By Liam Collins
The number of nations in the world has more than doubled since the conclusion of World War II, yet the incidence of interstate war has declined. Nowhere has that trend been more evident than in Europe. Once the epicenter of interstate war, the relative peace on the continent in recent decades has led to debate as to whether interstate war in Europe is obsolete.
Yet Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its subsequent seizure of Crimea and active support for separatists in Ukraine’s east in 2014 has led some to question whether interstate war in Europe is truly dead. Today, Russia has amassed some 100,000 troops along its nearly 1,200-mile land border with Ukraine, leading to speculation that a Russian invasion could be imminent.
A Russian invasion in 2022 while likely to be a game-changer and fundamentally different from its previous incursions, is however unlikely.
Why it would be a game-changer
A Russian invasion today would be game-changing because it would represent the first undeniable and telegraphed invasion in Europe since the end of World War II when Russia gobbled up Eastern Europe. Vladimir Putin tried to convince the world that he was protecting Ossetians from Georgian “genocide” to justify his 2008 invasion under the pretense of the international norm of the responsibility to protect. The evidence, however, indicated that the war was “premeditated” and Georgia acted preemptively, similar to what Israel did in 1967’s Six-Day War. Thus, the international community did not buy Putin’s justification.
Learning from this experience, Putin avoided using overt military forces in Ukraine in 2014. Instead, he used “Little Green Men” and other hybrid means to seize and ultimately annex Crimea without firing a shot. After Ukraine had Russian-backed separatist forces on the ropes, Putin was forced to send smaller formations into Ukraine’s east, but he continued to deny Russian support.
What makes an invasion of Ukraine in 2022 fundamentally different from Russia’s previous invasions is that this one is being telegraphed by Moscow. Russia’s invasion of Georgia came as a complete surprise, as did its seizure of Crimea. A second major difference is that Russia lacks even an implausible justification for the invasion. In both previous wars, Russia attempted to justify its interventions under the responsibility to protect.
Neither of these conditions exist in 2022. While Putin has yet to directly threaten “invasion,” his words—he has threatened “appropriate retaliatory military-technical measures” if the West’s aggressive approach continues—and actions—the troop buildup—portend a potential invasion. Likewise, Putin lacks even the feeblest pretense for invasion. There is no population that Putin can claim that he needs to defend. Quite the contrary. Ukrainians have seen the devastation and the lack of opportunity in the Donbas and want no part of it.
Thus, if Russia were to invade, it would be a game-changer — an invasion within Europe that has been telegraphed in advance with no justification. It would be an unequivocal declaration of war. It would demonstrate the weakness of the international system that was unable to deter. It would also erode confidence in various international institutions and the West in general. Russia, no doubt, would pay a steep political price, but in a battle of relative gains, it is not clear that Russia’s price would be any higher than the West’s price — a clear demonstration of the West’s impotence.
Why an invasion is unlikely
Nevertheless, an invasion is also unlikely. Putin is calculated and behaves fairly rationally, even if he routinely operates outside of widely accepted international norms. He recognizes that he would pay a high economic cost for an invasion. Sanctions against Russia following its seizure of Crimea in 2014 have been estimated to have cost Russia roughly $50 billion per year. With President Joe Biden signaling to Russia that it would “pay a heavy price” for any invasion, Putin knows that sanctions would be swift and severe if it were to invade.
Likewise, Putin knows that any invasion would come at a significant military cost. In its five-day war with Georgia, Russia lost as many as 22 aircraft. A price that Russia seemed unwilling to pay because it caused Russia to significantly decrease its air support after losing so many aircraft in the opening days. With Stinger missiles being transferred to Ukraine from Lithuania and Latvia, Putin realizes that he would likely lose a significant number of aircraft with any invasion.
When Putin sent T-90 tanks across the border in 2014, they were almost “impenetrable.” Since then, the United States has provided Ukraine with Javelin anti-tank missiles, with additional missiles arriving from Estonia. Since 2014, the United States has also invested nearly $2.7 billion in training and equipment to reform Ukraine’s defense establishment. Putin, thus, recognizes that he would face a much tougher enemy than he did in 2014.
Putin also realizes he would likely pay a domestic cost for the victory. Russian mothers do not like their sons coming home in body bags any more than Western mothers. And while Putin is likely confident that he would score an initial victory, albeit at heavy costs, he also has to recognize that he would likely face a costly insurgency. Ukraine recently adopted a law enshrining civilian resistance as part of Ukraine’s national defense and these volunteers have been training.
Finally, an invasion would seem to accomplish little in terms of likely policy objectives. Crimea was unique; it was “strategic territory”, it provided Russia access to the Black Sea and housed its Naval Base in Sevastopol. Russia could have attempted to annex Georgia’s South Ossetia or Ukraine’s Donbas, but it did not. Russia’s objective was not about capturing territory, instead, it was about control: preventing both from joining NATO.
NATO is unlikely to let any nation that does not control its territory join. With no end in sight for the current status quo in Ukraine’s Donbas, it would appear that Russia is achieving its strategic objective at a fairly low cost. An invasion would only increase the cost, with no additional gain. And if the occupation became costly, as it likely would, the domestic repercussions could lead to his demise. Thus, invasion, though still possible, seems unlikely.
What an invasion could mean for Israel
An invasion could weaken international norms, but that seems unlikely to have any effect on Israel given that none of its immediate neighbors have the desire or capability to invade at present. A Russian invasion, however, would demonstrate the weakness of the international community at deterring action, which could embolden terrorist actors in the Middle East. It might also embolden Israel to be freer with its actions.
Regardless, an invasion does not appear in anyone’s best interest, especially Ukrainians and Russians.
Col. Liam Collins is the Executive Director of the Viola Foundation and the Madison Policy Forum and a permanent member with the Council on Foreign Relations. A retired Special Forces Colonel, Liam served in a variety of special operations assignments and conducted operational deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, the Horn of Africa and South America. Read full bio here.