By Iris SOBCHAK & FRANK Sobchak
In the waning hours of his presidency, President Trump ordered the U.S. military to change its Unified Command Plan by moving Israel from European Command (EUCOM) to Central Command (CENTCOM).
Seemingly a small and semantic change, in reality the shift is nothing short of tectonic and momentous. While the decision did not receive much coverage because of the attack on the Capitol and surrounding events, it is an important issue with many considerable ramifications. Specifically, it will have immediate practical implications and will create new opportunities for engagement that could trigger another wave of diplomatic developments and normalizations.
European Command was established in 1952 to provide unified command and authority over US forces in Europe focused on the danger of a Soviet invasion during the Cold War. By contrast, Central Command was established by Ronald Reagan in 1983, taking over from the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to address Middle East crises. Israel, Lebanon, and Syria were chosen to remain in EUCOM, at least in part because Egypt was the only country in CENTCOM that recognized Israel. Also informing the decision was the thought that the animosity towards Israel from many Arab nations would complicate coalition negotiations and operational planning.
At the time, simply having an Israeli entry stamp in one’s passport prohibited American military planners from entering most Arab states, and the ridiculous posturing of officials maintaining two passports became a necessity. General Norman Schwarzkopf believed that not having Israel in CENTCOM made his job as coalition commander during the 1991 Gulf War easier and noted, “I’d have difficulty impressing the Arabs with Central Command’s grasp of geo-political nuance if one of the stops on my itinerary had been Tel Aviv.”
But the decision had negative consequences on U.S. interagency planning. In the Department of Defense, Israel was under EUCOM while in the State Department it was organized under the Near Eastern Bureau with its Arab neighbors. This caused difficulties in the areas of defense and diplomacy, including when negotiating treaties or coordinating operations. But the geo-strategic tides shifted and in 1994 Jordan joined Egypt in recognizing Israel.
Fast forward to more recent months and we note that as part of the recent Abraham Accords, Bahrain, UAE, Morocco, and Sudan have also normalized relations.
Moving Israel to CENTCOM is a significant step towards correctly aligning the State and Defense Department regional bureaus and commands. The logical realignment of Israel in CENTCOM is good for governance and will allow the U.S. to manage the national bureaucracy and communications between these governmental organizations and with our allies in the region.
Additionally, the two most pressing regional (and potentially geo-strategic) dangers of our time, a rearming and resurgent Iran and the threat of militant Islamic fundamentalists groups such as Al Qa’ida and ISIS, are issues that require the involvement, coordination, and assistance of countries throughout the region.
The U.S. has long sought to build a regional defense arrangement to counter Iranian expansion and prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. By including Israel in the appropriate plans and operations, CENTCOM will have greater success in achieving these goals, whether they be through missile defense, non-proliferation, countering terrorist financing, or simply killing or capturing senior terrorist leadership. Israel and her neighbors will also benefit greatly as the change aligns with their own security objectives.
Switching Israel to CENTCOM also creates new opportunities. Such a realignment will compel other Arab states that have not yet recognized Israel to engage more with her more readily. The alignments also has the potential to lead to warmed relations or even a new wave of recognitions or normalizations.
At the CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, there exists an “engagement village” where all countries included in the region send liaisons to coordinate and make connections. Having Israel as part of this engagement village will open an additional back door of communications that will enable further cooperation on a multitude of issues. Even countries that do not yet formally have established relations with Israel would have to collaborate with Israel in such an environment and it is not inconceivable that such efforts could lead to the quiet prospering of informal relations with Iran’s principal Gulf rival, Saudi Arabia.
Another possible outcome could be that Israel’s shift results in a larger American military unified command plan reassessment. Such a review could spur the movement of the countries in northern Africa that are more culturally and geographically similar to those in the Middle East to be realigned with CENTCOM as well. Making this move would line up CENTCOM with the way that the State Department has structured their Near East Affairs Bureau. It makes logical sense to have Morocco, Libya, Algeria and Tunisia in the same regional headquarters, as they are facing similar issues as the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt.
The decision to shift Israel to CENTCOM is one that will have significant, immediate, practical benefits for the United States, Israel, and the Arab nations of the region. The only possible downside to this decision is that should Israel come into conflict with any of the other countries within CENTCOM, decision making and operational planning would become more complicated. More likely however, is that such a realignment would help deter this kind of conflict and create a greater peace between Israel and the other countries of the region.
Engagement leads to personal connections and the dispelling of biases and prejudices. As the American author Mark Twain wrote, “Broad, wholesome, charitable views of men and things cannot be acquired by vegetating in one little corner of the earth all one's lifetime.” Let us all hope that this move helps inspire such views.
Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. Read full bio here.
Iris Sobchak (Lieutenant Colonel, Retired Army) has had a diverse 29 year career in the military, academia, financial services and in women’s leadership consulting. She taught History at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and she holds a BS in international/Strategic History from West Point and a MA in Latin American History at Penn State.