If Israel doesn't win the war against Hamas, Zionism is dead

Golda Meir said, “If we have to have a choice between being dead and pitied, and being alive with a bad image, we’d rather be alive and have the bad image.”

It’s been over 100 days since Hamas committed the proportional equivalent of 15 9/11 attacks. Over 200 IDF soldiers have already fallen in Gaza, and hundreds fell on October 7, as the government downplayed the very credible threat from Gaza. Thousands more have been injured, many permanently. These soldiers bravely sacrificed their lives so that their fellow Israelis may live in peace. It is not reassuring to contemplate that it is in the hands of Israel’s poorly trusted government whether or not all their sacrifices may have been in vain.

I fought in the Gaza Strip in 2009. My two younger brothers fought there in this war. I have friends who have lost loved ones and who were permanently injured in the same kind of terror nests where Israel is losing its best today. Zionism is the dream of Jewish self-determination as the solution to centuries of antisemitic murder and oppression. I am one of millions over the years who consider it to be a dream worth dying for. But, if Israel does not pursue victory after October 7, Zionism is dead.

Over the last few days, social media posts and other reports have suggested that Israel had proposed a two-month cessation of fighting in exchange for the phased release of the hostages. Such a deal would include a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza’s population centers, allowing Gazans to return; it would release an unspecified number of terrorists, and if implemented, IDF operations in Gaza would be significantly reduced when fighting resumed. In essence, a major win for Hamas and the ultimate loss for Israel.

Let me explain. If Hamas were wise enough to accept such a deal, (I pray they are not) they will have succeeded in irreparably destroying Israel’s sense of security; in demonstrating the efficacy of extreme violence to free terrorists as was their stated objective; in igniting massive global sympathy for the Palestinians, in boosting their own popularity and discrediting the Palestinian Authority (PA) as polls currently show, and in bringing a global initiative for Palestinian statehood back into urgency.

It’s amazing what a campaign of rape, torture, beheading of infants, and hostages taking can achieve. 

Absent Israeli victory, Hamas will rebuild, recruit, and rearm. They do not care about Gaza’s civilian sector. Its destruction is a propaganda win. Finally, a resumption of low-intensity fighting will not disarm Hamas, nor bring its leadership to justice, where high-intensity fighting failed to do so. 

As of today, the IDF has done Hamas significant damage but has failed to end its ability to fight and it has failed to kill nearly any of its senior leadership in Gaza. Most importantly, Israel has, as yet, failed to cause Hamas’s political collapse. The Gazan population has not risen up and Hamas will swiftly reestablish control wherever the IDF leaves. This outcome would make Operation Iron Swords just a larger version of past IDF operations that failed to blunt Hamas’s capabilities and certainly failed to deter terrorists from attacking Israel since it uprooted its communities and withdrew its military in 2005. The only thing that can do so is full Israeli military control over Gaza for the foreseeable future. Political solutions will eventually be important, but this must be Israel’s paramount and unimpeded goal until it is achieved.

While the plight of the hostages is painful beyond words, if Israel does not defeat its enemies, bring them to justice, and reestablish security after October 7, the Zionist dream is dead. 

How could any enemy fear a country that does not win after taking a hit like that? 

Every enemy would learn that to win strategically against Israel and survive, they must make sure to rape and butcher their way through music festivals and communities and take many hostages. 

Israel must reverse the horrible incentive structure that it created with its disastrous deal for Gilad Schalit. Israel should do its best to return the hostages, but it cannot commit suicide over them – which is what abandoning victory would be.

To quote Churchill – another leader who faced an implacable, genocidal foe – Israel’s only option post-October 7 is “victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.”

Without victory, Israel would have betrayed Zionism. My relatives arrived in Israel after the Holocaust and fought in 1948 against all odds for Israel’s independence. They and their children fought in every war since. My brothers and I fought decades later.

 Zionists worldwide must fight for Israel

Ours is the story of millions who fight for an idea, for a safe haven and sovereignty. We do not ask for an end to the fighting, we are willing to bleed as much as it takes, for as long as it takes. But, we demand that we do not surrender the mission. Zionists worldwide are willing to fight with every tool at their disposal, be it weapons, words, money, or prayers for a country where Jews and all citizens feel secure, not for a country that surrenders to terrorists.

There is no security or pride in a country that makes a deal that allows the enemy to escape justice and remain a threat after the degradations of slaughter, torture, rape, and mutilation, and after the sacrifice of so many soldiers who fought to win. 

Without victory, Israel would always be waiting in fear of another October 7, which Hamas has vowed to revisit upon Israel until its annihilation. I would not risk my children’s lives for such a country. 

I will not live in its ever-shrinking borders as communities near Gaza and Lebanon become nightmare zones haunted by the gruesome specter of rape and murder. Finally, I will not feel pride for a country that has the means but not the will to defend itself.

I want a homeland, not a 22,000 sq. km. Yad Vashem. 

Golda Meir said, “If we have to have a choice between being dead and pitied, and being alive with a bad image, we’d rather be alive and have the bad image.” This is a great quote but a false choice. The world respects those who respect themselves. This is true on the playground and in the Middle East. 

Victory will ensure both Israel’s security and its image.

The writer has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Virginia with a focus on strategic/security studies, counter-terrorism, conflict resolution, and asymmetric warfare. He is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute.

Israel's Defense Must Not Be Held Hostage

By jeremiah rozman

Over the past few months, hundreds of thousands of Israelis have turned out to protest judicial reform. The discourse on this issue is fraught with doomsday hyperbole. As a result, there is the potential for serious economic damage and a rift with the United States.

However, this pales in comparison to the danger represented by a movement—championed by some prominent leaders and politicians—that calls on reservists to refuse their obligation to serve: In essence, a call for mutiny.

This is not within the realm of legal protest. It cynically seeks to hold Israel’s security hostage if unelected elements do not get their way, and does so in the name of defending democracy.

Contrary to hyperbole about judicial reform being the “end of democracy,” it would, in fact, make Israel’s Supreme Court more accountable to the Knesset, Israel’s elected branch of government. Clearly, this is not the end of democracy.

The dispute over reforms is a policy dispute. In fact, it is a rather mundane one, considering that, absurdly, it remains possible for Israel’s judiciary to rule against the reforms.

Gullible people might believe that judicial reform poses an existential threat to Israel’s democracy. The cynical people driving the movement know this is false. They claim it is such a threat because only extreme danger can justify extreme actions such as soliciting mutiny.

This attempt to coerce political change by threatening to degrade Israel’s security is akin to a toxic partner threatening self-harm if they do not get their way. Supporters of the refusal movement explicitly say so.

For example, a member of the Brothers in Arms organization stated outright, “If the overhaul bills are passed, we and tens of thousands more who are with us will stop volunteering for reserve duty. … The army is disintegrating before your eyes.” Addressing Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, he stated, “We expect you to stand up and say that you will not vote for the laws.”

In a democracy, policy differences are addressed through voting. There is nothing wrong with opposing judicial reform. Peaceful protest is protected. But mutiny is criminal.

As IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi said, “Hezbollah and Hamas have one goal, and that is to destroy Israel; they do not care what kind of judiciary it has.”

Some 10,000 IDF reservists, including 1,000 Air Force reservists, have stated their refusal to serve in protest of judicial reform. Israel has a small active military. Mandatory reserves allow Israel to field a military capable of deterring and, if need be, defeating regional threats despite its small population.

Many reservists fill critical roles, especially pilots and elite soldiers like the Yahalom unit’s combat engineers. 160 such reservists recently refused to serve. These soldiers are expensive to train, meet difficult standards and conduct critical missions.

The refusal movement also threatens the active service. Defense analyst Amos Harel noted, “In brigades, they’re talking about ‘our’ units and ‘their’ units as solidarity erodes during the judicial overhaul.”

Ministers Miki Zohar and Itamar Ben Gvir stressed this point, sharing a staged video showing ground forces asking for aerial support and pilots asking them their position on judicial reform. A dying soldier then says, “My brothers, from right and left, don’t put politics in the army.” This political theater makes a valid point.

Israel won its independence because numerous identity groups worked together. There was a religious-secular divide, a socialist-capitalist divide, a Sephardi-Ashkenazi divide, a Western European-Eastern European divide and so on. But all these factions shared the goal of a secure Jewish homeland.

They almost failed to achieve it. When independence was declared, Israel had to decide whether to permit the existence of a separate military structure loyal to a separate political faction. But despite a bitter rivalry, the Etzel and the Haganah collaborated during the 1948 War of Independence.

Towards the end of the war, however, Diaspora supporters sent the Etzel a shipment of critical arms on a ship called the Altalena. The Haganah was ordered to fire on the ship if it refused to hand over those arms to the new Israel Defense Forces. It did so.

As difficult as this decision was, it is unlikely that Israel would have survived without a unified military that obeyed the lawful orders of the democratically elected government.

Imagine the precedent set by legitimizing refusal to serve on political grounds. Will soldiers serve only under governments they support?

The optimal solution to this crisis is top-down and bottom-up persuasion through an appeal to common sense and unity. 80,000 reservists have signed a petition against refusal and elite units have condemned refusal as well.

Those inclined to refuse must listen to those on their side of the political divide. Protest leaders and politicians should stress the need to protest through means that do not harm security or democracy. National Unity Party head and former IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz has done so, despite opposing Netanyahu and judicial reform.

Finally, only persuasion can retain the high-quality volunteers who serve in the reserves. A suboptimal solution is punishment, including dismissal, fines and the requirement to pay back benefits.

When soldiers refused to serve during the disengagement from Gaza, they faced military justice. Although punishment should be the last resort, it is preferable to capitulation, which legitimizes mutiny as a way to coerce policy changes. It is also better than ignoring the problem, which degrades readiness and divides the military.

In the lead-up to the destruction of the Second Temple, zealots failed to convince the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem to attack the Romans instead of waiting out the siege. They burned Jerusalem’s food and supplies stores to render that option impossible.

The resulting calamity is a warning against drastic unilateral action that harms Israel’s security. It is fine to have policy preferences and to use legal means to promote them. But Israel was established to defend the Jewish people. This defense must not be held hostage.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

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It is Time for Israel to Act Decisively

By Jeremiah Rozman

Let me start with a controversial proposition: Iron Dome has thus far done Israel no favors. The technologically brilliant missile defense system is praised as a shining exemplar of Israeli ingenuity, a point of pride. Indeed, criticizing Iron Dome to an Israeli or someone in the pro-Israel community is akin to speaking ill of Israel's latest Eurovision finalist. However, I stand by my assertion. This latest round with Gaza shows why. 

The problem with Iron Dome is not its technology. Its capabilities have impressed to the point that even the world's preeminent arms exporter, the United States has purchased batteries, as have several other advanced European militaries. Its technology can save lives if used in a strategically wise manner. But, to say it has would be an unprovable counterfactual. Indeed, the evidence suggests otherwise. Since Iron Dome became a mainstay in Israel's arsenal, conflicts with Gaza have been longer, more destructive, and resulted in more Israeli casualties. 

A weapon is only as good as how it is used. To quote Knesset Member Yoni Chetboun from 2019, Iron Dome has become a “sleeping pill” for the Israeli government. It has allowed Israel to manage the conflict with Gaza without having to seriously degrade the threat. Instead, despite a few flare-ups each year where Israel claims each time to have dealt a "severe blow" or "changed the equation," or something along those lines, each time Gazan militants rebuild and emerge with greater launch capabilities and new leadership.

The truth is that Iron Dome has allowed Israel’s government to avoid decisions that require unity and stability. It does this by enabling Israel to manage this conflict through what I call a greater skew toward defensive vs offensive denial. Denial means blocking an enemy from hitting you. Deterrence means persuading an enemy not to hit you through the threat of hitting them back to the point that they calculate that it is not worth it. As I argue in my book Socializing Militants, How States End Conflict with Non-State Militants, terrorist entities that are willing to die to carry out an absolutist agenda cannot be deterred and cannot be negotiated with to end the conflict. Israel cannot agree to cease to exist on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) exist to fight Israel or die trying. You cannot deter a group of people willing to die by threatening them with death. At best Israel can achieve a strategic pause where they recover and prepare for their next aggression. This is precisely the pattern we see. Hamas is rearming while PIJ provides a shield as the current magnet for Israel's strikes. Either Hamas will join in when it deems the time right, or PIJ will become the new big player in Gaza and the West Bank, this is already becoming the case, with PIJ increasingly getting a larger share of Iranian support. With deterrence off the table, Israel needs to effectively deny its enemies the ability to attack. Israel’s periodic strikes do not inflict anything close to a mortal wound. Within a few months, PIJ and Hamas will be better prepared than before this last round and Israel will have better intelligence, precision, and missile defense. So where does this go? The answer is… a continuation of the same dynamic. 

For Israel, this is a loss. It is an abnegation of the duties of a government for Israel to allow its south and increasingly its center to become war zones every few months. Israel must realize that effective denial requires offense, seriously degrading its enemies’ capabilities instead of relying on defensive capabilities that allow it to become increasingly comfortable with an ever-growing threat. Some call this strategy "mowing the lawn." To effectively mow the lawn, Israel needs to use its army, not just its air force and missile defense. It requires ground forces to do more than take out tunnels. It requires a prolonged operation to kill off thousands of terrorists and destroy their arsenals. Israel has the capability. But does it have the will?

Israel paid with the lives of one percent of its population to emerge as a sovereign state in 1948. If in the past, Israel had been unwilling to take casualties to prevent a noose tightening around its neck, it never would have been able to score its strategically crucial victories over its adversaries in 1948, 1956, and 1967. If Israel is no longer willing to pay the butcher’s bill, it will never have security.

Some ask why Israel needs to strike Gaza at all since it has Iron Dome. I heard a senior IDF officer answer: "Just because I'm wearing a cup doesn't mean I will let you kick me in the groin all day." For nearly-two decades Israel has allowed its southern communities to be pummeled and abused, its children growing up under fire. Israel should use Iron Dome not to forestall military action but to defend the home front while it cleans house. Israel’s government must be willing to take risks. This requires the government, the media, and the people to stop filtering every action or inaction through the lens of domestic politics. National security must supersede political bickering. 

The Zionist ideal was a Jewish state willing and able to defend itself, not a state that is a punching bag for jihadists. Using Iron Dome to avoid risking IDF casualties and to put off tough decisions is not working. It is time to use the IDF for its intended purpose. Every soldier understands their duty to risk their lives to defend their civilians. If given the order, Israeli soldiers will bravely take the fight to these terrorist organizations instead of allowing communities to be bombarded. This decision lies with the government. If Israel does not wish to retake control over Gaza, it must at least mow the lawn, and thoroughly this time. Iron Dome should enable this, not prevent it.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

The Flawed U.S. Middle East Policy Establishment

By Jeremiah Rozman

In a presupposition-laden Washington Post article entitled Biden Should Respond Boldly to a Radical Netanyahu Government, former State Department negotiator Aaron David Miller and former U.S. ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer espoused numerous falsehoods and provided unsubstantiated and logically flawed policy advice at a level that should be beneath the standards of publication in a serious outlet. Every paragraph is filled with blatantly false statements and shoddy logic. This article demonstrates exactly why the U.S. Middle East policy establishment has failed so abysmally in recent decades.

The authors advise the Biden administration to cut offensive arms sales to Israel, cut diplomatic ties with Israeli ministers, pressure Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians, pressure the Abraham Accords countries to rethink their positions that led them to make peace with Israel, and support measures against Israel in biased international institutions. They make no attempt to explain how or why their desired “bold” response to Netanyahu’s future government would serve U.S. interests.

The authors begin by claiming that Netanyahu’s future government possesses “antidemocratic values inimical to U.S. interests.” They do not define what interests these values are “inimical to.” Some argue that a strong relationship with a secure and technologically advanced democracy at peace with its neighbors and collaborating with them and the U.S. on security, research and development and intelligence sharing precisely serves U.S. interests. While there certainly may be valid counterarguments, the authors fail to provide any.

The title presupposes that Netanyahu’s future government is “radical” while the authors fail throughout the article to mention that relative to the governments of its neighbors with which the U.S. has solid diplomatic and security relations, Israel’s government is among the most moderate by any metric. Indeed, it is the only democracy with liberal protections and free elections in the entire region.

Perhaps the authors are confused about the democratic process. They state that “Benjamin Netanyahu has midwifed the most extreme government in the history of the state.” In fact, Israel’s democratic parliamentary government was not “midwifed” whatever that means. Rather, it was elected by voters. Had they voted differently, this government would not exist. Perhaps the authors should be asking why Israel’s population chose a right-wing government?

The authors go on to attack Minister Avi Maoz, whom they claim, “espouses a fierce anti-LGBTQ agenda.” They might note that Israel is the only country in the entire region where it is legal to be LGBTQ. Its neighbors, many of whom have strong diplomatic and military relationships with the U.S., have punishments for homosexuality ranging from public beatings to imprisonment to death.

Miller and Kurtzer then warn that under this future government “Palestinian terrorist groups are likely to intensify their attacks against Israelis.” Israelis are painfully aware that Palestinian violence preceded this government and indeed any Israeli government. If outcome Y predates treatment X, clearly treatment X did not cause it. Perhaps the authors should dig deeper?

Netanyahu’s new government, the authors also argue, may “trigger another serious round of fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza.” They fail to note that for nearly two decades there have been continuous attacks from Gaza and intense episodes of fighting every couple of years. Hamas’s charter calls to kill all Jews and fight until Israel is replaced with an Islamic theocracy. I am unfamiliar with the Article in its charter that states that it will continue violence until Israel elects a left-wing LGBTQ-friendly government.

The authors go on to warn that the new government might “change the status quo by legitimizing Jewish prayer on the Noble Sanctuary/Temple Mount.” They do not explain why allowing Jewish prayer in a Jewish holy site alongside Muslim prayer in a Muslim holy site is something the Biden administration should oppose. They also do not explain why they are calling to single out the only country with religious freedom in the region.

The authors ask Biden to “make it clear to Israel that his administration will have no dealings with Ben Gvir, Smotrich or their ministries if they continue to espouse racist policies and actions.” They also think that “Israel should know that the Biden administration will be on the alert for Israeli actions that deserve to be called out and condemned.” This follows on the heels of the Biden administration proposing full immunity to Saudi leader Mohammed Bin Salman over the Khashoggi killings and continuing to deal with many of its Arab partners with deeply entrenched racism, and homophobic and misogynistic laws.

Shockingly, the authors want the Biden administration “to inform the Abraham Accord countries that their evident lack of interest in the plight of the Palestinians will undermine their relationship with Israel and damage their credibility in advancing other regional objectives with the United States.” This makes very little sense—why would lack of interest in the Palestinians undermine their relationship with Israel? The authors give no explanation. Nor do they explain what regional objectives with the U.S. would be harmed or how.

Perhaps the most blatant falsehood in this entire article is the authors’ assertion that “for a U.S. president to put pressure on a democratically elected Israeli government would be unprecedented and controversial.” Every U.S. administration, since Israel’s independence, including even the Trump administration, has put significant and well-documented pressure on democratically elected Israeli governments.

The authors do offer a single sentence regarding the Palestinians. They argue that “the Palestinian leadership, for its part, should be plainly told that U.S. support depends on its willingness to hold elections, build a responsible democratic government and curb violence and terrorism.” The authors surely know that this has never been the case and is unlikely to come about anytime soon.

This article is so inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and flawed that it likely would not have been published absent the outlet’s agreement with its tone and absent the authors’ credentials. It reads more like a temper tantrum that Israel elected a government that the Beltway foreign policy establishment does not like, than a thoughtful analysis or sound policy advice.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Iran in Ukraine: Lessons for Israel

By Jeremiah Rozman

Israel’s security establishment sees a nuclear-armed Iran as its greatest “intolerable” threat. Iran crossing the nuclear threshold changes Israel’s security position from one where it faces the threat of violence from many enemies but total destruction from none, to one where Iran holds the capability to destroy Israel in a nuclear holocaust, with Israel left guessing under what circumstances it would resolve to do so. This dynamic leaves Israel not only vulnerable to a perhaps unlikely nuclear attack but also to very likely nuclear blackmail, severely constraining Israel’s ability to act against its enemies including Hamas and Hezbollah. Israel considers a nuclear Iran an unacceptable strategic outcome. What this means is that if negotiations on a return to the nuclear deal between Iran and the powers fail, as they very likely might, Israel may be faced with two options, launch a risky and potentially unsuccessful kinetic strike against Iran’s nuclear program or accept a nuclear Iran. Since Israel has maintained that the latter is not an option, the former–a kinetic strike–is a very real possibility. In that event, Israel will almost certainly find itself in a kinetic war with Iran and its proxies, including the formidably armed and strategically positioned Hezbollah. To face this possibility Israel needs to understand how Iran will fight. Iran’s involvement in Russia’s war on Ukraine provides a glimpse into what very well might be Iran’s strategic calculus if it faces Israel.

Since Ukraine launched a rather successful counteroffensive, Russia has shifted strategies in Ukraine. Russia’s shift to targeting Ukraine’s critical civilian infrastructure through mass precision strikes marks its third strategy in this conflict. Each phase of the conflict can be understood as Russia targeting a different Center of Gravity (CoG). This term originating with Carl von Clausewitz has been slippery to define. In essence, it denotes a defeat mechanism. Knock out a CoG and you defeat the opponent’s “freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.” 

First Russia went for a swift knockout blow against what it thought was a reachable CoG with the best cost-benefit payoff -- Ukraine’s government. President Vladimir Putin sought to achieve this by killing or capturing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and installing a pro-Russian puppet. When this failed, Putin attacked another CoG, Ukraine’s military. It reckoned that with Zelensky out of reach, Russia needed to defeat Ukraine's military to achieve his desired policy outcome without appearing to blatantly target Ukraine’s civilians. Prior to air power, if an attacker could not pull off a governmental coup, defeating a nation's armed forces was a necessary step to forcing capitulation. In the age of air power, especially precision air power, this is no longer the case. Herein we find Putin's latest strategic shift.

The Ukrainian military proved a tougher CoG than anticipated, too tough for Putin to defeat. At best Putin has secured a military stalemate, capturing some territory at enormous cost. While Ukraine may or may not be able to completely drive Putin out of Ukrainian territory, it is clear now that Putin cannot rapidly defeat Ukraine’s military.

Over the past few weeks Putin has shifted towards attacking what he must consider to be Ukraine’s last tenable CoG. While some have dubbed Putin’s new actions ‘vengeful’ there is a strategic calculus to them. Putin believes that Ukraine's critical civilian infrastructure is also a CoG, meaning that by knocking it out, it can force Ukraine to capitulate even if it cannot defeat its armed forces. Using precision air power with Iranian drones playing a central role, Russia has been able to deal enormous damage to Ukraine's water and power grid in advance of the upcoming harsh Ukrainian winter, this despite Ukraine being able to intercept a majority of these munitions. Iran must be drawing important lessons from this battlefield testing. Its advisors are on the ground helping Russia integrate these drones into its arsenal. It is likely that Iran is taking notes for a future conflict with Israel.

Combined with Hezbollah, Iran has enough precision munitions to truly threaten Israel by a similar targeting of critical infrastructure tested by Russia in Ukraine. Iron Dome and Israel’s other air defenses have never been tested against precision munitions or against the type of precision combined drone and cruise missile attack that Iran conducted against Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil refineries. While Israel is certainly better able to strike targets in enemy territory than Ukraine has been thus far, it also has far less strategic depth than Ukraine, meaning it has fewer targets that Iran and its proxies must hit and they are less dispersed.

Because it is highly unlikely that Iran and its proxies can defeat Israel’s armed forces or capture its seat of government, Iran might determine that Israel’s only vulnerable CoG is its civilian critical infrastructure as well as its population. If Iran believes that it can defeat Israel by inflicting enough damage on these targets, any future kinetic conflict with Iran would likely see the targeting of Israel’s power and water facilities. Iran has already targeted these with cyber attacks. Iran has successfully tested complex precision targeting against Saudi Arabia, defeating U.S. provided Patriot air and missile defenses. It is currently honing this form of warfare in Ukraine.

Israel must learn from Ukraine as Iran surely is. In order to deter Iran by threatening a military response to it crossing the nuclear threshold, Israel must demonstrate that it can defend itself to the point where Iran no longer sees Israel’s critical infrastructure as a defeatable CoG. This would make the threat of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program far more credible, potentially preventing war. Israel’s next best option if deterrence fails is to win in conflict. Israel must harden its critical infrastructure and improve its ability to rapidly target Iran and its proxies’ precision fires if it is either to deter Iran or defeat it if deterrence fails. Therefore, Israel should rapidly integrate lessons learned from Russia’s new Iran-backed strategy in Ukraine and pay close attention to how Ukraine contends with this new strategy.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Israel can't allow bigots to control the narrative around the Temple Mount

By Jeremiah Rozman

In a fully rational world, it should be obvious to any observer who honestly seeks moral clarity that in a religious site sacred to multiple religions, the side that seeks to visit and pray in peace and also allows full religious freedom to the other is in the right, while the side that reacts with violence and seeks to bar the other from prayer is in the wrong. But in the real world’s cacophony of nonsense and ethical confusion, it is clear that Israel needs to forcefully, clearly, and, most importantly, publicly articulate its position to the world.

Failure to do so allows bigots and those seeking to harness bigotry to demonize Israel, arouse violence, inflame antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment, and work to derail Israel’s budding diplomacy with its Arab neighbors. To prevail, Israel’s message must be clear: The Jewish People’s ties to the Temple Mount are an undeniable historical fact. Israel wants peace, tolerance, and religious freedom, while those who stash rocks, pipes, bottles, and weapons and engage in violent rioting are the ones who are truly desecrating the site.

While it is undeniable that since Islam’s conquest of Jerusalem in the seventh century CE, the Mosque that they built on the site of the Jewish Holy of Holies has become a Muslim holy site. Therefore, this site has been holy to Muslims for well over a millennium. No one is seeking to undermine this. However, it is also equally undeniable that the site has been holy to the Jewish people for centuries before Islam ever existed and the Jewish people never abandoned this belief. Therefore, every discussion to follow must be based upon the solid understanding that the site is indeed holy to both Muslims and Jews.

The argument that Israel seeks to take sole control over this or other holy sites is thoroughly disingenuous and has cynically been used for political purposes, with Hamas, the Palestinian Authority (PA), and Arab leaders inciting violence and hatred over peaceful Jewish worship. Their rhetoric utilizes blatant religious bigotry clearly aimed at incitement. For instance, in a 2015 speech, the ostensibly moderate Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas proclaimed: “The Al-Aqsa [Mosque] is ours… and they have no right to defile it with their filthy feet. We will not allow them to, and we will do everything in our power to protect Jerusalem… We bless every drop of blood that has been spilled for Jerusalem, which is clean and pure blood, blood spilled for Allah, Allah willing. Every martyr (Shahid) will reach Paradise, and everyone wounded will be rewarded by Allah.”

This position is not unique to extremist non-state militants. Just last week, the Arab League called to end Jewish worship on the Temple Mount, stating “Al-Aqsa and Haram al-Sharif in all its area is a sole place of worship for Muslims” and the UAE, a member of the Abraham Accords, canceled participation in a planned Israel Independence Day flyover due to the Temple Mount riots.

 The trope that Jews are trying to seize and desecrate Muslim holy sites -- “Judaizing the Temple Mount”-- has been used to foment violence since the 1920s. If Israel is “Judaizing” the Temple Mount, it is certainly taking its sweet time. One might even argue that Israel is going about it all wrong. For instance, when the Ottomans conquered Constantinople, they did not work out a deal by which Eastern Orthodox clerics and Byzantine authorities retain control over the Hagia Sophia. They just conquered it and converted it into a mosque. Israel by contrast conquered the Temple Mount in a defensive war after imploring Jordan not to attack. Upon its military victory, Israel then gave control over the Temple Mount to the Jordanian Waqf. There is no historical precedent in which a military victorious country made such a concession to a vanquished foe. One might have expected that the world would credit Israel for its tolerance.

Today, the concepts of human rights, dignity, equality, and tolerance are thankfully considered to be paramount in most of the world. The demand to bar only Jewish worship at a site that is sacred to multiple religions is akin to the worst examples of segregation. Jewish worshippers on the Temple Mount are not guilty of disrupting Muslim prayer. They are not the ones rioting, shouting, burning tires, throwing rocks, or even murdering worshippers. Indeed, neither Jews nor Israel even consider asking to ban Muslim worshippers from the holy site. While most controversial issues are some shade of gray, this is one of the most black and white ethical dilemmas. Jews want to pray and let Muslims pray. Those manufacturing a crisis want the Jews banned, period.

Unfortunately, many international leaders and the international media automatically blame Israel and thus, peaceful Jewish worship for tensions. Even the State Department called upon Israel to defuse tensions caused by Arab rioting on the Temple Mount. It is amazing that this centuries-old excuse for violence still bears weight.

If we start with assuming the best intentions of ostensibly neutral parties, the culprit behind this is ignorance, not malice. Therefore, it is less useful for Israel to bemoan antagonists for their antagonism than it is to proactively educate those inclined to take the side of those with the loudest voice. In other words, Israel cannot allow bigots to control the narrative around the Temple Mount, and it is high time its leaders get out in front with a well-articulated explanation. While many Jews and Israeli officials have made this case, the audience cannot be either those who agree with Israel’s position, or those predetermined to oppose it. Rather, Israeli leadership must make an articulate, public and unapologetic case to its Arab neighbors and the world that it respects religious freedom, demands that same respect and that it is those perpetrating violence who are truly desecrating this holy site. This is urgently needed, not just to combat antisemitism and anti-Israel sentiment, but to save the hopeful promise of the Abraham Accords.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Ukraine is not the most important square on the chessboard

By Jeremiah Rozman

The Cold War was the last time that the United States faced real competition from a peer adversary. It was the formative crisis for most of the current U.S. policy establishment and much of the politically engaged adult population. Furthermore, American trade, culture, and treaties tie it strongly to Europe. Therefore, it is understandable that a crisis in Europe involving Russia is currently consuming the bulk of U.S. attention. However, today China is the only country with the potential to contest U.S. global leadership and Europe is not the most important arena for Sino-U.S. competition. Nor is Ukraine the most likely flashpoint for a potentially catastrophic great power showdown. The U.S. has recently sought to pivot to the Indo-Pacific. The crisis in Ukraine threatens to defer, if not derail, this necessary re-posturing, but effective compromise with Russia could turn this crisis into an opportunity.

Keeping Ukraine in context

Keeping Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence is not a vital U.S. interest. Defending Ukraine’s ability to preserve its self-determination is ethical. However, as has always been the case in global affairs, power trumps ethics, institutions, and often even strongly-worded threats, condemnations, and sanctions. The U.S. is no longer the undisputed hegemon that it was at the end of the Cold War. In Europe, power and resolve have shifted in Russia’s favor.

Allowing Ukraine to fall into the Russian sphere does not threaten the integrity of NATO, nor the security of its members. Disputing the strategic importance of Ukraine, the Atlantic Council’s Emma Ashford noted that “during the Cold War, the line was a thousand miles further West.” Yet, the U.S. emerged victorious against a true global competitor. Today, Russia does not pose the same peer threat that the Soviet Union did. That role is filled by China. Unlike China, Russia does not have the economic potential nor the stated desire to compete with the U.S. for global leadership. Rather, it wants a buffer zone from NATO military hardware and European Union political and economic encroachment. This is understandable. The U.S. Monroe Doctrine has long held the Western hemisphere as its sphere of influence. When the Soviet Union brought Cuba into its sphere and militarized it, the U.S. considered it to be intolerable.

It’s no longer 1992

In the heady years after the U.S. emerged victorious from the Cold War – from which Russia emerged in shambles – more sanguine voices that anticipated the need to consider Russian interests in a future European security paradigm lost out to advocates for rapid NATO enlargement. The ghosts of this decision would come back to haunt European peace in 2008, 2014, and now. Boris Yeltsin’s drunken ravings over NATO expansion in 1994 have been echoed many times by the eminently sober Vladimir Putin. While the U.S. would prefer to continue in its unfettered dominance, it has explicitly stated that it is unwilling to risk U.S. troops in defense of Ukraine. Conversely, Russia has signaled that it sees Ukraine as a vital interest, one that it is willing to go to war over. If Russia is willing to pay the price of sanctions and an estimated 3,000 to 10,000 troop deaths, what will stop it from invading?

If Russia is determined to invade, the more the U.S. protests and invests, the more reputation and resources it stands to lose when it happens. Some prominent voices are pushing the U.S. to take a strong stance, even risking military conflict because “China is watching.” Russia invading Ukraine would not invite China to invade Taiwan if the U.S. articulates that it sees Taiwan’s defense as non-negotiable, on par with defending actual NATO members while distancing itself from promises to defend Ukraine. However, putting the U.S. reputation on the line over Ukraine and losing, while shifting resources to Europe that otherwise would have gone to the Indo-Pacific, could make it more likely that China invades Taiwan. Therein lies the greatest strategic risk of the Ukraine crisis; it threatens to derail the urgently needed U.S. pivot to the Indo-Pacific. Taiwan is not just more important to U.S. interests because it produces over 92 percent of the world’s semiconductors critical to all forms of modern technology, but mainly because unlike Russia, China is a peer threat.

Economic and military options?

The U.S. and its allies have limited economic and military options to deter Russia. At best, these would postpone the next crisis. Economic options that would have the sharpest impact are likely to also harm the countries imposing them. For example, removing Russia from the international banking SWIFT system would “really sting,” but the U.S. and European allies might have already rejected this option due to the potential for major economic harm.

Another strong economic policy would be to block the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. President Biden and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz have explicitly threatened Russia that it will be rendered non-operational if Russia invades Ukraine. However, European reliance on Russian oil and high gas prices in the U.S., blunt the West’s ability to harm Russia’s heavily oil-dependent economy without harming itself. Furthermore, China appears inclined to undermine any U.S. imposed sanctions.

Alongside economic options, the U.S. could arm Ukraine to “bleed Russia.” Skeptics note that no conceivable amount of Western military support will enable Ukraine to defeat a determined Russian offensive. Russian regular units are not the separatist irregulars that Ukrainian nationalists have been fighting in Donbas. Russian regular units made mincemeat of Ukrainian armored battalions in a matter of minutes in 2015. Highly successful Russian use of force could showcase a new “revolution in military affairs,” a modern version of what the U.S. succeeded in doing when it showed the world the effectiveness of its new military capabilities in the Gulf War. Putin might even prefer this to achieving his goals without bloodshed.

Detente with Russia aids competition with China

Areas for compromise and cooperation between the U.S. and Russia abound, from counterterrorism to arms control. Effective detente would undercut the growing Sino-Russian relationship which poses a significant threat. In the Ukraine crisis, China backs Russia due to a shared interest in revising the international order through force. Coordination with Russia over European security could pull Russia away from China, a country with which it shares a long and historically disputed border. Good relations with Russia would help the U.S. to compete with China, while enduring crisis with Russia would tie up U.S. resources in Europe.

In Ukraine, compromise is clearly the best option, although conceding to Putin goes against America’s long-held policy of liberal internationalism. This crisis can be an opportunity to finally develop what U.S. preponderance has allowed it to put off for nearly three decades, a durable European security structure that takes into account the needs (not wants) of NATO and Russia. This would enable the U.S. to more effectively compete where it matters most.

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The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Can Iran Stall its Way to Nuclear Weapons?

By Jeremiah Rozman

Iran wants nuclear weapons. This rational desire aims to ensure that it can pursue its interests without fearing foreign military intervention. The United States and Israel both have rational reasons for wanting Iran to never obtain nuclear weapons. Despite its vastly inferior resources, Iran is advantaged in pursuing its goals because it simply needs to stay the course, gradually enriching nuclear material, while the U.S., Israel, and other involved parties must overcome significant differences that prevent a united front capable of deterring or disrupting Iran’s nuclear weapons program. By reducing deterrence, these differences harm the diplomatic effort, making a peaceful end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions less likely.

Iran’s goal

Iran’s leaders seek regional dominance not only for ideological reasons but because being more powerful makes them less vulnerable. They saw the fate of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, both of whom suffered humiliating and violent deaths at the hands of a U.S.-led coalition after giving up their nuclear programs. Conversely, Pakistan and North Korea both succeeded in getting nuclear weapons despite U.S. protestations, threats, and diplomacy. They raced their way to nuclear weapons and their leaders remain in power. Obtaining nuclear weapons would be a major win for Iran’s leaders. Therefore, dissuading them will be difficult, even with a united opposition.

A (dis)united front

The U.S., Israel, Western powers, Russia, China, and Iran’s regional adversaries all have an interest in stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons. But their interests are not nearly the same in terms of urgency or severity.

For Israel, a nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat. For the countries in the region, the threat is nearly as potent. Although Iran has not promised to wipe them off the map in a nuclear holocaust, post-revolution Iran has a long history of bloody warfare, military intervention, and terrorism in the Middle East. Just this week Iranian-backed Houthis launched armed drones into Saudi Arabia.

For the U.S., a nuclear-armed Iran threatens some of its interests, but not its survival. These threats include: increased instability in a decreasingly important region, increased terrorism, threats to deployed military assets, and threats to European allies.

The European powers appear ambivalent to the threat of Iranian nuclear weapons that would likely be able to strike their soil. They are happy to see sanctions removed and to resume trading with Iran and purchasing its oil. Finally, Russia and China would love to see the U.S. fail to achieve a much-heralded foreign policy objective.

Paths to stopping Iran

There are three main approaches to thwarting Iran’s nuclear ambitions: 1. deterrence, 2. military action, and 3. diplomacy. These paths complement each other. Military action makes deterrent threats more credible and diplomacy can make denuclearization more palatable. Coercive diplomacy is nothing new. Negotiating with someone while holding a gun to their head is still negotiating, it is just more likely to succeed.

The deterrence disconnect

Fully destroying Iran’s nuclear program is likely to be difficult and costly. Successful diplomacy requires deterrence because Iran’s strong preference is to get nuclear weapons. Deterrence has two components. The opponent must perceive a country or coalition as having both the necessary capabilities and resolve. Neither is sufficient on its own. The fundamental problem to deterring Iran is the absence of a unified entity with both. The U.S. has the capabilities. Israel and regional countries have the resolve. However, these players are currently incapable of conveying a unified purpose.

Israel has high resolve and moderate capabilities

Iran sees Israel as having abundant resolve, but limited capabilities and potency, while  Iran has a deterrent of its own. Israel would face difficulties refueling and penetrating Iran’s deep fortifications, and whether its attack succeeds or fails, it will likely face Hezbollah and perhaps also Hamas in a multi-front war with massive damage, casualties, and unabating rocket fire that can target the entire country, hit sensitive sites and overwhelm its Iron Dome missile-defense system.

The U.S. has warned Israel over military action as it negotiates with Iran. An Israeli strike could ruin its relationship with its most important partner. The U.S. might refuse to replenish Iron Dome. Israel failed to significantly reduce the rate of fire from Gaza in its most recent altercation. Israel expects thousands of rockets a day in a war with Hezbollah, many times more than Gazan terrorists were able to launch.

As is always the case with preemptive action, it is difficult to justify casualties today to prevent potentially greater casualties in the future. However, Israel has shown on several occasions that it is willing to strike to prevent future catastrophe, even against strong U.S. opposition.

Finally, if Iran thinks that its nuclear program can survive an Israeli strike, it is unlikely to be deterred. Iran also sees regional powers like the Saudis who can barely contend with the Houthis, as lacking the capability to threaten Iran’s nuclear program.

The U.S. has high capabilities and moderate resolve

Conversely, the U.S. has the capabilities portion of the equation, but perhaps not the resolve. The U.S. and Israel have discussed military options should all other initiatives fail. However, the Biden administration has shown reluctance to risk military altercation in the Middle East and its disorganized and rushed exit from Afghanistan does not lend credibility to threats against Iran.

Complete the deterrence equation for diplomacy to prevail

There are three ways to complete the deterrence equation. The first is to boost Israel’s capabilities. Some congressmen and analysts have suggested giving Israel refueling planes and “bunker buster” bombs. The second is to boost perceived U.S. resolve by moving military assets to the region and making public threats should Iran pass a specified red-line. The best way is to marry U.S. capabilities with Israel’s resolve through joint statements and war games – the  more official and public, the more credible. This is the best shot to boost deterrence and enhance diplomacy. However, unless the U.S. and Israel can close the policy gap, this is unlikely to succeed and Iran could stall its way to a bomb.

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Proud to have served the IDF and the U.S. Army

By Jeremiah Rozman

As Veteran’s Day approaches, I feel inclined to reflect upon my privilege to have served in the armies of the world’s most important guardians of freedom. As a Jew, I see the IDF as my people’s most important defensive institution: Israel’s military might ensures that Jews will “never again” be defenseless. Israel has a global role in terms of protecting Jewry, but its military is primarily concerned with its immediate region. The United States has a global role as the leader of a broad coalition in defense of global freedom. It has an expeditionary military to match this mission. Although both militaries face common challenges, they are designed and postured for different missions. This reflection is not intended to critique either military;  I simply offer my story and what I consider to be an interesting comparison of certain aspects of my service in each of them.

In 2005, I immigrated to Israel with the dream of fighting for Jewish liberation. My father risked his life to teach Hebrew and keep Judaism alive in the Soviet Union. His father fought the Nazis in the Soviet Army. I was also strongly influenced by stories of partisans and Jews who fought the Nazis and fought to secure Jewish self-determination in Eretz Israel. I see modern Israel as a direct continuation of Jewish history; a new chapter from the biblical era. I could not pass up the opportunity to serve in what I consider to be the direct legacy of the army of King David. My three younger siblings each made aliya and served in the IDF as well. 

In 2006, Israel sent me to a military ulpan where I spent three months in immersive study of Hebrew and Israel’s culture, history, geography etc. with motivated immigrants from several countries. In 2007, I joined the Golani infantry brigade and served all over the country. I saw combat in Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip.

My other grandfather was a Washington D.C. native who served in the U.S. Army during WWII. The U.S. was the haven where my family built a successful and dignified life. Having served in Israel’s military, I felt the duty to serve the U.S. as well. After two years of working as a national security analyst, I joined the U.S. Army and earned my commission in July 2021. I served as an enlisted combat soldier in the IDF in my teens and early twenties. Now in my thirties, I am a combat support officer in the U.S. Army's Chemical Corps. My service in each army has been rewarding in quite different ways. Nearly everyone inevitably asks me how these two armies compare.

One major difference, especially important for me, is religious life. Being Jewish in the IDF was easy. Being an observant Jew in the U.S. Army has been more spiritually challenging. However, the U.S. Army has always done its best to accommodate my religious needs. While I have certainly encountered much good-natured curiosity, especially as I prayed in my Jewish religious garb after breakfast in formation on each day of basic training, I never experienced even a shred of antisemitism. Isolation from a Jewish community has been my biggest challenge thus far. Chaplains and organizations like the Aleph Institute have been extremely helpful.

The IDF and the U.S. Army have some interesting training differences. In the IDF, non-combat basic trainees undergo brief training that can last as little as two weeks. All U.S. Army soldiers undergo 10 weeks of basic combat training due to the U.S. military’s expeditionary mission which deploys support components into combat zones.

Naturally, basic training in an all-male infantry unit in the IDF was more physically demanding than the basic training that I went through for non-infantry soldiers in the U.S. Army. IDF infantry basic training is probably more similar to U.S. Army infantry training at Fort Benning. Basic training in the U.S. Army is more difficult in other ways. For instance, U.S. Army trainees have their phones locked away and do not leave post until the 10 weeks are through. Trainees in the U.S. Army were more than slightly jealous that in the IDF you usually get your phone for an hour at night, go home on many weekends and can even smoke cigarettes if so inclined.

Another major difference is how IDF infantry trainees conduct all of their training in battle-ready kit, while the U.S. Army strictly regulates access to live ammunition. Having loaded magazines in the barracks in basic training strikes U.S. soldiers as inconceivable. Even more shocking is that IDF soldiers, even in basic training, take their weapons home with them.

Another major difference is the commissioning process. In the U.S. Army, receiving a commission requires a college education. In the IDF, soldiers that prove themselves capable leaders are selected at an early point in their career to go to the IDF’s officer academy and earn their commission without a college degree.

In my experience, without exception, the IDF has a reputation for professionalism and skill. I have heard this from U.S. soldiers of all ranks, from non-commissioned officer (NCO) professionals to high ranking officers. I can say from my time in the IDF that the respect is mutual. 

The U.S. Army and the IDF have much to teach each other. The IDF excels in urban operations, counterterrorism, linking industry to defense needs, and military intelligence. The U.S. Army has vast expeditionary combat experience, unparalleled logistics and an NCO corps that sets the gold standard for professionalism. Both countries’ soldiers share the warrior ethos of bravery, resilience, intelligent initiative and ethical conduct in combat. 

I intend to serve as defense attaché to Israel. My deep familiarity with Israel and the IDF gives me a unique ability to enhance the working relationship between two countries that I believe are forces on the side of good in the world. I am proud to have served both the IDF and the U.S. Army. 

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

US Afghanistan Withdrawal: Lessons for Israel

By Jeremiah Rozman

The United States has definitively lost Afghanistan. U.S. military power ousted the Taliban and prevented its return for twenty years. As the U.S. withdrew, the product of two decades of nation building melted away as if it never existed, save the heaps of military hardware left behind. The collapse of the U.S.’s Afghanistan strategy highlights the risks Israel would incur in creating a Palestinian state, as these projects hold key similarities.

Firstly, both the U.S. and Israel were involved in nation building. The U.S. sought to build an Afghan democracy capable of governing Afghanistan and maintaining peace and stability. Since the Oslo Accords, Israel has been working with the U.S. to build a Palestinian democracy capable of governing a future Palestinian state and of making peace with Israel.

Both of these efforts involved building and training armies capable of suppressing terrorists. Both involved introducing western style democracy into regions without prior experience with it. And both sought to defeat and marginalize well-organized Islamic fundamentalist groups with a strong sense of purpose and robust networks of support. Both attempts at nation building ultimately failed.

In Afghanistan, the corrupt U.S.-backed government never had much legitimacy, and its military quickly dissolved when U.S. forces withdrew. The corrupt Palestinian Authority never enjoyed legitimacy either. It lost an election to the militant group Hamas, and its U.S. trained forces were swiftly routed by Hamas when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Gaza. The forces that Israel backed in southern Lebanon were quickly defeated by Hezbollah when the IDF withdrew. History demonstrates that organized, internationally supported, and motivated Islamist groups usually win in power vacuums.

Both the U.S. and Israel had the military ability to defeat their Islamic fundamentalist enemies, but only had sufficient political will necessary to keep them at bay and maintain a manageable status quo. For Israel, international pressure and low domestic tolerance for casualties drove it to risk its security by removing its forces from Gaza and Lebanon. The botched U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was an unforced error. There was no major domestic or international demand for the U.S. to withdraw its remaining 2,500 troops immediately. In fact, international allies were left blindsided by President Biden’s rapid pullout. No U.S. soldier had been killed in combat there in over 18 months, and the cost of maintaining an effective counterterrorism base of operations was sustainable.

The U.S. decision to withdraw under minimal pressure bodes ominously for countries promised U.S. protection. Will that protection be rescinded when there really is pressure? After the U.S. appeared to flee before its own shadow, abandoning billions of dollars of sophisticated equipment to an enemy with no air force, no satellites, and no nuclear missiles, are Taiwan and South Korea still truly confident in U.S. protection if nuclear armed dictators come knocking?

In 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry offered Israel technology and promises of international protection if it withdrew its military from the strategically important Jordan Valley to allow a Palestinian state to include that territory. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan suggests that Israel was right to rely on itself.

Both Democrat and Republican U.S. administrations promoted the “two-state solution” which in essence sought to nation build in the Middle East. The Trump administration was the first to break with that thinking which had persisted since Clinton. The Biden administration is back to the old playbook. It officially supports the creation of a Palestinian state. From Clinton’s Oslo Accords to George W. Bush’s “Roadmap” and “Disengagement,” the U.S. has reassured Israel that a future Palestinian state would not pose a security threat.

However, the U.S.’s poor track record at nation building in the Middle East is mirrored by its poor track record predicting outcomes in that region. The Oslo Accords ended in a bloody intifada; the Disengagement ended in Hamas capturing Gaza and turning it into a terror platform. De-Baathification in Iraq ended in a bloody insurgency, and the withdrawal from Afghanistan yielded a rapid Taliban victory that apparently caught the Biden administration by surprise.

The world now has one more fundamentalist Islamic state, the Taliban run Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. There is little doubt a future Palestinian state would be the same. According to recent polls, Hamas would still win Palestinian elections, but in the Middle East, more important than ballots are bullets, as the 2021 Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza clearly show. 

The U.S. military kept the Taliban at bay in Afghanistan, and the IDF keeps Hamas from taking over Judea and Samaria. While a fundamentalist Islamic victory is surely a tragedy for liberty, tolerance, and human rights, especially women's rights, it is first and foremost a security threat. A Taliban-run Afghanistan harbored Al Qaeda, resulting in the attacks of September 11, 2001. Many fear that it will once again become a safe haven for terrorists and that the next big attack is only a matter of time.

For Israel, a Hamas-run state bordering Israel's major population centers, economic centers, and international airport would pose an existential threat. All of Israel would be within range of a variety of short- and long-range rockets, mortars, and sniper fire and easily infiltrated through tunnels. In the twenty-first century, oceans are no guarantee of national security, but at least for now, the Taliban or Al Qaeda cannot fire volleys of rockets at Washington, D.C. from Afghanistan.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan tells the world’s dictators and terrorists that the U.S. is no longer interested in its post-WWII role as the military guarantor of freedom. Any country would be wise to understand that it can ultimately only rely on its own power. “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” If Israel severely weakens its ability to defend itself by withdrawing its forces to create a Palestinian state, it must understand that it will assuredly be left to suffer what it must when that state falls to Islamic fundamentalists as history and the facts on the ground strongly predict.

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

Can regional peace bring the Palestinians to negotiations

By Jeremiah Rozman

Many predicted that Israel’s August 2020 breakthrough with the UAE would likely have a cascading effect. Since then, Israel has seen positive developments with Oman, Malawi, Chad, Morocco, Kosovo, Serbia and now Bahrain. Saudi Arabia opened its airspace, and Sudan’s ambassador hinted at the potential for thawing relations. President Trump predicted Israeli peace with up to nine countries soon to follow.

Some lament that peace with Arab countries reduces the pressure on Israel to pursue peace with the Palestinians. Palestinian leadership understands this. By demonstrating that Israel will not be compelled into concessions, regional peace provides the best hope yet for Israeli-Palestinian peace. 

Israel’s accords with Egypt and Jordan provided peace without free movement of goods and people. The Abraham Accords between the UAE, Bahrain and Israel, is the first Arab-Israeli “warm” peace. It was achieved without stipulations regarding settlements or a two-state solution, showing that Israel’s legitimacy and diplomatic progress will not be held hostage to indefinite Palestinian intransigence. European support and rare U.S. bipartisan enthusiasm for these accords, reinforces this conclusion.

A sign at the anti-Netanyahu “Balfour Protests” in Jerusalem read in Hebrew, “Bibi, make peace with Mars next.” The protestor argued that peace with countries not at war with Israel is less important than peace with the Palestinians. One could be forgiven for not viewing the lack of peace with the Palestinians as a personal failure of the current prime minister. None of Israel’s leaders have achieved it because the Palestinian leadership’s ideology does not allow productive negotiations. The “moderate” Palestinian Authority (PA), is unwilling to officially relinquish territorial demands in the event of a peace treaty, while obliterating Israel as a sacred duty, is a core tenet in Hamas’ charter.

The oft-repeated maxim “one makes peace with one’s enemies, not friends,” is misleading. One cannot make peace if the opposing side does not seek peace. Therefore, Israel acted rationally when it tabled futile attempts to make peace with entities ideologically opposed to a pragmatic negotiated agreement.

The only way to compel a non-state militant organization to abandon absolutist ideology central to their raison d'etre, is by credibly threatening them with decisive defeat. Despite possessing the firepower, Israel is too constrained to credibly threaten the Palestinians with military defeat. Since Israel cannot achieve peace through military victory or negotiation, its sole remaining realistic strategy has been management of the conflict. Israel has been pursuing this strategy with increasing success since the Oslo peace process collapsed in a bloody intifada. 

Israel manages conflict with the PA through a robust military presence, and security cooperation with an entity that benefits from quiet in terms of power and wealth and relies on the Israeli military to keep Hamas from overthrowing it as it did in Gaza. Israel manages conflict with Hamas with effective denial strategies including: active defense, physical barriers, intelligence, and controlled violence. 

Regional peace between Israel and its neighbors holds the possibility of changing this dynamic. It provides a pathway to socializing the Palestinian leadership to pursue pragmatism by threatening them with decisive political defeat in the form of rendering them irrelevant should they continue their intransigence.

Fear of irrelevance has driven Hamas, Hezbollah and the PA to engage in rare direct talks to figure out how to contend with Israel’s flourishing regional relations. Meanwhile, Israel actively seeks peace with neighbors whose ideology does not supersede shared interests. Hence, we see cascading peace between Israel and Arab countries that seek to be part of a prosperous and secure alliance with Israel and the United States, and fear Iranian aggression over Israel’s non-existent threat to them. 

Israel’s successful peace with its neighbors threatens to leave the Palestinian movements without a rationale. It is a sign of impotence that Palestinian factions have responded to the threat posed by peace, with “days of rage.” Palestinian leadership spoke of betrayal, livid that the Arab League failed to support them in opposition to the peace deals. 

On the day that the accords were signed on the White House lawn, both Hamas and Fatah issued bellicose statements slamming the peace deal, as terrorists fired rockets from Gaza. A senior Fatah official threatened, “peace begins in Palestine and war begins in Palestine.” This has been proven false. The longstanding truism that regional peace begins with an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty, is collapsing. 

The new alignment in the Middle East will likely be durable. UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs promised to foster relations with Israel irrespective of a change in U.S. leadership. With Israel’s acceptance in the region likely to be permanent, the Palestinians will face a choice; be left without a state, without attention, and without the ability to secure one through pressure or violence, or abandon their absolutist agenda in order to negotiate productively.

Although Israel agreed to forestall applying sovereignty in the territories for at least four years, creating a Palestinian state requires direct negotiations. Palestinian rejectionism would likely ensure that in four years’ time, whether Israel decides to annex or not, facts on the ground will make a Palestinian state increasingly unlikely. 

The longer Palestinian leadership hesitates, the less likely they are to gain. There is the possibility that the Palestinian people will overthrow their leadership for failing to act in their interests. However, predicting uprisings is not easy. Perhaps when Abbas retires, his replacement might bring to power a PA leadership that puts pragmatism above ideology. This would require them to be the first Palestinian leader to not view a territorial final status agreement as an act of treason.

There is no guarantee that the Palestinians will succeed in putting pragmatism over ideology, despite this being necessary for breaking the paradigm of status quo management which favors Israel, obtaining sovereignty, and achieving peace. However, by unmistakably demonstrating that continued intransigence threatens to leave them by the wayside without harming Israel, peace between Israel and its neighbors poses the best chance for socializing the Palestinians into an entity capable of making peace. 

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Geopolitics of the Israel-UAE Peace Agreement

By Jeremiah Rozman

With strong U.S. backing, on August 13, 2020, Israel and the UAE agreed to normalize relations. The UAE is the third Arab country to do so since Israel’s founding. 

In exchange for full normalization, Israel agreed to suspend extending sovereignty to disputed areas. As a supporter of sovereignty, especially in the strategically critical Jordan Valley, I view this agreement with tempered optimism. It supports the strategic interests of the U.S., U.S. partners in the Middle East and Israel. It does not harm Israel’s de-facto defensive position and should encourage the Palestinians to negotiate. Following an extensive election campaign, which heavily featured the promise to extend sovereignty, this deal has mixed results for Israel’s domestic politics. 

Great Power Competition

The Israel-UAE peace agreement was at least as much about U.S. strategic interests as it was about Israel and the UAE. Washington’s strategic priority is great power competition. Its top adversaries are Russia and China. Its main advantage is its alliance network. By solidifying the start of a coherent alignment between itself, Israel, and regional partners, the U.S. can lead a united front against Iran while preempting Russian and Chinese encroachment on its traditional allies. Furthermore, European partners often clash with the U.S. over Israel. This agreement has been warmly welcomed by the Europeans, helping to smooth over some of these differences.

Regional Security and Prosperity

The main benefit of this agreement is not ending violence, as was the case with Egypt. Rather, it is the setting of a diplomatic precedent intended to open a new regional realignment and an era of cooperation. 

Forward thinking Arab leaders realize that oil does not hold the promise for prolonged prosperity that it did fifty years ago. Their countries need access to state of the art technology and expertise in order to build economies and militaries primed for success in the information age. The U.S. and Israel can offer much needed investment, expertise, and defense support. Normalization with Israel opens the door for multilateral cooperation to modernize regional economies and enhance collective defense with an eye focused towards restraining Iran. 

Presidential candidate Joe Biden’s campaign credited the Israel-UAE breakthrough as the culmination of “efforts of multiple administrations.” Perhaps this assertion alludes to President Obama’s Iran deal, which caused regional powers to seek cooperation with Israel out of fear of Iran. This agreement, as a starting point for regional cooperation, will greatly boost Israel’s ability to target Iran should the need arise. 

Israel and the Gulf countries fear that if Joe Biden were to win the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, and follow through on his platform’s pledge to reenter the JCPOA, ending the maximum pressure strategy against Iran, the need to kinetically target Iran’s nuclear program could very well arise. For Israel to carry out a successful attack, it needs good relations with partners, the use of airspace, staging grounds, refueling capabilities, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support. By simply boosting the credibility of the threat to strike Iran, the peace deal enhances deterrence against Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

By forestalling sovereignty and securing increased visitation to the al Aqsa Mosque, this agreement gives the UAE a concrete policy win for the Palestinian cause. This boosts its leadership clout and contrasts the advantages of diplomacy with the Hezbollah/Lebanon confrontational model which has secured nothing for the Palestinians and brought ruin to Lebanon. 

For Israel, the main strategic drawback of the agreement is postponing de jure sovereignty, which is the optimal way to ensure Israeli control over the Jordan Valley for posterity. In the near term, this changes nothing, though. Israel has maintained security control over the Jordan Valley for over five decades and can continue, now with the tacit support of Arab powers, until an adequate deal is presented. This would require concrete border commitments from the Palestinian Authority (PA). Due to their ideological opposition, this is unlikely to be obtained.  

Over the coming years, the UAE will inevitably see substantial economic and defense benefits from normalization with Israel, making the treaty ever more difficult to abrogate. If the PA remains unwilling to negotiate peace, it is unlikely that the UAE will withdraw from the agreement if Israel extends sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. At that point, Israel could extend sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and other areas in the disputed territories without substantively harming relations with its Arab partners. Both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Jared Kushner have signaled that this is on the table. Whether it is implemented depends mostly upon the actions of the PA. 

Israel’s Domestic Politics

For Israel’s domestic politics, the peace agreement will have mixed results. It will exacerbate trust issues between the electorate and the Likud. Netanyahu campaigned on the promise of sovereignty, which was strongly supported by his voters. Some might credit him with masterful “door in the face” negotiating, waiving the credible threat of sovereignty in order to secure a diplomatic win by then conceding on it. Others will see this as a bait and switch. Either way, it exemplifies foreign policy from on high, keeping the masses in the dark so that the “experts” can play geopolitical chess. While this may or may not be desirable, it is likely to erode faith in electoral promises. 

Conclusion

The much heralded Israel-UAE peace agreement has disappointed many proponents of sovereignty. Others see normalized ties without requiring a change to the status quo as a betrayal of the Palestinians. In reality, this is a pragmatic move aimed primarily at boosting the U.S. geostrategic position with an eye towards great power competition. Secondarily, it opens the door for regional alignment between Israel and Gulf countries for economic and military cooperation. It does not harm Israel’s security in the short-term. It does not definitively end sovereignty. It does however, boost Israel’s position vis-à-vis its only existential threat, a nuclear armed Iran. For these reasons, the deal should be viewed with tentative optimism, as a win for Israel, moderate Arab regimes and the democratic global order. 

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Israel Should Extend Sovereignty to the Jordan Valley Now

By Jeremiah Rozman

There is strong consensus among Israel’s defense establishment that Israel must maintain a permanent military presence in the Jordan Valley. Extending sovereignty is the best way to secure that. Sovereignty also facilitates peace talks by removing a non-starter from the discourse. Sovereignty’s benefits outweigh the risks, while continuing the status quo harms growth, does not prevent international scorn and entails long-term risks. Israel should seize the opportunity provided by its historically large government, the Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” vision, and favorable international conditions to extend sovereignty to the Jordan Valley.

The Jordan Valley’s strategic importance 

Prime Ministers spanning Israel’s political spectrum, including: Rabin, Barak, Sharon and Netanyahu, all staunchly supported retaining permanent control of the Jordan Valley. Military control allows Israel to enforce the demilitarization of a future Palestinian entity, defend against conventional attack, deter and prevent forces from destabilizing Jordan, and mobilize reservists along interior lines.

Past withdrawals have failed to achieve peace, weakening Israel’s security in the process. Understanding these lessons, no responsible leader should cede control over strategic territory in an unstable region, to an untrustworthy entity. Israel’s evolving defensive capabilities do not minimize the importance of territorial control. Active defense entails taking fire which hurts Israel’s economy and traumatizes its citizens. The less Israel has to rely on it, the better. 

Israeli control of the Jordan Valley is key to preventing the “Gazafication” of any future Palestinian sovereign entity. Without it, militants can infiltrate from anywhere in the Middle East, extending Iran’s reach, and that of other militants, to territory bordering the Jerusalem-Ashdod-Haifa triangle, home to 70 percent of Israel’s population and 80 percent of its economic infrastructure. Foreign forces and “trip-wires” cannot prevent this. For example, the United Nations failed to enforce Hezbollah disarmament following the 2006 Lebanon War. 

Sovereignty, not status-quo

60% of Israelis with a clear opinion want the government to extend sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. Some experts argue that sovereignty would unnecessarily focus negative attention upon Israel, and they advocate for Israel to simply continue building “facts on the ground.” Such an approach has not shielded Israel from international condemnation in the past. 

Continuing the status quo neither moves the peace process forward, nor enhances Israel’s future prospects. It asks Israel to 'play dumb' and assumes that the international community and the Palestinians will play along indefinitely. This risks Israel being pressured into a withdrawal from the Jordan Valley in the next peace process as it was under the 2013 John Kerry led initiative. 

Israel has historically failed to maintain a military presence beyond its borders. Extending sovereignty now, under the auspices of a U.S. proposal, would create a powerful political “fact on the ground,” while continued limbo disincentivizes investment in civil infrastructure needed to build a de-facto presence.

The Risks

The Jordan Valley contains only 58,000 Palestinian Arabs who will likely remain under PA sovereignty. The demographic risk is a non-issue. Sovereignty enjoys significant public support and diplomatic risks are overblown. 

The Palestinian Authority

Israel’s mutually beneficial cooperation with the PA is unlikely to suffer significantly. Abbas’s oft-repeated threat to cut security ties is hollow. The PA relies on the IDF to keep Hamas from throwing its men off of roofs as they did in Gaza. This is why despite numerous threats, in practice, the PA will likely continue security cooperation.

Jordan

Israel and the U.S. both desire good relations with Jordan. However, Jordan faces severe challenges to its stability, relies heavily on U.S. support, and benefits from the IDF securing its western border. It is therefore unlikely to curtail cooperation over territory that it ceded its claim to in 1988. Senior Jordanian officials have reportedly signaled this position repeatedly to Israel and to other leaders involved in the U.S. led peace initiative.

Regional powers

Increased threat from Iran and decreased importance of Middle Eastern oil lead regional powers to seek stronger ties with the U.S. and Israel. Several Arab countries are quietly backing the U.S. plan allowing Israel to extend sovereignty. Senior Saudi officials reportedly said that for many Arab states, official opposition is for show. 

The E.U. and international bodies

The EU has voiced strong opposition to Israel’s sovereignty plans. Hungary and Austria have prevented unanimous condemnation and will likely make it impossible for it to impose sanctions on Israel, while mutually beneficial trade and defense ties are unlikely to suffer much. 

The International Criminal Court (ICC) also expressed concern. In the past it has sought to prosecute Israelis for fighting Hamas. If Israel is criticized for defending itself against a terrorist entity which calls for genocide in its charter, there is little reason to believe that it can ever avoid being the target of a double standard by the ICC or other international bodies. The U.S. recently rejected the ICC’s power to charge its troops. Its authority should not be overestimated. 

The U.S.

The Trump administration’s approach to Israel has gained rising legitimacy as its political opponents’ predictions of “a regional explosion” over moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights failed to materialize. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo’s most recent statements called extending sovereignty “a decision for the Israeli government.” He noted regional support and expressed disappointment over the PA’s refusal to participate in negotiations. Future administrations from either party are unlikely to pressure Israel to withdraw once sovereignty is an established fact. Nor would they be likely to curtail defense, intelligence, trade or diplomatic relations which enjoy strong congressional and popular support. 

Conclusion

There is broad consensus that Israel must maintain military control in the Jordan Valley. Continuing the status quo does Israel no favors, while the risks of extending sovereignty are likely overblown. Sovereignty reduces the likelihood that Israel will be pressured into further withdrawal. It also removes ambiguity, enhancing Israel’s ability to build infrastructure. This will yield economic as well as security dividends. Israel should seize the current opportunity. Long-term ambiguity is not in Israel’s interest despite it consistently being the easier short-term route. 

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Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.