Israel is at war with a bloodthirsty Hamas.

By Yochai Guiski

Israel awoke Saturday, October 7 to a shocking reality; Hamas launched a large-scale incursion into communities near Gaza, employing aerial gliders speedboats, and heavy machinery and explosives to bring down parts of the border fence, all the while launching thousands of rockets at Israeli towns and communities.

The brutal nature of the Hamas assault was self-evident, as Hamas “fighters” massacred old women at bus stations in scenes reminiscent of the Russian assault on the Ukrainian town of Bakhmut. Hamas also brought Israeli “prisoners” to Gaza, showcasing themselves brutalizing captured Israeli soldiers or joyriding through the area with an Israeli senior citizen. Other, vile images show abuse of the bodies of dead Israelis.

Some images have emerged from the communities overrun by Hamas, but the devastation and the final death toll will become clear only after the IDF retakes the area and learns of the state of the local civilian residents. The Hamas raid also coincided with a music festival held where young people held an outdoor dance party – many of them were killed or wounded, while others were kidnapped and taken to Gaza, as were some residents of the area. Hamas is notorious for its ill-treatment of Israelis, holding them without any communication or access to the Red Cross for years.

Gazans also pillaged the communities they entered, taking heavy machinery, cars, and other equipment, which they then paraded in Gaza.

The attack came out of nowhere and was a major surprise to Israel and its intelligence community. This at a time when Israel was working on securing additional aid to Gaza; it has allowed thousands of Gazans to work in Israel and was in the process of allowing the Palestinians to drill for natural gas off the Gaza coast.

Hamas decided to throw all this away and plunge the region into war, claiming it was doing so as a response to Israeli Jews entering the Temple Mount during the holiday of Sukkot, thus, in their view, defiling the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

We do not know why Hamas did so. Was it their Jihadi identity asserting itself at the expense of the Gaza population, was it a coordinated plan with their Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah partners, or did they seek to take advantage of the internal turmoil within Israel?

What we know for certain is that Gaza is about to pay the price for the hubris of its leaders; we can certainly see the cruelty they have unleashed on Israeli civilians.

It is a stark and painful reminder that even as Israel pursues additional avenues to advance peace in the region with Saudi Arabia and others, some would rather see it all burn down to serve their religious zealotry and unhinged willingness to use force.

Israel will need to take an extremely hard look at its defenses and intelligence. The concept of defense based on technological superiority came crashing down, as simple numbers and ingenuity allowed Hamas to overwhelm, overrun, or bypass them altogether. The lack of strategic intelligence on Hamas’s intentions and of tactical intelligence on its widespread assault along the supposedly secure border should prompt a comprehensive assessment of the failure.

The political echelon should not receive a free pass. The government’s dogged obsession with a one-sided judicial reform tore Israeli society from within. Internal security deteriorated markedly and little time was allocated to security issues not related to Judea and Samaria.

The opening phase of what will be the Gaza war was a spectacular failure. Let us hope things get better from now on, and not worse, and let us also hope that Israel is going to learn from its mistakes and that it will never repeat them. Let us also hope that the internal divisions that have marked the tenure of the current government will ease and that both sides of the political divide learn the old maxim attributed to Benjamin Franklin – “We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.”   

LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

American Jews Don’t Get It

By Micah Jones

On Friday, October 6, my wife and I enjoyed Shabbat dinner with our almost-ten-month-old son. This Shabbat was special as it was now the time of year where we could welcome Shabbat a little earlier in the evening, before our son’s bedtime. Even more so, our son was now old enough to sit at the dinner table with us and gaze upon the Shabbat candles and touch the challah as we sang ha-motzi. And most special, was my wife and I blessing our son and being together as a family:

Y’simkha Elohim K’efrayim V’khimenasheh 

May God make you like Ephraim and Menasseh 

Y’varekh’kha Adonai v’yishm’rekha.

Ya’er Adonai panav elekha vhuneka.

Yisa Adonai panav elekha, v’yasem l’kha shalom 

May God Bless you and keep you.

May God’s light shine on you and be gracious to you.

May God’s face be lifted upon you and give you peace.

          As my family and I sat around the dinner table, the holiness of the moment was profound and the sanctity of Shabbat was like a glow that wrapped us closely in its sheltering light. Within our house, in our little town outside of Boston, in the United States of America, my family and I were safe and well, and free to live our lives as Jews without fear of violence or retaliation.  

The same could not be said for Jews in Israel.  

I woke up on Saturday morning, October 7, to news of the unimaginable terror that had descended upon Israel. At the time of this writing, over 700 Israelis had been murdered, many Jews taken hostage, and thousands of rockets fired into Israel’s southern communities. On the fiftieth anniversary of the Yom Kippur War, Hamas had violated the sanctity of Shabbat to launch a surprise attack on Israel, once again plunging the country into chaos. I immediately texted my close Israeli friends whose reserve units had already been activated, as well as my cousin who had recently made Aliyah and was on lockdown in her small town. The situation was chaotic and undoubtedly would be intensifying over the coming days.

As I refreshed my phone for updates, I read that Prime Minister Netanyahu had declared that “Israel was at War.” Undoubtedly the IDF’s response will be substantial and justified, and I hope that Hamas leadership and its forces are eliminated, once and for all.

But as I read the news and received updates from my friends and family, I was overwhelmed by a sense of guilt and shame. There was nothing I could directly do to help my fellow Jews in Israel. My life would not be affected directly. I would spend the weekend with my family, going for walks, enjoying some leisure time, and spending quality moments with my son.

 I was blessed to be a Jew in America.

It is this reality of comfort for American Jews that makes it difficult to comprehend the quotidian reality our fellow Jews experience in Israel. Especially in reform communities, many American Jews cannot comprehend why Israel must act the way it does—whether via its security posture or interactions with its neighbors. American Jews are so comfortable and so privileged in their safety that they cannot fathom that there are genuine forces of evil, like Hamas, that would like nothing more than to murder them simply because they are Jews.  Rather, many American Jews turn a blind eye toward actual Jew hatred, like that spouted by Hamas, or other international actors, like Iran, and instead claim that real antisemitism is that which is found online on X (formerly known as Twitter). 

Although Jew hatred does, occasionally, manifest itself in violence within the United States, as we have seen in the last few years in Pittsburgh and Poway, these incidences are few and far between. American Jews are blessed to live in a philosemitic country where they are welcomed in all aspects of society and government. But Jewish success and integration in America is rare when compared to the history of the Jewish people, and the reality of what Jews face the world over, and especially in Israel.

American Jews are not a monolith. They are not all Zionist, as I am, and many may never have been to Israel. In recent months, many American Jews have been extremely critical (unjustly in my opinion) of the Netanyahu Administration’s judicial reform efforts.  But as American Jews read and watch the news this weekend, I hope that they will take a moment to give thanks for their safety here in America. I hope that they will think of their fellow Jews in Israel who are hiding in bomb shelters with their families. I hope that they will pray for those Jews who have been kidnapped by Hamas and may face fates worse than death. And I hope that we American Jews will offer our support to our brothers and sisters in Israel to ensure that Israel can rebuild and prevent such acts of war by Hamas from ever happening again.

Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division. Read full bio here.

The time has come to topple Hamas but also think about what's next.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

In the hours after Hamas’s massive and devastating onslaught against Israeli civilians in the south of the country, it has become clear that the die has been cast and that Israel can no longer accept Hamas’s regime in Gaza, Col. (res) David Hacham, a Miryam Institute senior associate and former Arab Affairs Advisor to several Israeli ministers of defense, assessed on Saturday.

“Israel will need to topple the Hamas regime – but it also must think about what happens on the day after,” said Hacham.

As Israel plans its response, the country’s defense establishment – which is fully cognizant of the cost in blood of such a war – will need to prepare for the possibility of a new military administration in Gaza, he cautioned.

The option of a partial campaign, striking Hamas and withdrawing, is unrealistic, said Hacham.

The wave of deadly cross-border attacks that began at 6:30 a.m. on Saturday demonstrated a severe strategic failure by Israel on a scale last seen in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, 50 years ago, he added.

“One difference stands out – the lack of a prior alert in 1973 affected military maneuvers, whereas today, they have had a terrible effect on the civilian home front,” Hacham stated.

Israel’s failure has three key components, according to the former advisor. “At the intelligence level, Israel failed to detect the plan to attack despite its advanced units, eavesdropping, surveillance, and the capabilities of Military Intelligence and the Shin Bet,” he stated. “It took Hamas many months to prepare the attack, and its ability to organize and maintain the elements of surprise, while keeping the onslaught under wraps, is a major success for it,” he added. “Hamas contributed to the deception by pretending that it was in routine mode, asking to increase the number of Gazan workers allowed into Israel.”

The heartbreaking scenes of civilians caught up in the attack, crying in terror for their children, yet with no help available, was the visual, tragic expression of this failure.

Another aspect of the colossal Israeli failure is the fact that IDF soldiers and officers, along with unarmed civilians, were taken to Gaza as hostages.

The unbelievable scope of Israel’s killed and injured count is difficult to internalize, Hacham said.

“Israel’s Maginot Line collapsed in this attack like a house of cards. Despite the billions of shekels invested by Israel in building its underground and overground wall to block tunnels and infiltrations, Hamas found and exploited its weak spots. Hamas simply breached the 65-kilometer barrier with bulldozers, creating a highway for terrorists and other Gazans who cleverly exploited it,” said Hacham.

In the air, meanwhile, terrorists simply flew over the barrier with powered paragliders.

Internally, Hamas saw the internal divisions in Israeli society created by the dispute over the judicial overhaul. They viewed these developments as a major sign of Israeli weakness, and they exploited it to harm the country, Hacham said.

This was further nourished, he argued, by the way Hamas interpreted the refusal by pilots and IDF officers to volunteer for reserve duty, a move that projected weakness as far as it was concerned.

The head of Hamas’s military wing, Mohammed Deif, claimed the attack was sparked by the “desecration” of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem when thousands of Jews ascended the site during Succot, as well as violence by settlers in Judea and Samaria.

Hacham also noted that Hamas views the Palestinian Authority and its President, Mahmoud Abbas, as traitors.

As Israel plans its next steps, he proposed that Israel coordinate to a certain degree with Egypt, which is a major element that it can engage with, as well as Qatar, due to the funding it provides for Gaza.

Hacham noted that Abbas “made his usual comments during a meeting of his chiefs of staff, once again blaming Israel,” and added that “in reality, he has no say on what occurs in Gaza.”

According to the former defense official, Iran’s role must also be scrutinized closely. “Iran is a central inciter and supporter of Hamas, providing over one hundred million dollars annually to the organization and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It is reasonable to assume that Iran was in on the planned attack,” he stated.

Both Iran and Hamas have an interest in sabotaging the emerging trilateral Saudi – Israeli – United States agreement, which would blaze a trail for other Arab Muslim countries to follow suit and normalize relations with Israel, something that he said would create an enormous challenge to the Iranian-led regional axis.

As for Hamas itself, there is no doubt that its Gazan base is a central strategic asset for it and that it wants to continue to rule it, according to Hacham. “Yet Hamas miscalculated by going this far and not realizing that Israel will decide that it had enough and that it could well go for the option of toppling Hamas,” he said.

Moving forward, Hacham said the region will also need to be on alert for the potential threat of fundamentalist Islamist elements in Judea and Samaria – Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad – hitting senior Palestinian Authority operatives in targeted killings as part of the power struggle raging as Abbas’s rule draws to its end. “All sides are preparing for the start of the post-Abbas era,” Hacham said.

He noted that Deif warned the PA and Abbas to cease security cooperation with Israel during his speech.

Ultimately, the horrific events of October 8 mean that the spark has been lit and that it could set off an even bigger fire,” Hacham stated. “Hamas often speaks about the unity of arenas – Gaza, Judea and Samaria, east Jerusalem, southern Lebanon, and within Israel – with Iran orchestrating all of this from above. In Deif’s latest speech, he called for this unity to occur. This explains Israel’s warning to Hezbollah not to exploit this opportunity, but Israel still has to prepare for potential escalations in east Jerusalem, the Temple Mount, Judea and Samaria, and within its borders,” Hacham said.

“Israel’s interest is to isolate Gaza and avoid a multi-front arena while also preparing for exactly that scenario, at the same time as it seeks to start the painful process of moving forward after its colossal failure in Gaza,” Hacham concluded.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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Jewish and Democratic: Why one completes the other

By SHARON ROFFE OFIR

The gender partition set up by the Orthodox Rosh Yehudi organization during the Kol Nidrei prayer in Dizengoff Square in the heart of Tel Aviv this past Yom Kippur is a mere metaphor for the separation that divisive elements have been trying to create within Israeli society for several years, and all the more so in the last nine months.

The disturbing images of the scuffles that erupted during Yom Kippur Eve prayers in Tel Aviv on September 24 keep replaying in my mind.

Normally, no one would disagree with the argument that every person, irrespective of their opinion, should, in their own way, envelop themselves in sanctity during Judaism’s holiest day.

But the reality here has long been far from normal. The debate is not about a gender partition but rather about a separation fence that grows ever higher as certain elements seek to create a barrier between Jewish Israel and democratic Israel.

These divisive forces call on everyone to choose a side without understanding that these two values live together and that without one or the other, the State of Israel loses the basis for its existence.

Should the citizens of Israel choose a side between Jewish and democratic? Splitting a disputed Tallit is a familiar concept in Judaism. The good news is that we did not invent this wheel; the subject has always been controversial. The bad news is that the debate has reached boiling point and there is no leader to calm the situation down. A fire is burning the prayer shawl.

The time to restore order has arrived. To do this, one must go back to basics. Let us start with the Jewish component. In the Book of Genesis, Chapter 1, Verse 27, in the story of the creation of the world, it is written: “So, God created mankind in his image; in the image of God, he created them.” This is one verse that embodies an entire concept.

Unlike the stories of other ancient Middle Eastern nations, the Bible comes along and produces a democratization of the idea of the image of human beings. This formed a key stage in the perception that divinity exists in every person—no more holy kings and idols—and this is a basic principle that teaches us about the dignity and rights of all people.

The idea of a Jewish state is mentioned in the UN General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, and is subsequently anchored in Israel’s Declaration of Independence.

So where did the idea of a democratic state come from? While the Declaration of Independence does not explicitly mention 'democratic,' it undoubtedly envisions Israel as a democratic state. The declaration states that the Jewish state will have elections, a constitution, institutions of governance and a constituent assembly.

The Declaration of Independence outlines in its vision Jewish and democratic foundations. The State of Israel is a Jewish nation-state and a state whose religion is Judaism. Can a nation-state also be a democratic state? Take the example of European countries. In Europe, the nation existed before the establishment of the modern state; these countries were established on the basis of an ethnic-cultural identity.

As such, these Western countries each have their own nation, and they all respect the components of democracy. Having official state religions is no impediment to democracy.  Britain, where the ruling religion is the Anglican Church, is an example of a democracy with a state religion, as are countries like Norway and Denmark that adopted the Lutheran-Christian religion and democratic values.

So why do many Israelis struggle to reconcile Jewish and democratic as part of a single whole? The answer is rooted in the political system and the power structure in Israel. Over the years, the democratic component has been eroded (elections alone are not democracy), while the Jewish component (as the ruling religion) has never been defined and has taken on shades that have nothing to do with Judaism.

The current government has taken things to a new level, and parts of the coalition are unaware that a messianic halachic state is not a Jewish state.

Returning to the harsh images of the eve of Yom Kippur, 2023. The fuel thrown on to the fire fanned the flames: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu divided the people into those who are authentic Jews and those who are not. Division serves him but does not serve us.

If we manage to understand that this is not a political debate but a threat to our very basic existence here, we will conclude that there is no Jewish without democratic, and vice versa.

The fact of the matter is that the struggle for democratic Zionism will also affect Israel’s Judaism. The idea that power lies in the hands of one authority is not the way of Judaism; a state that is less democratic is also less Jewish.

As Israeli jurist Justice Menachem Elon of blessed memory once put it: “The dual-purpose end—a Jewish and democratic state - is one, and one arrives and teaches about the other, and one arrives and completes the other, and they become one in our hands."

Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

What would be the security & strategic dimensions of an Israel-Saudi deal?

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

As the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia gets ever-closer, it is reasonable to assume that Israel’s defense establishment is conducting a thorough analysis of the potential security ramifications of such a maneuver.

Normalization would be a part of a trilateral agreement between Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel, and has the potential to redefine regional alignments.

In due time, the Israeli government will be equipped with recommendations from the defense establishment to help it navigate this strategic junction. The proposed normalization of relations is predicated on Saudi Arabia's requests to purchase American F-35 fighter jets, cutting-edge air defense systems, and a civilian nuclear reactor that is outfitted with a uranium enrichment fuel cycle.

Saudi Arabia wishes to receive American security commitments and to build long-term stability to enable it to become an economic powerhouse. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s vision is to turn the desert kingdom into a regional powerhouse that attracts business and investment and is not reliant on oil for its economic prosperity.

In assessing these requests from an Israeli perspective, it is impossible to examine them in isolation. Beyond the undeniable fact that they would improve Riyadh's capacity to defend itself against Iranian aggression, the Saudi ‘asks’ should also be seen in the wider context of the ongoing arms race between Israel and Iran. In recent years, Iran has disturbingly closed the gap on Israel’s military edge over it and its axis of proxies. Equipping Saudi Arabia with new capabilities that would be pointed at Tehran would, therefore, boost Israel’s strategic interests, while also carrying implicit risks.

But first, an examination of recent developments in Iran’s capability force build-up is in order.

The ban on Iran possessing ballistic missiles imposed by the United Nations will be lifted in October, and this could be a significant event for the world and the region, due to the blossoming cooperation between Iran and Russia.

Europe may soon see Iranian ballistic missiles fired by Russia at Ukraine. Given the robust nature of Iran's military industry, which is capable of the mass production of missiles, drones, and a wide variety of other types of weaponry, Russia has become dependent on Iranian firepower.

 As a result of Iran's assistance to Russia in its conflict with Ukraine, Moscow owes Iran a debt; as repayment, Iran may receive Russian Sukhoi jets. Russia could also help Iran with spy satellites and with the development of a more sophisticated missile arsenal.

Even if Iran occasionally cuts corners in terms of quality, the rapidity with which it manufactures its arms and then distributes them to regional proxies via air, land, and sea channels is cause for concern. Iran is expanding its influence all over the region, including Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, in addition to Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel's goals in the region are clear: it wants to build an anti-Iran bloc of states that includes itself and other pragmatic Arab Sunni nations. In this context, the Abraham Accords, signed with the UAE and Bahrain in the year 2020, were a groundbreaking initiative. The normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the Arab world, however, holds the promise of being the real game-changer.

A shift of this magnitude is monumental, and it gives rise to optimism for a more positive and stable future. Amid these seismic shifts, Israel's overarching goal continues to be to maximize strategic gains while managing the risks associated with these gains.

To craft a new Middle East, certain gambles are required; as a result, the potential arming of Saudi Arabia needs to be viewed within the context of this grand strategy.

Iran continues to arm and fund its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, creating a clear joint Saudi-Israeli interest to contain these threats.

Israel's expanding influence in the region, on the other hand, has caused trepidation in Tehran. This may have been the trigger for the Iranian government to launch a charm offensive and to normalize ties with Saudi Arabia in March.

The Abraham Accords and their expansion should therefore be seen as Israel’s response to Iran’s strategy of encircling it with missile bases and well-armed enemies.

Throughout history, the attitude of many Arab nations toward normalization with Israel was cautious and their strategy was to wait for the Palestinian conflict to be resolved. This all began to change from 2020 onwards, when the acknowledgment of Israel's growing economic and military power, and its close ties with the United States—reshaped diplomatic priorities for Arab Sunni states.

These states identify Iran as the primary security threat to them.

All these processes have enabled Israel's integration into the Middle Eastern map in an unprecedented manner.

This shift is exemplified by the growing ties between the IDF and not only long-standing partners such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, but also rumored military-strategic relations that are kept secret for the time being.

In addition, the transfer of the IDF from the US European Command to the Central Command, which is responsible for the Middle East, following the signing of the Abraham Accords, has greatly enhanced Israel’s integration in the region.

Even though it does not signify the formation of a Middle Eastern NATO, it does encourage information sharing, deterrence, and defense cooperation among nations. These kinds of collaborations have the potential to be formidable obstacles in the way of Iran's goals.

As such, normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is not merely another diplomatic effort. It is a possible harbinger of a new order in the Middle East, one in which Israel and Saudi Arabia, two Middle Eastern powerhouses, can combine their military, economic, and political power to push back against Iran in new ways.

These are the larger considerations that should guide the discussion on Saudi Arabia’s requests from the U.S. in exchange for normalization. 

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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Cyber is the new oil in Middle East diplomacy

By RENE-PIERRE AZRIA

Fifty years ago, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia dared confront the then-most powerful man on earth, US President Richard Nixon. The king wielded an unexpected but fearsome weapon: oil embargoes.

King Faisal, angry at Nixon’s massive rescue of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, overnight cut all deliveries of oil to the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and several other European countries, plunging the West into an unprecedented panic.

The vengeful king also ordered a massive increase in the price of oil, which jumped from about $3 a barrel in early October 1973 to about $12 a barrel in April 1974. Within months, the US, Japan, and Europe were suffering from runaway inflation and a series of deep recessions.

By 1979, prompted by the revolution in Iran, the oil price had tripled again, to about $36 a barrel. US inflation followed, and the fed funds rate moved over 20% in 1980, crushing the Jimmy Carter administration and ushering in the Ronald Reagan era.

Revenues of oil producers, particularly those in the Middle East, skyrocketed, creating unprecedented financial power for Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and the UAE. The most influential man in the world briefly became Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, then oil minister of Saudi Arabia, who had inspired the creation of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and negotiated the takeover, by the Kingdom, of Aramco, the old Arabian American Oil Company.

For decades after the 1973 “oil shock,” the price of oil and the production quotas decided by OPEC and OAPEC conditioned the foreign policies of the West vs. the Arab world, thus vs Israel. It was openly admitted that applying pressure on Israel to compromise with its Arab foes was the required path to appease Arab oil producers.

Two views dominated the oil-producing cartel: that oil should be viewed in the economic context of supply and demand, and that oil should be viewed and used essentially as a political pressure tool. Sheikh Yamani was on the side of moderation, warning his colleagues that raising oil too high, too fast would prompt a market reaction. Oil, however, was being used by Middle East powers as a weapon, but as such it turned out to have unpredictable impacts. During the Iraq-Iran war, Saudi Arabia kept lowering the price of oil to deprive Iran of money, a strategy which indeed hurt Iran but equally weakened all the oil producers and profoundly divided OPEC.

Sheikh Yamani was essentially correct. The high price of oil made exploration and invention worthwhile. The West found numerous new oil fields (North Sea, West Africa, Russia, and more recently North American shale oil), developed massive new energies (nuclear, LPG, and more recently renewables), and started conserving energy. The US today is self-sufficient, and Israel has become a gas exporter. Oil may still sustain the finances of large oil producers, but it does not rule Middle East politics any longer.

An alternative to oil

If not the oil, what then gave Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, one of King Faisal’s grandsons, the power to ignore and confront US President Joe Biden in 2023? 

Cyber power.

Cyber power is this writer’s shortcut for the revolutions of the last 20 years: the Internet, mobile phones, smartphones, social media, artificial intelligence (AI), and the global propaganda techniques derived from this new toolbox. The battlefield has moved from Western chanceries to billions of little screens, and world public opinion gets manipulated by the Arab world, quite cheaply, through deafening propaganda and targeted character assassination.

This is not to say that the Middle East is now devoid of oil plots and old-world battling. At no time since the Yom Kippur War has terrorism abated, nor has guerrilla warfare, intelligence work, lawfare, or cyber attacks on civilian infrastructures. 

The world public opinion, however, pays little attention to the feuds between Iran and Sunni powers, to the civil war in Syria, to the division of Libya, to Turkey’s ambitions in Iraq, to the Kurdish drama. The Arab world has successfully managed to protect these gruesome Muslim-to-Muslim conflicts from international interference, while constantly keeping Israel in the international penalty box.

The convicted murderer and politician, Marwan Barghouti, once announced in a Financial Times editorial the launch of the “Boycott, Divest, Sanction” movement against Israel. He specified that the movement would first target the BBC and the Financial Times, because they dominated English language media, and had the farthest reach into opinion leaders across the world. Since then, anti-Israel crusades have left the realm of the print and been amplified billions of times by social media and the internet in general. Hammering works.

Israel discovered a fantastic antidote against this electronic poison: the concept of the Start-up Nation. The Start-up Nation is the 21st-century equivalent of the kibbutz dream: a brilliant shortcut for success, scientific progress, peace, and universal contribution. Young Westerners identify with its message of hope and sharing, and so do youths in emerging countries.

The Start-up Nation opened the way for the Abraham Accords, for the opening of diplomatic relations in Africa, and for the investment flows from India, China, Japan, and Korea. The Start-up Nation reversed decades of negative tropes on Israel.

Yet, news from Israel today seems to revolve exclusively around a potential constitutional crisis perpetrated by the incendiary policies of a handful of far-right ministers. Will the damage to Israel’s standing among nations be so deep and so lengthy as to wipe out the goodwill created by the start-up nation concept?

Israel used to win skeptics’ hearts by bringing opinion leaders to Israel, showing them its geopolitical realities, and letting them judge by themselves. Four billion people today are less than 30 years old; they are tomorrow’s leaders. What can they know of Israel’s history, of the Jewish people’s struggles? What will shape their view of whether Israel may survive? The Internet.

Isn’t it time for Israel to go back to inventing, creating, and getting Nobel prizes? The power is in the Web. Harness it.

Rene-Pierre Azria, is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute. He began his career in service of the French Treasury, and is a recipient of the French Legion of Honor for his services to philanthropy and international finance. Read full bio here.

MirYam Exclusive: Yoav Gallant's Delicate Balancing Act.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has been in a very difficult position for several months, faced with the need to navigate between Israel's domestic judicial reform crisis and the interlinked crisis of unprecedented cracks in the cohesion of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Time and again, Gallant finds himself at a crossroads. Israel's national security and the cohesiveness of its defense establishment are in jeopardy as a result of the toxic interaction between politics, military preparedness, and the conflict between the government and the judicial branch.

For the time being, the IDF is equipped with the capabilities necessary to successfully carry out its activities. On the other hand, the ongoing pattern (at the time of this writing) of reservists not turning up for their scheduled active service, especially in essential units within the air force and intelligence, might have disastrous consequences if left unchecked.

If this pattern persists and becomes more widespread, it may compromise Israel's capacity to react to broader security challenges. There is no specific estimate of when this may happen, but the military establishment is on high alert in an effort to assuage the worries of the reserves and make the political echelons aware of the seriousness of the issue.

The fact that the IDF is now facing its greatest difficulty in maintaining unity since its founding in 1948 highlights the urgency of the problem, and this issue is eating up Gallant’s time, preventing him and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and the General Staff from spending the time they’d like to pour over readiness for war scenarios and Iran.

In order to prevent a schism from developing among the ranks of the armed forces, Gallant has been trying to apply his influence in government to bring the domestic upheaval under control and free the military from its current political impasse. In Gallant's view, the way to achieve this is to achieve a broad consensus over judicial reform and to move on as a nation as quickly as possible to a set of priorities that will serve rather than wreck Israeli interests.

His messages to the public and the ruling coalition, of which he is a part, have reflected this.

"The citizens of Israel and the IDF need unity. Now is the time to put aside our differences and to find what we have in common and what unites us," Gallant urged on September 5.

"I call on my friends in the Knesset to reach consensus and to do so quickly—for the sake of our country and the security of the State of Israel," he added.

Five days later, on September 10, during an address to the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Gallant issued one of his most detailed calls for the political system and civil society to rearrange their national priorities, following a description of Israel’s severe plethora of security threats.

"In the face of all these stands the State of Israel. Our military, intelligence, economic, and technological power allow our existence," he stated. In a hostile environment saturated with challenges, Israel has been able to defend itself due to the high-quality commanders and soldiers that it has, advanced weapons, breakthrough technology, and a deep understanding of enemy goals and modus operandi.

And yet, he warned, protecting the State of Israel is conditioned on the Israeli people being able to act in union and close rank.

This ability has been challenged disturbingly by a growing fissure in Israeli society over the feud regarding the balance of power between state authorities, he said.

"The price may be heavy—too heavy in national security contexts —and so major changes are made by broad consensus," he stressed.

"As the head of the security system, I declare here: The continuation of the internal struggle among different currents within the State of Israel seeps into the IDF and other security organizations and exacts a price that the IDF and the security system cannot bear," said Gallant in one of his sternest warnings to date.

"I'm not dealing with the question of who started or who is right. I say: The continuation of the internal struggle endangers national resilience, the Israel Defense Forces, and our ability to ensure security for the State of Israel and protect its citizens."

"How far are we willing to deepen the rift? When do we decide that it is our duty to return to the priorities suitable for the State of Israel?" he asked.

During his speech, Gallant laid out what he said was the correct national priority list, and it began with forming a broad national consensus on the major issues of the day.

"This is a prerequisite for ensuring the national security and continued prosperity of the State of Israel," he stressed.

He then listed the other priorities as preserving Israel's ability to defend itself against its enemies, chiefly against the Iranian nuclear threat and the terror arms sent towards Israel from its borders, followed by normalization with Saudi Arabia and through it with most of the Arab and Muslim world — an objective Gallant said could be missed by Israel if the internal rift continues.

In addition, he said, Israel’s security and political power are based on its economic capability and continued economic growth, which are themselves predicated on innovation and technology.

"It's important to remember that the condition for continued foreign investment, manufacturing, and innovation is stability. Social division and ongoing disputes also harm the vital economic effort for our future and existence," he stated.

Finally, he listed law and order and stopping serious crime in Israel's cities in general and in the Arab sector in particular as the final priorities to defend the social fabric of the country and Israel’s ability to function.

"Given the great challenges ahead, especially the security threats, which might become existential threats, we have to clearly tell ourselves—we have a duty to get back to the main issues. Security, normalization with our neighbors, a thriving economy, and the rule of law and order — all of these precede any other national effort and are more important than it," said Gallant.

"This is the priority; this is the precedence, and everything else can wait for the appropriate time and manner."

In July, indicators of the fissure in the military began to appear as 1,142 reservists, including many from the Israeli Air Force, conveyed an alarming message. They announced their intention to withdraw their participation in active service if an amendment to the Basic Law: The Judiciary, annulling the Reasonability Standard, which limits the Supreme Court's ability to oversee decisions made by the government, was approved. The amendment passed and Gallant has been dealing with the fallout ever since.

In fact, Gallant has been in crisis mode over this issue since at least March. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to fire Gallant on March 26, 2018, due to his issuing a public warning over the threat posed by the judicial reform issue to unity in the ranks.

There was an outpouring of public outrage that enveloped the whole country in response to the decision, which Netanyahu later overturned.

Ultimately, the unique composition of the IDF, which is comprised of both conscripts and reserve forces, means that no military technology or equipment can substitute a basic level of cohesion for the military to function properly, and this is what Gallant has been seeking to rescue from the fire of Israel’s domestic crisis.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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monthly brief: Three Key Strategic Events That Shaped Israel.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

The month of September brings with it three key anniversaries of pivotal strategic events that have indelibly shaped Israel and the region.

The Gaza Disengagement

On September 22, 2005, Israel completed its unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and North Samaria. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Gaza, and Israel evacuated every civilian and community from the Strip, uprooting over 9,000 Israeli settlers from 25 settlements.

Proposed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, this maneuver aimed to bolster Israel’s security, initiate a separation from the Palestinians, and boost the country’s international stature.

Yet, just two years later, in 2007, Hamas ousted Fatah in Gaza, transforming the Strip into an Iranian-backed rocket launchpad.

Since then, Israel has grappled with four major armed conflicts with Gazan terror factions and several smaller rounds of hostilities, involving Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The skies over Israeli cities routinely blaze with rockets from Gazan terror factions.

Israel's pioneering Iron Dome air defense system, operational since 2011, has played a pivotal role in shielding its citizens and enabling the Israeli Air Force to lead campaigns against the terror groups by reducing pressure on Israeli governments to launch ground offensives. Meanwhile, Hamas’s ambitions extend beyond Gaza, as it eyes the West Bank with intent.

The Oslo Accords: Legacy of a Stalemate

Rewind to September 13, 1993. On the  White House lawn, President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and PLO chief Yasser Arafat inscribed their signatures on the Oslo Accords. Three decades later, hopes of a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace appear to be buried. Yet, the Accords still profoundly influence the matrix of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the West Bank.

Today, the Palestinian Authority (PA) governs Area A of the West Bank and, despite numerous challenges, persists in its security collaboration with Israel. Notably, no Israeli government has abolished the Oslo agreements or disbanded Palestinian autonomy in major West Bank cities. The accords may have reached an impasse long ago, but the underlying arrangements continue to serve the mutual interests of both parties.

Echoes from 1973

This month, the Israel State Archive unveiled its most extensive dossier on the 1973 Yom Kippur War, shedding fresh light on the catastrophic intelligence lapses preceding Egypt and Syria's coordinated assault on Israel. The scars of the war, marked by Israel's unpreparedness and consequent heavy casualties, remain etched deep into its national consciousness.

Yet, the saga of the IDF rebounding from initial setbacks, summoning reserves, and launching counteroffensives that neared Cairo and Damascus is an enduring testament to Israeli resilience.

Today, the threats encircling Israel have metamorphosed. The specter of enemy infantry and tank brigades storming its borders has receded. In their place, terror armies, equipped with rocket and missile arsenals, lurk. Iran-backed terror armies such as Hezbollah, armed with an estimated 200,000 warheads and embedded within civilian enclaves, epitomize this threat.

While discerning enemy motives remains intricate in 2023, Israel’s extensive, technologically advanced intelligence infrastructure renders it far less vulnerable to strategic surprises than on the eve of the 1973 war.

Drawing lessons from the Yom Kippur debacle, Israel has spearheaded an intelligence renaissance. Today's IDF is backed by a cutting-edge sensor grid stretching across land, sea, air, and space, and fueled by artificial intelligence that processes vast quantities of intelligence.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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A battle for Israel’s future

By SHARON ROFFE OFIR

There are times in the life of a nation that we will forever remember as turning points. One of these was the 1973 Yom Kippur War; this September as we mark 50 years since that war, we will find ourselves facing a perhaps equally critical turning point. This battle will be waged not in the deserts of the Sinai Peninsula or on the volcanic terrain of the Golan Heights, but in the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice.

Just a month before she retires, Supreme Court President Esther Hayut will conduct the battle of her life, and the decision she presides over will shape the life of the entire nation.

The announcement of the government's narrowing of the Reasonableness Standard – which restricts the court’s ability to strike down laws on the grounds that they are unreasonable – was received by Hayut in Germany, where she was visiting along with a group of Supreme Court justices. They cut short the visit and returned to Israel.

The judges understood that as important as the visit to Germany may be, they could not remain abroad while Israel is on fire. Petitions to repeal the amendment that annulled the Reasonableness Standard – a law passed by a large majority in the Knesset – were quickly stacking up

A week later, the decision was made. Hayut announced that the petitions would be heard on September 12 – for the first time by an extended lineup of 15 judges. The Reasonableness Standard is not the only issue facing the Supreme Court – the court’s judges face a heavy workload. They will also address petitions filed against the government's failure to convene the Judicial Selection Committee, and appeals against an amendment to Basic Law: The Government that limits the ability of the Knesset to declare a prime minister “incapacitated”  and which the petitioners claim was designed to personally serve Prime Minister Netanyahu – the amendment prevents Netanyahu,  who is on criminal trial for three separate cases, from being declared incapacitated if he is found to have breached a conflict of interest agreement by engaging with the judicial reform program.

In other words, the difficult crisis facing the State of Israel is coming to the Supreme Court, and the decisions that will be made may decide the fate of Israeli democracy. It is difficult to bet on how the court will rule; Until now, the Supreme Court has never stricken off a Knesset Basic Law. However, previous Supreme Court rulings that dealt with the constitutional status of the Basic Laws (such as the Supreme Court discussion in the context of the Nation-State Law), and discussions on whether such laws are immune to judicial review, give some indications.

These suggest the decision will be made in line with the degree of constitutional legality that the judges will assign to the amendment that annulled the Reasonableness Standard. Other factors include the judges' views of the extent of the alleged misuse of the Knesset's authority and purpose and their assessment of the degree of harm caused by the amendment. The Supreme Court will also assess its authority to disqualify the amendment.

These major questions surface against the background of signals by coalition members, the prime minister and his ministers regarding the possibility that they will not respect the Supreme Court's ruling. Such calls make it clear to the panel of judges, liberals and conservatives alike, that their decision will be a turning point in the life of the State of Israel. The situation post-September will be very different from what came before. This forms a decisive test for the question of checks and balances, and the identity of the driver holding the steering wheel.

Hints of the worldview of Chief Justice Hayut can be found in the dramatic speech she made after Justice Minister Yariv Levine introduced his comprehensive judicial reform. Addressing the Reasonableness Standard, she stated, among other things: "If there is no room for a judge's value decision regarding the reasonableness of a government decision, the next step – according to the same logic – may be that the judge also has no professional advantage in determining what forms reasonable doubt for the acquittal of a criminal defendant.” In other words, if a judge cannot exercise judicial review of government, administrative and constitutional decisions, we can shut down the court entirely.

"From here, the road is short to the deletion of extensive chapters in the various Israeli legal sectors, all of which are subject to value standards that the judge must examine and decide upon," Hayut warned.

Those who support annulment of the Reasonableness Standard and denying the Supreme Court authority to review the laws laid down by the Knesset, and those who demand that Justice Hayut does not sit on the panel, are in fact expressing what opponents of the judicial overhaul fear – a state that will not allow substantive judicial review is a state on the threshold of dictatorship.

 Appointing judges on behalf of the delusional reform laws (225 laws in total – for those interested) will turn us into a fully-fledged dictatorship.

How will Israeli society emerge post-September? This is a question that should concern every one of us. Unlike September 1973, the battle to hold the line this time will be waged by the Supreme Court and the many citizens who come out week after week to protest for the future of the country.

Any government that wants to act on behalf of its citizens should not fear a Reasonableness Standard, and that which may seem reasonable today could develop into something deeply unreasonable tomorrow. When that happens, there might not be anyone around to stop it.

Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Israel-Saudi normalization is Biden's diplomatic 'Hail Mary'

By Chuck Freilich

The Biden administration appears to be pursuing two separate but complementary tracks in the Middle East: continued efforts to reach a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear standoff with Iran and Saudi-Israeli normalization. Both tracks are designed to stabilize the region and potentially even lead to a strategic transformation. 

With the hopes for a new nuclear deal stymied by Iran, the administration is now attempting to reach “informal understandings.” Iran would halt uranium enrichment at the 60% level – dangerous, but not yet sufficient for a bomb – and refrain from attacking US targets in the Gulf. The United States, in exchange, would unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian assets, to be used for purchases of food and medical products; and allow Iraq $4 billion to pay for the electric power it buys from Iran.

The Saudi-Israel track is the one with the potential for far-reaching regional change. In reality, it is a multilateral package that would impose major demands on all sides but also provide major benefits. It is the diplomatic version of football’s “Hail Mary” play. 

What do the Saudis want in order to normalize ties with Israel?

The Saudis, in exchange for normalization, are demanding that Israel make significant, although as yet unspecified, concessions on the Palestinian issue. 

Saudi demands of the US are more specific: a defense treaty; access to essentially unlimited American weapons; and US approval of a civilian Saudi nuclear program. 

Given King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s hard-line positions on the Palestinian issue, the Saudis may be considering only partial normalization at this point, pending Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s ascent to the throne. If true, this would undoubtedly limit American and Israeli willingness to accede to the Saudis’ far-reaching demands. 

Israel’s concessions to the Palestinians would be significant and encompass the avoidance of measures that would jeopardize a two-state solution. Israel would have to indefinitely postpone West Bank annexation, as well as the establishment of new settlements and the legalization of illegal outposts. It would also transfer some of the territory from Area C in the West Bank now under Israeli control to the Palestinians. 

The Biden administration would seek Israel’s acceptance of the Saudi demands, especially on the nuclear issue, and even Israel and AIPAC’s active lobbying in Congress, as a means of gaining approval for what will be a difficult sell.

The Palestinians were expected, at least in the initial American thinking, to once again remain on the sidelines, as they did during the negotiations leading to the Abraham Accords. In exchange for refraining from active interference – their usual modus operandi – the Palestinians were to gain extensive Saudi aid and benefit from the Israeli concessions. To the administration’s surprise, however, the Palestinians may be adopting a different approach this time, seeking to be involved in the process. 

The US wishes to put the Iranian nuclear issue to bed, at least until after the 2024 elections, and thereby minimize the dangers that a crisis with Iran would deflect international attention from the war in Ukraine and global competition with China. In addition to full normalization with Israel, the US will likely seek a Saudi commitment to end to the war in Yemen, provide the Palestinians with truly generous aid, and impose significant constraints on the kingdom’s rapidly expanding ties with Beijing. 

President Joe Biden is a true friend of Israel – the only president to define himself as a Zionist and to take his children to visit the concentration camps. 

Critical American strategic interests notwithstanding, the primary impetus for the recent momentum appears to be Biden’s growing concern that Israel is incapable of extracting itself from two imminent inflection points. These are the demise of the two-state solution with the consequent ramifications for its Jewish and democratic character and the judicial overhaul process, begun by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ultra-right-wing government which threatens Israel’s democratic character. 

The practicability of the above package has justifiably met with considerable skepticism. All sides would have to make major concessions and even a watered-down version would likely lead to the collapse of Israel’s coalition and either to the formation of a new and more moderate one or to early elections that would constitute a de facto referendum on the package.

Either outcome would be welcome for an administration that seeks to confront the sides, especially Israel, with the need to make historic decisions. It is unclear, however, how a breakthrough would help Netanyahu achieve his one overriding objective – of forcing an end to the corruption trial that may land him in jail – or whether he has any residual ability to place the needs of the state above his own.

The US, for its part, has not signed a defense treaty with any country since Japan in 1960. To do so with Saudi Arabia, a country that is reviled today by much of the Democratic Party, is a very tall order. 

The administration must also take into account that acceding to the Saudi demand will likely lead to demands for similar treaties by Israel and a number of Arab allies, as well as other states around the world. On the upside, a series of bilateral treaties with countries in the Middle East could constitute the basis for the regional security architecture that the US has long sought to establish. 

A second critical decision is whether to acquiesce to the demand that Saudi Arabia be allowed a domestic uranium enrichment capability – a critical component of a potential military program in the future. Acquiescing would raise the awkward question of why Iran should be barred from such an enrichment capability if Saudi Arabia is not, and set a dangerous precedent for future proliferators. 

Conceivably, a compromise might be found whereby US willingness to grant the Saudis a defense treaty would be contingent on their willingness to forgo enrichment. Should a trade-off such as this prove elusive and the overall package ultimately depends on it, a sufficiently intrusive inspections regime would provide a reasonable compromise that Israel, too, could live with. 

Thirdly, US willingness to grant the Saudis access to the most advanced American weapons – such as F-35 aircraft – would make it very difficult to live up to the congressionally-mandated commitment to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). However, based on past experience, a solution could probably be found by selling the Saudis weapons that are one generation behind those provided to Israel, missing some specific capability, or whose geographic deployment in Saudi Arabia is limited.  

Faced with a reinvigorated American-led military alignment, Iran would be the big loser in this scenario. While it is most likely to respond to this strategic setback by exercising greater restraint, a manufactured crisis designed to reset the table by increasing enrichment to the 90% level, cannot be ruled out. 

Normalization with Saudi Arabia would constitute a historic transformation in Israel’s strategic circumstances, essentially ending the conflict with the Arab states and at least somewhat containing the remaining belligerents – Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. It would also open up much of the Muslim world to Israel, possibly enabling normalization with Indonesia, Malaysia, and even Pakistan. 

An opening with the Palestinians, even if limited, is better than the current stasis, which is leading inexorably to a one-state binational solution. Anything that forces an end to the judicial overhaul (read “wrecking ball”), is more than welcome. The “informal understandings” with Iran on enrichment are far from ideal, but the best of the bad alternatives, and assuming an effective inspection regime can be found for Saudi enrichment, the benefits for Israel could not be clearer.

At this point, all of the above is still very tentative and it is unclear whether Biden is willing to put his full weight and authority behind it. However, senior American officials who recently met with their Saudi counterparts apparently came away sufficiently encouraged to proceed to the next step, an upcoming meeting with Netanyahu’s Strategic Affairs Minister and close confidant, Ron Dermer. 

It is still decidedly a long shot, but as David Ben-Gurion famously stated, “Anyone in Israel who doesn’t believe in miracles is not a realist.” 

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

monthly brief: Constitutional Crisis Brewing? Israel Saudi Normalization & Israel-German Defense.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

Israel's key institutions are finding themselves having to answer the question of how they would act in the event of a constitutional crisis.

Such a crisis could arise in a scenario in which the Israeli government refuses to adhere to a potential Supreme Court ruling striking down the government's amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary that narrows the 'Reasonableness Standard ' and thus takes away the court's ability to cancel government decisions or legislation on the grounds of their lack of reasonability. 

The head of Israel's national trade union, the Histadrut Labor Federation, Arnon Bar David, warned on August 16 that if the government precipitated such a crisis, his organization would act to shut down the Israeli economy with mass strikes. 

"A refusal to adhere to Supreme Court decisions would be a violation of the status quo. We will not allow it to happen," he warned. 

It is believed that the IDF, the Israel Police, the intelligence community, the diplomatic corps, and the civil service would side with the court in such a scenario. However, on Thursday, August 17, the candidate favored by National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir to become the next Israel Police Commissioner, Cmdr. Yoram Sofer, refused to answer a media question on the issue, calling the question "irrelevant."

Government ministers and Members of Knesset have recently refused to answer questions on how they would act in the event of a Supreme Court ruling to strike down the reasonableness standard. 

Saudi Arabia covers its 'Palestinian bases' ahead of possible normalization with Israel

On August 14, Saudi Arabia announced that it had appointed its ambassador to Jordan, Nayef bin Bandar Al-Sudairi, as “non-resident ambassador to the State of Palestine and Consul General in Jerusalem.”

The Saudi move seeks to protect the Kingdom’s legitimacy both domestically and in the Arab world. It sends a message that it has not forgotten about the Palestinian issue as it moves forward with a process aimed at normalizing ties with Israel and gaining security guarantees, advanced weapons, and a civil nuclear program from the United States. 

The Saudi appointment can be seen as a signal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, telling him that any normalization agreement will require significant concessions from Israel regarding the Palestinians, such as a commitment not to annex Area C of the West Bank, a halt to the construction of settlements deep within Area C, and possibly transferring parts of Area C to Palestinian Authority, as well as other steps designed to stabilize the PA's rule. 

It is unclear what kind of impact such steps would have on the stability of Israel's ruling coalition, which includes nationalist-religious elements ideologically opposed to the division of the Land of Israel. 

The Palestinian Authority welcomed the Saudi appointment, saying that the “timing of the decision reflects the interest of the brotherly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Palestinian cause,” the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates said in a statement Sunday.

Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen told Tel Aviv’s 103 FM radio station Sunday that Israel was aware of Saudi Arabia’s planned appointment, but that the kingdom did not coordinate with Israel on the matter.

US authorizes sale of Israel’s Arrow 3 air defense system to Germany

The Israeli Ministry of Defense, German Federal Ministry of Defense, and Israel Aerospace Industries confirmed on August 17 that they will sign a record-breaking $3.5 billion defense agreement – Israel’s largest-ever defense deal – for the supply of the Arrow 3 Israeli air-defense system to Germany.

The system will achieve initial operational capacity by 2025 and full capacity by 2030.

Germany’s investment in the Arrow 3 system, which intercepts ballistic missiles in space at exceptionally long ranges and high altitudes, comes against the backdrop of the threat posed by Russia and its missile arsenal.

IAI CEO Boaz Levy, whose mother was a Holocaust survivor, noted the powerful historical significance of the Jewish state providing a defense system for the German people 78 years after the Second World War.

Arrow 3 is the leading missile defense system of its kind for the interception of exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, according to the Israeli Defense Ministry.

After receiving approval from the U.S. government, senior officials from the Israeli and German Ministries of Defense will partake in a ceremony to sign a Letter of Commitment (LOC), that marks the commencement of the agreement. The allocated commitment of $600 million will facilitate the immediate initiation of work on the project, said the Ministry.

As part of the deal, IAI and the Israeli Air Force will provide training to the German Air Force.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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