuss a third point that was mentioned but perhaps did not receive enough attention. 

1. Mr. Landau asserts that the current 15-20% unemployment rates are first and foremost NOT a macro-economic problem. He explains that many of the newly unemployed are young, low income and unskilled individuals and that the impact of these unemployed individuals on the Economy is not significant, therefore. 

I disagree. 

The underlying goals of economic policy is the well-being of all individuals in the Economy. If a non-trivial share of individuals in the economy is unemployed then the Economy is facing a huge economic problem, both at the micro and the macro level. This is true irrespective of the education, age and skills of those unemployed. If anything, having many unskilled individuals unemployed implies that the recovery period from the current crisis may be more protracted given that these individuals will find it increasingly difficult to find jobs elsewhere. 

Furthermore, due to the rise in unemployment, income inequality can be expected to increase, yielding further negative ramifications on the Economy. 

The unprecedented rise in unemployment is clearly, first and foremost an economic problem, therefore.

2. The conversation discussed in length the Israeli balance of payments, which for various reasons improved in recent months. Macroeconomic indicators (e.g., GDP, balance of payments, inflation) are not important in their own right. They become important when they tell us something about the performance of the Economy overall. 

Unfortunately, the balance of payments indicator is probably the only macroeconomic indicator that looks somewhat positive at this time. Other indicators (such as unemployment which was discussed above) provide a different perspective.  For instance, the Bank of Israel estimates that GDP in Israel will fall by 6% in 2020.  Private consumption, the main driver of economic growth in Israel in recent years, has fallen dramatically (per-capita private consumption dropped by 22.2% in the first quarter of 2020). Finally, the government deficit is expected to be at 13% by the end 2021. That large deficit is driven by increased government spending and a drop in government income due to lower tax collections. 

The implications of the current crisis are far-reaching. First, unemployment rates are expected to remain high for the next 4-5 years. Second, the government will need to fund its debt through higher taxes and lower government spending on education, welfare and infrastructure projects. While it’s possible that not all measures will be adopted in the immediate to near term, in the world of economics there's no such thing as a free lunch. Someone (the Israeli public) will end up footing the bill for the vast (probably warranted, given the situation) government spending. 

3. Many of the adverse implications of Covid-19 are common to many countries. Yet, unfortunately, the Israeli case is further complicated by a dysfunctional government. 

Reflecting this leadership crisis is the current disagreement regarding the government budget, and whether the newly formed coalition will pass a budget before August 25th. 

Absent a budget by that August date, elections will be triggered automatically, announced and held this coming November. Despite contrary opinions held by nearly all economists - including the Governor of the Bank of Israel - Prime Minister Netanyahu is advocating for a short-term budget for the coming 3 months. Deputy Prime Minister Gantz is seeking a budget that takes us through 2021.   

A failure to resolve the budget impasse could well result in the international credit agencies (Moody's, Fitch and S&P) lowering the credit rating of the Israeli government, leading to higher interest rates having to be paid by the Israeli government.  

Perhaps even more troubling than looking at a particular macroeconomic indicator is the notion that - unlike the large economic crises that Israel faced in 1985 and 2001-2002 – in this particular scenario, the politicians running the Israeli government, and specifically the current Prime Minister, are distracted by other political considerations - considerations that prevent them from fully focusing on the very real challenge at and helping the economy exit its current state of crisis, bringing it to recovery and - hopefully - prosperity.   

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Itai Ater is a Professor of Business Economics and Strategy at the Coller School of Management at Tel Aviv University. Itai, born and raised in southern Israel, served as an officer in the IDF's 8200 unit.

VIDEO: WILL THE GOVERNING COALITION LAST?

A Conversation With Former MK, Nachman Shai

VIDEO: ISRAEL'S ECONOMY IN THE COVID-19 ERA: AN UPDATE

Pinchas Landau & Allan Marks Provide An Economic Update

VIDEO: IAF ANALYSIS OF SECOND LEBANON WAR

The Israel Air Force's Role In Lebanon Two

NO PANDEMIC CAN STOP OUR POLITICAL CRISIS

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

Only a coronavirus-sized global pandemic could break Israel's political paralysis - but not for long. 

Just a few months after the formation of the government, political feuding and paralysis is back, yielding to nobody and nothing, including the coronavirus crisis, potentially bringing us to the cusp of national elections – once again – within a year. 

One of the clearest signs of this new phase is the escalating political battle between Prime Minister Netanyahu and Alternate Prime Minister Gantz. The number of issues on which they clash only continues to grow. 

Netanyahu is insisting upon an annual budget, due to rapidly changing conditions. Gantz, meanwhile, seeks a bi-annual state budget, saying it will provide greater stability. 

The budget argument is also governed by the political interests of either side. Netanyahu wants short-term political arrangements, which would allow him to dismantle the government if he feels the need to do so. Gantz, on the other hand, wants to safeguard his position as future prime minister, in line with the coalition deal. The absence of a budget would serve Netanyahu’s goals and undercut those of Gantz because it would amount to a pretext for the dissolving of the coalition.  

Coalition agreements have also been violated. The first of which was carried out by the Blue and White Party, which voted in favor of a law banning 'conversion therapy' for gays and lesbians, something that could push the seat of prime minister even further from Gantz's reach. 

For many of Gantz's initial supporters, recent months have been a resounding disappointment. One would expect that a politician for whom an entire role was invented - that of alternative prime minister - would work day and night to prove himself, and generate new, creative ideas, in order to justify his position. 

He has failed to do so. His decision making is extremely slow. Off the record, some of his associates have been increasingly critical of his drawn out demeanor. Instead of being at the forefront of responses to Israel's multiple crises, he often appears to be absent. 

While many of his voters remain disgruntled by his violation of his pledge not to form a government with Netanyahu, Gantz could have redeemed himself in the eyes of those voters if his commendable step toward national unity in the face of an emergency had been followed with a demonstration of leadership. 

Unfortunately for Gantz, that is not what has happened. His spokespeople often release anemic media messages expressing how difficult the situation is, but leadership, not commentary, is what is needed from him. 

As a result, in a political reality divided firmly between pro and anti-Netanyahu camps, with no middle ground, Gantz’s Blue and White party has plummeted in the polls to a mere nine mandates, making it difficult to imagine how he can assume the position of prime minister next year. 

Gantz has been careful not to aggravate Netanyahu or to break new political ground. The result is that he is now politically paralyzed. 

Even in his role as defense minister, a position from which he could demonstrate leadership and experience, he is subsumed by Netanyahu, seemingly of his own will, leaving the Israeli people wondering why he seems so absent - even in what is a flagship role in Israel. 

LEADERSHIP TO EMULATE

Yair Lapid, leader of Yesh Atid and chairman of the opposition, is filling the void of alternative leadership created by Gantz. Lapid, now polling at 16 seats – a leap forward for him, is capitalizing upon his role as opposition chief. Gantz would do well to emulate that example.

Lapid has already launched his 2021 election campaign, and is gaining the support of voters disappointed in Gantz. 

This month witnessed another example of leadership, one that promoted gender equality in the political system. Three women, from three different political parties, who sit on the Coronavirus Knesset Committee, cancelled a government decision. 

The Committee Chairwoman, Yifat Shasha Biton (Likud), Yulia Malinkovski (Yisrael Beitenu) and Hila Shay Vazan (Blue and White) boldly challenged the government's desire to shutter public pools and gyms and to close down beaches on weekends, citing the lack of data supporting the idea that such places are transmission hubs and that during the pandemic, allowing people to be active in such places creates an outlet for mental wellbeing. 

Their ability to band together and challenge the government is an example of how to prioritize the needs of our citizens; above and beyond our coalition politics. The contrast between their conduct and the conduct of Gantz could not be more stark. 

Shasha-Biton made her decision knowing that the punishment ultimately doled out to her from the Likud for her “rebellion” was in the offing, but she acted nonetheless. Ultimately, she was removed from her post as a result.

Gantz seems to be steered primarily by what best ensures the safety of his political seat. 

Despite the ongoing, severe challenges posed by the pandemic, a return to political crisis is in full swing in Israel. 

The possibility of yet another round of elections is back on the agenda.

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Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel.

Questions for Peace Proponents Overseas

BY Benjamin Anthony

Peter Beinart is the latest non-Israeli to prescribe what Israel must do to resolve its conflict with the Palestinians. Beware this prophet. A former, impassioned advocate of the two-state solution, he now calls for the establishment of “a Jewish home that is not a Jewish state” in a single entity he calls “Israel-Palestine”; effectively, a one-state solution.

Beinart’s  proposal, printed in The New York Times, is symptomatic of an U.S. political pendulum whose direction is unfavorable to the state of Israel and whose momentum is generated in significant part by strands of vocal, Diaspora Jews.

Israel must challenge him and those like him.

Below are six questions for overseas proponents of the two-state and one-state solutions to the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

Is the policy you propose implementable?

When advocating for the two-state solution, could you open a map of the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and demonstrate how a contiguous state for the Palestinian Arabs — incorporating Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip — could be established without breaching the contiguity of northern and southern Israel?

Is there evidence that concessions of Israeli land and security control will yield peace for Israel?

Since withdrawing from Gaza in 2005, Israelis have fallen prey to thousands of rockets launched from the territory vacated. More than two-thirds of the state of Israel is within range of rocket attacks from Gaza. Does that reality inspire confidence in further concessions of land or security control?

Are the majority of Israelis prepared to divide our capital city?

The people of Israel always yearned to return to Jerusalem. For millions of Israelis, Jerusalem is the heart of our existence. Thus, we believe that carving up that heart would destroy, not preserve, the broader Israeli organism. No Israeli prime minister has successfully negotiated the partitioning of Jerusalem since its reunification. Israelis are not in the business of partitioning the holy city.

If a given solution fails, will those who championed it be willing to live with the consequences of that failure?

Since Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, three defensive operations have been launched by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in response to acts of terror from the strip. Such operations required, among others, the repeated, mass mobilization of the IDF reservists. These citizen soldiers are our fathers and our mothers, our doctors, professors, lawyers and innovators. Some of these citizen soldiers are killed. Anyone unwilling to accept such risks for themselves has no right to ask Israelis to do so.

If a given solution fails, will those who championed it be willing to have their own children face the consequences of that failure?

Most of Israel’s defenders are ages 18 to 21. In wartime, they can see the towns they defend from the forward lines of the battlefield. The IDF’s last four major, cross-border operations resulted from the land for peace formula and the relinquishing of Israeli security control. In each case, our teenage defenders were protecting a society whose children have grown up under rocket fire. Are overseas peace proponents so confident in their suggestions that they would be willing to stake the lives of their own children on its outcome?

Why do people overseas believe Israelis require any pressure whatsoever in order to fashion a peaceful way forward for ourselves and our loved ones?

The Israeli debate as to how we ensure a life of peace is alive and intense. It is Israel’s to have. Overseas pressure is not required for us to recognize the urgency of peace-making. We have made peace with enemies before. We seek to do so again. We have not, and do not, seek to do so along parameters that would imperil our very existence.

If Beinart and others like him are unable to respond with a resounding “yes” to all these questions, they ought to move away from policies they have thus far promoted and consider alternative ideas.

A stubborn unwillingness to do so is indicative of a readiness to impose upon Israelis a standard they would never accept for themselves.

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Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. His portfolio includes the coordination of high level briefings by senior members of the Israel defense establishment - active and retired - to elected officials; including within the US Administration, the US Senate, and the US House of Representatives, on matters relating to the state of Israel and her strategic relationship and positioning in an international context.

ISRAEL'S VIEW OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES: A COMPLEX PICTURE

By Yaakov Lappin & Chuck Freilich

As tensions mount on the Israeli-Lebanese border, the role of Lebanon's official military must not be overlooked. Defining an Israeli perspective of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is more complex than meets the eye. On the one hand, as can be seen from current events, Hezbollah's growing domination of Lebanon's official military is a source of deep concern. On the other, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) maintains regular open channels of communication and coordination with the LAF, which are used to help stabilize the Lebanese – Israeli border area during sensitive times. 

Officers from the IDF's International Cooperation Unit (ICU) meet with counterparts from the LAF every few weeks, at the headquarters of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which hosts the encounters in the Lebanese town of Naqoura. 

The meetings have been successful in their goal of avoiding unintended incidents and border friction, as Operation Northern Shield (December 2018 to January 2019), which was launched to destroy a series of cross-border Hezbollah attack tunnels, has demonstrated. 

At such meetings, the military delegations display English-language presentations to one another, outlining their requirements and outstanding issues. According to former ICU head Brig. Gen. Erez Maisel, "On some days, they [the LAF] would describe us as the Enemy Defense Force. Now they just write 'Israeli Force.'" 

The LAF has raised 13 "areas of contention" with the IDF that touch on the exact location of the Blue Line. At least one of those areas was resolved through military-to-military dialogue, when the IDF offered a solution accepted by the LAF.  

At the same time, IDF commanders have expressed concern over the increasingly cooperative relationship between the LAF and Hezbollah. The LAF does not prevent Hezbollah from entering into any area it pleases and it has a protocol through which its units do not enter southern Lebanese villages without gaining prior Hezbollah approval, which makes sure to remove any incriminating evidence.  

In some cases, Hezbollah personnel wear LAF uniforms and the two even enter villages for joint patrols, which of course allows Hezbollah to prevent any attempts to truly uncover its illegal presence and reimpose Lebanese sovereignty. The cross-border Hezbollah tunnels, which Israel discovered and destroyed last year, were dug under the nose of the LAF. Hezbollah has shown off captured US military equipment, which could only have come from US aid to the LAF.

All of this has helped Hezbollah to circumvent UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which bans it from deploying armed units and weapons into southern Lebanon. The resolution sought to ensure that the LAF would be the sole military force in the region, but Hezbollah has succeeded in subverting it to give it cover for its armed presence. In fact, most villages in southern Lebanon have become bases for Hezbollah rockets and other armed positions, in many cases almost every home. 

What remains unclear is how different components within the LAF view their military's relationship with Hezbollah. 

The possibility of internal divisions appears tangible. The LAF is formally dedicated to the Lebanese state, while Hezbollah is an Iranian-sponsored Shi'ite fighting force that views the Lebanese state, ultimately, as a host to be exploited. This long-standing clash of interests within Lebanon came to the fore once again during the Coronavirus crisis, which further magnified the country's catastrophic economic troubles.

Hezbollah’s presence has not been conducive to efforts by Lebanon to secure an IMF loan, with the organization's chief, Hassan Nasrallah setting conditions for receiving the loans, and warning that a failure to adhere to them could "make the country explode." Nasrallah's fear is that the IMF's conditions for granting the loan could obstruct Hezbollah's ability to exploit Lebanon's banking system. 

For years the US has poured billions into the LAF, over $2 billion since 2005 alone, viewing it as the only force in Lebanon that might prove capable of countering Iranian influence. In addition, the U.S. says that the financial assistance has enabled the LAF to successfully repress ISIS on Lebanon's border with Syria. 

In practice, Hezbollah has long held de facto control over the LAF, which does not make decisions of consequence without its approval. Indeed, in recent years, Hezbollah has come to dominate the government of Lebanon - in reality it is the government - and is also the primary socio economic force in the country. 

The Trump administration, despite its policy of “maximum pressure” towards Iran, recently released $105 million in aid to Lebanon. In Congress, in contrast, pressure is growing to condition at least 20% of the aid to the LAF on a reduction in Hezbollah’s influence over it.  

The LAF could, in theory, fill in a vacuum left in southern Lebanon in the aftermath of a new Israel – Hezbollah war, thereby enabling the IDF to quickly withdraw after a future conflict. This has already been done in the past, and was the intent behind Resolution 1701. Hezbollah’s stranglehold over the LAF and Lebanon, as a whole, however, have proven too strong, but there are few better alternatives.  

For decades, Iran’s Hezbollah proxy has hollowed out the Lebanese state, including the LAF, creating a situation in which it becomes hard to apply leverage, because no one appears to really be in charge and all options are bad. Aid to the LAF has almost become a form of indirect assistance to Hezbollah itself, but to cut it off completely would only strengthen Hezbollah further.

In these circumstances, the Congressional legislation conditioning part of the aid to the LAF on a reduction in Hezbollah’s influence, appears to be a first step in the right direction. Lebanon does need a jolt. Growing pressure must also be brought on France and others to join the US and, more recently, Britain and Germany, in formally designating Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Growing pressure must also be applied on Hezbollah’s financial channels. 

Israel, for its part, should continue its efforts to document and expose Hezbollah’s takeover of Lebanon and especially the deployment of its forces in the south, in violation of Resolution 1701, as well as the ongoing precision guided missile program. 

For all of the criticism of Israel’s hasbara (public diplomacy), its previous efforts in this area bore fruit and can do so again.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University.

IRAN'S AYATOLLAHS: DOWN, BUT FAR FROM OUT

By Yaakov Peri

Iran has now named Ershad Karimi as the perpetrator of the blast at the Natanz nuclear facility, but the ongoing series of blasts, fires and power failures taking place throughout Iran, including in Tehran, in other locations of strategic significance at the advanced centrifuge development site in Natanz, and the nature of the operations have the hallmarks of a state entity, with highly advanced attack capabilities. The responsible entity certainy has leading capabilities in the realm of cyber, and possibly, in the context of the reported explosions, is the beneficiary of personnel placement inside Iran. 

While it is possible to generate explosions through cyber capabilities, when blasts are involved, operational teams on the ground are a more likely source of attack. 

While the Iran's regime continues to investigate who is responsible, its relative silence is indicative of it's helplessness. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, who was expected by some to threaten Israel as a result of the blasts, made no mention of them during a recent speech. He made no mention of them and focused his message upon issues such as the 'agricultural jihad' in Lebanon, a country which is suffering from a severe economic and political crisis. Iran's and its proxies are cultivating a sphere of deniability.

Silence cannot hide the fact that the Iranian regime has failed to protect its most strategically important assets. Naturally, its suspicion will be trained on Israel, and though this could be the latest phase in Israel's shadow war with Iran, other possible operatives cannot be ruled out; including the United States and Arab adversaries of the Islamic Republic such as Saudi Arabia and, very importantly, elements of Iranian opposition must also be considered. 

The continuing nature of the incidents, and the fact that they include power blackouts is significant. More extensive than a temporary power outage, the  blackouts are disruptive to city infrastructure, and are potentially harmful to the Iranian nuclear program. 

The entity responsible for these incidents has also timed them to ensure the maximum effect upon, and bring maximum strain to, an Iranian regime already battling a confluence of challenges. Biting U.S. sanctions and falling oil prices have worsened Iran's economic crisis. The coronavirus pandemic has taken a heavy toll on Iran, though the extent of that toll is being concealed by its government, and a crisis of confidence in their leadership is emerging among the Iranian people. 

These mysterious attacks appear to have damaged Iran's ability to produce advanced uranium enrichment centrifuges and have likely caused significant setbacks to the country's nuclear capabilities. 

The repeated, continuing attacks on Iran's electrical infrastructure also indicates that whoever is behind the incidents now possesses the ability to launch attacks of this type as and when they wish to. 

The image of Iranian regime, having been caught off guard, has weakened at home and the attacks have buoyed the morale of the Iranian opposition that no longer feels alone and isolated. 

And yet, despite all of these setbacks Iran isn't going anywhere as a Shi'ite revolutionary regime.

It will seek to expose the attackers, and it will choose how it responds from a menu of revenge options, including kinetic strikes to cyber attacks, such as those that struck the Israeli water treatment plant. 

Whichever option Iran selects, its response will be calculated to fall short of the threshold of war. Iran has no interest in launching a war against Israel or the U.S. and while its nuclear program has been damaged, the regime will seek to repair that damage, learn relevant lessons and continue its long term conflict with Israel. Despite their efforts to downplay the attacks, Iran will be compelled to respond, if only to salvage the image of the regime. 

As we await Iran's next move, the regime of the Ayatollah's is looking considerably more vulnerable than it would like the Iranian people to know. 

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Mr. Yaakov Peri concluded his distinguished career as Director of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Service). He served in that position from 1988-1995. Prior to that role he held the position of Head of the Shin Bet Northern Command and the Judea & Samaria Command. In 2013 he joined the Yesh Atid party, was elected to the Knesset and was appointed Minister of Science, Technology and Space.

THE SECOND LEBANON WAR: A RETROSPECTIVE

By Noam Tibon

Fourteen years have passed since the eruption of the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Now is an appropriate time to assess the conflict.

 While the Middle East has dramatically changed in the intervening years, the risk of a future Israel – Hezbollah war remains.

 Looking back, it is clear Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah did not anticipate a war would result from the kidnapping raid on IDF reservists patrolling the northern border he ordered. He merely hoped to increase pressure on Israel, which was in the midst of a separate military operation inside the Gaza Strip.

 The kidnapped IDF reservists, Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev, were on their last day of duty. They were ambushed in a vulnerable spot in the sector they patrolled and Hezbollah's attack was well prepared. A deadly, unforeseen chain reaction followed, leading to the Second Lebanon War. 

At its start, neither side had planned for it. By its end, both were claiming victory.

An Iranian proxy, Hezbollah was intended to serve as a deterrent against an Israeli strike on the Iranian nuclear program. It was not intended to initiate regional conflicts. As far as the Iranians were concerned, the war was a disruption to its original plans. But Iran could console itself by its tightened  control over the terror group; a result of the conflict.

The war consisted of two phases. The first prioritized IDF air and artillery power in lieu of a ground offensive. The second phase saw the deployment of ground forces into Lebanon in order to battle Hezbollah.

The first stage witnessed highly effective IDF operations. 

The Israeli Air Force launched a massive bombing campaign against an extensive list of targets, stunning Hezbollah. Israel suffered few civilian casualties as a result of a well organized home front. After one week, Hezbollah was seeking a ceasefire.

That success generated vigorous debate within the IDF General Staff and the Israeli government. The first side of the debate viewed Hezbollah's northern border raid as a local incident. The two kidnapped reservists had not survived the raid. Their view was that Israel should limit the conflagration to the air power and artillery firepower already expended, reaching an end state that was to their advantage if they did so. That view did not prevail. 

Israel's decision to push forward resulted in two developments, both of which impeded the IDF's momentum. 

First, the air force ran out of targets, even as Hezbollah continued to fire its rockets, paralyzing the Israeli home front. 

Secondly, when the ground offensive took shape, a series of operational mistakes occurred, and Israel began absorbing casualties. As those numbers mounted, the Israeli government became less and less inclined to stop the conflict while in a weakened position.

Israel's war planning thus became unbalanced. It was initially predicated upon achieving victory by way of air power, but the ground offensive continued. 

Additionally, prior to the war, the IDF had spent more than five years of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in the West Bank. Israeli ground forces had not been prepared for a ground maneuver of the nature required in the Lebanese arena, therefore. A ground maneuver was ordered nonetheless.  

But Israeli infantry and armored units struggled to deal with Hezbollah's Kornet anti-tank guided missiles, fired in open areas and built up combat zones alike. 

In the battle of Wadi Saluki, Hezbollah cells, armed with anti-tank missiles, faced off against Merkava tanks from the IDF's 162 Division, resulting in a relatively high number of IDF casualties.

Paratrooper reservists also absorbed many casualties in firefights with Hezbollah. Those events soured Israeli public opinion against the war.

Though the IDF succeeded territorially, the tone felt by many Israelis was one of failure. As that sense increased, Israel requested a ceasefire.

A key lesson from the conflict is that when flooded with enemy rockets, the ability of Israel's home front to continue to function is extremely finite.  

In the months and years that followed, struggles were waged over how to assess the war. 

Some Israeli political figures sought to present it as a failure, a characterization further fueled by Hezbollah's own description of their ability to merely survive an Israeli military campaign as a "divine victory."

 But today, with the passage of time, we know that Hezbollah was far more damaged than was believed in 2006. 

We also know that Israel achieved a significant level of deterrence, which remains in place to this day. Hezbollah's chief remains confined to a bunker. 

Yet the aftermath of that war is still central to the IDF's planning in 2020. 

Last year's public dispute between former IDF ombudsman, Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Brick, and then IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, over the readiness of the ground forces, is an example of that.

The IDF has purchased advanced new armored personnel carriers and tanks, and installed active defenses on its armored vehicles. But most of the army still relies on old equipment and would have to conduct a maneuver without such protection.  

Since - and as a result of - the war, Hezbollah has tripled its projectile arsenal. It has placed strong emphasis on building up its stockpile of precision guided missiles. Israel is combating that build up, primarily on Syrian soil and in Syrian skies. 

While neither Hezbollah nor Israel are interested in entering into a conflict in the near term, the central lesson of the Second Lebanon War is that such a war can occur even if no one desires it. 

The IDF's mission is to ensure readiness, maintain full alert on Israel's northern border and prevent war if possible. But if it erupts, Israel is prepared to do what is needed in order to achieve a rapid and decisive victory, including raining down destruction throughout Lebanon. 

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Major General Tibon spent his military career specializing in counter terrorism and homeland security. His command positions include service as Commander of the 202nd Battalion of the Paratroopers Brigade, Deputy Commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, Commander of the Etzion Regional Brigade, Commander of the Judea Regional Brigade, Commander of the “Nahal” Brigade, Head of the Personnel Division of the IDF Ground Forces, Chief of the Infantry and Paratroopers Corps, Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division and Commander of the Command and Staff College, IDF. His most recent military position was Commander of the Northern Formation.

Where are the consequences for DeSean Jackson’s rant against Jews?

By Mark Goldfeder

We are living in a moment of righteous awakening that has resulted in a long-overdue movement to end systemic racism and call out those who are not on board. We fire people over old tweets that do not live up to 2020 standards, even if the writers apologize or try to contextualize them. There is zero tolerance for hate, or even for insufficient sensitivity. Unless, apparently, the group being discriminated against is Jews.

It’s hard to draw a different conclusion from the saga of Philadelphia Eagles wide receiver DeSean Jackson. In a series of Instagram posts, Jackson praised the noted anti-Semite Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam, designated by the Southern Poverty Law Center as a hate group for its hostility to Jews. He also posted a text attributed — mistakenly — to Adolf Hitler claiming that “white Jews” are exploiting black Americans and resorting to blackmail and extortion to advance “their plan for world domination.”

Jackson’s post was not vague and did not speak in generalities. The text he shared with his 1.4 million followers touted age-old conspiracy theories about Jewish manipulation and encouraged others to study Nazi ideology to confirm that Hitler was right about the Jews.

For everyone who has ever expressed outrage about a public figure suspected of covertly dog-whistling to neo-Nazis: A star athlete with a massive following overtly praised, and tried to spread the teachings of, the genocidal leader of the real Nazi Party. He asked others to learn from a monster who also persecuted and murdered black people, gay people and other minorities. Where is the outrage now?

The subdued reaction to Jackson’s comments has been alarming. Yes, the Eagles organization fined Jackson an undisclosed amount and issued a statement saying the posts were “absolutely appalling.” But it made only a vague promise to continue “to evaluate the circumstances” and “take appropriate action.” The NFL said the comments were “highly inappropriate,” yet punted the matter back to the team. Jackson himself attempted an apology, but implausibly claimed that he “really didn’t realize what [the purported Hitler] passage was saying.” In some corners of social media, Jackson has been appropriately excoriated for his actions. But other prominent athletes — former NBA player Stephen Jackson and Eagles defensive lineman Malik Jackson — have defended his comments, saying he was “speaking the truth” in one case and praising Farrakhan as “honorable” in the other.

There has been no massive backlash, no outpouring of denunciations from celebrities, and no real accountability — in the form of a suspension or, ideally, termination. As former Eagles team president Joe Banner suggested, it’s hard to imagine that the response would be as muffled if Jackson’s vile posts had targeted any other minority group.

This is how anti-Semitism works: It starts with horrific lies about Jews that legitimize hate and then grows more entrenched when no one takes a firm stand against it.

Unfortunately, anti-Semitism is a very real problem in our country. Each year since 1979, the Anti-Defamation League has published a report measuring the number of anti-Semitic acts in the U.S. In 2017, there were 1,986 reported incidents, a 57 percent increase over the previous year, and the biggest annual jump since the organization started tracking these numbers. In 2018, there was a 105 percent increase in the number of recorded physical assaults, including the deadliest attack on Jews in U.S. history at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh. In 2019, the total number of anti-Semitic incidents increased 12 percent over the previous year, with a 56 percent increase in physical assaults. There were, on average, nearly six anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. each day.

According to the FBI, the majority of religiously motivated hate crimes in the United States are committed against Jewish people, despite the fact that they make up less than 2 percent of the population. On campuses around the country, anti-Semitism has become rampant, with recent studies showing that the number of Jewish students experiencing anti-Semitism on campuses across the United States had spiked to nearly 75 percent.

These trends are terrifying, and there is much work to be done to reverse them. It starts with calling out anti-Semitism for what it is: hate speech that, while legally protected, should never be acceptable in decent society. If DeSean Jackson avoids meaningful censure, it sends the dangerous message that the kind of hatred he espoused is tolerable — and that, in a moment when we are making impressive strides toward greater equality for people of all races and creeds, it’s somehow okay to leave the Jews behind.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.

AOC should stop pretending to be an Israel expert

By Mark Goldfeder

A dozen radical lawmakers known for their anti-Israel bias, led by New York Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, have sent a letter to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo decrying Israel’s plans to begin implementing President Trump’s Vision for Peace and calling for the United States to withhold military aid if Israel applies its law to some of the territories in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) over which Israel has lawful sovereign rights.

The letter demonstrates once again that Ocasio-Cortez and her fellow leaders of the left wing of the Democratic Party are trying to turn what has long been a staple of bipartisan agreement, support for Israel, into just another area of conflict. Constituents need to understand exactly whom they might be voting for in November: politicians who actively promote false narratives with potentially critical implications.

Ocasio-Cortez's letter is disingenuous and dangerous. Legal terms have precise definitions. For example, the West Bank is not illegally occupied. Israel’s planned extension of civil law to Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley is not an annexation.

Occupation occurs only when a country takes control of a territory owned by another legitimate sovereign. Annexation is the forcible acquisition of one state's territory by another state. There is not yet, nor has there ever been, a state of Palestine from which to take. If there were, calls for a two-state solution would be redundant.

Israel is the only country in existence with any legal claim to title and sovereignty over the territory in question. The Jewish people’s rights to the land were guaranteed by the 1920 San Remo Resolution and the 1922 Mandate, then reconfirmed by the 1945 United Nations Charter. Israel lawfully inherited title to and de jure sovereignty of the full mandatory area when Israel emerged from the mandatory system.

After Jordan (along with five Arab countries) invaded Israel in 1948, Jordan seized and illegally occupied Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley for 19 years, renaming this area "the West Bank." Although Israel lost de facto possession of this territory for that period, Israel never lost her sovereign rights, guaranteed under binding international law. Israel regained control over this territory in a defensive war in 1967.

Ocasio-Cortez's letter seems oblivious to the fact that, despite the legality of its territorial control, Israel has already given back the vast majority of the land it retook. It did so in a series of attempts to make peace. Israel gained a total of 26,178 square miles of territory in 1967. To date, it has ceded sovereignty over 23,871 square miles of that or 87% of that territory. At various times in recent history (including deals proposed in 2000, 2008, and 2014), Israel has offered up to 99.3% of the remaining disputed territory in exchange for peace. Each time, the Palestinians refused.

Ocasio-Cortez's letter simply ignores legitimate Israeli rights and security needs, or that there could be any Jewish equivalent of the endorsed Palestinian “national rights.” Likewise, the letter makes no mention of the Palestinian Authority’s intransigence and support for terrorism, including payments to terrorists to murder Jews.

Indeed, there is no mention of Palestinian wrongdoing at all. The words peace, coexistence, and negotiations appear nowhere in the document. It does, however, include the absurd claim that the Palestinians “understandably refused to participate in a process that is not grounded in a recognition of their national rights under international law.” That sentiment sounds reasonable only if you ignore both the Palestinian Authority’s history of turning down generous proposals, and their blanket refusal to engage in the very peace talks that led to this moment — talks that once again included the opportunity for a Palestinian state.

That opportunity is still very much on the table, should Palestinian leaders choose to come and sit.

Ocasio-Cortez’s letter is also dangerous because U.S. military aid to Israel, while generous, is an investment, not charity. Supporting Israel in combating Middle Eastern terrorist groups and expansionist potentates is crucial for America’s own national security. Israel is our closest ally in the Middle East and our only reliable source of intelligence and cyberdefense.

Our shared security interests include but are not limited to preventing nuclear proliferation, combating terrorism, containing Iranian, Turkish, and Russian expansionism, and promoting the rule of democracy. Israeli-developed technology protects our citizens and troops at home and abroad. In addition, U.S. military aid to Israel is actually spent in the U.S., providing jobs and economic growth that benefits our own defense industry. Jeopardizing these benefits while pressuring a longtime ally to surrender both its rights and its attempt to forge a lasting peace, in a hostile region with an unwilling partner, under a plan sanctioned by our president no less, is simply not defensible.

Israel has the legal right to implement the Vision for Peace and to exercise Israeli law over land that Israel owns. American politicians have the moral responsibility to not hurl false accusations at our allies and to protect our own security interests by protecting the U.S.-Israel alliance.

Already two years ago, when Ocasio-Cortez was first campaigning, she criticized Israel and referred to Israel’s presence in the West Bank as an occupation. When pushed by PBS’s Margaret Hoover to explain why she said that, she was unable to answer, and tried to laugh it off by explaining that she is not an expert on the issue. Now that she is in Congress, she needs to stop pretending to be one.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations.

VIDEO: TARGETED KILLINGS: STRATEGIC ASSET?

 A Conversation With Israeli Intel. Officer, David Hacham

WHO BY CELLPHONE? WHO BY MISSILE? WHO BY BOMBING? ISRAEL'S TARGETED KILLINGS WILL CONTINUE

By David Hacham

After a five year moratorium, Israel's targeted killings reemerged in November of last year when the IDF conducted a missile strike against the Northern Brigade commander of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Bahaa Abu Al-Ata, in Gaza. 

The IDF emphasized that Al-Ata had become a ticking time bomb who refused to respond to prior warnings. The strike led to a 48-hour round of intense escalation.

The use of targeted killings has stirred animated controversies, and has led many, particularly overseas human rights organizations, to criticize Israel's policy. Such organizations perceive it as an illegitimate and immoral policy, describing it as "an execution without trial." 

Yet, in the conditions of today, targeted killings remain a vital part of Israel's ongoing strategy, one which will likely be used again in the future in order to maintain our clear-cut advantage in the war against terrorism. 

Israel's advanced operational and intelligence capabilities, and determination to implement surgical killings, constitute a source of constant threat to those seeking to harm it's security. 

One need only look at the list of those targeted for killing in order to understand the anxiety the practice causes among Israel's enemies.   

Hamas founder and leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza on March 22, 2004, while his successor, Dr. Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi, was killed weeks later, on April 17, 2004. On April 16, 1988, an elite IDF unit assassinated one of Fatah's key founders in Tunis, Khalil Al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad. 

Sheikh Yassin played a central role in the founding of Hamas. I knew him - personally - and held many meetings with him, both in my office and in his Gazan home, when I served as head of the Arab Affairs Department in the IDF's Military Administration of Gaza during the years of the First Intifada, from 1987 to 1993. 

Despite his total physical disability, Yassin was able to ingeniously seize upon a grave strategic error committed by Israel in 1987, when it approved the founding of the Al-Mujama Al-Islami religious charity association. Throughout the 1980s, Yassin consolidated his position in Gaza through the use of 'Da'wa' - establishing a wide Islamist religious civilian infrastructure, and using it to take over institutions and associations for the purpose of boosting his status as a rival to the nationalist Fatah movement.  

Yassin was laying down the building blocks for what would evolve into Hamas. Hamas officially came into being during the early days of the First Intifada, which erupted on December 9, 1987. 

Rantisi, a pediatrician by profession, replaced Sheikh Yassin as Hamas leader. Like Yassin, I knew Rantisi well from my military service in Gaza. It was impossible to miss his burning hatred of Israel and Jews. Each time we'd meet, I'd feel his hateful gaze upon me. Rantisi was also a founding member of Hamas, and he was one of the 415 Hamas and Palestinian (PIJ) terrorists deported to Lebanon in December 1992 by the Rabin government in response to the kidnapping and murder of Israeli Border Policeman Nissim Toledano. Rantisi spent a year in a southern Lebanese camp, during which time he stood out as a leader and a speaker, and rose to a senior, unshakeable position within the organization. 

Another senior terror figure who was eliminated from the scene through a targeted operation was Fathi Al-Shkaki, a founder and first operational head of PIJ. He was killed in Malta on October 26, 1995, in a Mossad special operation. I knew Shkaki very well. He studied medicine in Egypt, where he was first exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Upon his return to Gaza, he became active in PIJ. He was arrested by Israel in 1986, and expelled to Lebanon in 1988 during the First Intifada. After his expulsion, Shkaki was able to reorganize PIJ into a deadly terror group, and assume the role of its exclusive leader. 

An additional prominent figure targeted by Israel for assassination was Yahya Ayash, also known as 'the engineer,' a senior Hamas operative who masterminded many deadly suicide bombings against Israelis in the 1990s. Yahya's killing occurred on January 5, 1996, through a boobytrapped cell phone, in which 50 grams of explosives had been planted. Ayash was in a hideout apartment in Bet Lahiya in northern Gaza when he received the phone from a Shin Bet Palestinian agent. The killing was the product of a complex and sophisticated operation, which included meticulous planning, and outside-of-the-box thinking.

In December 2006, the High Court of Israel ruled that striking those taking a direct part in hostile, violent activities is a legitimate tool, but can only be used in order to prevent future attacks, rather than as retribution, revenge, punishment, or deterrence.  

The ruling also said that the harm to noncombatants has to meet standards of proportionality to the military value of the target. Many bitter arguments in Israel arose over targeted killings, most prominently, after the July 2002 air strike that killed Hamas operative Salah Shhada, alongside 14 civilians in a Gazan residential building. 

The Israeli government set up a committee to check the IDF's conduct in that incident, and found that no criminal offenses were committed. But it did find that an intelligence failure had occurred causing disproportionate harm to civilians. 

Looking back, there can be no dispute that targeted killings form one of the most critical and important methods Israel has in its long-term war against terrorism. The end objective is to minimize the scope of terror attacks by removing those who plot and initiate operations from the scene. Such strikes cause significant harm to operational terror capabilities, morale, and future motivation to implement terror attacks. 

Targeted killings stir fear among those terrorists seeking to do harm. Their use pushes terror organizations into defensive positions. They have a paralyzing effect, at least temporarily. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the influence of this tool is ultimately limited and short-term. 

After the initial shock, new operatives rise up and fill the ranks, but the very real threat of their removal, as was the case with Rantisi, successor to Sheikh Yassin, looms large; as it is intended to do.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.

ISRAEL SHOULD APPLY SOVEREIGNTY AND REJECT THE TRUMP PEACE PROPOSAL

BY Benjamin Anthony & David Benger

Regardless of how far-reaching or limited, immediate or gradual the process may actually be, Israel should apply sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, but it must not do so under the framework of the Trump peace plan. That plan, if implemented, exacerbates all of Israel’s present security concerns and leaves it with no discernible advantages. Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley must be decoupled from the Trump plan, therefore.

The extension of Israeli sovereignty is a policy consonant with the principled, decades-long held view of Israeli leaders that Israel must retain security control over the Jordan valley.

That bedrock of Israeli national security, combined with the continued growth of Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria, has increased the calls for international recognition of Israeli sovereignty in those areas, the recognition of which would enshrine Israel's national security imperatives in law and resolve the somewhat purgatorial status of Israelis who live there.  

Indeed, Israel should have recognized its own sovereignty over Judea and Samaria long ago, just as it did over the Golan Heights in 1981, but it has not yet done so. Instead, it has deferred any decisive legislative action vis-à-vis the Jordan Valley right up to the present day.

Absent an Israeli declaration, the Trump plan is now the voice most openly calling for the recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, something that has pleased many observers who value the importance of Israel affixing its eastern border. The unfortunate consequence of this is that the Trump administration seems a more strident supporter of the idea than do many Israeli policy makers.

A thorough analysis of the plan reveals that the concessions requested of the Israelis in exchange for American support of sovereignty extension are far too great for Israel to accept or work from as a basis for negotiation.

Heavily conditioned upon a change in Palestinian behavior though the plan is, it encourages negotiations on issues that Israel has long considered non-negotiable, to a degree that is unpalatable and unacceptable.

First: the question of Jerusalem. The Trump Plan explicitly proposes that the capital of a future Palestinian state is to be situated in East Jerusalem. It states:

“The sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem...and could be named Al Quds..Jerusalem should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Israel. Al Quds…should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Palestine." 

If Israel applies sovereignty to the Jordan Valley as part of the Trump plan, it will be doing so while knowingly elevating the partition of Jerusalem to a legitimate subject for negotiation. Jerusalem is the eternal and indivisible capital of the Jewish people. President Trump cannot be allowed to play King Solomon with that city.

Second, the plan explicitly calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria. By applying sovereignty over the Jordan Valley as part of the deal, Israelis themselves will be party to a proposal that anchors a Palestinian state in the heartland of the Jewish people's ancient homeland.

This would expose Israel to a potentially belligerent Palestine perched atop the Judean hills. Such a Palestine would enjoy a topographical advantage over Israel's most densely populated civilian areas and industrial sectors, including Tel Aviv. 

This plan defies the ideological and religious principles of many Israelis who support sovereignty.

It wantonly ignores the pyrrhic price Israel could be required to pay, according to the plan itself, promoted as it is by a transactional American president who, beyond November, will be free from reelection considerations, and who will likely be in pursuit of a foreign policy legacy. 

Third, this plan dangerously resurrects the widely discredited “land for peace” strategy that harmed Israel’s security interests in the past and continues to do so in the present. It encourages further concessions of Israeli land, specifically in the Negev region, for the stated purpose of expanding the Gaza Strip.

Gaza has been a haven for terrorists since the Israeli withdrawal from the enclave in 2005. There is no evidence to support the idea that an expansion of Gaza’s borders into Israel will improve the situation. 

In essence, the plan offers Israeli land adjacent to the Gaza strip, that has been cultivated and inhabited by Israelis for a century – and which is in no way disputed – to an enemy state. It effectively calls for the affixing of Israel’s eastern border with Jordan, with whom Israel has a peace treaty, at the cost of further ensnaring over a million Israelis within a reality of continuing, sustained, indiscriminate rocket barrages from an ever larger launching pad to Israel’s west.

Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, stated that “It is in the Negev where the creativity and pioneering vigor of Israel will be tested.” Ceding Israeli land in that part of the country will destroy that vision.

In addition to the many flaws particular to the Trump plan, it’s high time that Israel disentangles itself from US-brokered peace processes writ large. Historically, peace deals brokered by Americans have not aged well for Israelis. Every concession to the Palestinians simply becomes the starting point for the next round of negotiations, while Israel gains nothing in return; not peace, nor quiet, nor international legitimacy.

No other sovereign nation awaits the permission of the United States of America when deciding its domestic affairs and priorities, as Israel has done. The parameters of the Trump plan prove that it is not in Israel’s interests to continue to do so, despite the long-standing bonds between the two countries.

If the American 'quid' is the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over land Israel already legitimately holds, Israel’s 'quo' must not be the division of its capital, the anchoring of a Palestinian state in its heartland, the ceding of further land, and the placement of its citizens in yet greater danger.  

Israel must reject the Trump plan outright. It only endangers Israel further. Instead, Israel should assert full effective civil control over the Jordan Valley, and arrive at the next negotiation from a place of strength. 

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Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. His portfolio includes the coordination of high level briefings by senior members of the Israel defense establishment - active and retired - to elected officials; including within the US Administration, the US Senate, and the US House of Representatives, on matters relating to the state of Israel and her strategic relationship and positioning in an international context.

David Benger is a 3rd year JD student at Harvard Law School. At Harvard, David is the chapter president of Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under the Law, and the Events Chair of the HLS Alliance for Israel. He is also an editor on the Journal of Law and Public Policy and the HLS National Security Journal.

DEBATE VIDEO: SHOULD ISRAEL APPLY SOVEREIGNTY NOW?

The Latest In The MirYam Institute Debate Series 

BLM, Israel and the Dangers of Intersectionality

By Elana Dushey

In the past month, America has transformed from a landscape of empty streets under COVID-19 lockdown to streets crowded with protesters, vocalizing anger and grief over generations of Black suffering due to systemic American racism. Catalyzed by the murder of George Floyd at the hands of police officers, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement is energized, and the fantasy that racism no longer exists in America is being publicly and collectively debunked. BLM has the soap box and the world is listening.

American racism is not merely a police issue. The fact that racism is rampant in interactions between police officers and Black civilians is telling: it suggests that 21st century American racism is rooted so deeply in the American psyche that the Black body is often unlawfully and immorally viewed as a threat.

But police (and not all police) are not the only Americans guilty of racism; police/civilian racism is symptomatic of the undercurrent of racism in America as a whole. This recognition reveals the imperative for self and collective examination, insisting on a space for quiet reflection, listening, and learning, despite the discomfort that may arise from those findings; at its best, the BLM movement is simultaneously encouraging hyper dynamism and hyper reflection — and, if Americans nurture both equally, we will witness great and constructive change. Like many Americans, I am examining my inner and outer world to determine how I can contribute to an equitable and just America. Because I insist on examining nuance, I concurrently respect lawful law enforcement and support BLM because it is the voice of needed change.

However, for me, as a Zionist, Jewish American, my support of BLM becomes complicated, as BLM’s agenda is repeatedly exploited by the problematic umbrella of intersectionality — an ideology that overlaps categories of identity based on perceived shared experiences of discrimination.

Intersectionality lumps groups of people — despite their historical, cultural, political, and social differences — into an overly simplified binary of oppressed vs. oppressor. Intersectionality may be well-intentioned, despite its intellectual flaws, but when it comes to Israel, intersectionality becomes a veiled and hypocritical discourse to spew antisemitism.

Now to the detriment of Black and Jewish Americans, BLM protests/activism have become locations for intersectionality — and thus platforms to vilify Israel and create inaccurate parallels between racism in America and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.  Here are some examples:

In an effort to blame Israel for Minnesota police officer Derek Chauvin’s murderous behavior, a pro-Palestinian group began a widely circulated tweet which claimed that the Minneapolis police department was trained by the IDF- an absurdly illogical connection that can only be attributed to antisemitism.

Protestors desecrated synagogues across the nation, including one in LA-by spray painting “F—k Israel” on its facade.

In a protest in my own town, one of the organizers boldly asserted that American racism is akin to Israeli oppression.

Linda Sarsour’s MPower Juneteenth gathering unabashedly advertised that it was “open to all, minus cops and Zionists.” The audaciousness of such a caveat is terrifying considering the protest was at Gracie Mansion — the official residence of the New York mayor.

Anti-Israel rhetoric is antisemitic. But intersectionality constructs an arena where antisemitism can thrive behind the veil of supposed social justice. Because the rhetorical flaws of intersectionality erase social and historical nuance it also feeds the tribalized discourse that America has fallen prey to. Particularly among liberal circles, the Jewish self-determination has been irresponsibly translated into a narrative of Jewish oppression, and colonialism — a gross misrepresentation. But I am not writing to address those inaccurate accusations against Israel.

I’m writing to discuss how I can negotiate the contradiction of supporting the BLM movement, while recognizing how it is often misused to disseminate false information about Israel. In tribalist fashion, do I abandon my support of BLM because its surrounding discourse has perpetuated anti-Zionism (and antisemitism)?

No, I don’t, because I won’t abandon my Black American brothers and sisters in their cause. Nevertheless, in the spirit of honesty and self-examination, that I hope becomes the zeitgeist of our time, I look at the parallels that are drawn between Black Americans and Palestinians, despite their inaccuracies, and try to learn something:

In Israel, is the Palestinian/Israeli dynamic one in which Palestinians experience racism? Do Israelis view the Palestinian individual as a threat? In the Palestinian territories, anti-Jewish/Israeli hatred is academically and systemically indoctrinated. Martyrdom is encouraged and glorified. Palestinians have consistently launched or attempted to launch terror attacks against Israelis, including via rocket fire, suicide/homicide bombings, car rammings and stabbings. As such, Israel must constantly identify and subdue legitimate and violent threats from Palestinians, while still not succumbing to stereotyping and racism. Does Israel always succeed with this balance? I hope so. But I don’t know.

I do know, however, that Israeli/Palestinian conflict was not engendered from Israeli racism and colonialism, as BDS asserts. The situation, including Palestinian suffering, was borne from a complex historical reality too long to describe here. But in addition to Israel’s involvement, the Palestinian leadership has greatly contributed to the challenges both groups face by exploiting its own people and rejecting multiple opportunities for peace and economic betterment.

Still, to eradicate racism, should Jews look inwardly and question if they view Palestinian bodies differently than they view Jewish and Israeli bodies? Yes, absolutely. That type of self-examination is a constructive result of paralleling Black Americans and Palestinians. But that is where the constructive nature of it ends.

Labeling Israel as the “oppressor” is inaccurate and dangerous — not only to Jews, who have been suffering from an exponential rise in hate crimes, and who have historically/continuously advocated for Black American civil liberties — but it is also destructive to Black Americans, who will gain nothing by the vilification of Israel.

Now is the time to give Black Americans their platform to speak, without allowing other groups to exploit that platform with hate. Let’s hear BLM so we can self-examine and learn to create a better America for Black Americans. We need honesty and accuracy now, not grotesque over-simplifications and the lies of intersectionality. Let us empower BLM to be a model of how to combat social injustice with passion, intellectual honesty and nuanced discourse; we should discuss Israel-related issues, but not in context with BLM.

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Elana Hornblass Dushey earned her PhD in English Literature from Fordham University in 2015 with a dissertation that focused on Jewish American literature and its approach to Zionism and Israel. For 12 years, she taught literature, composition, and film at St. Johns University and Fordham University, where she was awarded numerous fellowships. Following her degree, she was a Connected Academic Fellow in the Modern Language Association.

Israel Should Extend Sovereignty to the Jordan Valley Now

By Jeremiah Rozman

There is strong consensus among Israel’s defense establishment that Israel must maintain a permanent military presence in the Jordan Valley. Extending sovereignty is the best way to secure that. Sovereignty also facilitates peace talks by removing a non-starter from the discourse. Sovereignty’s benefits outweigh the risks, while continuing the status quo harms growth, does not prevent international scorn and entails long-term risks. Israel should seize the opportunity provided by its historically large government, the Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” vision, and favorable international conditions to extend sovereignty to the Jordan Valley.

The Jordan Valley’s strategic importance 

Prime Ministers spanning Israel’s political spectrum, including: Rabin, Barak, Sharon and Netanyahu, all staunchly supported retaining permanent control of the Jordan Valley. Military control allows Israel to enforce the demilitarization of a future Palestinian entity, defend against conventional attack, deter and prevent forces from destabilizing Jordan, and mobilize reservists along interior lines.

Past withdrawals have failed to achieve peace, weakening Israel’s security in the process. Understanding these lessons, no responsible leader should cede control over strategic territory in an unstable region, to an untrustworthy entity. Israel’s evolving defensive capabilities do not minimize the importance of territorial control. Active defense entails taking fire which hurts Israel’s economy and traumatizes its citizens. The less Israel has to rely on it, the better. 

Israeli control of the Jordan Valley is key to preventing the “Gazafication” of any future Palestinian sovereign entity. Without it, militants can infiltrate from anywhere in the Middle East, extending Iran’s reach, and that of other militants, to territory bordering the Jerusalem-Ashdod-Haifa triangle, home to 70 percent of Israel’s population and 80 percent of its economic infrastructure. Foreign forces and “trip-wires” cannot prevent this. For example, the United Nations failed to enforce Hezbollah disarmament following the 2006 Lebanon War. 

Sovereignty, not status-quo

60% of Israelis with a clear opinion want the government to extend sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. Some experts argue that sovereignty would unnecessarily focus negative attention upon Israel, and they advocate for Israel to simply continue building “facts on the ground.” Such an approach has not shielded Israel from international condemnation in the past. 

Continuing the status quo neither moves the peace process forward, nor enhances Israel’s future prospects. It asks Israel to 'play dumb' and assumes that the international community and the Palestinians will play along indefinitely. This risks Israel being pressured into a withdrawal from the Jordan Valley in the next peace process as it was under the 2013 John Kerry led initiative. 

Israel has historically failed to maintain a military presence beyond its borders. Extending sovereignty now, under the auspices of a U.S. proposal, would create a powerful political “fact on the ground,” while continued limbo disincentivizes investment in civil infrastructure needed to build a de-facto presence.

The Risks

The Jordan Valley contains only 58,000 Palestinian Arabs who will likely remain under PA sovereignty. The demographic risk is a non-issue. Sovereignty enjoys significant public support and diplomatic risks are overblown. 

The Palestinian Authority

Israel’s mutually beneficial cooperation with the PA is unlikely to suffer significantly. Abbas’s oft-repeated threat to cut security ties is hollow. The PA relies on the IDF to keep Hamas from throwing its men off of roofs as they did in Gaza. This is why despite numerous threats, in practice, the PA will likely continue security cooperation.

Jordan

Israel and the U.S. both desire good relations with Jordan. However, Jordan faces severe challenges to its stability, relies heavily on U.S. support, and benefits from the IDF securing its western border. It is therefore unlikely to curtail cooperation over territory that it ceded its claim to in 1988. Senior Jordanian officials have reportedly signaled this position repeatedly to Israel and to other leaders involved in the U.S. led peace initiative.

Regional powers

Increased threat from Iran and decreased importance of Middle Eastern oil lead regional powers to seek stronger ties with the U.S. and Israel. Several Arab countries are quietly backing the U.S. plan allowing Israel to extend sovereignty. Senior Saudi officials reportedly said that for many Arab states, official opposition is for show. 

The E.U. and international bodies

The EU has voiced strong opposition to Israel’s sovereignty plans. Hungary and Austria have prevented unanimous condemnation and will likely make it impossible for it to impose sanctions on Israel, while mutually beneficial trade and defense ties are unlikely to suffer much. 

The International Criminal Court (ICC) also expressed concern. In the past it has sought to prosecute Israelis for fighting Hamas. If Israel is criticized for defending itself against a terrorist entity which calls for genocide in its charter, there is little reason to believe that it can ever avoid being the target of a double standard by the ICC or other international bodies. The U.S. recently rejected the ICC’s power to charge its troops. Its authority should not be overestimated. 

The U.S.

The Trump administration’s approach to Israel has gained rising legitimacy as its political opponents’ predictions of “a regional explosion” over moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights failed to materialize. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo’s most recent statements called extending sovereignty “a decision for the Israeli government.” He noted regional support and expressed disappointment over the PA’s refusal to participate in negotiations. Future administrations from either party are unlikely to pressure Israel to withdraw once sovereignty is an established fact. Nor would they be likely to curtail defense, intelligence, trade or diplomatic relations which enjoy strong congressional and popular support. 

Conclusion

There is broad consensus that Israel must maintain military control in the Jordan Valley. Continuing the status quo does Israel no favors, while the risks of extending sovereignty are likely overblown. Sovereignty reduces the likelihood that Israel will be pressured into further withdrawal. It also removes ambiguity, enhancing Israel’s ability to build infrastructure. This will yield economic as well as security dividends. Israel should seize the current opportunity. Long-term ambiguity is not in Israel’s interest despite it consistently being the easier short-term route. 

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.