By Yochai Guiski
Following the clash between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, now is the time to examine the wider implications of the latest chapter in the decades long conflict between Israel and its enemies, especially vis-à-vis Hezbollah in Lebanon.
As Hezbollah looks to the south, what conclusions should it draw? Here are some important ones:
The IDF knows quite a lot about its enemies: If Hezbollah had not yet understood this from the steady stream of attacks by the Israel Air Force (IAF) in Syria, and the occasional spectacle of Israel releasing intelligence to the world about Hezbollah sites in Lebanon, the latest operation should drive the point home.
The IDF is ready for conflict from day one: If in the past, Hezbollah could rely on the fact that the IDF needed at least a few days to gather and prepare its forces for combat, the conflict in Gaza has illustrated the IDF’s ability to strike extremely hard and extremely fast, right from the start.
The IDF is determined and highly destructive: If the attacks against military targets in high-rises in Gaza, and the ability to hit underground military infrastructure were signs of things to come in Lebanon, then Hezbollah should be worried for its strongholds in Beirut and throughout Lebanon. Israel has warned for years that placing Hezbollah military assets at the heart of civilian areas will not shield them from the IAF’s reach, as they are legitimate military targets.
The IDF was able to counter or defeat all Hamas “surprises”: Hamas tunnels were inconsequential in the fighting or proved to be death-traps to those who used them (albeit not to the extent the IDF would have liked); its drones were shot down or had little impact, and other “surprises” were countered before launch (such as the mini submarines destroyed at the Gaza port).
Iron Dome works spectacularly well: If there was even a shred of doubt about the capabilities of the Iron Dome system, its ability to deal with barrages of more than a hundred rockets at a time has proven that the enemy’s method of trying to overload the system, has yielded little success thus far.
The IDF did not perform a ground maneuver, yet again: Israel reluctance to get into a ground maneuver in Gaza, despite the intensity of the conflict, will surely be perceived as weakness or at least as hesitation in dealing with Hamas and Hezbollah’s ground capabilities. The combination of hidden and fortified defenders accompanied by long range and accurate anti-tank systems, would seem like a winning formula. However, the fact that there was little chance to glean information about IDF capabilities (such as Trophy) probably feels like a missed opportunity for Hezbollah.
The liberal and mainstream media veer steadily toward the Palestinian narrative of victimhood and oppression: The focus on the humanitarian impact of the conflict by the press is steadily growing, as is criticism about the power gap between Israel and its enemies (Israel as the proverbial bully). This trend could prove damaging to Israel in the court of public opinion and may serve Hezbollah, as it seeks to present itself as the protector of Lebanon against “Israeli aggression”.
There are cracks in support for Israel in the United States: In the mainstream media, at the grassroots level, in the liberal and progressive sections of the political field, and most worryingly in Congress:
- This makes Israel far more susceptible to international pressure (and/or retaliation) because of its growing dependance on America for weapons systems and political support.
- US senators and members of the House of Representatives appear ready to stop Israel from acquiring American weapons, or at least make it much harder. The overall implications could affect the way Israel would be able to fight in Lebanon and defend itself (duration, targets, forced ceasefires).
- However, the Biden administration has proven itself to be a staunch Israel supporter, both publicly in Congress, and at the political level, by helping Israel end the current fighting, in a manner consistent with its security needs and strategic goals.
- Hezbollah may not know exactly what kind of American support Israel would get in the event of conflict, but the overall situation is more conducive to its way of fighting, chips away at Israel’s deterrence and probably places more limitations on Israel’s freedom of operations in Lebanon then in the past.
The IDF has operational gaffs. It seems like in every military operation, the IDF makes a few unforced errors – offensively or defensively. Putting a bus full of soldiers in an area that Hamas can hit ended fortunately without any casualties as a Hamas anti-tank rocket hit it just minutes after the soldiers disembarked. The IDF targeting of a building housing several media outlets without providing timely justification turned into a media and political firestorm that dominated the news cycle. Hezbollah would undoubtedly seek to create and exploit such mishaps by the IDF.
Israel was not willing to defeat Hamas. It is abundantly clear that Israel was unwilling to even consider toppling the Hamas regime, and was content to exchange blows and hit Hamas hard to restore its deterrence. This probably bodes well for Hezbollah, who may understand that Israel will not go for the jugular in a future conflict.
If one were to summarize all these lessons for Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, they would probably not be much of a surprise to him. The conflict in Gaza was quite predictable and did not venture much outside the established “box” of past operations, although it was more intense than previous ones.
The bad news from Nasrallah’s standpoint would be the IDF’s quality of execution, the decisive way its airpower was employed, and the stellar performance of the Iron Dome system, as this trifecta would be the main challenge to Hezbollah if war erupts. While the good news from his point of view would be the apparent friction between Israel and the U.S., and the price Israel pays internationally for using force, which harms its overall stature and deterrence.
LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.