By Yaakov Lappin
In recent years, the Israeli defense establishment has pioneered a new combat doctrine, dubbed by the military as 'the campaign between wars.' Today, this campaign is at a crossroads.
The campaign between wars employs surgical air strikes, coupled with cutting-edge intelligence-gathering, for the purpose of selectively disrupting the enemy's ability to build up its offensive force. The campaign is reportedly active throughout the Middle East.
Signs of this campaign occasionally hit the headlines. Examples include the February 6 reports of alleged Israeli air strikes that hit multiple Iranian-linked sites around Damascus, Syria, in which 12 people were reportedly killed. While the targets are not known, it is fair to assume that they involved attempts by Iran to move advanced weapons into Syria to threaten Israel with.
So far, Israel's active defense campaign has proven to be extremely valuable.
It prevented Hezbollah in Lebanon from acquiring a high number of precision guided missiles, which could be used to hit critical strategic targets in Israel in any future war. It has also largely prevented Iran from establishing a new war machine in Syria. And it reportedly put a dent in Iranian efforts to build new missile bases in Iraq, which could be used to target Israel.
Yet as time goes by, the chances of escalation from this campaign grow. The Israeli defense establishment finds itself having to carefully navigate between two core national interests. The first interest is the need to stop unacceptable force build-up by the enemy. The second is to have a prolonged period of calm, to enable Israeli's society and economy to develop without interference.
When both of these objectives are served by the campaign between wars, the decision to act is easier. When the two interests come into potential conflict, the dilemma for Israeli decision makers gets more acute.
The need to create lengthy periods of calm is critical for the wellbeing civilian society, and for the prosperity of the national economy.
IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi delivered a speech on December 25 at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, in which he stressed this point. One of the military's top objectives, he said, is to "create periods, intervals, time periods, in which there is a high level of security, in which there are no wars. It is not enough to win the war – and it is incumbent on us to do that - we must also manage defense and security in a manner that does not put the country to the test every two to three years."
In other words, armed conflict breaking out every two to three years would represent a failure for the IDF. A reality that is characterized by prolonged periods of calm, on the other hand, is what is needed to ensure that Israelis wish to remain in their homeland, build families, and flourish, he argued.
Israeli military power and the willingness to use it create deterrence against enemies. This, in turn, prolongs the periods in which there are no wars.
As a result, the campaign between the wars has been highly beneficial for Israeli deterrence. It demonstrated to foes that Israel's long reach is precise, and that they are at risk at any time. It has also shown enemies that they are vulnerable to Israel's penetrating intelligence coverage. This has reduced their desire to risk escalation with Israel. As such, the campaign between wars boosted deterrence, prolonged long periods of calm, and stopped the Iranian axis from building up its force to an unacceptable level.
WHEN INTERESTS BEGIN TO COLLIDE
Yet the question of what should happen if these two objectives – prolonging the calm and preventing enemy force build-up – begin to clash is growing more acute with time. Israel's answer to this question could play a major role in defining the security events of 2020.
The primary focus of the Israeli campaign has been the Iranian-Shi'ite radical bloc. This is the axis that has built up several radical armed organizations, and nourishes it with weapons, funding, training, and instructions.
The late commander of the Iranian Quds Force, Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, was the architect of this network. He raised up a number of terror armies, built weapons bases, and used them to spread Iran's presence in the region.
The geographical focus of Israel's active defense campaign has been Syria. This is the arena that has seen the most focused Iranian efforts. Syria is where the Iranians have been trying their hardest to smuggle missiles into, as well as rockets, explosive drones, and cruise missiles. It is also where Iran and Hezbollah are trying to position terror cells on Syria's border with Israel.
Israel has been able to prevent a great deal of these Iranian plans from becoming reality. Instead of an army of 100,000 militia members loyal to Iran, the Iranians control roughly 30,000 militia members in Syria. The grand Iranian vision of a Syria that is filled to the brim with missile and drone bases, as well as military formations that could in future launch ground attacks, has not become a reality.
But Tehran's appetite to continue trying to realize this dangerous vision remains in place. In fact, Iran has recently vowed to retaliate for future Israeli preventative action, creating a new risk for escalation. As time goes by, the risk of Iranian counter-strikes grows. This means the campaign between wars may soon pose a challenge to the goal of prolonging the quiet.
The Israeli Air Force, the Military Intelligence Directorate, and the General Staff must continuously assess risks of both action and inaction. Action is filled with operational risks, and the potential for unintended escalation.
And yet the option of inaction is even worse: Allowing Iran to arm its proxies with arsenals of precise firepower that dwarf the firepower of many state militaries. That would have emboldened the Iranian axis, and put Israel in a questionable opening position at the start of the next war.
The next Israeli government, together with defense chiefs, will soon have to decide what to choose: Prolonging the calm, or risking it to stop the proliferation of advanced enemy weapons.