By Yochai Guiski
The realization that Iran under President Ebrahim Raisi may not wish to move forward with the nuclear negotiations and recommit itself to the nuclear deal (JCPOA) has dawned on decisions makers and analysts in Israel and the United States in recent weeks.
This should come as no surprise. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, never had any real interest in the deal in the first place. He was always very suspicious of the notion of a deal, as he feared it would bring the “corrupting” influence of the West to Iranian society. He has always favored perseverance and resistance to the West’s influence, even at great economic cost.
Although there are other approaches in Iran, such as the one championed by former president Hassan Rouhani, it is ultimately the Supreme Leader’s reservations that need to be addressed to get to a deal.
Any scholar in the field of decision making can explain that a deal is reached when three conditions are met – the deal itself is worthwhile (and there is a path to reach it), there are no better options for either participant, and the benefits of having a deal outweigh the prospects of not having one.
For example, reaching a deal to sell a car for 10,000$ requires that you have a buyer willing to pay; that you don’t have an alternative buyer willing to pay 11,000$; and that you are willing to part ways with the car (it would not leave you unable to work or move around).
When analyzing the JCPOA, one can see that a deal was reached because:
1. Iran was promised economic benefits and sanctions relief, while keeping the core of the nuclear program intact, and being able to gradually grow it over time.
2. There was no alternative to a deal with the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany (P5+1), and no real way to avoid dealing with the demands of the U.S. and the Europeans, since they controlled the world financial system, and China and Russia were unable and unwilling to oppose them.
3. The option of not having a deal would have entailed more sanctions and economic hardship, and even a military escalation, which may have put the survival of the regime at stake.
The sum of these three conditions, and the Supreme Leader’s cautious nature, was great enough to overcome the supreme leader’s aversion and led him to “drink form the poisoned chalice” and accept the deal after being persuaded by President Rouhani and his ministers.
The current situation is very different:
1. The benefits of a deal have shrunk considerably. Six years into the JCPOA, Iran has learned it cannot trust the U.S. to live up to its end of the bargain; that the private sector is extremely risk averse regarding investment in Iran; and that a decarbonizing western economy would not be a good fit for an oil and gas exporting Iran.
2. China has emerged as a significant possible alternative to economic ties with the West. China is now Iran’s most important economic partner, it is hungry for oil and gas, has signed a strategic partnership agreement with Tehran and sees it as part of its “Belt and Road” initiative. Even if Beijing may view Iran as just a small part of its growing Middle East portfolio (which includes strong ties to the UAE and Saudi Arabia), the view from Tehran is different.
3. The possibility of war because of a “no deal” situation is practically nonexistent (after no response to Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia and the downing of a U.S. spy plane, and the U.S. strategy of accepting the situation in North Korea and Afghanistan). Sanctions are still in place, but the Iranian leadership thinks the worst has passed, and Iran has been able to adjust to the sanctions.
Under these conditions it is no surprise that the Supreme Leader has been unwilling sign off on a return to the JCPOA, this even while Rouhani was still president (and supposedly pushing for it).
It seems that the Supreme Leader was looking for something else when he allowed Iranian diplomats to return to the negotiating table (while not allowing them to directly negotiate with their U.S. counterparts):
1. Extract concessions and sanctions relief from the U.S. during the negotiations, without returning to the deal itself.
2. Deny the U.S. the capability of applying pressure on Iran, for fear of being blamed for the failure of the negotiations and being seen as a warmonger by different political actors in the U.S.
3. Provide time and space to advance the nuclear program, and other regional activities, while the U.S. is deterred (as bargaining chips and as tangible assets).
4. Create the conditions to enhance Iran’s ties with China, as its economic and political future, while Tehran uses the negotiations to embarrass the U.S. and show its abuse of power.
Up until now Iran’s logic has proven itself to be precise, as its actions have led to few consequences. The U.S. and Europe are not inclined to pressure Iran or lead to a crisis with Tehran, even as it enriches uranium to 60%, commences work on uranium metal, operates advanced centrifuges, and attacks various ships at sea and in port. All the while, China and Russia are still on Iran’s side and are calling on the U.S. to address Iran’s demands.
Going forward, one can expect Iran to continue the following trends:
1. Dragging out the negotiations, possibly in the hopes of strong-arming their counterparts to accept the status of Iran’s program as “fait accompli” and not rolling it back much.
2. Aspiring to enhance its relations with China.
3. Advancing the nuclear program: With a new hardline leadership and the understanding that no one will stop it, there is no telling when and if Iran would stop. Iran might even eventually decide to develop a nuclear device if it assesses that there is no credible U.S. military threat, and that the world might prefer to accept the situation and blame the Trump administration for the mess, instead of confronting Iran.
4. The growing pressure on Iran’s government from the accelerating Covid outbreak (Iran now ranks third in the world in the number of newly infected individuals) may play a part in a change of heart and a return to the JCPOA, but that seems unlikely.
The belief that Iran is willing to rejoin the deal and the view that acceleration of its nuclear program is aimed at attaining bargaining chips for the negotiating table have allowed Iran to advance its program without real cost (even if actions attributed to Israel set the program back in a few areas). Thus, it is imperative to make sure that Secretary of State Blinken’s statement that “negotiations cannot go on indefinitely” is translated into plans and action both in the U.S. and Israel.
LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.