Lessons from the Ukraine war

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

Many lessons are emerging from Russia’s war on Ukraine, some of which are of much interest to Israel.

One key lesson Israel can learn at this stage is that its decision to install various defenses on armored vehicles is critical and will likely enable the success of future Israeli ground maneuvers—unlike those of Russia and Ukraine.

Before continuing, it is important to issue a disclaimer: The attempt to apply lessons from the war in Ukraine to the Middle East is by nature complex. Among other things, the two regions do not share the same geography, climate, population or adversarial forces.

At the same time, as the war in Ukraine goes on, strategists worldwide are busy taking notes and looking for tactical and strategic insights that can be applied elsewhere—and the same is true in Israel.

So, what can we learn?

During the initial stage of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the war was marked by the failure of the Russian armored ground offensive, which invaded from the north towards Kyiv.

With time, we gradually learned that the offensive failed mainly due to logistical issues: Fuel and ammunition ran out and hundreds of tanks, APCs and trucks were abandoned or destroyed. Only some of these vehicles were hit and destroyed by anti-tank weapons, mainly Javelin missiles, which are devastatingly effective. It seems that armored maneuvers on long roads in dense anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) environments became too costly.

Israel, in contrast, has equipped a significant part of its armored brigades with active protection systems. This means Israeli maneuverability is relatively protected.

At the same time, using man-portable air defense systems (MANPADs), the Ukrainian military brought down about 200 Russian attack helicopters and close air-support craft.

Israeli close air support relies on stand-off precision strike munitions that eliminate the need to fly low and close.

In the first three weeks of the war, Ukraine used its Turkish armed UAVs—TB-2 Bayraktars. Their effectiveness was marginal and Russian air defenses downed the entire Ukrainian fleet fairly quickly. Is this scenario currently applicable to Middle Eastern arenas? For now, the likely answer is not yet.

With Russia failing to destroy all of Ukraine’s air defenses, it resorted to using huge numbers of cruise missiles—over 5,000—and hundreds of ballistic missiles to attack deep in Ukraine. This was before Iranian-made UAVs joined in the Russian attacks.

At first, Ukraine’s air defense systems struggled to intercept the cruise missiles, giving the Russians deep-strike precision stand-off capabilities for a while. But gradually, starting at the end of 2022, Western air defenses replaced the older Ukrainian Soviet-made systems, and Kyiv could shoot cruise missiles out of the sky alongside ballistic missiles and Iranian Shahed 131/136 UAVs. The U.S.-made Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC) 3 shot down  a few of Russia’s hypersonic Kinzhal missiles.

The arrival of the Shahed Iranian-made suicide drones, first used in Sept. 2019 against Saudi Aramco facilities, gave Russia a cheap, low-flying, precise firepower capability, which, together with the cruise missiles, are emptying out expensive Ukrainian air defense ammunition.

The warning here for Israel is clear. On the bright side, however, Israel’s Iron Dome interceptors are relatively cheap—up to 50 can be purchased for the cost of a single PAC 3 interceptor.

The bigger question for Israel stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war is whether Israel is correctly balancing its spending on armaments per million dollars as opposed to platforms. For example, should Israel purchase another squadron of F-35 fighter jets or spend the money on many more joint direct ammunition (JDAM) surface-to-air bombs, Iron Dome interceptors and 155-millimeter shells?

Meanwhile, Russia has fielded its own loitering munitions. One system, the Zala KYB, proved to be not very effective. The second, the Kalashnikov Lancet 3, has met with more success against Ukrainian targets such as radar installations, tanks, APCs and various air defense assets.

Ultimately, Russia’s long-range firepower threat remains substantial and Ukraine is using up ammunition in its air defenses at an alarming rate.

Ukraine, for its part, is missing key components in its arsenal that the United States has so far failed to deliver, such as heavy ground combat main battle tanks—the first Abrams tanks are not scheduled to arrive until the end of 2023)—aerial transport planes and long-range missiles.

However, Ukraine has made good use of anti-radiation missiles, such as high-speed radiation missiles (HARMs) that target enemy air defense radars and artillery-directing radars.

Ukraine is also heavily reliant on two types of U.S.-provided surface-to-surface guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS). There are two types: The M-142 launcher—a high mobility artillery rocket system (HIMAR)—and the M-270 guided rocket launcher.

Both of those systems provide Ukraine with a high and effective strike rate. The Russians are unable to intercept these weapons, forcing them to move their positions back from the front. This includes the relocation of key military headquarters and arms storage centers.

Ukraine has also received the Storm Shadow cruise missile from Britain, with a 250-kilometer range. The effectiveness of this weapon shows how important long-range, precision stand-off munitions are in modern warfare.

The West generally lacks precise surface-to-surface armaments that can reach targets 400 kilometers away. The U.S.’s own systems reach only around 300 kilometers, and they have yet to be delivered to Ukraine.

Israel, in contrast, has a range of high-precision long-range rockets in its inventory.

While the American weapons industry is supplying Ukraine with huge amounts of equipment and the White House keeps pumping cash into the Ukrainian war effort, it must be clear to Israel that no such precedent would be followed in its case. Israel will have to stand on its own two feet in the event of a major war.

Ukraine has 45 million people, not counting the five million refugees who have left the country. Russia's population is some 150 million. This means that both countries can put large numbers of soldiers on the ground. They have both sustained huge losses, but Ukraine has proven its long-standing fighting power, unity and national resilience.

These factors are not relevant to Israel, which can neither sustain such losses nor absorb warfare for that long without a rapid endgame due to its small geographical size and population. In Israel’s case, a ground maneuver will be essential as soon as the war begins.

The international community may condemn or even try to intervene in response to significant civilian casualties in a future Middle East war. Therefore, careful Israeli planning and strategic decision-making are crucial to executing a successful offensive while minimizing collateral damage.

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

Israel, Gulf states have yet to fulfill potential of defense sales

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

Israel and most of the Sunni Arab countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (made up of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar) have yet to utilize the full potential that exists for future defense and technology cooperation.

Israel maintains official ties with some GCC states but not others, and each relationship has a  unique nature. Oman is known as the Switzerland of the Middle East, and while it flirted with the idea of becoming an Abraham Accords state, it recently bowed to Iranian pressure and criminalized ties with Israel. The most significant milestone will occur when Israel and Saudi Arabia are able to initiate a more intensive and open relationship, which goes far beyond mutual normalization, and expands into technological and defense cooperation.

Diplomatically, this might strain the positions of Jordan (which appears to be in competition with Saudi Arabia over influence on the Temple Mount) and the Palestinian Authority, which could be upset by an Israeli–Saudi thaw before a breakthrough in attempts to reach a new Israeli–PA arrangement.

From a defense cooperation perspective, however, Israeli cooperation with the Gulf states in general, and Israeli – Saudi cooperation specifically, has a large potential that has yet to be fulfilled. Examples include the sharing of data from various defense sensors possessed by multiple countries to provide early alerts of Iranian threats, cooperation on intercepting common threats like Iranian missile and UAV attacks, and the sale of Israeli military capabilities to Gulf partners, like radars and surface to air missile interceptors, as well as modern laser systems. Such sales could even decrease the Gulf states dependence on American technology, creating a further motivation for them.

Israel’s September 2021 entry into the US’s CENTCOM framework, which covers the Middle East, can act as a useful platform for American-orchestrated Israeli–Gulf defense cooperation. While this will not amount to a Middle Eastern NATO with its own mutual assistance clause, it can still fundamentally transform the dynamics of the Middle East in the long run.

If Israel is able to break the official ice with Saudi Arabia, this would constitute a paradigm shift in the region compared with the current geo-political situation. Already, the 2020 Abraham Accords, signed between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, helped create knock-on shifts, such as Turkey’s change of attitude and a subsequent reduction in Ankara’s hostility toward Israel and Gulf states. A Saudi–Israeli accord would change the entire regional map.

An expansion of Israeli–Gulf ties would be powered to a major degree by the threat posed by Iran to the entire region, as well as the spread of Iranian-made weapons to the Tehran-led radical axis, and the expected arrival of Russian technology, such as Sukhoi SU-35 fighter jets, into Iran’s possessions.

Each of the six GCC countries is unique, and Israel has diverse types of relations with them. Kuwait, for example, has no formal ties with Israel, but low-profile business relationships do exist. Bahrain is economically weaker than other, wealthier GCC members, but Manama enjoys long standing good ties with Jerusalem, including defense ties. Qatar, for its part, is a problematic GCC member that plays double games with Israel and its adversaries – but eventually, Israel will need to learn how to maneuver among conflicting interests, and how to ‘dance’ with this state too.

Saudi Arabia remains the undisputed holy grail as far as Israel is concerned. One reason that this is the case is because the kingdom, under the leadership of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), is preparing to swap its large and powerful oil-based economy for a technology-based economy. This creates enormous potential for Israeli–Saudi cooperation. In addition, the Saudis are hungry for military capabilities to defend themselves against Iranian aggression. Riyadh has been purchasing ballistic weapons, guns, and drones from China, and recently attack unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Turkey.

These realities create a need for Israel and the US to reassess their total commitment to enforcing every clause of the traditional Qualitative Military Edge policy, which is backed by Congressional law that obligates the US not to sell any military capabilities to Middle Eastern clients if the sales can theoretically challenge Israeli military superiority.

Adherence to the QME has become almost religious in sections of some Israeli defense establishment, to the point where the most marginal of risks are exaggerated.

Assisting a Gulf ally like the UAE in acquiring F-35s is more important, for example, than enforcing every letter of the QME. The benefit of seeing a new regional partner emerge with capabilities that can challenge Iran outweighs the miniscule risk of such aircraft falling into hostile hands

In the coming years, Israel and its new Gulf partners, as well as future ones, have a historical opportunity to build new alliances, based not only on normalization, but also on putting advanced capabilities in the hands of Gulf partners who have good reason to prepare together for the threat posed by Iran. 

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

Russia-Ukraine war: A driver for Israeli defense exports to Europe?

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

As European states reassess their security situation amid the fallout of Russia’s war against Ukraine, signs are growing that acquisitions of Israeli defense products by European clients – and not only European clients – could substantially increase.

In 2021, according to Defense Ministry figures, Europe was the highest importer of Israeli defense technology. Overall exports hit a new record of $11.3 billion that year, with Europe accounting for 41% of that figure.

However, for this to increase further, European defense budgets will need to rise too, and the extent to which this will happen depends greatly on whether European states develop comprehensive defense strategies.

Such strategies go much further than decisions on defense budget increases.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was one of the biggest opponents of former US President Donald Trump’s insistence that NATO states allocate 2% of their GDP to defense. Now, Scholz how pledged to create a 100 billion Euro defense fund, and exceed the 2% threshold. But will this commitment last into the long-term? It is too soon to answer that question and meanwhile, the annual defense budget that Scholz is proposing is based on a gradual increase, not an immediate jump.

The second key question pertaining to Israeli defense exports to Europe relates to Israeli portfolio adaptability. Are the lessons now emerging from the Russian – Ukraine war relevant to Israeli defense company specialty areas, in a manner that favors distinct products from Israel?

The answer to this is more complex than meets the eye. The United States, for example, can easily supply Ukraine with anti-tank Javelin missiles, or Stinger man-portable air defense systems, by taking them out of US Military storage sites, or from storage facilities allocated for allies. Israel is not in the same situation.

While Rafael has been able to mass produce spike missiles for European clients (Euro Spike), Israeli UAV makers must produce systems from scratch, as is the case with most Israeli defense exports.

The repertoire of Israeli defense companies is generally strongest when it comes to suites for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance requirements, but not the platforms themselves.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance elements such as radars, on the other hand, are easier for Israeli companies to supply in significant numbers.

Additionally, some of the battlefield lessons emerging from Ukraine have changed since Russia launched its offensive in February. At the start of the war, songs of praise were written for Turkey’s Bayraktar TB-2 armed UAVs from the medium altitude long endurance category. Yet limited release of video footage of Bayraktar strikes is testimony of the limited and sporadic use made of this system (unlike the Azeri use of the Bayraktar against Armenian forces in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war).

In the skies, Russia effectively controls the medium to high altitudes, while neutralizing the armed UAVs. It is reasonable to assume that Israeli-made lightweight UAVs or loitering munitions will perform in this environment.

Both Russia and Ukraine have abandoned the low-altitude arena. For Russia, this means precision strike and ground support fire capabilities were largely lost, and Russia reverted to artillery strikes and high-altitude air strikes, conducted by powerful assault helicopters and fighter jets.

These trends reveal three things to Israel’s defense industry. The first is the growing need for standoff weapons, enabling warfighters to avoid getting too close to the ranges of enemy firepower.

Additionally, there is a growing need for advanced soft and hard kill active defense suites for various platforms such as tanks, helicopters, etc.  

Thirdly, air defense requirements are diverse. The Ukrainians are armed with a multitude of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, and not all warfighters are covered under medium-long range air defense umbrella.

Thus, it is unsurprising that Germany and others are showing interest in Israeli missile defense systems, like the Arrow program, and airborne balloon-carrying radar systems, which can detect cruise missiles and UAVs better than ground-based radars.

Meanwhile, the role of precision surface-to-surface rockets is increasing in the war, as the US and UK supply the Ukrainians with such systems, for example, GMLRS. Even though their numbers are small so far, their influence is highly significant.

In the cyber sphere, Russia failed to achieve its objectives, causing limited damage to Ukraine. Still, Ukraine’s communications networks, water, and electricity, transportation, keep working – and this underlines the central importance of cyber defense systems.

Electronic warfare is undoubtedly growing more influential as the war progresses.

These are the essential lessons that Israel’s defense industry can take away thus far from the war raging in Europe.

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.

North Korea’s arms set to influence the Middle East

By Yair Ramati

The weapons industry worldwide is flourishing. But while sales of classic military platforms – tanks, planes, and ships – have not stopped, it is UAVs, projectiles, and munitions, both offensive and defensive, that are driving the industry forward.

While in the past, the great powers – the United States., Russia, and China – had a monopoly over advanced armaments, today medium-sized and even small countries are producing them as well. North Korea, South Korea, Iran, and Turkey all manufacture advanced military equipment. Israel, of course, does too.

Against this global backdrop, it appears as if the flow of weapons from the Democratic Republic of North Korea to Iran is set to once again influence the strategic landscape of the Middle East.

Some waves of North Korean force build-up have in the past reached Iran and its proxies – either through direct technological transfers from Pyongyang to Tehran, such as missiles, or through ‘twists’ that the Iranian weapons producers conducted on North Korean technology.

North Korea is rapidly accelerating its force build-up, and this is likely to result in new weapons ending up in the hands of Iran.  Among these new weapons are  a combination of high-level technologies and products, such as submarine-launched cruise missiles and air defense systems.

This time, the direction of ‘traffic’ could be two-way, with Iranian drone technology possibly heading in the opposite direction from Iran to North Korea. 

Pyongyang has an economic interest in selling its arms to the Middle East, and its technology has significantly influenced Iran’s missile program. Mutual visits between Iranian and North Korean defense and weapons industry officials are routine.

As global tensions rise, including in southeast Asia, North Korea is ratcheting up its arms development. The past has demonstrated that this affects the Middle East, fueling Iranian capabilities and ambitions.

Just as Iran has in the past taken Russian missiles, such as the Kh-55 air-to-surface cruise missile, turning it into three different Iranian missiles, it will likely do the same when it receives North Korea’s domestically produced cruise missile.

These types of technological transfers fuel Iran’s weapons industries, which are decentralized and run along parallel lines to encourage competition and creativity.

In Iran today, multiple weapons production centers are active, with tension between them, in a way that is reminiscent of Israel’s defense industries in the 1970s and 80s. Even today, Israeli defense companies compete in producing missile defense systems, for example.

The South Korean connection

Meanwhile, as its arch-enemy North Korea develops new arms, South Korea is stepping up its own domestic arms industry production – and this trend will result in new competition in export markets for Israeli defense companies.

Israel already competes with Turkey’s weapons industries, which have deployed a modern armed drone, the Bayraktar TB2, used effectively by Azerbaijan in the recent Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and which has been acquired by Poland.

Thus, the U.S., Russia, and China are no longer the only major armed UAV exporters.

These developments also mean that traditional arms proliferation treaties are gradually losing their relevance.

The U.S. could no longer limit South Korea’s initiative to build missiles beyond the 300-kilometer range, enabling Seoul to develop missiles that cover the whole of North Korea –600 miles. South Korea also has missiles that have ranges of beyond 700 miles. This represents another step in the erosion of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The latest example of this is the U.S. decision to sell submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles to Australia, as part of its nuclear-propelled submarine deal. Until now, only Britain has been allowed to purchase Tomahawk missiles. Thus, another erosion takes place.

In summary, the world of armament industries is flourishing in an unprecedented manner, as medium-sized and smaller countries become significant players in the market. North Korea is producing a whole spectrum of armaments, and these will, in one form or another, find their way to Iran, influencing the Iranian threat profile faced by Israel.

Meanwhile, Israeli defense industries must prepare themselves to compete with South Korean for exports.

And worldwide, arms treaties are beginning to recede as they lose their gravitas.

With precision weapons becoming ubiquitous, Iran and its proxies are able to proliferate this technology, and Israel and Saudi Arabia have been the chief countries to suffer from this in the Middle East.

Air bases, a major tool for power projection, are under increasing threat from precision firepower, and Israel as well as regional pragmatic states need to think of new ways to counter the threat, including the formation of their own active missile units for returning fire in ways not dependent on fighter jets. 

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Improved Iron Dome stands up to tougher, newer challenges

By Shachar Shohat & YAIR RAMATI

The recent round of escalation between Israel and the Gazan terror factions, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), saw Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system intercept a variety of rockets and drones, in an extremely high stress environment.

Based on the available information and reports by the IDF Spokespersons Unit, it is possible to observe the improved performance of this unique air defense system,  which only recently celebrated a decade since its first real-world interception.

Hamas and PIJ launched some 4,360 rockets, at least six attack drones and many mortar shells at the State of Israel within a relatively short time frame –  just 11 intensive days.

Their fire rate averaged at around 400 rockets per day, most through intensive salvos, designed to overwhelm and defeat the Israeli Iron Dome batteries. This seems to represent a new threat era, with the recent conflict being a microcosm of the coming decade’s global threat and response trends.

Unlike previous conflicts in which standard rockets with low-lethality warheads were launched at Israel, this time the threat we saw was upgraded with domestically developed and produced rockets, carrying medium-weight warheads.

One of the important lessons that emerged from Operation Guardian of the Walls is that Hamas and PIJ have been able to establish a local rocket production capability,  clearly based on Iranian know-how. The enemy arsenals also included a few high precision drones whose design originates in Iran. None however were able to successfully hit Israeli territory.

Hamas and PIJ sought to saturate Israeli air defenses with large salvos fired rapidly, in some cases with around 100 projectiles in the air simultaneously. They fired from different azimuths at the same time, and used depressed trajectories with lower flight altitudes and shorter routes to targets in Israel.

Defending most of the Israeli civilian population and critical defense sites against such salvos, at various ranges, day and night, was no simple task for Israel’s air defense systems.  

The question of whether other air defense systems can cope with a quantitively similar threat, and also reach a reasonable performance within budget limits is very much an open one for all Western observers.

An additional and key aspect of defending air space in this conflict was the challenge of managing the air-situation picture.

Managing this complex, crowded event was made possible by an array of advanced sensors, radars, electro-optical devices, and sophisticated battle management algorithms, which meant that the IDF could deal with time-critical scenarios.

 As the rocket salvoes flew to their intended civilian targets in Israel, and many thousands of debris pieces created by previous interceptions fell from the sky, over 160 airborne platforms were flying nearby.

Fortunately, there was only a single report of an incident of Israeli friendly fire at an air platform (a drone), while the air defense batteries successfully conducted dozens of simultaneous rocket interceptions.

 Some observers attribute this success to the coherent, advanced, and centralized engagement structure of the Israeli air defense system, and the utilization of robust multiple sensors.

Quantitative figures published by the IDF spokesman, can be summarized by the following analysis: Despite the tragic cases of Israeli casualties in this conflict – 11 dead from rockets, many wounded, and some physical damage, this translates into roughly one casualty for every 400 launched rockets/mortar shells.

In light of the extent of the threat, the role of Iron Dome in preventing hundreds of casualties is obvious.

Nevertheless, the casualty count does not reflect the terror experienced by the civilian population in Israel. Millions of Israelis were forced to seek shelter from incoming rockets during day and night hours, while also dealing with physical damage and economic losses.

The combination of active air defense and passive defense (the latter made up of accurate warnings for the general population and compliance with those warnings by heading to safe zones) was a key factor for minimizing loss of life in Israel.

Some 15% of the rockets fell within Gaza, reflecting poor local design and production. These failed launches killed around 25 Gazans. 

Iron Dome, which is programmed to only intercept projectiles heading to populated areas, ended up engaging almost half of the rockets fired into Israel. This reflects an improvement in the accuracy of enemy rockets. During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, a quarter of Hezbollah’s rockets reached built up areas.

All of the drones launched at Israel were intercepted by Iron Dome or air-to-air missiles fired by the Israeli Air Force, or other ‘soft defense’ means.

At the end of the conflict, Iron Dome was able to keep up its unmatched 90% kill rate. Iron Dome has now intercepted over 4,000 projectiles since first becoming operational in 2011.

Maintaining a robust inventory of interceptors has been proven to be a key capability in dealing with the new projectile threat.

It is fair to assume that the latest conflict with Hamas and PIJ will not be the last. As a result, Israeli air defense systems must remain on the path of ongoing upgrades, and to systematically remain a step ahead of the enemy.

The combination of professional air defense teams, support from the United States Missile Defense Agency, and local creative industry solutions mean that this is a mission that can be met.

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Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

The UAE’s defense industry has significant potential for Israeli companies

By Yair Ramati

Israeli defense delegations did not attend Abu Dhabi’s IDEX international defense exhibition in late February as they had planned to, and although pandemic-related flight restrictions were cited by the Israeli government as the reason, another possible reason for this may have been due to security concerns.

IDEX is testimony to the United Arab Emirate’s policy of investment in order to promote its own defense industry, and its growing success in developing significant defense products.

The Emirati Edge advanced technology group for defense products, which recently announced a memorandum of understanding with Israel Aerospace Industries for the development of a counter-UAV system tailored to the UAE market, is the latest signal that the UAE, like Saudi Arabia, is determined to build an independent defense industry, which includes independent production capabilities.

Israel too could find a significant role to play in this market, despite the damage that was caused by the absence of Israeli defense companies from IDEX.

Part of what will determine Israel’s involvement in this market will be the openness of the Israeli defense establishment toward the UAE, and its willingness to share technology with the Emiratis.

The more Israel travels down the road of cooperation and moves away from traditional buyer – seller relations, the more likely Israel will be able to establish an important defense industry presence in the UAE and in the Gulf region.

The remaining open question is how long it will take the UAE to reach advanced indigenous defense production capabilities. The UAE has likely been observing other models of domestic defense industries in the region, such as Turkey, Israel, and Iran, and will draw inspiration from those models.  

What begins with maintenance can evolve within years into licensed production.

The UAE appears particularly keen to produce its own drones, and has brought in companies that build aircraft to learn from them.

The Chinese defense industry model can also serve as a valuable lesson for the UAE, since China did not start off by producing high quality drones as it does today, but gradually built up to this level of production with time.

An additional impetus for the UAE is the American decision to reevaluate the decision to sell it and Saudi Arabia air-to-ground munitions, as well as the U.S. reassessment of a decision to sell the UAE Reaper drones and F-35 fighter jets in a deal signed with the Trump administration.

 The UAE is already home to multiple international arms exporters. The country’s navy, ground forces, and air forces all have a combination of European and American equipment. For some platforms, like the fifth-generation fighter jet, the U.S.-made F-35 is the only game in town. In the field of armed drones and missile defense, Europe has little to offer the Emiratis, meaning that should the U.S. decline to sell these products, the UAE (like Saudi Arabia) will run into trouble.

Yet the UAE also cooperates with China and Russia. It has in the past purchased 50 Russian-made Pantsir medium-range ground-based air defense systems and upgraded them, as well armed drones from China. The latter were used to strike the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen and for air strikes in Libya.

The UAE has even purchased missiles from North Korea to support its operations in Yemen.

During the IDEX conference, representatives from across the Russian and Chinese defense industries were present, as well as a high number of representatives from Germany. The UAE is teaming up with German company Rheinmetall Defense for the joint production of shore-to-sea missiles.

Looking ahead, the UAE is interested in gaining the ability to produce its own loitering attack systems, and an array of bombs. The Halcon Emirati defense company is expanding its production program of the Desert Sting 16 precision guided glide weapons, launched from aircraft at ground targets.

Going forward, it is fair to expect the UAE to condition future acquisitions with foreign defense companies on close cooperation and technology sharing, and not to expect traditional buyer- seller relations.

Potential shifts in America’s defense policy toward Gulf states can be expected to create pressure on all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council – and not only the UAE. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are also bracing for changes, and pressure on these states appears to be highly problematic from their perspective.

The reassessment by the Biden administration on munitions sales is merely one aspect of an American shift, and the decision not to sell air-to-ground bombs for use in Yemen should be seen as a litmus test on future American steps.

Much like Israel greatly expanded its domestic defense industry following the French arms embargo on it in 1967, the same response could happen among Gulf states.

This could act as an invitation for China and Russia to expand their pre-existing involvement in the Gulf defense market through new acquisitions – while also creating potential space for Israel.  

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Here’s how Israel can maintain an advantage in the aerial systems race

By Shachar Shohat & YAIR RAMATI

For the past century, ever since the arrival of the aircraft on history’s stage as an effective and significant military combat tool, a race has been underway between offensive aerial platforms and defensive ground systems.

The basic process by which aerial platform capabilities are developed and then followed by a ground-based response has been with us for over a century. It is a cat-and-mouse game: Once an operational or technical gap appears, and the defense system finds itself lagging behind the attacking air power, the attackers gain air control, with all of its implications. Then the gap is closed, meaning that air defense systems regain an ability to extract high prices from attackers, to the point of being intolerable for them.

In the Middle East, this dynamic was illustrated when, toward the end of the War of Attrition in 1970, dense Egyptian air defense systems challenged the Israeli Air Force’s aerial freedom of operation for the first time.

At the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egyptian and Syrian air defense systems were so effective that air support became an almost impossible mission. Israel lost no less than 102 aircraft during the war; and at its end, it was clear that dealing with air defense systems had become the Israeli Air Force’s biggest challenge.

But in the First Lebanon War of 1982, the Israeli Air Force proved it had developed a clear edge over Russian air defense systems, as it destroyed 19 Syrian batteries and downed 97 Syrian jets without suffering any losses of its own. It was a milestone in the race and formed a revolution in the attacker-defender balance. Yet, it caused Middle Eastern adversaries to turn to new directions.

Even prior to the 1982 war, a new gap had appeared — the threat of ballistic projectiles — one that was left unanswered for years. During the First Gulf War in 1991, Israel was hit by some 40 Al-Hussein missiles fired from Iraq, a ballistic missile that had been used extensively in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War.

The late internalization of the threat dealt Israel a significant strategic blow. In March 2000, however, a partial reply appeared when Israel deployed an operational Arrow system for the interception of ballistic missiles.

The second aspect of the gap created by ballistic threats arrived through rockets and artillery shells. During the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Israel was hit by some 3,500 rockets without the ability to defend against them.

This gap was reduced, at least in the Gaza arena vis-a-vis Hamas, when in April 2011 the Iron Dome air defense system conducted its first interception. Since then it has continued to provide a defensive umbrella throughout several rounds of conflict.

Further afield, we have seen the cat-and-mouse dynamic continue: In September 2019, Iran launched a surprise attack on oil and gas facilities in Saudi Arabia using attack drones and small Iranian-made cruise missiles, placing a question mark over the kingdom’s air defense systems.

The 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan saw the collapse of Armenian front-line air defenses, exposing its Army to systematic destruction through a combination of precision-guided weapons, loitering munitions and armed drones.

Two basic insights arise from these developments. The first is that threats develop in jumps, while responses usually require lengthy development phases. The second is that the timing of conflicts determine whether the defender will have an adequate response to the threat, and what price the attacker or defender will pay accordingly.

For those developing solutions, a built-in conflict exists between working according to procedure and working quickly. Those who want to complete the full processes will need longer. We suggest more daring efforts and more risk-taking, and recommend assessing the form of future threats to guide development.

For example, low-grade rockets evolved into industrial-made rockets, which then morphed into heavy projectiles before becoming accurate missiles. These have been joined by drones, mortar shells and cruise missiles. The Iron Dome can tackle all of these.

Looking ahead is crucial. In addition, spiral development, involving step-by-step innovations, is the right course.

In terms of risk-taking, those unwilling to accept failures during trials will experience incremental progress rather than breakthroughs. At its core, this struggle is an arms race, and if adversaries catch up, the price will be high.

If in the past 50 years the dynamic of threat development was moderate, today the rate has accelerated, while the technological amplitude and range of threats is almost endless.

This is a complex and challenging combination for air defense system developers and operators, which sometimes finds expression in the need to deal with painful dilemmas, such as giving a reasonable response in certain areas only.

As the rate of new threat appearances grows rapidly, air defenders are tasked with the difficult mission of finding rapid solutions. This entails taking risks and breaking rigid development principles, such as systematic technological learning. It also calls for daring in the management of development, including the willingness to absorb failures, and the close cooperation between intelligence elements as well as development and operational personnel.

Israel must win this cat-and-mouse game to maintain its aerial supremacy.

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Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

MILITARY LESSONS: ARMENIA-AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT

By Yair Ramati

The recent war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which began on September 27 and ended on November 10, lasted six weeks. It offers valuable lessons for militaries worldwide.

The clash was the latest in the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, but ended this time with an overwhelming Azerbaijani victory, an outcome that is a far cry from the First Nagorno-Karabakh War (1988-1994), which ended in a stinging Azeri defeat. 

The history of the conflict goes all the way back to the period following World War One. During the Soviet era, Nagorno-Karabakh, despite having an ethnic Armenian majority, was governed as an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. The disintegration of the Soviet Union opened the door for severe fighting that ended in 1994 through international mediation. 

The initial Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in 30,000 deaths, the displacement of approximately 725,000 Azerbaijanis and between 300,000–500,000 Armenians from both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The terms of the end of that war reflected Armenia’s victory. 

Azerbaijan covers a geographical area more than two-and-a-half times greater than Armenia, and its population is more than three times the size of Armenia’s. Azerbaijan has the larger standing army and the larger number of reserves. Both sides rely mainly on Russian equipment. The armored forces of the two countries are nearly even in terms of main battle tanks. In the areas of artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sensors, precision-guided missiles, and air defense - the Azeri side enjoys superiority.

It now appears safe to conclude that Azerbaijan’s preparations for the 2020 conflict succeeded in giving it a significant qualitative edge. Baku achieved this by diversifying its military procurement. In recent years, Azerbaijan has sought multiple partners rather than rely on Russia as a sole supplier for technological arms purchases. It has reached out to Europe, Turkey, China, Israel, and others. 

Baku's focus was on purchasing high-tech weaponry required for battlefield superiority. Its superior resources and strategic insights gave it a significant qualitative technological edge over Armenia. 

The latest conflict can be divided into four consecutive phases. In the first phase, both sides inflicted mutual blows in a relatively balanced fight. The Armenian forces destroyed dozens of Azerbaijani tanks and APCs while their air defenses downed aircraft, UAV, and commando helicopters. The Azeris, on the other hand, used armed UAVs and loitering munitions to fight back, but made little, if any, progress on the ground.

In the second phase, which followed a successful Azerbaijani suppression of Armenian front-line air defense assets, the dominant battle pattern emerged. Armed Azerbaijani UAVs, loitering munitions, and attack helicopters were able to implement their close-air support plan and effectively target Armenian ground forces, while Azerbaijani ground forces made some advances. 

In the third phase, Armenia began launching a barrage of inaccurate ballistic missiles toward major cities in Azerbaijan out of frustration, as the Azerbaijanis used their armed UAV and loitering munitions for the systematic attrition of Armenian forces while their ground forces continued to make initial gains. 

In the fourth and final phase, high intensity fire was used by both sides. The Armenians fired rockets and missiles at Azerbaijani cities, while the Azerbaijani army continued with its advances from the north (minimal) and the deep penetration in the south of Nagorno-Karabakh, along the border with Iran. 

Precision-guided weapons played a key role in the battlefield, including short and long-range anti-tank guided missiles, loitering munitions, guided rockets ,and tactical missiles. 

The fighting also demonstrated that drone (UAV) warfare is an essential element in the art of modern warfare. It was Azerbaijan that deployed most of the drones in the war, with its military reportedly operating drones purchased from Turkey, and Israeli Harop suicide drones (loitering munitions). Armenian armed forces could only defend against these using their limited number of modern surface-to-air missiles. 

While Armenia was able to shoot down 25 Azerbaijani drones, the attrition rate was in favor of Azerbaijan, due to its combined use of drones and loitering munitions. 

Both sides used heavy artillery rockets as well as tactical missiles. Armenia's arsenal included Russian-made SCUD-B, SS-21 and Iskander tactical missiles, while the Azerbaijanis, according to reports, used Soviet-made Smerch 300 mm rockets and precision guided projectiles, including Israeli EXTRA long-range rockets and LORA high precision missiles.

Most of the Armenian long-range strikes targeted civilian centers while the Azerbaijanis used their precision arsenal for deep strikes against military infrastructure targets, such as S-300 air defense batteries. Azerbaijan did not have any alert system in place for its civilian population prior to hostile projectile impact, nor did it possess any intercept capabilities.

During the second, third and fourth phase of the fighting, the Armenians used (either directly or via Russian proxies) modern electronic countermeasure equipment. 

In addition, the entire battlefield in Nagorno-Karabakh experienced severe satellite GPS/GLONASS signal denial. This combination had an adverse impact on various precision-guided weapon systems that rely on continuous GPS signals and data-links. This may have contributed to the relatively high number of lost UAVs and loitering munitions.  

Hackers from Armenia, Azerbaijan and their respective allies actively participated in the cyber arena, targeting official sites, posting misinformation, or even trying to attack defense sites. 

Azerbaijan was able to suppress the mobile Armenian air defense force, but this took at least four days and came at the cost of significant losses. Once this was achieved, the picture on the battlefield changed dramatically, presenting a clear Azerbaijani advantage. 

In summary, small-scale conflicts such as the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war can tell other militaries a lot about preparations and operational implementation. 

A robust procurement strategy, along with state-of-the-art technology, the approach adopted by Azerbaijan, pays off. 

The conflict also demonstrated how new media and extensive propaganda campaigns are an integral aspect of 21st century armed conflicts. 

Finally,  the conflict exposed the fact that without effective and modern 360-degree air defense, all ground forces are subject to a high rate of attrition. Countries that wish to secure their ground forces must procure modern air defenses capable of handling the precision threats of the new battlefield.

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel.

How to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge in a changing Middle East

By Yair Ramati

The United States’ long-standing commitment to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge, or QME, forms a central pillar of Israel’s security strategy.

The U.S. commitment reflects the bipartisan support for Israel that has been expressed by all recent U.S. administrations and Capitol Hill. It encompasses multiyear military financial assistance made available to Israel for procuring weapons systems, as part of the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding; the joint development and production of missile defense systems; the sharing of intelligence information and missile alerts; and the holding of joint military exercises. American support also takes the form of pre-positioning U.S. military equipment on Israeli territory.

In order to ensure that this cooperation remains sturdy into the foreseeable future, both Israel and the U.S. will need to address several emerging challenges. Chief among them is Iran, whose hegemonic ambition in the Middle East is sparking a broader arms race between the Iranian-led Shiite axis and Arab Sunni states. This arms race jeopardizes Israel’s QME.

An additional challenge is the sheer volume of defense deals undertaken in the Middle East since the beginning of the 21st century, totaling hundreds of billions of dollars.

A third factor in considering threats to Israel’s QME is the fact that while the U.S. remains the main supplier of weapons systems in the region, European, Russian and even Chinese defense industries are becoming more prominent suppliers to Middle Eastern states.

The systems sold by these counties range from items that the U.S. has refused to sell (sometimes due to Israeli objections), such as armed drones, ballistic missiles, main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, air defense batteries and more.

In light of the above, there are Middle Eastern states — the Gulf petrodollar nations — with deep pockets that could easily afford to buy significant maritime and/or airborne fleets that are out of Israel’s economic reach. The higher the cost of platforms, the more the trend is pronounced.

At the same time, the Middle East is undergoing rapid changes, with three Arab countries — two of them Gulf states — signing historic normalization treaties with Israel, creating a different environment when compared to just a decade ago.

Israel’s core strategy of enhancing, strengthening and deepening its ties with Gulf states relies on a common mutual interest based on a view of Iran as a strategic enemy. With both Israel and the Gulf states facing a similar threat from Iran and its proxies, it remains unclear how wise a policy it is to object to Gulf countries procuring modern weapons systems from the U.S.

Blocking such procurements could push the United Arab Emirates to purchase Russia’s Su-57 stealth fighter jet instead of the U.S. F-35 aircraft, and it is not clear how such a scenario would better serve the mutual interests of the U.S. and Israel. The question of whether such an attitude would cause harm to the newly tightened Israeli-Gulf strategic relationship remains relevant.

No policy is free from built-in risks, and it is necessary for Israel to identify these in the pursuit of its QME in the new geopolitical environment, and to manage them appropriately.

Two of the most disturbing risks are long-term regime instability and the slippery slope potential of other countries achieving advanced defense technology.

In terms of regional instability, regional political history has witnessed multiple regime changes in recent years, and governments that are pragmatic today could become hostile tomorrow. Well-known examples include the Muslim Brotherhood’s takeover of Egypt, or the conversion of Turkey from an ally of Israel to a bitter opponent. Iran itself underwent the most drastic of changes, going from a close partner to the U.S. and Israel until 1979, when it became a sworn adversary after the Islamic Revolution.

The slippery slope risk means if the U.S. were to sell, with Israel’s approval, state-of-the-art technologies to country A, preventing country B from acquiring the same technology or platform would become highly complex and difficult.

In order to navigate these risks with minimum negative impacts to Israel’s qualitative military edge, establishing win-win strategies is an advisable path. This can include technological differentiation, which is based on the idea that not all platforms are the same and that the U.S. can keep some of its naval and airborne platform software packages to itself. Opening new technological routes for upgrading Israeli-American mutual cooperation, and increasing the volume and diversity of American pre-positioning of military equipment in Israel, would also further such strategies, as would deepening cooperation in missile defense; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and cooperation in space.

With Israel’s resources limited in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, an additional route to promoting its QME is through a U.S. government commercial loan, guaranteed against the funds provided by the 10-year Memorandum of Understanding.

At the same time, since Israel is also a defense technology and weapons supplier in its own right, bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Israel on arms sales to the region could pave the way forward to a trilateral and more healthy relationship: the U.S., the Gulf and Israel.

Ultimately, American and Israeli policies for maintaining Israel’s QME, in place since the 1960s, are due for an update. Tectonic changes in the region require fresh policies from both Washington and Jerusalem. An updated and balanced bilateral policy can enable Israel’s new peace partners to benefit from the diplomatic process they have entered, while minimizing erosion of Israel’s QME.

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Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel.