yochai guiski

Israel is at war with a bloodthirsty Hamas.

By Yochai Guiski

Israel awoke Saturday, October 7 to a shocking reality; Hamas launched a large-scale incursion into communities near Gaza, employing aerial gliders speedboats, and heavy machinery and explosives to bring down parts of the border fence, all the while launching thousands of rockets at Israeli towns and communities.

The brutal nature of the Hamas assault was self-evident, as Hamas “fighters” massacred old women at bus stations in scenes reminiscent of the Russian assault on the Ukrainian town of Bakhmut. Hamas also brought Israeli “prisoners” to Gaza, showcasing themselves brutalizing captured Israeli soldiers or joyriding through the area with an Israeli senior citizen. Other, vile images show abuse of the bodies of dead Israelis.

Some images have emerged from the communities overrun by Hamas, but the devastation and the final death toll will become clear only after the IDF retakes the area and learns of the state of the local civilian residents. The Hamas raid also coincided with a music festival held where young people held an outdoor dance party – many of them were killed or wounded, while others were kidnapped and taken to Gaza, as were some residents of the area. Hamas is notorious for its ill-treatment of Israelis, holding them without any communication or access to the Red Cross for years.

Gazans also pillaged the communities they entered, taking heavy machinery, cars, and other equipment, which they then paraded in Gaza.

The attack came out of nowhere and was a major surprise to Israel and its intelligence community. This at a time when Israel was working on securing additional aid to Gaza; it has allowed thousands of Gazans to work in Israel and was in the process of allowing the Palestinians to drill for natural gas off the Gaza coast.

Hamas decided to throw all this away and plunge the region into war, claiming it was doing so as a response to Israeli Jews entering the Temple Mount during the holiday of Sukkot, thus, in their view, defiling the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

We do not know why Hamas did so. Was it their Jihadi identity asserting itself at the expense of the Gaza population, was it a coordinated plan with their Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah partners, or did they seek to take advantage of the internal turmoil within Israel?

What we know for certain is that Gaza is about to pay the price for the hubris of its leaders; we can certainly see the cruelty they have unleashed on Israeli civilians.

It is a stark and painful reminder that even as Israel pursues additional avenues to advance peace in the region with Saudi Arabia and others, some would rather see it all burn down to serve their religious zealotry and unhinged willingness to use force.

Israel will need to take an extremely hard look at its defenses and intelligence. The concept of defense based on technological superiority came crashing down, as simple numbers and ingenuity allowed Hamas to overwhelm, overrun, or bypass them altogether. The lack of strategic intelligence on Hamas’s intentions and of tactical intelligence on its widespread assault along the supposedly secure border should prompt a comprehensive assessment of the failure.

The political echelon should not receive a free pass. The government’s dogged obsession with a one-sided judicial reform tore Israeli society from within. Internal security deteriorated markedly and little time was allocated to security issues not related to Judea and Samaria.

The opening phase of what will be the Gaza war was a spectacular failure. Let us hope things get better from now on, and not worse, and let us also hope that Israel is going to learn from its mistakes and that it will never repeat them. Let us also hope that the internal divisions that have marked the tenure of the current government will ease and that both sides of the political divide learn the old maxim attributed to Benjamin Franklin – “We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.”   

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Deciphering Hezbollah’s decision-making

By Yochai Guiski

Contrary to frequent statements made of late in both Israel and Lebanon, it is far from clear that Israel and Hezbollah are entering a period characterized by heightened risk of miscalculation.

Rather, the current period appears to be marked by a more intense exchange of warning signals between the two adversaries – particularly in Syria, where Israel has reportedly been highly active.

Hezbollah, for its part, has also initiated maneuvers, such as the March cross-border Megiddo highway terror bombing, although these have not succeeded in causing Israel to lose its balance. In April, Hamas in Lebanon fired 34 rockets at northern Israel, sparking Israeli retaliatory airstrikes.

Last year, Hezbollah threatened Israeli offshore gas rigs in the Mediterranean in the lead-up to the Lebanese – Israeli maritime border agreement and sent unmanned aerial vehicles in the direction of one of the rigs.

Together, such incidents could collectively suggest that we are in an era of heightened tensions in which any miscalculation could drag the region into conflict, much like the period leading up to the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

But another way of seeing things is that the situation is far from being on a slippery slope and that it is far from being a repeat of 2006.

It is true that Hezbollah seems to feel freer to launch tactical attacks and also more capable of doing so. And that Israel feels the need to reset the dynamics, returning to a situation in which Hezbollah was more restrained. But this does not mean that either side is likely to make a gross miscalculation any time soon.

The last decade has demonstrated that both Israel and Hezbollah can de-escalate – even when one or both of the sides sustain casualties. Both sides have learned too much from the 2006 war to blindly repeat those actions.

Is Hezbollah wrongly judging reality due to internal tensions in Israel? So far, Hezbollah has shown that it does understand the Israeli system well. However, there is a joker in the pack that could still upset the situation: Iran.

If Israel concludes that it must take action because the Iranian nuclear program is advancing too far, then it may, potentially, also feel the need to take Hezbollah out of the equation in parallel military actions. If the Iranian arena stabilizes, however, and the U.S. reaches some sort of arrangement with Tehran, that will neutralize the above scenario.

Despite all of Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah's bravado in his speeches, he is, in practice, very cautious and understands the fragility of his situation. 

Hezbollah’s decision-making vis-à-vis Iran

First and foremost, Hezbollah is an independent entity, both in its decision-making and in choosing how to respond to Iranian calls to action.  Of course, Iran has a very significant dialogue with Hezbollah, but in the end, Hezbollah is independent.

Does that mean Hezbollah will turn Iran down on the day of the order to go into combat with Israel? Most likely, it will not do that, but it could decide to limit the intensity of the action, and the scope of the action that it takes.

There is also the question of how other players figure into Hezbollah’s decisions. Hamas is not really an influence. Hamas leaders will not decide if Hezbollah or Iran escalate. On the flip side, however, Hamas’s leaders may decide that they will join in a future Israel – Hezbollah conflict.

Would Hezbollah be the initiator of conflict, like Egypt was in 1967? That scenario seems highly unlikely at this time. At the very least, Syria would have to stabilize first, much more than it currently is.

Would Hezbollah be willing to consider “lying on the fence” for Iran? It may choose to do that to a certain extent, and that is why Hezbollah is always preparing for war.

Hezbollah lives in dissonance between its Shi'ite Islamist messianic vision of destroying Israel and its day-to-day realpolitik considerations, which very much guide it and dominate its actual decision-making.

An Iranian nuclear umbrella is certainly an event that could change the situation, boosting Hezbollah’s tolerance for clashes. But this scenario is far down the road.

For the most part, and on a daily basis, Hezbollah’s decisions are guided by very rational calculations, much like those of its benefactor, Iran.

One often repeated question about Hezbollah’s decision-making is the role played by Israeli deterrence. But a more precise way of analyzing this aspect is to inquire about Hezbollah’s overall balance of interests.

Deterrence is too imprecise a concept to measure decisions by since it reduces all actions to binary dos or don’ts. Deterrence is by definition the power to dissuade an adversary from acting. In reality, Hezbollah is building up force and does initiate some hostile actions, but its overall balance of interests prevents it from initiating war with Israel.

Hezbollah has a concept of defense and attack, and it is keenly aware that it has a powerful enemy located to the south with many capabilities that are dangerous to it. Part of its war readiness against Israel is tied to its ideological values and affiliation with Iran. These all factor into Hezbollah’s complex balance of interests.

Lebanese domestic interests greatly affect Nasrallah’s decisions too – more than is often given credit for.

The interests of Lebanese Shiites themselves within Lebanon, the dynamics within the Lebanese government, relations with non-Shi’ite Lebanese allies, external relationships between outside players and the Lebanese state, the involvement of foreign powers in the region, all play a role, adding another layer of complexity to Hezbollah’s decision-making process.

It is a process that requires in-depth study, and one that cannot be reduced to pure ideology or to merely following Iranian directives.

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

The Palestinian issue is about supremacy, not justice

By Yochai Guiski

Two weeks ago, we marked, as we do every year, November 29, the date of the historic United Nations decision to partition the British Mandate of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. It has also come to be designated by the UN as “International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.” But even as the Palestinians and their supporters seek to rebrand the day and to cast Israel as a colonial, apartheid state, and an unscrupulous violator of human rights, one must point out the unflattering truth -- the Palestinian campaign is about privilege and supremacy of the Arabs and Palestinians and not about justice. 

Many readers will be scratching their heads at this point as privilege and supremacy are usually associated with white Europeans and Americans and not the seemingly poor and oppressed Palestinians. But they would be missing the obvious truth -- privilege and supremacy are not exclusively white but are borne of deep-seated perceptions of superiority by those groups who are in power, especially if they have held power for a long time. Some societies manifest it in a caste system, others do so by formally making religious or ethnic minorities into second-class citizens.

Jews were second-class citizens in the areas controlled by the various incarnations of Arab or Islamic rule over the centuries, and this only ended after the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. This happened all over the Middle East including in the Holy Land, where Jews have been living for centuries in holy cities such as Jerusalem, Tiberias, Hebron and Safed.

Jews were taxed for being non-Muslims; ofttimes they were persecuted (although less than in “enlightened” Europe), and were treated, as one Egyptian Jew described it, as “guests in their own home.” For most of that time, Jews were unable to own land, were confined to live in certain areas, and were subject to random acts of violence from their neighbors.

It is no wonder that when the “second-class” Jews were suddenly equal rights citizens under the British mandate, the Arabs chafed under what seemed sacrilegious -- a Jew enjoying the same rights as an Arab. No land was confiscated from Arabs and no houses were demolished; mostly uninhabited lands were bought and developed, but the anger simmered.

Even as the British tore away parts of the land destined for the Jewish homeland and created the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jews were building hamlets and prospering by the fruit of their labor without depriving the local Arab population. Yet, the Arab anger continued to grow. It was “unjust” and “unnatural” and the “good Arab boys” indeed took matters into their hands -- Jewish homes, businesses and hamlets were the targets of brazen criminal behavior and outright racist attacks, especially during “the Great Revolt” (1936-1939) against the British that saw Arabs destroy Jewish communities in Hebron, Jerusalem, the Galilee, and the Negev, killing over 400 Jews (though Arab casualties were far more severe, over 5,000 dead).

Palestinian apologists try to explain it away as budding nationalism and anger at the demographic changes, but this happened all over the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) – it was far from confined to the Holy Land. In Iraq, the notorious Farhud in 1941 saw Iraqis kill at least 180 Jews, wound over 2,000 and ransack the homes and properties of thousands. In Egypt, attacks on Jews in Cairo occurred in 1938 and 1945. The racist treatment intensified to a crescendo of violence against Jews as Israel was established – attacks on Jews were the norm, their properties were confiscated, and many were arrested or detained in camps. Around nine hundred thousand Jews were thus forced to migrate and leave most of their property behind. Second-class residents indeed.

Why is this about racism and privilege and not mere discord between nations? First, it was widespread and commonplace throughout the MENA region; there was not a single Arab or Middle Eastern country that didn’t see its Jewish community decimated and abused -- in the same way that no state in the American Confederacy treated blacks as nothing but slaves, and less than whites, after the civil war.

Second, the rejection of the right of Jews to self-determination in their ancient homeland is pervasive. The notion of Zionism, the national movement of the Jewish people, is described in the most derogatory terms – colonialism, racism, Apartheid, crimes against humanity. The rejection of the right to be an Israeli or a Zionist is evident in academia, sports (including harassing Israeli journalists in the “safe environment” of the soccer World Cup in Qatar), culture, and literature, just for the crime of supporting Jewish self-determination in the Holy Land.

Third, the Palestinians and their supporters are out to redefine history as part of denying Jewish claims to the Holy Land. In the Palestinian version of reality (which was adopted by UNESCO, in a controversy that led the US to exit the agency), only Muslims have a sacred connection to the Temple Mount (known to Muslims as the Haram al-Sharif). Make no mistake about it, this is racist to the core.

Fourth, when the Palestinians rose against the British, they did so after rejecting the idea of a pluralist country with a common parliament for Jews and Arabs. They were not fighting to get more rights -- their rights were never compromised -- but to return to the “good old system” where Jews “knew their place” and were kept nicely under the boot of the Arabs. Even if one accepts the notion of a local nationalist awakening, one must reject its racist elements against the Jewish minority.

Fifth, the utter rejection of the notion of Jewish indigenousness. Not only were the ties between Jews and their homeland denied, Palestinians and their supporters also deny Jews of Arab descent their hard-earned heritage. They harass Jews for cooking their traditional Middle Eastern foods or singing in Arabic and accuse them of cultural appropriation from the Palestinians, even though these are part of their centuries-old Middle Eastern heritage.

Sixth, Palestinians maintained their privilege through the decades. They are the only refugees that have their own agency, which has received tens of billions of dollars over the years, and their refugee status is permanent and passed on to their descendants. They also have two other dedicated UN agencies.

If you do not believe me, you can just look at the signs the Palestinian supporters carry. They do not hide their racist agenda and they yearn openly for the “good old days” – just look at the sign with several maps depicting the shrinking of Palestine, and you will see a pristine map showing 100% ownership of land by Palestinians prior to 1917 (though many signs now remove that map and only show the situation during 1917).

Stating this is not a defense of the wrongdoings that occur (way too often) as Israel continues to occupy the West Bank. One can, and should, criticize Israel for actions that fall outside appropriate and lawful action to defend its citizens from attacks, and for the unjust seizure of lands owned by Palestinians. Israel’s legal system is largely attentive to such issues and attempts to correct them (if not always in a timely or satisfactory manner in the eyes of its detractors). This very system is now besieged by those who find it too lenient toward the Palestinians.

But none of it matters to Palestinian supporters. They continue to proudly put these vile maps on signs, to contrast the “evil” Israeli occupation, with the seemingly natural and “good” status before 1917. Yet, we all know which system creates such “pristine” maps -- it is called Apartheid. The centuries of Apartheid that Jews had to endure under the Arab control of the Holy Land. Are the maps and those who proudly hold the aloft racist or not? You be the judge.

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Hezbollah’s role in the Israeli-Lebanese maritime agreement

By Yochai Guiski

Israel and Lebanon have reached an agreement that will alter how the world views their maritime borders. The agreement is designed to demarcate each country’s exclusive economic zones (EEZ), as well as the majority of their territorial waters.

The U.S.-mediated agreement has sparked a firestorm of controversy in the final weeks before Israel’s November 1 elections.

While viewed favorably by the coalition parties and the majority of Israel’s security establishment, opposition parties see it as a shameful capitulation to pressure from Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the United States and have even said they may not honor it if they come to power.

Defining maritime boundaries is more of an art than a science. There are some common methods, but they vary depending on the contours of the shoreline, near-shore islands and rocks, continental shelves, and other factors. As a result, many countries that are geographically close have unresolved maritime disputes (39 percent of all sea borders are contested).

Israel’s original claim regarding its EEZ, made in 2011, was an overreach that could not be justified under international law. The Lebanese position, claiming ownership of the gas field known as Karish, which is located in Israel’s EEZ, went even further and was far more irrational. Both positions could be described as starting points for future discussions. Since 2011, Israel and Lebanon have been negotiating a solution with the assistance of a U.S. mediator.

Lebanon’s original offer stemming from those discussions has now been accepted by Israel, with a few changes concerning security in territorial waters. As a result, Israel has relinquished its original claim to maritime boundaries.

It is important to clarify that EEZs are not sovereign areas. Instead, they are managed by states for economic and environmental reasons. They are part of the global commons, and any vessel can move through them.

Hezbollah has occasionally threatened to attack Israel’s rigs in recent years, but it has increased its threats significantly in past months, prior to and following the arrival of the Karish floating gas rig off the northern Israeli coastline. Hezbollah even sent unmanned aerial vehicles in the direction of the rig before they were shot down by the IDF.

After the agreement was made public, Hezbollah stated that Israel had agreed to Lebanon’s position and chalked this up to its tough stance. The group vowed to “keep an eye” on Israel to see if it followed through with the agreement.   

As the debate over the agreement played out in Israel, two leading schools of thought emerged.

One camp sees it as a reasonable compromise that reduces the likelihood of a security escalation in the short and long term. The threat of losing the benefit of gas exploration and production would, according to this line of reasoning, constrain Hezbollah while allowing the Lebanese state to stabilize its economy, and potentially, its political situation, without the need for assistance from Iran and Russia. This, in turn, would strengthen its internal position vis-à-vis Hezbollah. It would also strengthen the American and Western positions in Lebanon and the Middle East, as well as boost Israel’s image, while sacrificing nothing of real value.

The other side sees the agreement as a dishonorable capitulation that would set a dangerous precedent—a full Israeli territorial concession under threat of violence in exchange for almost nothing concrete.

This view holds that the current agreement boosts Hezbollah and humiliates Israel, with the gas rigs becoming the focal point of future extortion attempts by Hezbollah or other radical actors. Critics of the deal regard the idea of the agreement restraining Hezbollah as unrealistic, and they see Israel’s weakness as a potential trigger for escalation. They also see a potential economic windfall for Iran and Hezbollah because they can influence Lebanon’s decision-making.

According to the Israeli business daily Globes, the dispute between the parties took place within the Israeli security establishment and resulted in the resignation of the head of the Israeli negotiation team.

It is too soon to tell which side is correct. Yet it is clear that Israel can make some early gains from the agreement, while Lebanon’s gains will take several years to materialize.

In the short term, a real threat of escalation has been removed, and Israel can begin producing gas from the Karish gas field—while exporting some of it to an energy-starved Europe.

In addition, while Hezbollah will likely receive credit for the agreement in the short term, Lebanon will need to avoid escalation with Israel in order to reap economic benefits in the long run.

Lebanon could build its Kana-Sidon undersea gas field in a few years, improving its ability to generate electricity and its finances, which could also benefit Hezbollah.

The agreement’s success may put pressure on Hamas and the Palestinian Authority to reach a similar agreement to develop the gas reservoir off the Gaza coast.

These developments can be considered stabilizing factors in a vacuum, but things change if one brings Iran into the picture.

If a nuclear deal is reached between Tehran and the world powers, Iran will seize the opportunity to explore and develop gas and oil fields in the Lebanese EEZ in the Mediterranean Sea. This would strengthen Iran’s and Hezbollah’s overall influence over the country, while weakening the Lebanese state.

If the current standoff with Iran persists or worsens, the prospects for stability in Lebanon are also likely to be dashed. The risk of Hezbollah targeting Israeli rigs would, in this scenario, increase, making a symmetrical response by Israel impossible because it would need to attack the Lebanese rig—an asset of a European company.

Meanwhile, Israel’s concessions to Lebanon would remain binding.

It is therefore critical that Israel, the United States, and their European partners devise a strategy to prevent Iran from abusing the agreement, and that they maintain regional stability. If the escalation scenario ends up playing out, Israel would likely be much less willing to make peace and opt for diplomatic means in the future.

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

An Al-Jazeera reporter’s death and a Palestinian culture of lies

By Yochai Guiski

In the early hours of May 11, the IDF conducted a raid in the Jenin refugee camp, which has been a hotbed of terrorist activity over the last few weeks. IDF forces, together with Shin Bet domestic security service agents, who were trying to apprehend terrorist suspects, came under heavy fire from armed Palestinians shooting wildly in the narrow streets of the camp.

During the battle, Al-Jazeera’s veteran television correspondent Shireen Abu Akleh was killed (reportedly from a shot to the head) and another of the station’s journalists was shot in the back. As Abu Akleh is also an American citizen, the United States called for a “thorough investigation into the circumstances of her death and the injury of at least one other journalist”.

Footage of gunmen shooting indiscriminately in the alleyways of Jenin alleyways was published in the media as evidence of their reckless behavior, but an analysis by the Israeli human rights group B’Tselem of the area shown in the video and the location where the reporter was shot appears to indicate that these are two different sites.

The IDF has already committed itself to investigate the tragic incident as part of its regular protocols. Defense Minister Benny Gantz addressed the issue and while stating his support for the IDF soldiers acting to protect the country, also expressed sorrow for Abu Akleh’s death. He reiterated the commitment of Israel to a thorough and transparent investigation, called upon the Palestinian leadership to conduct a joint investigation and autopsy, and promised to provide a detailed report on the issue to the parties involved.

This seems like the sensible thing to do -- conduct a joint investigation, analyze the findings, and commit to transparency and open reporting on the issue. But the actions of the Palestinian side have shown that they are committed to a different agenda -- exploit the incident to scapegoat Israel, regardless of truth, consequence, or integrity.

First, the Palestinian leadership denied Israel’s request for a joint investigation and autopsy. The Palestinians rushed Abu Akleh’s body to the Institute of Forensic Medicine at An-Najah University in Nablus where an autopsy was carried out.

Second, as evidence emerged on social media of the reckless actions of Palestinian gunmen in Jenin, there was a coordinated effort by Palestinians (and others) to destroy evidence and delete any footage on social media of the clashes in Jenin, so as to prevent the truth from emerging and to dispute the narrative about the death.

Third, a narrative that claimed Israeli forces targeted the reporter deliberately was propagated. Al Jazeera claimed that the reporter was “assassinated in cold blood”, while Hussein al-Sheikh, the Palestinian minister for civilian affairs, stated: "The truth is murdered by the bullets of the occupation”.

Fourth, the reporter was hailed as a hero by the Palestinian leadership and media. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas decided to lead a ceremony honoring Abu Akleh at the Palestinian presidential compound in Ramallah, while Hamas produced a video clip praising her work on behalf of the Palestinian people. 

At the time of writing, we are mere hours from the tragic death which has yet to be properly investigated, but one thing is already certain: The Palestinian campaign to establish a narrative of Israeli guilt and premeditation and to disrupt the ability to get to the bottom of events is in full swing.

It is no less regrettable, but nevertheless predictable, that the only Palestinian on the Hill, Congresswoman Rashida Talib, promotes these abhorrent accusations and condemns Israel as an “Apartheid state” that “continues to murder, torture and commit war crimes” and “murdered” Shireen Abu Akleh. Congresswoman Talib also used the tragedy to call for an end to U.S. aid to Israel.

So let us bring some clarity to the affair and try to cut through the propaganda and narratives that the Palestinians have inundated the media with:

The IDF operation in Jenin was part of an ongoing effort to end the wave of terror attacks, many of which originated in Jenin. The deadly attacks in Bnei Brak (March 29), Tel-Aviv (April 7), and El'ad (May 5) were all perpetrated by residents of the Jenin area.

The terrorists who conducted these attacks all worked in Israel (without a permit) and got there rather easily through gaps in the security fence. Israel has in recent years been trying to improve the social and economic conditions of the Palestinians and did not crack down on these activities. This oversight had to change when the Palestinians launched a campaign of terror attacks in Israel. The operation in Jenin was thus justified and unavoidable. 

The IDF does not target the press deliberately. Such an accusation is nothing but a blood libel, propagated by the Palestinians and their supporters, who ignore the various times Palestinians have used press insignia in terror attacks, or the fact that terror groups like Hamas have their own TV and radio stations.

Al-Jazeera is not an ordinary media outlet. Much like RT is used by Russia, Al-Jazeera is used by Qatar to promote its agenda, and acts as a propaganda channel on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood. Al Jazeera’s venomous and sometimes unhinged criticism of Egypt and Saudi Arabia has been met with expulsions and was one of the major causes of the rift between the Gulf states and Qatar.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Al-Jazeera has served as a mouthpiece for Hamas, and its blatant support for the terrorist group has even led Israel to consider shutting down its operations in the country.

The Palestinians have been trying for a long time to get into the spotlight -- by comparing themselves to Ukraine or attempting to turn Ramadan into a rallying call against Israeli control of the holy sites in Jerusalem. Using the unfortunate death of the reporter is just another attempt to gain attention.

Even at a time when fake news triumphs over reason and catchy narratives rule the day, carefully gathering and analyzing the facts should still be the right way.

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

PM Bennett must mediate Russia Ukraine conflict

By Yochai Guiski

As events in Ukraine unfolded over the past few weeks we witnessed a Russian ground invasion, a valiant Ukrainian defensive effort, thousands of deaths, over a million refugees, and heavy sanctions by the United States and Europe on Russia.  Israel for its part tried to stay out of the fray and avoid taking a harsh tone with Russia.

As a result, Jerusalem’s partners in the United States and Europe, as well as journalists in the Israeli and international media, pushed it to adopt a more vocal and unambiguous tone regarding Russia’s assault on Ukraine.

Reports suggested that U.S. officials, and even President Biden himself, were critical of Israel’s stance, expecting it to be “on the right side of history” and to join the chorus of condemnation of Russia’s aggression, at least at the United Nations. If U.S. anger with the policies of India and the United Arab Emirates is any indication, the pressure on Jerusalem must have been intense.

As Israel tried to stay the course, Washington pushed harder and a few days into the war, Foreign Minister Yair Lapid condemned Russia’s attack on Ukraine, supported Ukrainian territorial integrity, and voiced Israel’s commitment to humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine.

Even these steps were seen as insufficient and expectations of Israel to provide additional support, including weapon systems were expressed by Ukrainian officials and by U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham. Although at least, the nonsensical idea of providing Iron Dome systems to Ukraine, which has been circulated by the media, was rightfully rejected by Ukrainian defense officials.

But Israel’s boldest move came over the weekend when Prime Minister Bennett secretly flew to Moscow to meet with President Vladimir Putin and then on to Berlin to meet with Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The prime minister was also in contact with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy during his journey. Israel also sought to coordinate the effort with the U.S. by reportedly conferring with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan before the flights.

The reactions to the prime minister’s initiative ranged from lukewarm support to dismissal and outright criticism of his actions.

But was Israel right to forge ahead with its mediation effort or should its leaders have toed the line, adopted a forceful approach toward Russia, and let other nations tend to the conflict? I believe the Prime Minister made the right call.

Even now, millions are in harm’s way or fleeing their homes in Ukraine to become refugees, and many millions more may suffer the same or much worse, as the crisis in Ukraine is set to intensify. The direct human toll could be extremely heavy, and the indirect costs of the conflict may be just as bad.

Shortages in grain supplies from major producers Russia and Ukraine, as well as the skyrocketing prices of wheat, may bring famine and instability to many countries including in the volatile Middle East.  

In these circumstances, Israel is one of the very few countries that are still on good terms with Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., and Europe. Should Israel walk away from its unique position and simply join the litany of states that forcefully criticize Russia (but do little else), or should it attempt to use its position to do some good?

There are several ways Israel can make positive use of its position vis-à-vis Russia:

1. Provide a secure and discreet back channel between the West and Russia. As the conflict in Ukraine intensifies and the specter of nuclear escalation looms, there would be value in such channels.

2. Allow for indirect communication between Russian and Ukrainian leadership, through Israel.

3. Communicate the need for humanitarian consideration to be incorporated into the Russian operations in Ukraine, as well as specific humanitarian requests.

4.  Assist the U.S. in understating Putin’s state of mind, and potentially help the U.S. develop and execute an exit strategy from the conflict and provide an “off-ramp” for the Russian leadership to de-escalate the situation.  

The value inherent in these possibilities is already being partly realized, as both President Putin and President Zelenskyy and other leaders conduct talks with Prime Minster Bennett, while the Ukrainian ambassador has commended his mediation effort, and even suggested that Jerusalem might be a venue for high-level negotiations.

The strategic and moral imperative dictates that Israel tries to use its influence to prevent more loss of life and alleviate the suffering of those who are still caught in the fighting, instead of joining the Western efforts to exact a toll from Russia for its actions.

Hundreds of thousands of Jews living in Ukraine and Russia would be part of the suffering, and as history teaches us, there are always dark forces of antisemitism at play in times of strife, who would seek to scapegoat and attack these communities.

There has been enough death and bloodshed in Ukraine, including the brutal murders of countless Jews during the Holocaust. The ground is already quenched with the blood of innocents - it need not get any more.

The Jewish Talmud teaches us a moral lesson - whoever saves one life saves the whole world. Israel must rise to the challenge and seize the moment to help save as many people as possible.

Doing so will not be achieved by joining the group of countries cutting ties with Russia and imposing sanctions on it, as the Israeli contribution to the overall effort would be negligible. Israel should focus on using the relations between Moscow and Jerusalem to help save lives.   

In his famous poem “The road not taken,” Robert Frost describes the contemplation of a person between two roads in the forest.  Like the choice made in the poem, Israel should also take the road less traveled, and hope that it makes all the difference.    

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

The similarities between Iranian and Russian belligerent foreign policy

By Yochai Guiski

Two separate high-stakes showdowns have been played out in recent months on the world stage: The first concerns the Iranian nuclear program, while the second is between Russia and the United States and European countries concerning Ukraine.

In the showdown over the Iranian nuclear program, Tehran has been pushing hard against U.S. and European demands to return to the nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and presented (at least initially) hardline negotiating demands. All the while, Iran’s continued non-compliance with the deal and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) have raised the specter of conflict arising from an attempt to delay the program by military means.

In the Ukraine, Western countries have seen Russia amass significant military forces (over 100 thousand troops and military equipment), threaten Kiev with military attack, and produce false narratives about Western aggression that requires a Russian response.

Moscow is already under sanctions for occupying and annexing the Crimean Peninsula and has received warnings from the U.S. about stiff sanctions should it initiate a military operation.

At first glance, these two issues seem unrelated: One is a multilateral nonproliferation negotiation regarding return to a nuclear deal that was abandoned by the Trump administration, and Iran’s noncompliance with the terms of the deal in response; the second is a potential war on European soil, which may lead to a crisis between two nuclear-armed great powers.

But at a closer look, the similarities begin to emerge:

1. Iran and Russia are both belligerent actors in their respective arenas:

a. The Kremlin and its allies are continuously intervening (through various tools - diplomatic, economic, covert, information, military) in the affairs of former Soviet republics, attempting to stifle pro-democracy dissent and prop up pro-Russian leaders, while supporting separatist pro-Russian groups.

b. Iran is also employing various tools to undermine the governments of Middle Eastern countries while funding and arming proxies who serve as its long arm. Iranian involvement perpetuated governance crises in Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip, and has exacerbated the humanitarian crises in Yemen and Syria.

2. Iran and Russia have both increased their belligerence in response to sanctions that sought to deal with their behavior. They are also willing to use capabilities that are deemed unacceptable by the West such as assassinations (including using chemical agents), supporting terror groups, and developing various WMD capabilities.

3. Both Iran and Russia do not shy from sending forces to prop up authoritarian allies or from the use of force to quash popular demands, such as in Syria, Belarus, or Kazakhstan.

4. Iran and Russia see themselves as victims of the current situation or at least adopt these positions outwardly:   

a. Iran depicts itself as a victim of Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the subsequent imposition of sanctions on Tehran. However, the “Nuclear Archives” showed that Iran had manifestly violated the JCPOA and the NPT by holding on to the blueprints and components of a military nuclear program, and it has violated NPT safeguards by holding and hiding enriched uranium. Iran has also leveraged the West’s interest in IAEA monitoring of its nuclear sites to prevent any meaningful investigation by the agency into its numerous violations.

b. Iran has also expanded its support for militias and terror groups around the Middle East that have targeted U.S. forces and their allies while claiming the U.S. is violating the nuclear agreement by sanctioning it for those behaviors.

c. Russia also sees itself as a victim of western interference. It sees the 20+ years of NATO enlargement to the east as an encroachment on its borders by a military alliance that primarily views Russia as its enemy. All the while remembering that the wars Russia fought in Europe were instigated by European nations.

d. It also views the development and deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities in Europe over the past decade as a significantly destabilizing development as these can reduce the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence.

e. Russia viewed the political change in Ukraine with genuine alarm, as its territory plays host to vital military installations (such as the only exit to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean) whose loss would have significant strategic implications. It reacted swiftly by seizing and annexing Crimea. Moscow also sees the NATO presence in Ukraine as an unacceptable risk to its national security (the distance between Moscow and the Ukrainian border is only about 500 Km of relatively open terrain).   

5. Conspicuously, both Iran and Russia seek guarantees from the U.S. and its allies that they would refrain from actions that could inhibit their ability to exercise their power in their respective (contested) spheres of influence (Russia provided treaty suggestions to the U.S. and Iran demands guarantees as part of the nuclear negotiations). They seek these guarantees knowing full well that their demands are near impossible to accept and even agreeing to discuss them might be interpreted as selling out U.S. partners in the region.

As the U.S. seeks to reinforce the notion of a rules-based international order, it is of paramount importance that regional bullies do not get a free pass on their behavior. Even if the U.S. and its allies might have done better in dealing with both nations, it is ultimately their aggressive policies that bear most of the responsibility for their current predicament.

Accepting the narrative that Iran or Russia are victims who just seek to have some protection from bullying U.S. policies would be counterproductive and an open invitation to aggression, which would also be closely monitored by an attentive Beijing.

Even if diplomacy is still the best road to address most of the issues between the U.S., Russia, and Iran, it would be foolhardy to attempt to kick the can down the road by acquiescing to unacceptable demands. Accepting them in diplomatic discourse with one actor would surely embolden the other to seek the same.

Even if the U.S. and Israel cannot fully agree on the nuclear negotiations with Iran, this should be a point they are united on. 

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Dealing with an intransigent Iran

By Yochai Guiski

This article is the third in a series dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. The previous installments dealt with Iran’s unwillingness to return to the JCPOA and China’s increasing importance to the Iran nuclear file.

The concrete possibility that Iran is not interested in returning to the JCPOA and merely wishes to attain sanctions relief through negotiations (“result oriented negotiations” as the Iranians put it) is now clear to decision makers in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East.

Furthermore, they now also understand that the current situation is untenable as Iran is no longer checking its nuclear program, and is willing to be bolder in its use of force, including harassing, attacking and hijacking ships.

As Europe (and the IAEA) are still heavily invested in the negotiations track it must fall to other players to deal with the implications. This means the US and Israel should swiftly plan and develop a strategy that should address three distinct issues:

·     Crisis planning and management, as part of moving Iran from its sweet spot of never-ending negotiations, and the application of pressure to get the situation under control both in the nuclear realm and regional security one.

·     China’s role vis-à-vis Iran, as its influence could be paramount if it chooses to engage on the matter. Russia has also an important role to play, as it is still shielding Iran from scrutiny by the IAEA.

·     Creating a better situation to deal with a “no deal” reality.

To that end, Israel and the U.S. should first agree on a set of priorities and acceptable outcomes. Even if Israel is not thrilled with the prospect of a U.S. return to the JCPOA, and the U.S. is wary of using non-diplomatic means to prod Iran form its current trajectory, there should be room for understanding and executing a shared strategy.

In order to have the best chance of success, additional Arab partners should be approached, consulted, and integrated into the strategy as they are major stakeholders in the Iran issue and possess additional tools and capabilities vis-à-vis China and Russia (oil and gas), as well as against Iran.

A major part of the strategy should be addressing China’s role and engaging it diplomatically to use its influence on Tehran. China’s involvement may come at a certain cost, but ultimately it is also in its best interest to keep the region from escalation. Gulf nations should play a major role in engaging China since they represent another vital interest for the middle kingdom.

As the U.S. is disinclined to wade into the non-diplomatic realms it should nonetheless aid Israel in applying pressure on Iran and preventing it from further expanding its destabilizing role in the region. A U.S.-Israeli agreement on these issues could lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive strategy involving additional U.S. partners in the region.

Such an arrangement would allow both sides to act while not surprising each other and could be the cornerstone for a new U.S. security architecture in the Middle East, as it plans to turn its attention to the Indo-Pacific. Dealing with Iran that way may also give the U.S. insights and experience in “grey zone” operations that are necessary for strategic competition elsewhere.

At the very least, the planning and strategizing process could put both countries on better footing in order to address a possible aggressive Iran under its new hardline leadership. After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the drawdown of combat operations in Iraq, Iran may see an opening to cement its grip on the region and further escalate the pressure on U.S. partners in Iraq, Yemen the Gulf, and possibly even against Israel.  

Israel should also focus on diplomacy with the two other world powers and describe, in no uncertain terms, the dangers posed by a nuclear Iran:

·      The countries of the region would see Russia and China as culpable for their economic and strategic support for Iran if the regime emerges from the current situation as a nuclear actor. Iran is already viewed as an existential threat to many countries in the region and they would not easily forget that.

·      As Iran grows in confidence, the leverage of Russia and China on Tehran would decline. Iran would emerge as a competitor to Russia’s oil and has already tried to get involved in the Caucasus (threating Azerbaijan). Regional instability would also undermine Chinese interests in the region including much needed energy supplies and strategic projects that are part of the “Belt and Road” initiative.

·      Israel should press Russia to back the IAEA demands to verify and investigate probable violations of the NPT safeguards. As long as Russia prevents any action vis-à-vis Iran by the nuclear watchdog, brazen Iranian activities will increase and Russia may find it very difficult to get Iran to adhere to the NPT (not to mention the JCPOA) if it is left unchecked.

Iran has shown it is willing to go to great lengths and endure economic and humanitarian hardships (sanctions and rampant Covid-19 surging through the country), in order to avoid making concessions in the nuclear realm. Iran has also doubled down on its regional activities targeting various countries with missiles, drones, and cyber-attacks, while providing its militia proxies with advanced weapons and financial aid.

All of the above shows that Iran would remain a regional threat, and it would pose an enduring challenge to the security of the region and to the interests of the U.S, and Israel, and their partners.

But Iran is not invincible, and its rise is not preordained – its resiliency is suspect, it is an oil and gas producer in a decarbonating world, and the climate crisis is likely to hit it hard. Showing Iran an unyielding and united front that is willing to act against aggression, while offering it a diplomatic solution (backed by China and Russia) to truly address its nuclear program and make sure it never gets a nuclear weapon is still the best option.  

The U.S. and Israel should not shy away from developing both lines of effort.

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

China now holds the keys to an Iran nuclear deal

By Yochai Guiski

Iran has come to the conclusion that a deal with the United States and Europe over its nuclear capabilities (JCPOA) no longer meets its cost-benefit analysis. The decarbonizing West may no longer serve as a destination for Iran’s oil and gas,  and, in Tehran’s view, cannot be trusted to adhere to a deal (even though the same clearly goes for Iran), while the Western economy and political system are no longer viewed favorably in the wake of the Covid-19 economic crisis.

China on the other hand has emerged as a favorable alternative for Iran:

1.      China has shown its appetite for Iran’s oil and gas over the years, and its growing economy will maintain demand for decades. China has maintained its thirst for Iranian oil even under sanctions, and even assisted Tehran in skirting them.

2.    China has a centralized political system more in line with Iran’s and would not pressure Tehran to change its regime or internal policies   – and may even provide it with better tools to control and monitor the Iranian population.

3.     China seems to view Iran favorably and is willing to invest in the country as part of the “Belt and Road” initiative (B&R). Beijing has signed a comprehensive strategic cooperation deal with Tehran, and has broadened its military ties with it (conducting joint military exercises).

4.   Both countries view the U.S. as their chief strategic rival/threat. They are both pursuing policies to weaken Washington’s power, standing and influence in their respective regions, and develop military capabilities to deny and disrupt the U.S. armed force’s ability to project power into these regions.

Despite the rosy outlook from Tehran, China seems to take a more nuanced approach toward Iran:

1.     China still views Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as strong partners in the Middle East and does not want to sour the relations with them by embracing Iran.  

2.     The amount of Chinese investment in Iran is still limited even though Iran is part of the B&R.

3.     China is still careful not to anger the U.S. by overtly and comprehensively defying sanctions.

4.      It seems that China is content to let the JCPOA negotiations drag out and has been leveraging it to criticize the U.S. and point out Washington’s failures in the Middle East.

5.      As the U.S. intends to drawdown from the Middle East in order to focus on the “Indo-Pacific” China might find Iran useful in disrupting Washington’s plans.

Whether China likes it or not, it now seems to own the Iran issue:

1.      China’s singular importance to Iran’s current and future economy lends it significant influence over Tehran to limit its nuclear actions and regional behavior.

2.     The Iranian strategic bet on China plays a major part in the failure to return the JCPOA, their ability to sustain their economy under sanctions, and in Iran’s pursuit of a “resistance economy”.

3.     Should China continue with its current policy regarding the nuclear negotiations, Iran may use the space and time to advance its nuclear plans and may even view it as a tacit approval to develop a nuclear weapon, much like North Korea did. If this scenario comes to pass it would impact China’s image as a willing backer of such regimes, and an ally to an emboldened enemy of many in the Middle East.

It is therefore important that:

1.      China recognizes its unique position and plays a responsible and prominent role in addressing Iran’s behavior and preventing it from further destabilizing the region.

2.     China understands that if Iran is left unchecked, even before it reaches a nuclear weapon, it would destabilize a region which is critical to China’s energy needs, and might foment ill will toward Beijing in an area that is a willing economic partner.  

3.      Middle Eastern nations wary of Iran’s regional and nuclear aspirations seek to influence Beijing’s policies towards Iran. They should try and encourage China to view the situation not as a “zero sum game” with the U.S., seek initiatives that help stabilize the region, and show that both great powers can work together, even in competition.

4.      The U.S. and Israel (separately and jointly) should devise a China-Iran policy that:

a.     Engages China on Iran and shared interests in maintaining stability in the Middle East  – especially the Persian Gulf  –  and even develop a joint understanding on the goals, ways and means, to do so.

b.     Seeks to enhance Beijing’s role in the nuclear negotiations, as it holds the relevant leverages to prod and cajole Tehran to return to a nuclear deal and to possibly commit to a more comprehensive deal down the line.

c.     Seeks to reduce the viability of Iran’s strategy of dependence on China, and impose increasing costs on such policies if engaging China fails.  

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

MIRYAM'S RIGHT OF REPLY: CRITIQUING BENJAMIN ANTHONY ON GAZA.

By Yochai Guiski

In his article ‘Some Democracies Can Withdraw. Israel is Not One of Them,’ Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, offers a scathing indictment of the Gaza disengagement and the subsequent inconclusive use of force in that arena, which he also sees as degrading the social fabric of Israeli society.

 I would like to respectfully offer a different approach:

1.      The disengagement from Gaza has indeed proven to be a failure. It has created a hotbed of terror and misery, while the international community still places the blame on Israel for its perceived control and security measures. But hindsight is always 20/20. If we are to harshly judge the leaders who decided on the disengagement, we should also see the threats and the benefits they saw coming.

2.      “Mowing the lawn” is meant to describe continuous and high tempo operational activity which seeks to put constant pressure on the enemy and deny it the ability to regenerate and establish new terror cells or other threats. The issue with Gaza is that the IDF did not “mow the lawn” effectively following the withdrawal and ceased almost completely after  “Operation Cast Lead” (2009). It  moved to a model of deterrence that is similar to the one used against Lebanese Hezbollah. Had we continued to pressure Hamas at every corner, our current situation might have been significantly better.

3.      The criticism should be leveled at the right target. It is not the IDF that decides how it should be employed; it is Israel’s elected officials. Blaming the IDF for not being utilized properly seems unfair.

4.      Israel’s social contract does seem unfair: In the south, people are subjected to attacks at the whim of terrorists, while other parts of Israel are not. However, this has been the reality for Israelis since the days of the British Mandate – border communities were always at the forefront, be it from Palestinian terrorism from Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, and Lebanon, until the 1980s (including rocket fire, artillery, infiltration, IEDs), to be replaced with attacks from Lebanon by Shia groups, and Palestinian terrorism all over Israel during the 1990s and 2000s. Each time it was a different Israeli group that bore the brunt of the attacks.

5.      It is not surprising therefore that Israel’s defense doctrine from Ben-Gurion to Jabotinsky has emphasized the need to accept the fact that our enemies would not relent. It dictates that we are always to be vigilant and defeat them in a cycle that will end only when they accept Israel and learn to live with it peacefully.

6.      It is a Sisyphean task, and currently Gaza is at the epicenter. However, to this day, we have not  cracked under the pressure; we endured, we persevered, and we prospered, while our enemies remain in squalor, backwardness, and poverty.

We are stronger than we seem, and we have the endurance to outlast our enemies. But in order to last for generations and centuries to come, we need to have the leadership and foresight to make tough, necessary, and prudent decisions.

The withdrawal from Gaza was not one our best moments, and possibly neither was the policy that followed, but this must not stop us from having the courage to make tough and sometimes risky decisions. Let us hope, pray, and vote for leaders who can make those decisions, and then follow through and make them work.  

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

U.S., Israel must prepare for Iran possibly not rejoining JCPOA

By Yochai Guiski

The realization that Iran under President Ebrahim Raisi may not wish to move forward with the nuclear negotiations and recommit itself to the nuclear deal (JCPOA) has dawned on decisions makers and analysts in Israel and the United States in recent weeks.

This should come as no surprise. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, never had any real interest in the deal in the first place. He was always very suspicious of the notion of a deal, as he feared it would bring the “corrupting” influence of the West to Iranian society. He has always favored perseverance and resistance to the West’s influence, even at great economic cost.

Although there are other approaches in Iran, such as the one championed by former president Hassan Rouhani, it is ultimately the Supreme Leader’s reservations that need to be addressed to get to a deal.

Any scholar in the field of decision making can explain that a deal is reached when three conditions are met – the deal itself is worthwhile (and there is a path to reach it), there are no better options for either participant, and the benefits of having a deal outweigh the prospects of not having one.

For example, reaching a deal to sell a car for 10,000$ requires that you have a buyer willing to pay; that you don’t have an alternative buyer willing to pay 11,000$; and that you are willing to part ways with the car (it would not leave you unable to work or move around).

When analyzing the JCPOA, one can see that a deal was reached because:

1.       Iran was promised economic benefits and sanctions relief, while keeping the core of the nuclear program intact, and being able to gradually grow it over time.

2.       There was no alternative to a deal with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1), and no real way to avoid dealing with the demands of the U.S. and the Europeans, since they controlled the world financial system, and China and Russia were unable and unwilling to oppose them.

3.       The option of not having a deal would have entailed more sanctions and economic hardship, and even a military escalation, which may have put the survival of the regime at stake.

The sum of these three conditions, and the Supreme Leader’s cautious nature, was great enough to overcome the supreme leader’s aversion and led him to “drink form the poisoned chalice” and accept the deal after being  persuaded by President Rouhani and his ministers.

The current situation is very different:

1.       The benefits of a deal have shrunk considerably. Six years into the JCPOA, Iran has learned it cannot trust the U.S. to live up to its end of the bargain; that the private sector is extremely risk averse regarding investment in Iran; and that a decarbonizing western economy would not be a good fit for an oil and gas exporting Iran.   

2.       China has emerged as a significant possible alternative to economic ties with the West. China is now Iran’s most important economic partner, it is hungry for oil and gas, has signed a strategic partnership agreement with Tehran and sees it as part of its “Belt and Road” initiative. Even if Beijing may view Iran as just a small part of its growing Middle East portfolio (which includes strong ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia), the view from Tehran is different.

3.       The possibility of war because of a “no deal” situation is practically nonexistent (after no response to Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia and the downing of a U.S. spy plane, and the U.S. strategy of accepting the situation in North Korea and Afghanistan). Sanctions are still in place, but the Iranian leadership thinks the worst has passed, and Iran has been able to adjust to the sanctions.

Under these conditions it is no surprise that the Supreme Leader has been unwilling sign off on a return to the JCPOA, this even while Rouhani was still president (and supposedly pushing for it).

It seems that the Supreme Leader was looking for something else when he allowed Iranian diplomats to return to the negotiating table (while not allowing them to directly negotiate with their U.S. counterparts):

1.       Extract concessions and sanctions relief from the U.S. during the negotiations, without returning to the deal itself.

2.       Deny the U.S. the capability of applying pressure on Iran, for fear of being blamed for the failure of the negotiations and being seen as a warmonger by different political actors in the U.S.

3.       Provide time and space to advance the nuclear program, and other regional activities, while the U.S. is deterred (as bargaining chips and as tangible assets).

4.       Create the conditions to enhance Iran’s ties with China, as its economic and political future, while Tehran uses the negotiations to embarrass the U.S. and show its abuse of power.  

Up until now Iran’s logic has proven itself to be precise, as its actions have led to few consequences. The U.S. and Europe are not inclined to pressure Iran or lead to a crisis with Tehran, even as it enriches uranium to 60%, commences work on uranium metal, operates advanced centrifuges, and attacks various ships at sea and in port. All the while, China and Russia are still on Iran’s side and are calling on the U.S. to address Iran’s demands.

Going forward, one can expect Iran to continue the following trends:

1.       Dragging out the negotiations, possibly in the hopes of strong-arming their counterparts to accept the status of Iran’s program as “fait accompli” and not rolling it back much.  

2.       Aspiring to enhance its relations with China.

3.       Advancing the nuclear program: With a new hardline leadership and the understanding that no one will stop it, there is no telling when and if Iran would stop. Iran might even eventually decide to develop a nuclear device if it assesses that there is no credible U.S. military threat, and that the world might prefer to accept the situation and blame the Trump administration for the mess, instead of confronting Iran.

4.       The growing pressure on Iran’s government from the accelerating Covid outbreak (Iran now ranks third in the world in the number of newly infected individuals) may play a part in a change of heart and a return to the JCPOA, but that seems unlikely.

The belief that Iran is willing to rejoin the deal and the view that acceleration of its nuclear program is aimed at attaining bargaining chips for the negotiating table have allowed Iran to advance its program without real cost (even if actions attributed to Israel set the program back in a few areas). Thus, it is imperative to make sure that Secretary of State Blinken’s statement that “negotiations cannot go on indefinitely” is translated into plans and action both in the U.S. and Israel.

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Seeking justice in the wrong places: Why Rep. Omar’s premise is wrong

By Yochai Guiski

Rep. Ilhan Omar embroiled herself in yet another controversy recently when she asked Secretary of State Anthony Blinken about the United States position on the International Criminal Court, and subsequently tweeted: “We must have the same level of accountability and justice for all victims of crimes against humanity. We have seen unthinkable atrocities committed by the U.S., Hamas, Israel, Afghanistan, and the Taliban. I asked @SecBlinken where people are supposed to go for justice.”

Seeking justice for victims of war crimes is a noble cause. As the grandson of Holocaust survivors, whose family endured some of the worst the Nazis could devise, making sure those who perpetrate crimes against humanity are brought to justice touches upon a powerful personal and national experience.

But this is as far as my agreement with Rep. Omar goes. The rest of her underlying premise about seeking justice in the international arena is highly questionable. As I am not qualified to talk about the U.S. experience, I will instead focus on the Israeli one.

For starters, her claim that she has not seen any evidence that Israeli courts “can and will prosecute alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity” is inaccurate to say the least. Israeli courts, and especially Israel’s Supreme Court, have heard thousands of cases of Palestinians who claimed they were wronged by the Israeli authorities. In many cases the courts intervened, changing a would-be course of action by the state, provided restitution, or even led to a rethinking of policy. Not all cases are heard and not all claims are accepted, but many, if not all significant legal cases are brought to judicial review.

In addition, Israel has another mechanism - the formation of commissions (by the government or the parliament), which have the authority to summon witnesses, examine evidence, report publicly (with confidential annexes) and make recommendations (some of which may be binding). For example, The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (The Turkel Commission) was tasked with addressing “Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to International Law”. The committee’s recommendations were mostly adopted and enhanced the way Israel deals with its compliance with International Law.

But that is only part of the issue, as one needs to look at the “justice” mechanisms that the international community applies to Israel:

·     When Israel pioneered the use of drones in counterterrorism operations to apply force accurately and reduce civilian injuries and deaths, it was accused by UN rapporteurs and many international human rights groups of extrajudicial killings.

·     When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was tasked by the UN General Assembly to address the legality of the barrier Israel was building around the West Bank and in Jerusalem, the Court overwhelmingly found it to be illegal, and even went as far as denying Israel’s right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN charter (ostensibly since “Palestine” was not considered a state at the time). The only dissenting voice was the American judge Buergenthal who dissected the decision and showed the glaring flaws in adopting sweeping findings based on little factual basis.

·     On that matter, detractors of Israel have claimed that Israel could have built the security barrier on its own territory and thus avoided the problem. Furthermore, they used that logic to “prove” Israel was just executing a land grab. However, if one looks to Israel’s northern border, that was exactly the course of action that Israel took when it built the security technical fence south of the “Blue line”, the internationally recognized border between Israel and Lebanon, within its own territory. The outcome of the decision was claims from the Lebanese side that Israel was violating its sovereignty every time Israeli forces crossed the technical fence, including an incident in 2010 in which an Israeli officer who was on a mission to cut a tree near the fence was shot dead. So, Israel cannot win no matter where it builds a security fence.

·     The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has singled out Israel for scrutiny (including its infamous Item 7, a permanent agenda on Israel, and the only one devoted to a specific country), while taking little notice of flagrant human rights violators across the world. To that extent the HRC has commissioned “Fact Finding Commissions” after every escalation in Gaza, which were almost exclusively tasked with evaluating Israel’s actions, while the actions of terror groups operating out of Gaza were pursued far less rigorously. And even putting at the head of its investigation into the 2014 Gaza war, a Canadian academic who had previously done work for the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and later resigned after the conflict of interest was revealed.   

But the International Criminal Court seems to take things even further:

·     When the Comoros Islands asked the court to examine the incident aboard the “Mavi Marmara”, the Prosecutor’s Office declined to open an investigation on the grounds of “gravity” (the alleged crime was not of the severity that requires the intervention of the court, as it was a single incident in which 9 people died). In an unprecedented move, the judges of the court challenged the prosecutor’s independence and ordered its office to reevaluate its position on not going forward with a prosecution. The prosecutor eventually reaffirmed its decision on the matter, but the proceedings dragged on for several more years.

·     On the Palestinian issue, the prosecutor (and eventually the court) decided to recognize Palestine as a state and accept its accession into the “Rome Statute” based upon the non-binding decision of the UN General assembly on the matter. The prosecutor than decided to open an investigation into the situation in the West Bank and Gaza (including Jerusalem) on its own.

So which kind of justice is preferred? The kind that makes sweeping findings with little factual evidence to support them, the kind where you single out a country for scrutiny while taking little stock of the actions of its enemies, the kind where the judges urge the prosecutor to press charges, the kind where application of the law is based on flimsy grounds but is politically popular?  

From the above precedents alone, there is compelling evidence which shows that looking for justice in these places is neither just, nor fair, and that in most cases robust, independent, and professional judiciaries who are scrutinized by democratically elected officials is the best remedy. It may not be perfect, but it is far better than the alternative.  

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

OPERATION GUARDIAN OF THE WALLS: LESSONS FOR A CONFLICT WITH HEZBOLLAH 

By Yochai Guiski

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Following the clash between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, now is the time to examine the wider implications of the latest chapter in the decades long conflict between Israel and its enemies, especially vis-à-vis Hezbollah in Lebanon.

As Hezbollah looks to the south, what conclusions should it draw? Here are some important ones:

The IDF knows quite a lot about its enemies: If Hezbollah had not yet understood this from the steady stream of attacks by the Israel Air Force (IAF) in Syria, and the occasional spectacle of Israel releasing intelligence to the world about Hezbollah sites in Lebanon, the latest operation should drive the point home.   

The IDF is ready for conflict from day one: If in the past, Hezbollah could rely on the fact that the IDF needed at least a few days to gather and prepare its forces for combat, the conflict in Gaza has illustrated the IDF’s ability to strike extremely hard and extremely fast, right from the start.

The IDF is determined and highly destructive: If the attacks against military targets in high-rises in Gaza, and the ability to hit underground military infrastructure were signs of things to come in Lebanon, then Hezbollah should be worried for its strongholds in Beirut and throughout Lebanon. Israel has warned for years that placing Hezbollah military assets at the heart of civilian areas will not shield them from the IAF’s reach, as they are legitimate military targets.

The IDF was able to counter or defeat all Hamas “surprises”: Hamas tunnels were inconsequential in the fighting or proved to be death-traps to those who used them (albeit not to the extent the IDF would have liked); its drones were shot down or had little impact, and other “surprises” were countered before launch (such as the mini submarines destroyed at the Gaza port).   

Iron Dome works spectacularly well: If there was even a shred of doubt about the capabilities of the Iron Dome system, its ability to deal with barrages of more than a hundred rockets at a time has proven that the enemy’s method of trying to overload the system, has yielded little success thus far.  

The IDF did not perform a ground maneuver, yet again: Israel reluctance to get into a ground maneuver in Gaza, despite the intensity of the conflict, will surely be perceived as weakness or at least as hesitation in dealing with Hamas and Hezbollah’s ground capabilities. The combination of hidden and fortified defenders accompanied by long range and accurate anti-tank systems, would seem like a winning formula. However, the fact that there was little chance to glean information about IDF capabilities (such as Trophy) probably feels like a missed opportunity for Hezbollah.

The liberal and mainstream media veer steadily toward the Palestinian narrative of victimhood and oppression: The focus on the humanitarian impact of the conflict by the press is steadily growing, as is criticism about the power gap between Israel and its enemies (Israel as the proverbial bully). This trend could prove damaging to Israel in the court of public opinion and may serve Hezbollah, as it seeks to present itself as the protector of Lebanon against “Israeli aggression”.

There are cracks in support for Israel in the United States: In the mainstream media, at the grassroots level, in the liberal and progressive sections of the political field, and most worryingly in Congress:

-   This makes Israel far more susceptible to international pressure (and/or retaliation) because of its growing dependance on America for weapons systems and political support.

-   US senators and members of the House of Representatives appear ready to stop Israel from acquiring American weapons, or at least make it much harder. The overall implications could affect the way Israel would be able to fight in Lebanon and defend itself (duration, targets, forced ceasefires).

-  However, the Biden administration has proven itself to be a staunch Israel supporter, both publicly in Congress, and at the political level, by helping Israel end the current fighting, in a manner consistent with its security needs and strategic goals.

-  Hezbollah may not know exactly what kind of American support Israel would get in the event of conflict, but the overall situation is more conducive to its way of fighting, chips away at Israel’s deterrence and probably places more limitations on Israel’s freedom of operations in Lebanon then in the past.  

The IDF has operational gaffs. It seems like in every military operation, the IDF makes a few unforced errors – offensively or defensively. Putting a bus full of soldiers in an area that Hamas can hit ended fortunately without any casualties as a Hamas anti-tank rocket hit it just minutes after the soldiers disembarked. The IDF targeting of a building housing several media outlets without providing timely justification turned into a media and political firestorm that dominated the news cycle. Hezbollah would undoubtedly seek to create and exploit such mishaps by the IDF.

Israel was not willing to defeat Hamas. It is abundantly clear that Israel was unwilling to even consider toppling the Hamas regime, and was content to exchange blows and hit Hamas hard to restore its deterrence. This probably bodes well for Hezbollah, who may understand that Israel will not go for the jugular in a future conflict.

If one were to summarize all these lessons for Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, they would probably not be much of a surprise to him. The conflict in Gaza was quite predictable and did not venture much outside the established “box” of past operations, although it was more intense than previous ones.

The bad news from Nasrallah’s standpoint would be the IDF’s quality of execution, the decisive way its airpower was employed, and the stellar performance of the Iron Dome system, as this trifecta would be the main challenge to Hezbollah if war erupts. While the good news from his point of view would be the apparent friction between Israel and the U.S., and the price Israel pays internationally for using force, which harms its overall stature and deterrence.

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.