By Tomer Barak
In recent weeks, talk of progress in the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with American mediation, has resurfaced in the media.
The discourse on the subject follows two main focal points. The first is the apparent Saudi effort to show pragmatism, signaling to both the United States and Israel that 'there is something to talk about'. The goal is to score points in Washington, and as a result, receive various benefits.
The very fact that such positive Saudi voices exist, whether they have merit or not, has an impact on preparing the Arab street for some movement toward Israel in the future.
At the same time, growing voices in Israel and the U.S. are arguing that a new window of opportunity has opened for normalization.
A second media talking point focuses on the demands and conditions placed by Saudi Arabia for progress to be made. This discussion also brings to light the hurdles that stand in the way of the desired breakthrough.
This discussion focuses on four core Saudi demands:
The first is the need to complete the rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) in the U.S., as well as bring about a change in the broader American political perception of Saudi Arabia. Both have been tarnished in Washington in recent years following the murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the war in Yemen, and more.
Mainly within the Democratic Party, Saudi Arabia is viewed as part of the problem in the Middle East, and not as part of the solution.
President Joe Biden will have to carefully consider his steps and decide whether the political achievements inherent in an Israeli-Saudi breakthrough are worth the political price he could pay in an election year.
The second challenge concerns a Saudi armament and security wish list containing advanced U.S. military capabilities and other security guarantees. In this context, the US will have to balance the preservation of Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), in accordance with American law, and with Biden's deep commitment to this principle -- as well as with the desire to strengthen an important regional partner as part of the regional campaign against Iran and the problematic Saudi track record regarding the improper use of U.S.-made weaponry in the Yemen war.
This balancing act will require a discourse with Israel, which for its part will also need to make decisions on how far it will acquiesce to Saudi expectations and refrain from objecting to arms sales to Riyadh, and whether it is prepared to make an active effort to counter objections in Congress.
The third challenge deals with Saudi aspirations to advance the Kingdom's civilian nuclear program. These aspirations include aspects of uranium enrichment on Saudi territory.
U.S. and Israeli officials have voiced over the years similar concerns regarding the proliferation of civilian nuclear technologies that could be converted into military capabilities. That is especially true in a country that has a history of hiding military capabilities and has cooperated with China on long-range surface-to-surface missile development.
The U.S. outline for an acceptable pathway for Riyadh on civilian nuclear progress, based on a limited model (like the one taken by the UAE, which gave up on uranium enrichment on its soil), is unacceptable to the Saudis.
The danger is that it will seek to develop its nuclear program via non-Western channels (China or Russia). Even if Riyadh does not create a linkage between the normalization process and progress in its civilian nuclear program, in the current situation, where China is gaining ground in the region, it makes sense for the U.S. (in coordination with Israel) to create a compromise sphere. In this sphere, Riyadh could implement its ambitions in a broader manner, but under very strict supervision mechanisms.
The final challenge is the Palestinian arena. On the surface, the escalation in recent weeks in the West Bank and the Israeli government's moves create an insurmountable obstacle for the Saudi leadership regarding any progress in the normalization process.
In the background is King Salman's traditional position, which places the issue as a main topic, unlike his son who is largely tired of the Palestinian issue and sees it as merely disruptive. Assumably, MBS would settle for a prolonged lull that would allow him to make progress in normalization.
It should be noted that the issue of the Palestinians has and continues to come up in American discourse on normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia -- though in this case, this seems to be the result of some leveraging the normalization option to pressure the Israeli government.
Some observers believe that the Palestinian issue can be placed on a lower level of prioritization and 'bypassed' through a series of relatively limited Israeli moves -- but even then, it is not certain that all members of the current Israeli government would see the moves in that way. Prime Minister Netanyahu could, however, try to market the political profit of such a maneuver and lead to their approval by his government.
So where do things stand?
There is no doubt that normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is an important and very lucrative goal. There is good reason that it is considered the 'holy grail' of the Middle East peace process.
The process would, in theory and practice, constitute official confirmation of Israel's acceptance in the Middle East, and mark the end of the era of hostility with the Sunni bloc.
Normalization agreements would be accompanied by economic and other agreements that will create many options when it comes to regional connectivity, business cooperation, the development of interconnected infrastructure in transport and energy, joint climate crisis adaptation, and more.
In the face of the common Iranian threat, the security dimension is also of great importance. However, dangers are inherent in Saudi security and nuclear demands.
Points of balance can be found between Israel’s security needs and Saudi ambitions, as well as the common desire to build a regional system against Iran.
But it must be clear - Even if the U.S. is willing to go the extra mile toward MBS and even if the Palestinian issue is somehow set aside, Israel cannot and must not compromise on two basic demands: the preservation of its QME, and the prevention, or very tight monitoring, of any Saudi nuclear capability that could potentially enable development of military nuclear capabilities.
Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.
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