By Yaakov Lappin

Israel and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror faction in Gaza were embroiled in a five-day conflict, which ended on May 12, dubbed Operation Shield and Arrow by the Israel Defense Forces. At the time of this writing, the truce between the sides had entered its first day with a projectile fired from Gaza violating the ceasefire less than 24 hours after it was reached. The IDF responded by striking two Hamas military posts, representing a return to the Israeli policy of holding Hamas responsible for attacks out of Gaza.

These events may seem eerily similar to the security situation that existed before the launch of Shield and Arrow on May 9, but appearances can be deceptive.

At the strategic level, the operation was not designed to change the basic equation in Gaza. It is still ruled over by Hamas, a terrorist Islamist regime, with its own Iranian-funded army and rocket arsenal. It is still home to other, smaller, factions that do not have government responsibilities, but are just as murderous as Hamas, if not more so – with one Iranian proxy, PIJ, standing out.

After PIJ terrorized the residents of Sderot with a 102-rocket barrage on May 2, to ‘avenge’ the suicide of its hunger-striking prisoner in an Israeli prison, the Israeli defense establishment felt the time had come to stabilize the Southern and Gazan arena and to knock PIJ back down to size or face a broader escalation scenario involving Hamas.

As a result, on May 9, after days of intricate intelligence tracking, and waiting for operational opportunities to arise, within the space of three seconds, simultaneous Israeli airstrikes in three separate locations eliminated three of PIJ’s senior military commanders.

PIJ then set out to terrorize Israeli civilians for the next five days and thereby exposed its operatives and assets to accurate and devastating Israeli firepower, guided by the highest quality intelligence.

When the smoke cleared, PIJ had lost twenty-one of its operatives, including the decapitation of its entire operational command level – with six senior commanders killed. Many of its rocket launchers and weapons bases, as well as command and control centers, were destroyed. PIJ’s leader, Ziad al-Nakhalah, sitting comfortably on the Iranian payroll in Beirut, and under Iranian pressure to keep going, could no longer ignore the calls from his own embattled operatives to accept the truce. Israel had proven that it is prepared to launch surprise attacks, to overcome terrorist tactics of human shielding, and to employ precision air power anywhere it needed to. The obvious message reverberated among larger enemies, Hamas and Hezbollah. Their operatives aren’t immune either.

Air defenses

In five days of conflict, PIJ fired 1,469 rockets at Israel, of which 1,139 crossed into Israeli air space, while 291 misfired and fell in Gaza. Three Palestinian civilians were killed by PIJ rockets falling in Gaza.

More than 95% of projectiles aimed at inhabited areas were intercepted by Iron Dome. The system offers a very high – but not hermetic level of defense. The approximate 5 percent gap in defenses stopped being a dry statistic and took on tragic real-life form when a rocket slammed into a residential building in Rehovot, south of Tel Aviv, killing an 80-year-old woman in her living room. A Gazan worker was the second civilian killed in Israel by PIJ rockets, in the western Negev region.

David’s Sling, the intermediate altitude defense system, made its first operationally successful appearance since going online in 2017. The Israeli Air Force used it to intercept two projectiles, testing its capabilities.

In the coming year, Israel is expected to begin deploying its Iron Beam laser interceptor, first on the ground, and later, on-board UAVs, which will be used to intercept rockets, mortars, and drones at the speed of light, and at a fraction of the cost of kinetic interceptors.

With Hamas’s cross-border tunnels cut off by Israel’s underground barrier, and Israeli air defenses improving by the year, the growing technological gap gives Israeli decision-makers hope that they can contain the threats from Gaza, and even significantly reduce the number of sirens in the Israeli home front in the future with the help of the laser interception technology, which can destroy some of the rockets over Gaza before they enter Israeli airspace.  

Offense

The IDF struck 371 PIJ targets, including apartments used by PIJ for command and control, weapons storage facilities, rocket launchers, and bases.

Israeli aircraft, both manned and unmanned – jets, helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles – were nourished with intelligence from a range of sources. The IDF Southern Command, Military Intelligence, and the Shin Bet intelligence agency worked hand-in-hand to locate targets and ensure they were free of large numbers of civilians. All of this, in dense difficult urban conditions, with PIJ cynically employing human shielding tactics, which are a core aspect of the doctrine of the region’s terror armies.

IDF officials shared accounts of watching PIJ commanders issue orders to rocket launching squads as they stood in apartments and drove in vehicles surrounded by their children. The IDF waited patiently for better opportunities and struck when they presented.

Looking ahead

The Gaza ceasefire seems likely to hold. On May 18, Israel will mark Jerusalem Day, celebrating the reunification of the city during the 1967 Six-Day War. This is always a period of high tension in Jerusalem, but one that Israel can manage in a manner that does not necessarily lead to new escalations in the capital or the West Bank.

Israel’s goal of stabilizing Gaza, without being drawn into a costly and major war, will be put to the test in the coming weeks. Other arenas are far more urgent: Iran is approaching dangerous nuclear thresholds, Hezbollah in Lebanon has amassed a monstrous arsenal of projectiles, including precision-guided missiles, and Iran is continuously trying to smuggle offensive capabilities into Syria, where it would like to build a second Hezbollah.

Israel’s multi-arena challenges mean that Gaza is but one arena among many.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.