By Yaakov Lappin
The tragic events that have afflicted the northwest Syrian region of Idlib, where 900,000 civilians have recently become refugees, were already being ignored by the international community before the Coronavirus pandemic descended on the world.
Now these tectonic events are sure to be relegated to the sidelines, despite the fact that the conflict in Idlib, and the accompanying upheaval, will have significant long-term consequences on the security and stability of the international system for years to come.
In many ways, the people of Idlib share a stark fate with millions of others of Middle Easterners, in failed state zones like Libya, Yemen, and Iraq. Homeless, jobless, and lacking any economic hope, an entire generation is growing up in the extreme conditions of instability and war.
Despite the elimination of ISIS's caliphate, war has not ended. A generation that grows up under such extreme conditions is more likely to be receptive to radical messages, and less inclined towards westernized concepts of democracy. None of these trends look set to change any time soon, and that spells bad news for long-term regional stability, as well as international security.
In Idlib, a coalition made up of Russia, the Assad regime, Iran, and allied militant Shi'ite militias are battling an assortment of Sunni armed organizations, some of which, like Hayat Tahrir, are radical Islamist.
Turkey has injected its own military forces into the area and backs some rebel groups. An examination of the actors involved in the Idlib conflict provides a good sample of the forces shaping the Middle East.
Turkish President Reccip Tayyip Erdogan is driven by a neo-Ottoman and Islamist vision of a greater Turkey that dominates the region. Erdogan's aggression is growing. He is also equally driven by a fear of millions of additional refugees from Syria spilling over into his country, which already hosts some 3.5 million Syrians.
Erdogan is facing significant economic troubles and domestic challenges at home. He is growing more confrontational with time, as authoritarian regimes tend to become during a crisis.
In February, Erdogan sent his forces into Idlib to interrupt the advance of the Assad regime and support the Sunni armed groups, representing the fourth Turkish operation in Syria in as many years.
The Assad regime is intent on retaking this province, and would be glad to ethnically cleanse it of its Sunni inhabitants, with the assistance of mass killings, just as it has done across Syria, including through the use of chemical weapons.
Assad is intent on completing his victory in the civil war, which has cost the lives of over half a million people since breaking out in 2011. Around six million Syrians are internally displaced, and almost the same number have left the country, with many seeking refuge beyond the region, in Europe. Assad has retaken 70% of his country with the help of his Russian and Iranian partners.
Throughout February, Syrian and Turkish forces clashed head-on, representing the first instance of state-on-state armed conflict in a lengthy period, until Russia imposed a shaky ceasefire.
These events reveal that the U.S. plays no role whatsoever in shaping events in Syria, but that Russia is very much the dominant superpower in this arena. This trend, of growing Russian influence in the Middle East, is further reinforced by the American desire to ultimately disengage from the Middle East. An American announcement in March about the departure from three bases in neighboring Iraq, and the partial American withdrawal from Syria in 2019, are evidence of this trend.
Another long-term implication arising from the developments in Idlib is the continued creation of refugee waves that will depart the Middle East for Europe.
Idlib is, itself, a refuge for displaced Syrians, and many could soon be on the move again, looking for safety far from Syria. Idlib's own population has doubled over the past nine years, as growing numbers of Sunnis fled the Assad regime's war machine. One million out of Idlib's three million people are crowded along the Turkish border, which they would probably try to cross if Assad's forces approach them.
The ceasefire brokered by Russia is unlikely to hold, and more fighting, casualties, suffering, and refugees seem more likely than not. Should the Coronavirus afflict the hundreds of thousands of homeless war refugees in Idlib, living in tents or sleeping rough, the Syrian tragedy would be further compounded, generating even greater numbers of refugees.
Turkey has in recent weeks already encouraged Syrian refugees in its territory to head into the European Union via Greece, in a desperate attempt to extort European countries to pressure the Assad coalition to stop the advance. Any further fighting is likely to create new waves of Syrian refugees, and they will not view Turkey as their final destination.
The Idlib situation has important take-aways for Israel. One lesson is that the keys to influencing events in Syria are in Moscow, not Washington. The second is that Russia will work to halt any development it views as a threat to the Assad regime, which hosts Russian air squadrons, and enables Moscow to project its influence, in great power fashion.
The Assad regime also owes its existence to the Iranian axis that fought on its behalf, and it is therefore cooperating with Iranian and Hezbollah entrenchment efforts, which directly threaten Israel. Israel will need to be a lot more successful than Turkey in protecting its critical interests in Syria, and to do so without conflicting with Russia.
Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.