By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin
Israel and most of the Sunni Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (made up of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar) have yet to utilize the full potential that exists for future defense and technology cooperation.
Israel maintains official ties with some GCC states but not others, and each relationship has a unique nature. Oman is known as the Switzerland of the Middle East, and while it flirted with the idea of becoming an Abraham Accords state, it recently bowed to Iranian pressure and criminalized ties with Israel. The most significant milestone will occur when Israel and Saudi Arabia are able to initiate a more intensive and open relationship, which goes far beyond mutual normalization, and expands into technological and defense cooperation.
Diplomatically, this might strain the positions of Jordan (which appears to be in competition with Saudi Arabia over influence on the Temple Mount) and the Palestinian Authority, which could be upset by an Israeli–Saudi thaw before a breakthrough in attempts to reach a new Israeli–PA arrangement.
From a defense cooperation perspective, however, Israeli cooperation with the Gulf states in general, and Israeli – Saudi cooperation specifically, has a large potential that has yet to be fulfilled. Examples include the sharing of data from various defense sensors possessed by multiple countries to provide early alerts of Iranian threats, cooperation on intercepting common threats like Iranian missile and UAV attacks, and the sale of Israeli military capabilities to Gulf partners, like radars and surface to air missile interceptors, as well as modern laser systems. Such sales could even decrease the Gulf states dependence on American technology, creating a further motivation for them.
Israel’s September 2021 entry into the US’s CENTCOM framework, which covers the Middle East, can act as a useful platform for American-orchestrated Israeli–Gulf defense cooperation. While this will not amount to a Middle Eastern NATO with its own mutual assistance clause, it can still fundamentally transform the dynamics of the Middle East in the long run.
If Israel is able to break the official ice with Saudi Arabia, this would constitute a paradigm shift in the region compared with the current geo-political situation. Already, the 2020 Abraham Accords, signed between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, helped create knock-on shifts, such as Turkey’s change of attitude and a subsequent reduction in Ankara’s hostility toward Israel and Gulf states. A Saudi–Israeli accord would change the entire regional map.
An expansion of Israeli–Gulf ties would be powered to a major degree by the threat posed by Iran to the entire region, as well as the spread of Iranian-made weapons to the Tehran-led radical axis, and the expected arrival of Russian technology, such as Sukhoi SU-35 fighter jets, into Iran’s possessions.
Each of the six GCC countries is unique, and Israel has diverse types of relations with them. Kuwait, for example, has no formal ties with Israel, but low-profile business relationships do exist. Bahrain is economically weaker than other, wealthier GCC members, but Manama enjoys long standing good ties with Jerusalem, including defense ties. Qatar, for its part, is a problematic GCC member that plays double games with Israel and its adversaries – but eventually, Israel will need to learn how to maneuver among conflicting interests, and how to ‘dance’ with this state too.
Saudi Arabia remains the undisputed holy grail as far as Israel is concerned. One reason that this is the case is because the kingdom, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), is preparing to swap its large and powerful oil-based economy for a technology-based economy. This creates enormous potential for Israeli–Saudi cooperation. In addition, the Saudis are hungry for military capabilities to defend themselves against Iranian aggression. Riyadh has been purchasing ballistic weapons, guns, and drones from China, and recently attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Turkey.
These realities create a need for Israel and the US to reassess their total commitment to enforcing every clause of the traditional Qualitative Military Edge policy, which is backed by Congressional law that obligates the US not to sell any military capabilities to Middle Eastern clients if the sales can theoretically challenge Israeli military superiority.
Adherence to the QME has become almost religious in sections of some Israeli defense establishment, to the point where the most marginal of risks are exaggerated.
Assisting a Gulf ally like the UAE in acquiring F-35s is more important, for example, than enforcing every letter of the QME. The benefit of seeing a new regional partner emerge with capabilities that can challenge Iran outweighs the miniscule risk of such aircraft falling into hostile hands
In the coming years, Israel and its new Gulf partners, as well as future ones, have a historical opportunity to build new alliances, based not only on normalization, but also on putting advanced capabilities in the hands of Gulf partners who have good reason to prepare together for the threat posed by Iran.
Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.
Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.