[In]dependently Strong: Israel and U.S. Military Support

By Cade Spivey

After Soleimani’s death, rather than imploding in a scramble for military leadership as some erroneously predicted, Soleimani was quickly replaced and Iran’s military resumed its threat to regional security in the Middle East. Iran’s aspiration to become a regional hegemon has not waned. 

While I do not view Soleimani's death with any measure of sorrow (he was a murderer with the stains of countless American lives on his hands), I wonder what may have been lost: whether the strategic value of his death is not undercut to some degree by the potential risk to the American-Israeli security partnership. Although Soleimani’s leadership undoubtedly posed a grave threat to stability in the region, the political impact of President Trump’s questionably-timed decision to end his tenure may have hurt the ongoing security of Israel in a way that some are too willing to ignore. 

Impressively, the Israel Defense Forces' capabilities are robust in every way, compared to Israel's enemies. The IDF can outgun, outrun, and generally outperform its foes across multiple domains simultaneously. This is a result of a long-time investment in defense spending by an Israeli nation willing to foot the bill with both blood and treasure. However, recent assertions proclaiming Israeli’s invincible capabilities ignore what the United States, in contrast, has posited for decades; i.e., that Israel’s greatest weapon is its friends. 

As a citizen of the United States, a former service member, and friend of Israel, I am concerned that the perennial calculus regarding Israeli military supremacy assumes unwavering American military support. As an Israel Law and Policy (I-LAP) alum, and from my service aboard a ballistic missile defense ship in the Arabian Gulf, I have seen the expanse of Israel’s territory. I well understand the breadth of theater threats, and thus am concerned that the kind of support Israel would need, in the event of a multi-arena war involving Iran and its proxy forces, is not guaranteed by the U.S.

Support for Israel has become an increasingly divisive topic in a politically fractured and polarized United States. For better or for worse, whatever President Trump touches seems to turn a very Republican shade of red. Whether intentionally or not, his political embrace of Israel (e.g. recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital, relocating the U.S. embassy, and endorsing Israel’s claim to the Golan Heights), has created increased tension between American parties.  Israel’s decision in 2019 to block certain (Muslim) Democratic House Representatives from visiting the West Bank has exacerbated that tension. To the detriment of its broader security, Israel is becoming a major partisan issue in the United States.

The killing of Soleimani may well be a short-sighted victory vis-à-vis Israel. As stated in a recent article by Major General Yair Golan (Israel Defense Forces, Ret.), Soleimani, was in fact replaceable as Iranian Quds Force Commander. Now, however, with backlash from Congress after the assassination, Israel is confronted with the prospect that any further military action the U.S. takes involving Iran and Iranian proxies may be limited to that which is explicitly approved by Congress, or at least will be subject to increased scrutiny. This recent fervor for restraint in the Middle East has not yet yielded legislative results. However, fallout from the end of President Trump's impeachment trial, the November election, and a potentially newly-elected and less enthusiastic President, leaves several variables in flux. 

What this portends for Israel, an Israel very likely engaged in active conflict with Iran and its Arab neighbors, is unknown. Israel may face an American polity that is more apprehensive about using military force to deter sustained Iranian aggression, or worse, one that is barred by a U.S. Congress from doing so altogether. It is unlikely that Israel will face a major conflict without at least some American support, but due to increased fracturing and polarization domestically, it may not come as quickly as needed. While an isolated Israel may be able to sustain itself in the short term, and perhaps even repel several waves on several fronts, a protracted conflict, without some form of relief, will find Israel in desperate need of a friend.

Edited by Natalie Stone