How Far Will Israel Go For Normalization With Saudi Arabia?

By Tomer Barak

In recent weeks, talk of progress in the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, with American mediation, has resurfaced in the media.

The discourse on the subject follows two main focal points. The first is the apparent Saudi effort to show pragmatism, signaling to both the United States and Israel that 'there is something to talk about'. The goal is to score points in Washington, and as a result, receive various benefits.

The very fact that such positive Saudi voices exist, whether they have merit or not, has an impact on preparing the Arab street for some movement toward Israel in the future.

At the same time, growing voices in Israel and the U.S. are arguing that a new window of opportunity has opened for normalization.

A second media talking point focuses on the demands and conditions placed by Saudi Arabia for progress to be made. This discussion also brings to light the hurdles that stand in the way of the desired breakthrough.

This discussion focuses on four core Saudi demands:

The first is the need to complete the rehabilitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) in the U.S., as well as bring about a change in the broader American political perception of Saudi Arabia.  Both have been tarnished in Washington in recent years following the murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the war in Yemen, and more.

Mainly within the Democratic Party, Saudi Arabia is viewed as part of the problem in the Middle East, and not as part of the solution.

President Joe Biden will have to carefully consider his steps and decide whether the political achievements inherent in an Israeli-Saudi breakthrough are worth the political price he could pay in an election year.

The second challenge concerns a Saudi armament and security wish list containing advanced U.S. military capabilities and other security guarantees. In this context, the US will have to balance the preservation of Israel's Qualitative Military Edge (QME), in accordance with American law, and with Biden's deep commitment to this principle -- as well as with the desire to strengthen an important regional partner as part of the regional campaign against Iran and the problematic Saudi track record regarding the improper use of U.S.-made weaponry in the Yemen war.

This balancing act will require a discourse with Israel, which for its part will also need to make decisions on how far it will acquiesce to Saudi expectations and refrain from objecting to arms sales to Riyadh, and whether it is prepared to make an active effort to counter objections in Congress.

The third challenge deals with Saudi aspirations to advance the Kingdom's civilian nuclear program. These aspirations include aspects of uranium enrichment on Saudi territory.

U.S. and Israeli officials have voiced over the years similar concerns regarding the proliferation of civilian nuclear technologies that could be converted into military capabilities. That is especially true in a country that has a history of hiding military capabilities and has cooperated with China on long-range surface-to-surface missile development.

The U.S. outline for an acceptable pathway for Riyadh on civilian nuclear progress, based on a limited model (like the one taken by the UAE, which gave up on uranium enrichment on its soil), is unacceptable to the Saudis.

The danger is that it will seek to develop its nuclear program via non-Western channels (China or Russia). Even if Riyadh does not create a linkage between the normalization process and progress in its civilian nuclear program, in the current situation, where China is gaining ground in the region, it makes sense for the U.S. (in coordination with Israel) to create a compromise sphere. In this sphere, Riyadh could implement its ambitions in a broader manner, but under very strict supervision mechanisms.

The final challenge is the Palestinian arena. On the surface, the escalation in recent weeks in the West Bank and the Israeli government's moves create an insurmountable obstacle for the Saudi leadership regarding any progress in the normalization process.

In the background is King Salman's traditional position, which places the issue as a main topic, unlike his son who is largely tired of the Palestinian issue and sees it as merely disruptive. Assumably, MBS would settle for a prolonged lull that would allow him to make progress in normalization.

It should be noted that the issue of the Palestinians has and continues to come up in American discourse on normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia -- though in this case, this seems to be the result of some leveraging the normalization option to pressure the Israeli government.

Some observers believe that the Palestinian issue can be placed on a lower level of prioritization and 'bypassed' through a series of relatively limited Israeli moves -- but even then, it is not certain that all members of the current Israeli government would see the moves in that way. Prime Minister Netanyahu could, however, try to market the political profit of such a maneuver and lead to their approval by his government.

So where do things stand?

There is no doubt that normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia is an important and very lucrative goal. There is good reason that it is considered the 'holy grail' of the Middle East peace process.

The process would, in theory and practice, constitute official confirmation of Israel's acceptance in the Middle East, and mark the end of the era of hostility with the Sunni bloc.

Normalization agreements would be accompanied by economic and other agreements that will create many options when it comes to regional connectivity, business cooperation, the development of interconnected infrastructure in transport and energy, joint climate crisis adaptation, and more.

In the face of the common Iranian threat, the security dimension is also of great importance. However, dangers are inherent in Saudi security and nuclear demands.

Points of balance can be found between Israel’s security needs and Saudi ambitions, as well as the common desire to build a regional system against Iran.

But it must be clear - Even if the U.S. is willing to go the extra mile toward MBS and even if the Palestinian issue is somehow set aside, Israel cannot and must not compromise on two basic demands: the preservation of its QME, and the prevention, or very tight monitoring, of any Saudi nuclear capability that could potentially enable development of military nuclear capabilities.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

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Jordan is preparing for an ultra-right-wing Netanyahu government

By Tomer Barak

If an outsider were to analyze Israel-Jordan ties in the weeks following returning Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's election victory, he would be led to the mistaken assumption that the peace between the two countries is stable, if not good.

Following the Israeli elections on Nov. 1, Jordan's King Abdullah II and Israel's President Isaac Herzog held warm meetings (at the COP27 climate summit in Sharm el-Sheikh), and a follow-up pact was agreed upon to promote the implementation of the electricity-water project (in which Israel sends the parched Hashemite Kingdom desalinated water, and Jordan sends Israel electricity from its solar panels).

Later, the two parties signed a letter of intent as part of a collaborative endeavor to restore and improve the Jordan River's ecology.

In addition, a public phone call was held between Netanyahu and King Abdullah. Both sides described the call as favorable.

But the above does not reflect the animosity and deep distrust between Abdullah and Netanyahu. Neither does it reflect Jordan's concerns over regional security and thus the stability of the kingdom itself. These concerns have grown significantly in light of Netanyahu's election win and the coalition he is forming with far-right parties.

The fears over Netanyahu's return are crystal clear to anyone reading the Jordanian newspapers which depict him as the leader of an extremist cabinet that will include several figures seen as regional pyromaniacs, foremost among them, the designated minister of national security, Itamar Ben Gvir.

To put it simply, this Jordanian interpretation of Israel's election results draws a direct link between the radicalization of Israeli policy in Judea and Samaria, as well as in Jerusalem, with Jordan's stability, and King Abdullah's status in particular.

Jordan's elites are concerned about three main issues.

First and foremost, there is the domestic front.

For years, the king has been more or less successful in balancing the Jordanian public's deep anti-Israeli sentiment with the need to rely on Israel when it comes to stability, and the kingdom's water and energy needs. The issue of security is also important, but since most security cooperation between the two countries is conducted away from the public spotlight, it usually continues without significant challenge. Coordination between the two countries has even reached new heights in recent years, in the face of a series of shared regional threats.

Abdullah has chosen to continue purchasing gas from Israel (at a reduced price) and receives crucial water supplies for his parched state. He has also signed further deals with Israel despite strong opposition from the public and parliament, including mass demonstrations.

The Jordanians, however, are concerned that provocations on the Palestinian issue could result in widespread, fierce public protests calling for the cancellation of the peace agreement with Israel.

Such developments could well force the authorities to take steps that would undoubtedly damage ties in order to placate the Jordanian street. This might even affect the profound Israeli strategic understanding that the peace with Jordan is a strategic asset for Israel and needs to be preserved at all costs.

Another front is Jordan's status in Jerusalem.

Jordan sees its unique position in regard to the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) as one of the keys to maintaining both King Abdullah's stature as the custodian of the holy places, and the stability of the Hashemite system as a whole.

It is worth mentioning that Jordan has often been able to use its unique position as the responsible adult to 'switch off' escalating tensions on the Temple Mount before they got out of hand. The kingdom has been the subject of praise for this role.

At the same time, Jordan lives under a continuous sense that its special role in Jerusalem is under threat from Israel and from other Arab and regional powers who seek to take a leading role at its expense.

On that matter, even if Netanyahu is perceived by Jordan as being committed to the status quo, Amman sees the emerging Israeli government as a real threat to its place in the Holy City.

The ultra-right-wing government could not only accelerate a dramatic increase in the number of Jews who visit the Temple Mount and pray there but could also abolish the status quo by allowing Jewish prayer on the Mount itself, or by establishing within the compound areas for Jews only. Currently, Jews are not allowed to pray at the compound that sits on top the mount.

It is clear to many in Jordan that any change to the status quo will trigger a deadly landslide, igniting internal Jordanian instability and heightening competition in the Arab world for control of the Temple Mount and dealing a blow to Abdullah's standing.

The third front concerns Israel's actions in Judea and Samaria.

Jordan's concerns have been stoked by the possibility that the new Israeli government could take unilateral measures such as annexation of the Jordan Valley or stepping up the settlement project.

Moreover, friction and violence in the West Bank could easily escalate, particularly during the Ramadan period in March and April next year.

Jordan appears to be less concerned about a scenario involving broad Israeli annexation of Judea and Samaria, due to the severe international ramifications that this move would induce. Such a move would also constitute a breach of the Abraham Accords, the pinnacle of Netanyahu's regional-diplomatic legacy.

Moreover, the new Israeli government's approach to Gaza and belligerent comments from designated cabinet members regarding possible confrontation in the Gaza Strip are setting off alarm bells in Amman.

On the bright side, it appears that Jordan's leadership still views the peace accord with Israel as a strategic asset that provides the kingdom with significant political, economic, and security advantages, and it does not want the treaty to be weakened. In light of the above, it appears that the near future holds the potential to drastically strain—and damage—Israeli-Jordanian relations. In the best-case scenario, the two sides, under U.S. and regional encouragement, preserve the old equation: Enhanced yet low-profile security cooperation, selected areas of additional cooperation, and mutual mistrust and political tensions.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

Jordan’s complex balancing act on the Temple Mount

By Tomer Barak

The Temple Mount (known in Arabic as the Haram al-Sharif) is not only one of the holiest places on the planet for Jews and Muslims but is also the focal point of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Like clockwork, the holy site becomes ‘the hottest show in town’ on several `trigger dates` that amplify day-to-day tensions surrounding the routine management of the Mount. The most sensitive dates are religious ones such as the month of Ramadan and the three Jewish pilgrimage holidays, as well as secular national dates like Israeli Independence Day (The Palestinians mark the “Nakba,” or the “catastrophe”, the day after Israel marks Independence Day) and Jerusalem Day.

On those occasions, local clashes regularly erupt between worshippers and law enforcement personnel. This is accompanied by an oft-repeated Palestinian narrative, according to which, there is a ‘Jewish Zionist attack’ on the Al Aqsa Mosque, and it is time to mobilize to ‘save it’ from Zionist attempts to ‘change the status quo.’

Jordan’s traditional role regarding Jerusalem and the Temple Mount is important. Jordan remains in possession of a key role at the site, a role accepted by Israel in the peace agreement with the Hashemite Kingdom (1994) and later by establishing the Jordanian Islamic trust, the Waqf, which has official control over the sensitive site.

Over the years, Jordan has capitalized on its ability to control and calm tensions, sometimes intervening only at the last moment, before disaster strikes to show the stature of King Abdullah in the region.

A couple of months ago, it became clear to all regional observers that the Ramadan month will form an especially hot flashpoint, and multiple parties, particularly the Jordanian leadership, made an effort to prevent a security deterioration. The Jordanian need for calm derived from the King`s attention to his internal arena -- the economy and relations within the royal family. Moreover, the King had no wish to see a return to last year’s efforts by Hamas to link Gaza and Jerusalem - pushing Jordan out of the equation in the Holy City.  

Nevertheless, the King`s efforts to coordinate between Israel and the Palestinians failed due to inflammatory acts from both sides.

At that point, Jordan changed its behavior and became increasingly confrontational toward Israel. The rationale behind this posture was to take advantage of the situation – bolstering the Kingdom`s status in Jerusalem vis-a-vis regional competition (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Hamas), and amplifying the King`s regional role in the eyes of the Biden administration.

The Jordanian rhetoric was very harsh, blaming Israel for initiating escalation in Jerusalem, and “denying” Muslims freedom of worship, as well as allowing Jews to pray on the Temple Mount under police supervision. Meanwhile, Jordan initiated several regional and international diplomatic meetings, utilizing them to attack Israeli policy.

Jordan’s rhetoric came to a peak on April 18, when Prime Minister, Bisher al-Khasawneh, went further than any Jordanian official had done until then, stating, “I salute every Palestinian, and all the employees of the Jordanian Islamic Waqf, who proudly stand like minarets, hurling their stones in a volley of clay at the Zionist sympathizers defiling the Al-Aqsa Mosque under the protection of the Israeli occupation government.”

This was active encouragement of violence -- an unprecedented message from Amman.

But it wasn’t all bad news. In order to maintain the ability to de-escalate, Jordan did not sever its diplomatic ties with Israel, and the fact that such messages were not repeated is an indication that Jordan sought to walk them back behind the scenes.

Moreover, King Abdullah intervened and pressed the need for calm during a meeting with United States President Joe Biden on April 25 in which he reaffirmed Jordan’s regional importance and its role in Jerusalem. According to several outlets, Jordan pressed the need to formulate new security arrangements on the Mount that would remove certain powers from Israeli security forces and transfer them to the Waqf.  

As for the Israeli response, Jordan has, for several years, assessed that Israel can contain many of its anti-Israeli sentiments and moves. This assessment was proven right again when Israel decided to respond harshly to the Jordanian rhetoric only through official channels, due to an Israeli wish to get through the high-tension period and past Jerusalem Day without a major eruption, and based on the assumption that relations with Jordan will normalize again.

In trying to assess the Jordanian game plan, it is clear that the inflammatory rhetoric and escalatory actions, especially by the prime minister, were a sign of distress – but they were not accidental.

Jordan lives under a continuous sense of a threat to the Kingdom`s special role in Jerusalem and the image of the king as the custodian of the holy places. It perceives that erosion of this role will lead to a real threat to the Hashemite system as a whole.

Firstly, from the Jordanian perspective, Israel’s decision to increase the number of visitors to the Temple Mount and grant police new powers of enforcement there is perceived as an encroachment on the status quo. The reality is that there is a large increase in the flow of non-Muslim visitors to the Mount, with record-high numbers of more than 30,000 visitors since the beginning of the year.

At the same time, attempts by Hamas to ‘take ownership’ of the Mosque very much disturb the Hashemite Kingdom.

In Jordan’s net assessment, the Kingdom has, over the years, been able to successfully maneuver by fending off challenges to this status from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel. However, the recent rapprochement of Israel with both Saudi Arabia due to the Abraham Accords, and Turkey, are alarming from the Jordanian perspective - even though neither of those countries is looking, especially publicly, to replace the Jordanian role in Jerusalem. Both countries state publicly that there is a need to preserve the status quo, and Jordan's role, in Jerusalem. 

In that regard, when the latest escalation erupted, although Jordan did not want the escalation to happen after it had already broken out it sought to leverage the violent incidents to improve its weak position.  

Israel has a clear interest in safeguarding its peace treaty with Jordan, which is a strategic asset. A stable and prosperous Jordan is an explicit Israeli interest.

At the same time, since the Palestinian conflict is not going to vanish, and the Temple Mount will likely produce further outbreaks, Israel and Jordan should continue to work together to control stability in Jerusalem, especially on the Mount.

Israel did well in restraining its public responses to provocative Jordanian statements while making clear its dissatisfaction.

Israel and Jordan, alongside their neighbors, can have a better future. The Abraham Accords have already enabled a trilateral agreement with the UAE (with the U.S, as a facilitator) on water and electricity swaps between the countries.

But to press on and move forward, it is critical to work on trust.  A mature discussion is needed to tackle differences. This would send an important message to the Jordanian public about the need to work with Israel, while also calming Israeli public opinion, which has grown increasingly flustered by Jordan’s hostile public posture.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

Converging interests: The Israeli-Jordanian-Emirati infrastructure deal

By Tomer Barak

Israel, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates signed two Memoranda of Understanding for economic projects on November 22, and while it is still unclear when and how they will be implemented, the agreements send a bright signal regarding a new era in regional cooperation.

The first agreement includes the construction of a solar power plant and storage facility in Jordan that will produce up to 600 megawatts per year of green electricity that will be sold to Israel and incorporated into its power grid.

The second agreement deals with the setting up of a desalination plant on the Israeli coastline, with the potable water it generates exported to Jordan at a scope of 200 million cubes per year - on top of the existing water deals in place between the two countries, which recently were expanded due to growing Jordanian needs.

Companies from the United Arab Emirates will be involved in building the projects, according to the agreements, which are only at the MOU stage thus far. In the coming year, the final details are scheduled to be finalized, as well concrete feasibility checks prior to implementation. The American special presidential envoy for climate, John Kerry, was involved in securing the two agreements.

Three processes came together to create the new agreements: The Abraham Accords, the thawing of Israeli-Jordanian relations in the past six months, which included visits by senior officials, and the growing engagement with the climate crisis along with Jordan’s growing water crisis.

For Jordan, the current and past water agreements provide solutions for what is an existential need. Jordan today suffers from a water shortage of 500 million cubic meters per year. The annual per capita water availability in Jordan is under 80 cubic meters, much lower than the global water poverty line, which stands at 500 cubic meters.

If this was not bad enough, the trend is going from bad to worse by the year. Current reserves, particularly the Disi Reserve on the Saudi border, will thin out in the coming years, and demographic growth coupled with accelerated dehydration linked to climate change will intensify Jordan’s water stress, leaving Jordanian soil parched, its agriculture in a state of collapse, and its residents thirsty. The amount of water to be provided under the terms of the MOU will not solve these problems but will certainly help Jordan improve its situation.

Alongside this essential need, the ability to attract foreign investments is a priority for King Abdullah. Environmental initiatives are a lucrative new means to attract funds for investment in the Jordanian economy. To that end, multinational-regional projects are a concept that western countries and international funds are willing to invest in.

For Israel, the agreement, if implemented, might help to achieve a governmental goal of boosting  renewable energy production (the target is 30% by 2030). In addition, there is the obvious strategic benefit that comes from strengthening Jordan’s durability and stability, and the peace between the two countries, which is highly significant for Israel’s security, and for strengthening cooperation with the UAE in the context of the Abraham Accords.

The picture is not totally rosy

The MOUs will face some challenges.

First and foremost, as with previous public agreements with Israel, there has been pushback from the Jordanian public and from parliament, both of which are characterized by strong anti-Israeli sentiments.

From the moment that news of the MOU signings surfaced, demonstrations broke out against the agreements. After Friday prayers following news of the agreements, demonstrators took to the streets of Amman under the leadership of youths affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and some Jordanian tribal leaders. As in previous Israeli-oriented protests, there were voices calling for dissolution of the peace accords, although these were only on the margins of the protest. In line with Jordanian political tradition, accusatory public fingers were pointed at the government and at normalization steps with Israel, but not against King Abdullah himself.

At the same time, the Jordanian Parliament, with whom the government didn’t consult prior to the signing of the MOUs, held a meeting on the subject, in which several MPs attacked government normalization steps with Israel, and even called for a vote of no confidence.

In order to enable the agreement, the Jordanian prime minister was sent in to reduce opposition and ‘usher’ in the agreements,  and, at the same time, initiated dialogue with the tribes.

A month into the signing, it seems that protests have  calmed down, but previous cases demonstrate that it is just a matter of time before the opposition will pick up on an issue as a means to once again attack the government.

Unfortunately, there will be ample opportunities for renewed protests during the coming year, when the sides will need to formulate the details of the agreements, and afterwards, while construction  of infrastructure for the projects is ongoing. King Abdullah and his government will have to continue to market the agreement as vital, and to employ tools to calm protests. One of those tools will need to be outside support, in the form of American and Emirati assistance, as well as keeping relations with Israel relatively free of crises over regional and Palestinian matters. 

There are ample potential challenges to this new cooperation. According to media reports, the Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman, who is already in complex relations with King Abdullah (after alleged Saudi involvement in Jordanian royal family feuds), was angered by the MOUs, which left him ‘outside of the picture,’ including in terms of relations with the U.S.

The Palestinian Authority was not part of the agreement despite being at the center of the Israeli-Jordanian-Emirati triangle.

Technical, financial, and environmental issues could also emerge along the way that could complicate implementation of the projects.  

In summary, if this process goes ahead successfully, it could pave the path for additional Middle Eastern multilateral agreements in the sectors of energy, infrastructure, climate, health, and other issues. It is of great importance that policymakers around the Middle East and in the U.S. be creative and enterprising, while displaying goodwill and adequate resources to shape and implement a needed regional integration and cooperation, which will benefit countries struggling with common challenges ranging from Iran to the climate crisis.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

Down on his luck at home, Erdogan shows his claws, again

By Tomer Barak

In recent months, Turkey`s foreign policy has swung wildly between threats to its neighbors, to outreach to rivals, including a willingness to receive a warm embrace from the UAE.

Don’t let this apparent incoherence fool you: Both policies derive from the same acute domestic challenges faced by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan who is concerned about the stability of his regime.

First and foremost, Turkey’s economic crisis seems to be getting worse from month to month: The Turkish Lira slumped 40% against the dollar in November, and some observers believe the currency could drop even further.

In Erdogan’s propaganda world, this devastating economic development derives from foreign intervention that is ‘undermining his regime.’ But this crisis in reality stems from Erdogan’s economic policy of growth at any price, and his ensuant demand to lower the Turkish Central Bank’s interest rate. This has occurred alongside substantial government interventions in decisions by the Bank, and an erosion of the Bank’s independence, leading to a decrease in the willingness of many international actors to invest in the country. All of this, two years into the pandemic crisis, which itself resulted in severe economic fallout in Turkey.

One surprising outcome of this crisis has been the renewal of ties between Turkey and the UAE, who have been regional rivals in recent years.

The UAE’s de facto ruler, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed, paid a visit to Turkey and pledged to establish a $10 billion fund for strategic investments in the country. What price Turkey will be required to pay for this generosity is not yet clear, but time will tell what Erdogan pledged in return with regard to regional policies.

Whether this injection of funds will help kickstart the Turkish economy is another question, with the country facing so many economic challenges.

Elsewhere, Turkey is still struggling to flatten the coronavirus curve, even before the outbreak of the new Omicron variant. The Government`s vaccine campaign is based on China’s Sinovac vaccine, but this campaign is faltering, and the public is not rushing to put its faith in it. This is disabling Turkey’s ability to quickly lift coronavirus restrictions, and increases negative domestic sentiment towards the ruling AKP party.

All of the above is occurring against a background of several disasters in recent months, such as the huge forest fires in western Turkey, which claimed a political toll on Erdogan. According to recent public opinion polls, in the event of elections, Erdogan will be unable, for the first time in his 18-year rule, to lead his party to victory, even if his party joins other parties in a coalition. The far-off date for elections (2023) does not ease Erdogan’s fears regarding this front, while some opposition parties have already called for early elections and rare protests over the economic situation were seen in Ankara and Istanbul.

Some spectators have observed that Erdogan, once again, has looked tired and languid in several public appearances, such as the Glasgow climate summit.

Under the weight of the above strains, Turkey’s regional foreign policy has once again become aggressive. This is a deliberate show of force designed to bolster Erdogan’s public image, but one that falls short of sparking a real regional clash, due to his understanding of the difficult situation faced by Turkey.

Meanwhile, Washington once again finds itself struggling to rein in the Sultan from Istanbul.

The United States has already ejected Ankara from the F-35 program after Erdogan opted to purchase advanced Russian-made S-400 air defense systems. American sanctions on Turkey, anchored by Congressional legislation, were put into place by the Trump administration, despite the relatively warm relationship that existed between the two presidents at that time.

President Biden’s less enthusiastic approach to Turkey and Erdogan hardly decreased tensions. Despite bilateral meetings held between the two leaders, most recently at the G-20 Summit in Rome in October, Erdogan chose to launch a new campaign to ‘retrieve Turkish funds’ paid in the past into the F-35 project, and which the U.S. refuses to return. The Turkish president even presented an alternative solution, in the form of supplying forty new F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, and upgrading the remaining Turkish air force fleet as a substitute for reimbursement.

Congress, it seems safe to assume, will not take a positive view of this offer. Erdogan has warned that a failure to meet his demands for compensation will lead him to further tighten relations with Russia, and to purchase additional Russian defense products, such as more S-400 batteries, advanced fighter jet platforms, and more. Such a maneuver would pose an even greater significant challenge for NATO, of which Turkey is a member.

Moreover, The US is intensifying its military presence in Greece, potentially at the expense of Its Turkish bases, a move that is obviously not viewed favorably in Turkey.

On the diplomatic front, Turkey has been involved in several highly publicized quarrels. Erdogan declared that he would eject ten foreign ambassadors – including the American ambassador – following a joint statement by them calling for the release of a jailed Turkish businessman. This diplomatic crisis was quickly resolved, and Erdogan backed down after most of the countries clarified that they did not mean to intervene in Turkey’s internal affairs. But the affair illustrates Erdogan’s new willingness to take punitive action –  even against the U.S.

The other quarrel was with Israel after an Israeli tourist couple was arrested for taking a photograph of the presidential palace – an act forbidden by law. Talks leading to their release were slow and grueling, and some observers claim that Erdogan exploited this civil incident in order to bolster his public image, by showing how he ‘stood up to Israel.’ In the aftermath of this incident, new lines of communication were set in place, including between Israel’s president and prime minister, and Erdogan. Yet this is no detente in the relations. It is merely a mechanism to prevent future tensions.  

In addition, reports of arrests of supposed spy networks belonging to Israel, Iran, and Russia surfaced, designed to signal to the region that Turkey is ‘determined’ to defend its national interests.

On the military front, Turkey has returned to a pattern of issuing military threats and taking action in its own regional environment. Examples include northern Syria, where Turkey threatened a new military operation to broaden its influence, undermining American and Russian interests. The threats were withdrawn after a stern message from Moscow, and it seems that for the time being Turkey’s appetite for a new conquest in northern Syria has faded.

In northern Iraq as well, Turkey has broadened its operations against “Kurdish terrorism”, but with no risk of a clash with any superpower in the area.

At the same time, Turkey has gone back to threatening Greece and Cyprus in the context of competition for natural gas reserves in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey takes a poor view of growing cooperation between Egypt, Greece, Cyprus and Israel within the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum group, and is seeking to torpedo its activities. To that end, after several months of quiet, Turkey has reactivated its gas research ships off the northern Cypriot coast, an act that is tantamount to marking out maritime territory.

At the same time, Turkey is increasing the presence of its military forces in Northern Cyprus, and has upgraded its airbases on the island, enabling them to launch drones. 

Alongside these developments, reports have surfaced over Turkey’s intentions to boost its forces deployed in Libya, on the eve of planned elections in that country.

At the same time, a Turkish ‘campaign of smiles’ has surfaced with the purpose of attracting foreign funds. It is marked by a willingness to swallow some pride and embrace the UAE’s funds, alongside a push for de-escalation of tensions with Egypt, Israel and even Saudi Arabia. This is joined by an attempt by Turkey to show a positive image on the global stage regarding climate change and other issues.

So long as Erdogan is consumed by domestic troubles, he can be expected to continue to show his claws. His occasional demonstration of pragmatism is intended solely to attract funds, and does not fool anyone that he has had a change of heart or that he is willing to let go of his neo-Ottoman aspirations.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

A hardening of U.S. policies toward Turkey is in order

By Tomer Barak

Relations between the United States and Turkey in recent years have been characterized by deep tensions over a series of divisive issues at the heart of their bilateral relations. Moreover, the two countries have not managed to abate tensions even though they are NATO partners, with proper lines of communications between governments and militaries, and had good dialogue at the presidential level during the Trump administration.

Tensions between the two countries have increased in recent months. The latest meeting between Presidents Erdogan and Biden on October 31 on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Rome took place in a strained environment. Biden expressed concern about Turkey’s purchase of S-400 air defense batteries from Russia, and about the state of human rights within Turkey.

Statement from both countries, indicating willingness to establish a new “joint mechanism” to strengthen ties, did not disguise the growing gap between their leaderships.

Recently, Erdogan threatened to designate 10  foreign ambassadors –  including the American ambassador – as “persona non grata”, following a joint statement by the ambassadors calling for the release of a jailed Turkish businessman.  

The diplomatic crisis was quickly resolved and Erdogan backed down after most of the countries clarified that they did not mean to intervene in Turkey’s internal affairs. But the affair underlines just how fragile Turkish-Western relations are, and that Erdogan in not deterred from taking punitive steps even toward very powerful nations. 

The ongoing fallout from Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 system from Moscow, and Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 fighter jet project, continue to reverberate.

Turkey is currently attempting to retrieve funds that it transferred in the past to the F-35 project –  a sum totaling, according to Erdogan, some 1.4 billion dollars. As an alternative, Turkey is willing to receive new U.S.-made F-16 jets, or to upgrade those already in its inventory.

Every transaction of this type would require approval from Congress where the current prevailing attitude to Turkey is highly critical of Ankara’s human rights record, its aggressive regional behavior, and its poor relations with Europe and the U.S.

Additional sore points – such as Turkey’s occupation of extensive areas of northern Syria, its aggressive conduct in Libya and the Mediterranean, illicit economic ties with Iran, support for Hamas, and the Biden administrations’ recognition of the Armenian genocide have all deepened the crisis in bilateral relations.

Washington’s policy to Turkey is binary. On the one hand, it still views Turkey as a significant partner and an important NATO member. As a result, the U.S. still attempts to safeguard continuous and positive working ties, as well as a dialogue between the leaderships. On the other hand, the understanding that Turkey is moving away from the West and is becoming a problem has sunk in. The U.S. therefore applies pressure and ‘sticks’ to prevent more negative conduct, with Congress appearing to be particularly hawkish in this regard. Until now, these efforts have led only to the most partial of successes.

Turkey, from its perspective, is skillfully maneuvering between the great powers. It is stretching the rope but not tearing it. It is exploiting opportunities to realize regional objectives, and to strengthen its strategic stability in northern Syria, Libya, Northern Cyprus, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey is also embarking on a military force build-up campaign using an array of defense product sources, while building its own domestic defense industry.

At the current point of time, it would be most beneficial to produce a stricter American approach towards Turkey, particularly in order to rein in its regional aggressive policies. In that regard, Turkey’s economic weakness at this time, and its severe currency crisis, could provide the U.S. and Europe with a needed and powerful leverage.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

Jordan’s positive era could lead to improved ties with Israel

By Tomer Barak

Despite facing an array of challenges, some of which may worsen again soon, Jordan`s King Abdullah should be quite pleased with recent trends  – both inside the kingdom and along its borders. 

This can be understood and analyzed through a number of factors.

Most importantly, it seems that the turmoil inside the royal court has quietened. The alleged April plot against the king, led by his half-brother, Prince Hamza, is over. Some high-ranking scapegoats were ‘sacrificed’ and placed on trial, but the family is working hard to show renewed unity within its ranks.

At the same time, Jordan has been able to block a third wave of Covid-19. Following the second wave that ended in May, Jordanians are gradually being vaccinated, the kingdom is receiving donations for further doses, and it has installed strong border supervision to prevent the entry of the Delta and other variants.

This situation could change rapidly, but it seems King Abdullah has gained a few months respite.

The economy is recovering to the extent possible from the previous pandemic wave. Jordan forecasts that in 2021, it will receive a total of four billion dollars of international assistance. Out of that sum, two billion dollars are designated for public programs such as health and social welfare, and not to security or military needs. This is a significant sum for development projects.

However, despite the positive economic indicators, the Jordanian economy remains shaky, lacks major growth engines, and remains heavily dependent on international assistance.

Externally, King Abdullah’s regional and international status is back on the up. He became the first Arab leader to meet with President Joe Biden in Washington in a visit that might mark the start of a new regional role for Jordan. The Trump administration viewed Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the centerpiece of the regional architecture.

King Abdullah is in a position to promote Israeli-Palestinian diplomatic talks without being in opposition to the Gulf states that signed the Abraham Accords. Rather than being mutually exclusive, Abdullah has found a way, under the Biden administration, to deliver the Palestinian story to the Abraham Accords momentum, using his natural position as ‘caretaker’ of the Palestinian issue. 

Meanwhile, Jordan is creating new relations with Egypt and Iraq. This axis is critical to Jordan’s stability, economic development, and struggle to influence Iraq against Iranian influence (and at the same time against Saudi and Emirati influence).

The upcoming American withdrawal from Iraq is set to intensify this regional competition.

Iran is seeking to strengthen its Shi’ite militias in Iraq, led by Kataib Hezbollah. Jordan is preparing for the American exit, and is working to secure its economic, political, and security interests in Iraq, and along the border, so that it does not become an eastern zone for Iranian-backed aggression.

In Washington, Abdullah spoke of Iranian-made drones that attacked Jordan and of his  concerns regarding Iran’s activities in the region. The King also mentioned that the conflict between Israel and Iran in Syria affects Jordan, and how, on several occasions, missiles fired at Israel from Syria landed in Jordan.

This is even more important in light of the fact that the U.S. is preparing to move some of its military presence from Qatar to Jordan in order to reduce exposure to Iran’s firepower range.

On the Syrian front, Jordan has managed to harness other Arab countries to improve their relations with the Assad regime, while improving trade channels along the border. It is not yet clear how renewed fighting in the Dara region, in southern Syria, will impact this trend. 

Jordan is studying the new government in Israel and it views a number of improvement points from its perspective, while recognizing the limitations of how far relations can really improve under current conditions.  

After years of bad blood between Abdullah and Netanyahu, a series of high-level bilateral meetings between the King and Israeli leaders has ignited hopes of a brighter future.

Core problems have not been solved, but a new process of dialogue has clearly begun.

In addition, several obstacles have been removed; Israel agreed to boost water supplies to Jordan, and the World Bank’s decision to abolish the Red Sea-Dead Sea program has extracted a thorny issue between the sides.

Tensions however very much remain. Israeli actions in East Jerusalem and settlement construction in Judea and Samaria receive ongoing Jordanian condemnations, just as they always have.

King Abdullah is aware that the new Israeli government cannot maneuver significantly regarding the Palestinians.  He recently said that the government was not ideal, but his discourse with its leaders gives him optimism.

Moreover, the relatively tranquil period gives the King the ability to advance relations with Israel – with minimal public wrath. This stands in stark contrast to previous times when protests led the King to take policy decision to foul relations as a tool to calm unrest.

The above leads to the conclusion that the glass ceiling of Israeli-Jordanian relations remain in place, although after years of being stuck, there is now a way to boost diplomatic, civil, and economic relations – albeit below that ceiling.

For Israel, improved relations serve the national interest. The peace treaty with Jordan is a core strategic asset, facilitating security arrangements along Israel’s eastern border, repelling threats from the East, and supporting regional stability. Jordan’s influence on the region is positive. Thus, even if the peace between the two nations is a cold one, especially due to anti-Israeli sentiment among the Jordanian public, the relationship forms another part of the regional puzzle which, when combined with the Abraham Accords, enables multi-lateral regional cooperation that includes Israel on a range of essential civilian matters.

The bottom line is that the Biden administration should view Jordan as a key component of its regional stability architecture, along with Egypt and the Gulf states. It would be a waste not to utilize King Abdullah’s window of opportunity to step forward with his vast experience and skills of being an innovator, a recruiter, and a connector who can energize regional processes.  

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

A change is needed in the U.S. approach to the Yemen war

By Tomer Barak

A brutal war has been raging in recent years in Yemen between Iranian-backed Houthi rebels (also known as Ansar Allah) and a Saudi-led coalition. Recent attempts by the UN and the U.S. to achieve a cease fire between the two sides have so far failed, and unfortunately have also emboldened the radical Iranian axis.

As a result of the war, Yemen is suffering from the most severe humanitarian crises in the world today. The number of casualties is staggering. Some 230,000 people have been killed (more than 100,000 as a result of the fighting and some 130,000 from indirect causes such as famine and poor health services), and some 4 million have become refugees and IDPs (Internally displaced people).

The conflict in Yemen has a long history. The last six years of intense fighting have led to a stalemate. Each side has dug into its positions, and the country is divided between the two parties (with other parts controlled by Jihadi groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and ISIS). Clashes are a daily affair, and the two sides fire projectiles at each other’s civilian population centers and infrastructure (airports and energy sectors).

Moreover, it seems that the conflict is growing in intensity, as the Shi’ite Houthis are engaged in a force build-up process that is accelerating, with high-quality know-how, technology, and capabilities delivered to them by Iran.

UN reports have indicated that Iran is providing the Houthis with sophisticated drones, anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles.

The Houthis of Yemen are a social and political tribal power who lived in the peripheral regions of Yemen’s mountainous northern region for years and attempted to gain political capital (with little success) during Yemen’s Sunni ruling government after the country unified in 1991. 

After 2011, when the wave of revolutions and insurgencies spread throughout the region, the Houthis saw an opportunity to gain control of further territory. They took advantage of Iran’s willingness to provide aid, and began stocking up on more advanced weapons. In late 2014 they marched south and managed to seize the capital, Sana`a. Since then, Iran’s willingness to provide support has allowed the Houthis to leap ahead in their military capabilities. 

Today, the Houthis control a third of Yemeni territory, which covers more than 10 million people, and they run a full government that includes components of a healthcare system, education, tax collection, and other state functions. Houthi diplomatic missions are active in Iran, among Iraqi militia areas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and other locations.

The Houthis area local organization with localized Yemeni interests, but they also adhere to a virulent anti-Western and anti-Israel ideology. The Houthi flag expresses this radicalism succinctly through its slogans of ‘Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, and Victory for Islam”.

The Houthi-run ‘state’ possesses an organized military with structured command and control, including a general headquarters that is responsible for future force build-up, and which features combat commands. The Houthi army includes an air wing that operates long-range cruise missiles, attack drones, and ballistic missiles.

The Houthis have proven long-range firepower, including unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles that can reach over 1,700 kilometers, with high levels of precision. Attacks on Riyadh and the UAE from Yemen have demonstrated such capabilities.

Alongside aerial power, the Houthis are in possession of advanced maritime capabilities and can interrupt the freedom of navigation in the Bab el-Mandeb strait at the southern end of the Red Sea. In recent years, they have demonstrated their willingness to target oil tankers (using UAVs, shore-to-sea missiles, and naval mines).

It must be assumed that the Houthis are continuing to develop long-range strike capabilities. Houthi leaders have threatened to strike Israel in the event of a future military conflict and are believed to be working diligently to acquire the ability to strike targets in Israel, more than 2,200 kilometers from their bases in Yemen.

The Biden administration led a rapid review of U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen. In this context, Washington canceled the Trump administration’s categorization of the Houthis as a terrorist entity (to allow NGOs access to Houthi-run areas), put a temporary hold on offensive weapons deals with Saudi Arabia, and doubled down on its diplomatic efforts to achieve an end to the conflict in Yemen.

However, this approach is only part of a larger U.S. campaign in the region, focusing in bringing Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table.

In that regard, The U.S. is trying to achieve a combination of several short-term goals: Reducing potential escalation that will harm the talks with Iran; managing the humanitarian crisis; helping Saudi Arabia to exit the quagmire in Yemen; and focusing U.S. military efforts to downsize Washington’s deployment in the greater Middle East.

However, past reconciliation attempts and ceasefire periods allowed the Houthis comfort zones for significant force build-ups, which they used to independently build their armed force with good manufacturing skills (contrary to common perceptions) and by receiving Iranian support. The result was always an intense escalation.

A premature ceasefire without a major pushback against the Houthis will likely counter American goals in the long run, and assist Iran in gaining a foothold in a sensitive area, allowing the Shi’ite axis to threaten regional, U.S., and Israeli interests. 

Instead, the U.S. should consider changing its approach based on an understanding that it has a window of opportunity to show firmness on Yemen together with its partners in the Gulf - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman.

The U.S. has the means to play a dominant role in the campaign, employing air power and intelligence resources while pressuring the Houthis extensively in their areas of control, possibly to the point of defeating them, and at the same time, to better supervise coalition efforts in order to make sure that armed conflict standards are being maintained.

This would send a clear message of U.S. determination throughout the region, and possibly be beneficial even to the nuclear talks with Iran.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.

Israel-Jordan Peace Remains Strong Despite Political Clashes

By Tomer Barak

The peace between Israel and Jordan forms one of the essential pillars of Middle East stability. In both Jerusalem and Amman, as well as in Washington, the accords, in addition to the basic stability of the Hashemite Kingdom, are viewed as a top priority strategic asset.

Yet, 26 years after the signing of the treaty, the peace remains “cold” and animosity toward Israel among the Jordanian public  is still high. Moreover, political clashes erupt from time to time.

In recent years, mutual relations have been shaped by two contrary directions:

On the upside, common security challenges, from ISIS to Iran, saw the countries maintain extensive security cooperation. The main element of which is defending the border (and common strategic interests) from criminal organizations and other radical elements aiming to harm both countries as well as the peace. Such cooperation has prospered even during periods of diplomatic tensions.

At the same time, non-security initiatives were introduced in support of Jordan’s economic needs. Usually, with low publicity to soften public pressures. Top examples are the supply of Israeli natural gas to the Kingdom, and the export of Jordanian goods through Haifa port.

 On the downside, despite the abovementioned mutual interests, in the political and public dimensions, Jordanian-Israeli relations are in a poor state.

Relations hit an all-time low in 2017 following Jordanian fury over the perception of how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu managed the Israeli embassy shooting crisis, in which an Israeli security guard was attacked and shot dead two Jordanian men.

The public embrace of the guard by Netanyahu fueled anti-Israeli sentiment, endangered the gas agreement, and lead finally to King Abdullah`s decision (2018) not to extend the land lease agreement that gave Israeli farmers access to land in the Tzofar and Naharaim enclaves. A year later, a move by Jordan to flex its muscles at the Al-Aqsa Mosque (a push to change the status-quo at the Bab-Al Rahma gate), put the countries on another political collision course.

Moreover, the fact that Jordan did not play a role in the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, and the Israeli government’s announcement of its intention to apply sovereignty to parts of the West Bank placed the king in an uncomfortable position. This state of affairs left Jordan as second choice for the United States behind the Gulf states, threatened  Jordan’s regional role regarding the Palestinian issue and its precedence over the Al-Aqsa Mosque site in Jerusalem.

The hostility was fueled further by Jordanian fears that Israel could try to ‘dump’ the Palestinian question at Jordan’s doorstep, by encouraging the idea that Jordan is a Palestinian state.

This was the baseline of the relationship, but in recent weeks new faultlines have emerged. The current crisis began with the cancellation of Jordanian Crown Prince, Hussein Bin Abdullah’s visit to Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in March (allegedly, due to disagreements over security arrangements), and the subsequent last-minute calling off of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s flight to the Gulf through Jordanian airspace.

In recent weeks, an alleged coup attempt by the King`s half-brother, Prince Hamza bin Hussain, has rocked the kingdom’s stability. Whether this was mere frustration that was portrayed too publicly, or a real move designed to strengthen Hamza’s role, it seems that the current incident is over and the family understands the need to show some unity in order to maintain stability.

Jordan navigates through many other basic challenges: severe economic challenges, a refugee problem, radical jihadist terrorism, and external threats.

The Covid-19 pandemic is taking a great toll on the Kingdom. The country is struggling to cope with a second and severe wave of the virus, and public frustration and mistrust toward the government is on the rise.

Yet King Abdullah, after more than 21 years on the throne, is skilled at conducting a balancing act and reinventing Jordan time and again. The king succeeded in attracting highly needed foreign aid to support Jordan’s  economy.  A third of the Kingdom’s  state budget comes from foreign aid, mostly from the West (U.S., IMF, World Bank and Europe), though Gulf states inject cash during crises.

The fact that multiple powerful players have a vested interest in keeping Abdullah’s rule stable is of high significance.

Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz recently stated that Israel has a clear interest to safeguard its peace treaty with Jordan, which is a strategic asset. A stable and prosperous Jordan is an explicit Israeli interest.

In light of Israel’s interest in keeping its longest border stable, there are some steps Jerusalem can take to promote this objective. This includes extending the existing gas deal; creating new cooperation on the supply of water –for example hosting Jordanian desalination plants on Israel’s Mediterranean coastline that would nourish Jordan’s water supply system; assistance in the field of desert agriculture; further employment of Jordanians in the tourist sector in Eilat, and more.

Such initiatives should be placed on the table despite the current climate, since Jordan’s economic development is an Israeli interest. One way to get around Jordanian public opposition to such cooperation is to offer it in the form of multi-lateral frameworks with the involvement of third parties such as a Gulf state.

But it takes two to tango. There is a need to educate the Jordanian people about the benefits of peace. Embracing the Abraham Accords and showing a willingness to publicly join the regional winds of change could stimulate public criticism, but in the long run, it will have beneficial impact. Israel and the U.S. must do more to show that the way forward includes a better acceptance of Israel as an integral, constructive, and essential part of the region.

Israel, Jordan and the U.S. have an obligation to work together to bolster relations and to add layers of civil cooperation on top the security dimension. The way to move forward in a bilateral manner will be slow and will face political and public friction. A quicker path is through multilateral-regional initiatives with international support. Our policy makers should seek out both paths at the same time.

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Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.