The NPT Review Conference: Israel’s diplomatic predicament

By Eitan Barak

After repeated delays since April 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the tenth Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) is set to convene in August 2022. Israel’s non-membership has been a hot issue in all NPT RevCon meetings for two decades to the point of being a truly diplomatic predicament and we anticipate no surprises in August: harsh diplomatic pressures will be directed toward Israel to relinquish her alleged nuclear weapons (NWs) stockpile by joining a regional would-be Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ).  As in the past, Israel’s refusal to join the NPT or a WMDFZ entailed limited if any diplomatic costs, and because the 1969 Golda-Nixon “Understating” granting Israel immunity from pressure from the United States to join the treaty[1] has no expiration date, one can ask: What went wrong in the 21st Century?

The answer, we suggest, is to be found in two distinct developments during the 1990s, which converged in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference:

(a) The Arab states’ decision to alter their approach according to which Israel has no NWs.

The Arabs’ former approach, either a result of an assessment that Israel may have not crossed the nuclear threshold (i.e., the weaponization stage) or, perhaps, a “ploy” meant to eliminate anticipated internal Arab pressure to follow suit, had been considered a major advantage of Israel’s ambiguity policy. A formal Israeli admission ― so goes the rationale ― would force Arab leaders to pursue their own programs given anticipated public pressures. In the late 1980s however, some Arab states, mainly Egypt, did change their minds. [2]

A sign of this change was already visible during the Paris Conference on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWs, January 1989), at the end of which the Council of the Arab League issued an unexpected communiqué linking progress on the CW Convention’s drafting process to progress on nuclear disarmament (the onset of the Arabs’ so-called "linkage policy”).[3] A year later, in April 1990, after Iraq’s president Saddam Hussein threatened to use CWs against Israel in response to a supposed Israeli attack against his country, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak presented a plan to establish a regional WMDFZ.[4]

In January 1992, Amr Moussa, Egypt’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, raised the issue of regional nuclear disarmament in his opening address at the 1992 plenary session of the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) held in Moscow following the October 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. Later, in September 1992, Egypt orchestrated an Arab League Resolution, No. 5232, officially pledging member states to boycott the CWC until Israel joined the NPT, or, at least, announced its commitment to join.[5] Similar statements by Jordanian and Qatari high-ranking officials during the ACRS talks (1992-1994) reflect the demise of the Arabs’ “game of pretense”.[6]

(b) The firm US policy to extend the NPT indefinitely, without a vote.

Unlike global arms control (AC) agreements having indefinite duration, Article X(2) provides that 25 years after the NPT’s entry into force (EIF), a conference would be convened to decide, by majority vote, the treaty’s duration. As the NPT’s EIF was March 1970, renewal was set for the 1995 Five RevCon (the “NPT Review and Extension Conference”). Due to complex legal considerations regarding an additional limited extension, for the U.S. the strongest supporter of indefinite extension, unlimited extension was to come at even higher costs.[7] 

While the US overcame initial objections to an indefinite extension voiced by many states belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement (e.g., South Africa or Indonesia) already before the Conference, Egypt was a different case.[8]

Thomas Graham, the U.S. ambassador charged to ensure indefinite extension, recalled Egypt’s FM Amr Moussa as stating during his visit to Cairo in April 1994 “in the strongest of terms” that “Egypt, although devoted to the NPT, would not support indefinite extension or even a long extension, unless Israel, prior to the conference, took ‘concrete steps’ in the direction of eventual NPT membership”.[9]  The Egyptian stance was supported by other Arab states despite the milder positions expressed in their own bilateral discussions with U.S. representatives.[10]    

Hence, despite numerous discussions by the U.S. and other NPT parties’ senior officials with Egyptian and Israeli officials, the issue was resolved only at the very last moment: the night before the extension was approved.  Egypt had found a golden opportunity to extract significant gains from the international community and had no intention of squandering it. According to the May 11, 1995 Resolution, the parties “call upon all states of the Middle East …without exception, to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible“ (Para. 4)  ―as well as― “to take practical steps...aimed at making progress towards, inter alia, the establishment of an effectively verifiable” WMDFZ and WMD’s [sic] delivery systems. [11]

In retrospect, Egypt’s notable achievement was transforming the Israeli nuclear issue from a bilateral to an Arab-Israeli issue and eventually to an international issue. The “compromise” which allowed indefinite extension without voting was sponsored by the three NPT depositaries:  Israel’s “best friend”, the U.S., the UK, and Russia. All have taken a moral, if not legal, commitment to establish a regional WMDFZ. Given the US pressures, however, Israel, at that time, considered the Resolution an impressive diplomatic success.[12]

As the U.S. had achieved her goal of indefinite extension and had no intention of breaching the 1969 Understanding and jeopardizing Israel, one of her truest allies, it was just a matter of time before Egypt and her Arab supporters realized that they had been cheated. A strong sense of humiliation was inevitable; as such, this resolution’s promotion has become a contested issue at every NPT RevCon held since. Egypt has uncompromisingly waged battles over this issue during the last four NPT RevCons (mainly in 2005, 2010, and 2015) and, since 2018, in the UN First Committee and the IAEA General Conference. These battles as well as Egypt’s substantial gain in the 2010 RevCon go beyond the limits of this short piece. Yet, one thing is assured: the August 2022 venue will serve as another opportunity for her. As the 2020 RevCon’s designated President, Amb. Gustavo Zlauvinen, stated in April 2021 in the wake of his numerous talks with state parties: “... State Parties have also been focused on regional issues – primarily the implementation of the long unfulfilled 1995 resolution on the Middle East. Progress on this issue is essential for many States Parties”.[13]  

Ironically, despite not being an NPT member state, Israel – clearly the most responsible among the four nuclear non-member states vis-a-vis NWs –has paid the highest political price for the treaty’s indefinite extension.

[1] On the understandings forged with every new Administration see, e.g., Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1998, p. 337.

[2]  For suggestions regarding the main reason for Egypt’s new approach see, e.g., Levite and Landau, Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture”, (Tel-Aviv: Papyrus) 1994 (Heb.), pp. 78-79. 

[3] See CWCB 4 (May 1989), p. 7.

[4] See CD document no. CD/989, 3. The plan was also presented to the UNGA. See UNGA document no. S/21252; A/45/219.

[5] See CWCB 18 (December 1992), p. 14. In retrospect, all the Arab states have joined the CWC, implying the linkage policy’s failure. As to the motives behind Egypt's decision to lead the assault against Israel’s nuclear program, see, e.g., Feldman Shai, Nuclear Weapons and arms control in the Middle East, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UPS), 1997, p. 221.

[6] See Feldman, Id., p. 212.

[7] For the legal considerations see Thomas Graham, Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control and International Law, (Seattle: University of Washington Press), 2002, p.258.

[8] Besides various US gestures to key states, this was achieved by introducing two additional decisions alongside the extension decision. On the ME “Package Deal”, see Daryl G. Kimball and Randy Rydell, “The NPT in 1995: The Terms for Indefinite Extension” ACT Vol. 50(4), (May 2020), pp. 35-36.

[9] Graham, Id.p. 268.

[10] Jayantha Dhanapala, as the Conference President and chairman of the crucial discussions recalled: “This resolution…brought all the Arab countries on board”.  Jayantha Dhanapala, "The 2015 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Review of a Requiem," Global Governance Vol.21(1), (January-March 2015): 1-8, at 4.

[11]  NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), Annex (operative para.5)

[12]  See for instance, Gerald Steinberg, “The Nuclear Deterrence - Israel vs the US”, Nativ, Vol. 50(3), May 1996, pp. 41-46, at p.41 (Heb.).

[13] Emphasis added. Statement by HE Gustavo Zlauvinen, President-designated, in “Promoting a Successful Outcome to the 2021 NPT Review Conference”- Event organized by Austria, Kazakhstan and Switzerland,  April 28, 2021, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/2021/04/gz_speech_-_promoting_a_successful_outcome_to_the_2021_npt_review_conference_-_28_apr_2021_.pdf, at p.4

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Dr. Eitan Barak is a faculty member at the Program in Strategy, Diplomacy, and Security (SDS) at the Shalem College. Prior to joining the Program, Dr. Barak was a long-time member of the faculty of the Department of International Relations and a senior researcher in the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Read full bio here.

Diplomacy, not sabotage, top option for Iran nuclear PROGRAM

By Eitan Barak

A recent report that Israel gave the United States less than two-hours’ notice prior to its alleged April 11 sabotage attack on the underground Natanz uranium enrichment site , thereby leaving U.S. intelligence agencies with insufficient time to respond, has drawn attention to the relationship between then Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the newly elected Biden administration. Yet its greater importance lies in the fact that Israel, in the view of the administration, was required by “longstanding, unwritten agreement to at least advise the United States of covert operations, giving Washington a chance to object”.

Irrespective of the embarrassment, the affair should cheer Israeli readers.

Such a tacit agreement means that the U.S. condoned, if not cooperated in, previous alleged Israeli sabotage actions targeting Iran’s nuclear program, at least since May 2018. In other words, both sides’ cost-benefit calculations suggest that this is the “right thing to do” given the absence of a diplomatic solution (i.e., a viable, effective agreement), the immense difficulties for Israel in executing a military solution, and the U.S. reluctance to push for such a solution.

Indeed, from the Israeli perspective, even tactical actions are preferable to doing nothing in the face of Iran’s increasing efforts in the nuclear realm. Furthermore, due to many factors, including the parties’ avoidance of declaring responsibility, this policy has so far not triggered a full-scale war between the two sides.

In conclusion, it is hard to challenge Israel’s adoption of this tactic as long as Iran refrains from abiding by any international agreement (e.g., the JCPOA) aiming to curb its nuclear program.

After all, Israel’s resort to sabotage attacks is a long-standing practice. In the early 1960s, for instance, Israel launched “Operation Damocles”, in which sabotage attacks, including targeted killings, were directed at the German scientists and technicians developing rockets for Egypt up to the end of 1963.

Although used against most of Israel’s enemies, this practice represents an important stage in implementing the so-called “Sharon/Begin Doctrine”, specifically, in Sharon’s words, that “Israel cannot permit the introduction of nuclear weapons [to the Middle East-E.B.]. For us, this is not a question of the balance of terror but our continued existence. So, it will be our duty to nip this danger in the bud”.

Under this doctrine’s umbrella, Israel carried out “Operation Opera” in Iraq (June 1981) and “Operation Outside the Box” in Syria (September 2007). In both cases, the aerial strikes were considered a “last resort”, after exhaustion of all other tools (i.e., diplomatic pressuring of supplier states, sabotage actions and, finally, an implicit appeal to the US to execute the military strike that, although rejected as expected, was considered as providing a “green light” for Israeli actions). 

To illustrate, only three months ago, in June 2021, a sort of formal confirmation was received that two years prior to the 1981 attack on the Iraqi reactor, Israel had sabotaged, on French soil, a shipment of materials destined for the Iraqi facility. As in the 1960s, the action followed multiple phone calls to French and Italian workers in the involved companies at the sites “advising” them to avoid any connection with Iraq and the reactor’s construction. Research has since suggested, however,  that this military strike was somewhat counterproductive as, inter alia, it triggered a new covert program that, despite gross inefficiencies, placed Iraq at the threshold of nuclear weapons capability a decade later.

In the present case, given the prevailing estimates that Iran had reached self-reliance in its nuclear program after 2010, no third parties are available as targets for diplomatic pressures and sabotage actions. Furthermore, giving the immense difficulties involved in executing a successful military strike against Iranian nuclear installations, in the absence of a diplomatic solution Israel sees few options available beyond continuing sabotage attacks that can – at best – delay the program while gaining time to reach a diplomatic solution.

Unfortunately, all the historical lessons suggest that sabotage attacks can do little other than slowing the pace of state-initiated military nuclear programs. This view seems to be shared by Israel’s defense establishment, to the point where it ascribes the Iranian slowdown in its nuclear race during the last three months solely to renewal of the Vienna talks.

After numerous sabotage attacks, it seems clear that diplomacy is the best if not the only solution to Israel’s predicament vis-a-vis Iran’s nuclear program.

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Dr. Eitan Barak is a senior researcher at the International Relations Department, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Prior to joining the Department, Dr. Barak was a Fulbright postdoctoral grantee in the International Security Program at Harvard. Read full bio here.

Israel and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC): The COVID-19 Pandemic as a Golden Opportunity

By Eitan Barak

The Covid-19 pandemic and allegations that the virus was engineered in China before spreading globally, even if inadvertently, have made clear to all the inherent danger of biological weapons )BW) use.  This category of weapons has been declared illegal under international law due to the inherit inability to use them while simultaneously maintaining the required distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Even the most lethal agents require substantial time (“a latency period”) before the victims are aware of their fate. Undoubtedly, in the modern era, even several hours is sufficient for infected combatants to travel to populated areas and infect masses of innocent civilians.

Therefore, by the 1970s, the international community had drafted a treaty (commonly referred to as “The Biological Weapons Convention” or BWC) with the intent of eliminating all BWs. By joining (through ratification or accession) the Convention, the member states committed themselves to never develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or retain these weapons, alongside fulfilling their obligation to destroy or divert existing BWs in their arsenals to peaceful use within nine months of joining,

Indeed, on March 26, 2020, while the world was celebrating the BWC’s 45th anniversary, [IE1] the pandemic reverberated throughout in all the respective addresses, including that of the U.S. representative, ironically the state which is the main culprit for the Convention’s intrinsic flaw: the absence of an effective verification regime. Thus, despite various significant steps introduced during the years to strengthen BW verification, many perceived the BWC’s main function to be the symbolic declaration of a universal moral stance. 

Nevertheless, the Convention’s universal acceptance has steadily spread, with 183 member states currently counted. Four additional states (Egypt, Haiti, Somalia, and Syria) have only signed the treaty.

Unfortunately, Israel, together with the r island states of the Comoro Islands, Kiribati, Micronesia, and Tuvalu, as well as five African nations (Chad, Djibouti, Eritrea, Namibia, and South Sudan) has kept itself completely outside the Convention. Furthermore, according to UN reports, in addition to Haiti, which is under process of ratification, initial procedures (or final ones in the cases of Micronesia and South Sudan) to join the Convention have started in all nine states except the Comoro Islands and Eritrea.

In short, Israel finds itself belonging to a club of only five states (Egypt, Syria, Somalia, the Comoro Islands and Eritrea) having no intent of joining the Convention. Given the other members’ identities, Israel has surely gained little prestige by its membership.

As such, the question of Israel’s refusal remains prickly. After all, in 1969, Israel joined the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, banning the use of chemical and “bacteriological methods of warfare”. Although Israel has reserved the right to retaliate in kind, it is clear that even if Israel does possess such abhorrent weapons, they simply won’t be used, even within the context of retaliation. For a democratic state seeking to be part of the West and being dependent, to some extent, on the U.S., the moral taboo on using such weapons and the expected harsh reaction of the international community effectively rules out any such action.

A serious explanation of this refusal is not to be found in the official statements where Israel has justified its longstanding refusal to accede to the BWC by making the somehow traditional claim that BW disarmament requires regional negotiations aimed at establishing a weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ), including the elimination of ballistic missiles. 

Given that such weapons provide Israel with no valuable strategic military benefits, we must turn to the political setting for an answer. However, the treaty’s absence of penetrating means of verification, assured that Israel’s historic concerns over abuse of these means by its foes are irrelevant. Instead, it appears that the main reason for its refusal is hard to formally articulate: the dangers aroused by the “slippery slope” scenario. 

According to this reasoning, Israel’s joining the BWC will broaden and accelerate the efforts of the Arab states and their supporters in the international community to force Israel to relinquish its alleged nuclear arsenal. Formally, this can be done either by forcing accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Israel can join only as non-nuclear weapons state, or by extracting its consent to the establishment of a regional WMDFZ. The latter means overruling Israel’s preconditions for such a zone – mainly the signing of peace agreements with all its neighbor states, including Iraq and Iran, and the elapse of a two-year period following the signing of these agreements to ensure that they are indeed lasting. Armament, according to the contested Israeli view, is not the “disease” to be cured; rather, it is the main symptom. Therefore, if an appropriate response to the real “disease” (the absence of lasting peace agreements in the region) is to be found, the symptom must first, naturally, be resolved.

 In fact, some argue that the anticipated pressures on Israel to disarm its alleged nuclear arsenal may come only after an “intermediate phase” in the process: an attempt made to force Israel to ratify its 1993 signature of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Due to the strong link in the international community between these two categories of weapons – well-reflected in the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol – this scenario is quite plausible.

In light of this troublesome situation and the isolation in which Israel finds itself, it is worthwhile viewing the COVID-19 pandemic as a unique window of opportunity in which to do “the right thing” and join the BWC. The pandemic provides Israel with the framework as well as the valuable justification for taking such a step while making it very difficult for her adversaries to misrepresent her joining. Should it join the BWC, Israel can be portrayed as a nation that, by virtue of the current unique circumstances, knows how to set aside the trivial political considerations belonging to a pre-Coronavirus world. Any abusive attempt to realize the “slippery slope” would then be perceived very negatively.    

Eighteen years ago, Avner Cohen wrote with respect to the BWC that: “The time has come” for Israel “to [finally-EB] put itself squarely on the ‘right’ side, that of Western civilization”. If this was a call for action in the pre-COVID world, it is surely a cry for action in its wake.

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Dr. Eitan Barak is a senior researcher at the International Relations Department, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Prior to joining the Department, Dr. Barak was a Fulbright postdoctoral grantee in the International Security Program at Harvard. Read full bio here.