Chuck Freilich

Israel-Saudi normalization is Biden's diplomatic 'Hail Mary'

By Chuck Freilich

The Biden administration appears to be pursuing two separate but complementary tracks in the Middle East: continued efforts to reach a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear standoff with Iran and Saudi-Israeli normalization. Both tracks are designed to stabilize the region and potentially even lead to a strategic transformation. 

With the hopes for a new nuclear deal stymied by Iran, the administration is now attempting to reach “informal understandings.” Iran would halt uranium enrichment at the 60% level – dangerous, but not yet sufficient for a bomb – and refrain from attacking US targets in the Gulf. The United States, in exchange, would unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian assets, to be used for purchases of food and medical products; and allow Iraq $4 billion to pay for the electric power it buys from Iran.

The Saudi-Israel track is the one with the potential for far-reaching regional change. In reality, it is a multilateral package that would impose major demands on all sides but also provide major benefits. It is the diplomatic version of football’s “Hail Mary” play. 

What do the Saudis want in order to normalize ties with Israel?

The Saudis, in exchange for normalization, are demanding that Israel make significant, although as yet unspecified, concessions on the Palestinian issue. 

Saudi demands of the US are more specific: a defense treaty; access to essentially unlimited American weapons; and US approval of a civilian Saudi nuclear program. 

Given King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s hard-line positions on the Palestinian issue, the Saudis may be considering only partial normalization at this point, pending Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s ascent to the throne. If true, this would undoubtedly limit American and Israeli willingness to accede to the Saudis’ far-reaching demands. 

Israel’s concessions to the Palestinians would be significant and encompass the avoidance of measures that would jeopardize a two-state solution. Israel would have to indefinitely postpone West Bank annexation, as well as the establishment of new settlements and the legalization of illegal outposts. It would also transfer some of the territory from Area C in the West Bank now under Israeli control to the Palestinians. 

The Biden administration would seek Israel’s acceptance of the Saudi demands, especially on the nuclear issue, and even Israel and AIPAC’s active lobbying in Congress, as a means of gaining approval for what will be a difficult sell.

The Palestinians were expected, at least in the initial American thinking, to once again remain on the sidelines, as they did during the negotiations leading to the Abraham Accords. In exchange for refraining from active interference – their usual modus operandi – the Palestinians were to gain extensive Saudi aid and benefit from the Israeli concessions. To the administration’s surprise, however, the Palestinians may be adopting a different approach this time, seeking to be involved in the process. 

The US wishes to put the Iranian nuclear issue to bed, at least until after the 2024 elections, and thereby minimize the dangers that a crisis with Iran would deflect international attention from the war in Ukraine and global competition with China. In addition to full normalization with Israel, the US will likely seek a Saudi commitment to end to the war in Yemen, provide the Palestinians with truly generous aid, and impose significant constraints on the kingdom’s rapidly expanding ties with Beijing. 

President Joe Biden is a true friend of Israel – the only president to define himself as a Zionist and to take his children to visit the concentration camps. 

Critical American strategic interests notwithstanding, the primary impetus for the recent momentum appears to be Biden’s growing concern that Israel is incapable of extracting itself from two imminent inflection points. These are the demise of the two-state solution with the consequent ramifications for its Jewish and democratic character and the judicial overhaul process, begun by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ultra-right-wing government which threatens Israel’s democratic character. 

The practicability of the above package has justifiably met with considerable skepticism. All sides would have to make major concessions and even a watered-down version would likely lead to the collapse of Israel’s coalition and either to the formation of a new and more moderate one or to early elections that would constitute a de facto referendum on the package.

Either outcome would be welcome for an administration that seeks to confront the sides, especially Israel, with the need to make historic decisions. It is unclear, however, how a breakthrough would help Netanyahu achieve his one overriding objective – of forcing an end to the corruption trial that may land him in jail – or whether he has any residual ability to place the needs of the state above his own.

The US, for its part, has not signed a defense treaty with any country since Japan in 1960. To do so with Saudi Arabia, a country that is reviled today by much of the Democratic Party, is a very tall order. 

The administration must also take into account that acceding to the Saudi demand will likely lead to demands for similar treaties by Israel and a number of Arab allies, as well as other states around the world. On the upside, a series of bilateral treaties with countries in the Middle East could constitute the basis for the regional security architecture that the US has long sought to establish. 

A second critical decision is whether to acquiesce to the demand that Saudi Arabia be allowed a domestic uranium enrichment capability – a critical component of a potential military program in the future. Acquiescing would raise the awkward question of why Iran should be barred from such an enrichment capability if Saudi Arabia is not, and set a dangerous precedent for future proliferators. 

Conceivably, a compromise might be found whereby US willingness to grant the Saudis a defense treaty would be contingent on their willingness to forgo enrichment. Should a trade-off such as this prove elusive and the overall package ultimately depends on it, a sufficiently intrusive inspections regime would provide a reasonable compromise that Israel, too, could live with. 

Thirdly, US willingness to grant the Saudis access to the most advanced American weapons – such as F-35 aircraft – would make it very difficult to live up to the congressionally-mandated commitment to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). However, based on past experience, a solution could probably be found by selling the Saudis weapons that are one generation behind those provided to Israel, missing some specific capability, or whose geographic deployment in Saudi Arabia is limited.  

Faced with a reinvigorated American-led military alignment, Iran would be the big loser in this scenario. While it is most likely to respond to this strategic setback by exercising greater restraint, a manufactured crisis designed to reset the table by increasing enrichment to the 90% level, cannot be ruled out. 

Normalization with Saudi Arabia would constitute a historic transformation in Israel’s strategic circumstances, essentially ending the conflict with the Arab states and at least somewhat containing the remaining belligerents – Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. It would also open up much of the Muslim world to Israel, possibly enabling normalization with Indonesia, Malaysia, and even Pakistan. 

An opening with the Palestinians, even if limited, is better than the current stasis, which is leading inexorably to a one-state binational solution. Anything that forces an end to the judicial overhaul (read “wrecking ball”), is more than welcome. The “informal understandings” with Iran on enrichment are far from ideal, but the best of the bad alternatives, and assuming an effective inspection regime can be found for Saudi enrichment, the benefits for Israel could not be clearer.

At this point, all of the above is still very tentative and it is unclear whether Biden is willing to put his full weight and authority behind it. However, senior American officials who recently met with their Saudi counterparts apparently came away sufficiently encouraged to proceed to the next step, an upcoming meeting with Netanyahu’s Strategic Affairs Minister and close confidant, Ron Dermer. 

It is still decidedly a long shot, but as David Ben-Gurion famously stated, “Anyone in Israel who doesn’t believe in miracles is not a realist.” 

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Israel is Soft on “Soft Power”

By Chuck Freilich

 

“Soft power” is a function of a state’s ability to achieve its national security objectives through the appeal of its culture (arts, science, economy), the moral authority of its ideals (human rights, equality, democracy), and the quality of its domestic and foreign policy, rather than by coercive means. The more universal a state’s values, the greater its soft power.

In its early decades, Israel enjoyed great soft power. The horrors of the Holocaust created international sympathy and support for the Jewish people. Israel’s heroic early years were the subject of books, movies and song. The pioneers who reclaimed the ancient land and the kibbutz, came to epitomize Zionism’s attempt to build a new and just society.  The dramatic ingathering of the exiles is the story of legend. Israeli democracy was highly regarded and Israel was hailed as a “light unto the nations”.

Jews around the world cheered, cried and rejoiced upon Israel’s rebirth and celebrated its achievements, with the warm support of many Gentiles. Israel’s military victories were a source of international admiration and a balm for the souls of Jews worldwide, who saw in them the ultimate revenge against the Nazis. Israeli development projects, especially in agriculture and water, were deeply appreciated models in many developing countries.

The seemingly never-ending occupation, however, and especially the settlements, have fundamentally transformed Israel’s image. Israel is widely regarded today as an aggressive occupying power, bent on denying Palestinian rights. Nearly six decades after the Six-Day War, Israel has utterly failed to convince the international community of its claim to the West Bank.

Israel’s image has been further tarnished by questions relating to the quality of its domestic policies and democracy, including the recent “judicial reforms”, excessive prerogatives of the ultra-orthodox, status of Israeli Arabs, and rise of the radical right.

Over the decades, as Israel’s international standing waned, and the Arab refusal to make peace, or even negotiate, left Israel with little choice, military force came to occupy an outsized portion of its national security strategy. Moreover, force seemed to work; Egypt and Jordan made peace, and even Syria and the Palestinians conducted advanced negotiations. For a variety of reasons, however, Israel is reaching the limits to the efficacy of military force. It can continue to defend itself successfully and buy time, but there is no military solution to Palestinian nationalism, the Hezbollah and Hamas threats, or Iranian nuclear program.

In the interim, Israel has downplayed its soft power, or undermined it through some of its policies. The Palestinians, who have repeatedly rejected dramatic peace proposals, never presented a peace proposal of their own and who are governed by a dictatorship in the West Bank and a theocracy in Gaza, have wielded “soft power” very effectively and are winning the war for international opinion. 

In practice, Israel still enjoys considerable soft power. The epic story of the early decades may have faded, but diaspora Jews still harbor a deep sense of affiliation and caring for Israel. Christians around the world view Israel as the Holy Land and realization of divine scripture. Many still buy Jaffa oranges, an outdated symbol of Israeli agriculture, or fly El Al, long a fully privatized company, out of a sense of identification. Today, multinational corporations and scientists from around the world flock to the “Start-Up Nation”, seeking the technological creativity they cannot find elsewhere. Israeli arts and science enjoy an international reputation. Israel’s chaotic democracy still stands out in a dark sea of Middle Eastern authoritarianism.

These sources of soft power are the indispensable basis for much of Israel’s “hard” power, especially in the US. American support for Israel derives from three primary factors: the pro-Israel lobby and Israel’s strategic importance, but stems overwhelmingly from its soft power, the shared values that are the basis for the broad identification of the American public as a whole. Without this sense of identification, American support would not have remained as high as it has, for decades. American and European leaders’ opposition to the “judicial reforms” was so strong, precisely because they feared that Israel itself was undermining the normative basis for their countries’ relationships with it.

Soft power is of limited efficacy as a direct instrument of policy. It is hard to sway other countries just out of a sense of warmth and identification. Nevertheless, no country should be more attuned to soft power than Israel, whose right to a national homeland and subsequently to an independent state was recognized by the League of Nations and United Nations respectively and whose American support stems largely from it. Furthermore, Israel has successfully concluded many deals with foreign leaders and officials over the years, because in situations in which they could have adopted different decisions, identification with Israel was the determining factor.

Israel will not be able to fundamentally alter its international standing without resolving the West Bank issue, or at least achieving significant progress. Nevertheless, there are a number of important changes that Israel can make to improve its strategic circumstances, all of which are related to its soft power.

The use of force must be subject to clear political objectives, including the war of the narratives, which is almost as important today as the action itself, in some cases more. International standing, images and delegitimization campaigns, have a significant and even decisive impact on the outcome of policy initiatives, especially those that involve military action. Too often Israel wins the battles, but loses the war of narratives.

Israel must position itself so that it is always perceived as the side actively pursuing peace and accommodation, not the obstacle. The Jewish diaspora must come to be seen as a vital national security partner and asset, which greatly expands Israel’s capabilities beyond its indigenous ones, and treated accordingly.

Israel is a world leader in some of the primary issues of international concern today, including food security and agriculture, water, the environment and global warming, migration, poverty and entrepreneurship. Israel must do more to leverage its expertise in international organizations. Israeli aid programs (“Mashav”) are a pittance and should be increased. An Israel-diaspora “Jewish Peace Corps” would expand Israeli involvement in these areas and deepen Israeli-diaspora ties, especially between the young. Israel should also continue to provide emergency assistance in times of crisis, as it has so successfully done, notably in Haiti, Turkey and Ukraine.

The Palestinians miss virtually no opportunity to present their case in every possible international forum, with a long-term cumulative effect. Together with the US and others, Israel should target a few select and less politicized international organizations, such as the IAEA, in which a sustained effort can be made.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

A House Divided Cannot Stand

By Chuck Freilich

 

Three months ago, Israel’s economy was booming. Israel still faced severe threats from Iran and Hezbollah, and there had been an increase in Palestinian terrorism, but overall Israel was never more secure. Its ties with states around the world were expanding and hopes for near-term normalization with the Saudis and others abounded. Israel was a vibrant democracy and viewed its approaching 75th anniversary with optimism.

Israel is now convulsed by self-inflicted divisions that are wracking its society and economy, undermining its democracy and threatening the pillars of its national security. Reservists from Israel’s most hallowed military units are in a state of near rebellion and what starts in the reserves will rapidly spill over into the regular army. Israel is on the verge of coming apart.

With international attention focused on Ukraine and the US-Chinese global rivalry, Iran is making steady progress towards a nuclear capability. In essence, it already is a nuclear threshold state, with sufficient fissile material for some five bombs and more soon. The only thing preventing Iran from weaponizing a nuclear warhead, the final hurdle to an operational capability, is its ongoing fear of the international and Israeli response. With both the international community and Israel focused elsewhere, this fear has greatly diminished and a nuclear Iran is an increasingly real possibility.

Moreover, the recent agreement between Iran and its arch-rival, Saudi Arabia, was a significant achievement for the former, that may signal an important realignment of regional forces. The agreement provides for a restoration of diplomatic relations, after a seven-year hiatus, and renewed economic and even military cooperation. Assuming that it is actually implemented - not a foregone conclusion – the agreement would give Iran three important wins: a reduction in regional tensions; a weakening of the American-led regional coalition; and, at a minimum, a blow both to Israel’s hopes of building a military alignment against Iran and for further regional normalization.

Further complicating the picture, the Iranian-Saudi rapprochement was brokered by China, not the US. For decades, China has become an increasingly important economic player in the region, buying vast quantities of oil from both the Saudis and Iran, but it had yet to turn its economic prowess into diplomatic and military might. In recent years, this has begun changing, as China deployed limited forces in the region (Djibouti), conducted repeated naval exercises with Iran and Russia, signed a 25-year strategic agreement with Iran, and now, for the first time, led a major strategic development in the region. The US still remains the preeminent power in the region, especially militarily, but the big question is whether the agreement signifies the beginning of the Chinese era in the Middle East.

The Saudis and Emirates, who also recently renewed ties with Iran, are engaging in classic hedging behavior. Driven by an ongoing loss of confidence in the US guarantee for their security, they are seeking other means of ensuring it, first by expanding ties with Israel, now by reducing hostilities with Iran. One can agree with their thinking, or not, but it is important to understand their mindset.

The Gulf and other Sunni states’ loss of faith in the US guarantee began with the Second Gulf War, in which egregious American miscalculations, in their view, greatly empowered Iran. The US then “abandoned” Egyptian President Mubarak, ostensibly its leading Arab ally. The US negotiated a flawed nuclear deal with Iran, but abruptly withdrew from it, without a Plan B, and failed to respond to a major Iranian attack on Saudi oil facilities and to a subsequent attack against the UAE. Ongoing US pressure for human rights reforms, snubbing of the Saudi crown prince, and pressure to end the war in Yemen, added to the sense of animosity. Statements that the US no longer needed Mideast oil, true in a narrow sense, ignored the reality of one global energy market, further heightening Gulf insecurity.

The glitter is also off the Abraham Accords with Israel and the Arab signatories - extent and potential - are re-evaluating their positions. This dramatic breakthrough in relations, which had the potential to transform the region and Israel’s place in it, was driven first and foremost by the common fear of Iran and growing doubts about American resolve to prevent a nuclear Iran. The UAE and Bahrain, with Saudi approval, sought to build an undeclared alliance with Israel, signed defense cooperation agreements and even began making major purchases of Israeli weapons. The UAE warmly embraced Israel, in dramatic and heretofore unimaginable ways.

Israel could never constitute a substitute for the US, of course, but its ongoing political crisis, with five rounds of elections in three years and now almost complete meltdown, have clearly demonstrated its limitations as a reliable strategic partner for the Gulf states and led to growing disaffection. The Emiratis have reportedly already cancelled weapon sales, Prime Minister Netanyahu has pointedly not been invited to visit, and there is palpable concern among the Abraham Accords states over the directions being taken by the new government, especially regarding the Palestinians.

The breakthrough with Israel was also driven by the Abraham Accords states’ interest in access to Israeli high-tech, especially cyber, and the belief that Israel’s integration into the region would help moderate its policies towards the Palestinians. In both areas, they have been disappointed. The international uproar over Israel’s cyber exports, stemming primarily from the NSO affair, caused Israel to greatly scale back sales to nondemocratic states. The new government’s ultra-hard right composition and de facto intention to annex the West Bank, contradict the hopes of all Gulf states, as well as assurances given to the UAE at the time.

The Middle Eastern landscape is changing before our eyes. Unsurprisingly, neither friend nor foe are sitting back and graciously waiting for Israel to get its house in order. As has long been known, a house divided cannot stand. 

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Israel Still Should Not Provide Weapons to Ukraine

By Danny Ayalon & CHUCK FREILICH

The first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an appropriate time to assess Israel’s policies toward it, chiefly its refusal to sell weapons to Ukraine. The need for this assessment is particularly acute given the close strategic relationship that has emerged between Russia and Iran and the ramifications for U.S.-Israeli relations.

Israel’s sympathies lie squarely with Ukraine. Nevertheless, its response to date has been limited to significant, but not overwhelming, humanitarian aid, including a field hospital, ambulances, protective vests, helmets, food, water purification equipment, and more. Israel has reportedly also provided Ukraine with intelligence information and voted with it in the United Nations. Conversely, Israel has steadfastly rebuffed Ukrainian requests to provide weapons, including defensive ones, such as Iron Dome.

A wounded bear is particularly dangerous and Russia can cause Israel severe harm. We thus believe that Israel’s refusal to sell Ukraine weapons remains appropriate, but that this may change depending on Russia’s actions. For now, we propose a number of semi-military measures that would be of great utility for Ukraine and position Israel firmly within the Western camp but mitigate Russia’s response.

There are seven primary reasons for our caution.

First, Iran has supplied Russia with 1,700 drones, is apparently building a factory in Russia to produce as many as 6,000 more, and may provide it with ballistic missiles. In return, Russia has reportedly agreed to supply Iran with SU-35s fighters, helicopters, and possibly the S-400 air-defense system, warships, submarines, and satellites. Russia and Iran already cooperate in the cyber realm. They also recently signed two agreements designed to promote bilateral economic ties and circumvent international sanctions: a “transportation corridor” from Russia to Iran and out to the Far East; and an alternative mechanism to the global SWIFT system. Israel must avoid measures that may lead to an even closer Russian-Iranian strategic alliance.

Second, Russia and Iran are the two primary players in Syria. At times, Russia has sought to counterbalance Iran’s efforts to expand its influence there, including the build-up of a significant military presence and use of Syria to transfer weapons to Hezbollah. Wartime needs forced Russia to withdraw some forces from Syria, but not the S-400s. If used against Israeli aircraft, Israel’s ability to counter Iran’s buildup would be greatly constrained. So far, Russia has refrained from doing so, but that could change at any time. No less than NATO countries, Israel is on the front lines with Russia today and can find itself at war at any moment with Iran, Hezbollah, and Iranian-supported Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel cannot allow this to happen.

Third, Russia is a party to the nuclear agreement with Iran and ongoing international negotiations. At times, Russia has played a constructive role in this regard, but it has been supportive of Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency recently and can be highly disruptive. A desperate Russia might even provide Iran with concrete assistance for its nuclear program. Israel cannot afford to alienate Russia too much.

Fourth, Israel is not a global power with major weapons stockpiles, does not have the spare capability, and cannot transfer critical systems to Ukraine without endangering its own security. Indeed, it has the minimum number of Iron Dome batteries necessary and a shortage of interceptor missiles. Moreover, as Ukraine’s defense minister indicated, other systems are better suited to its needs, including American ones, which the United States has abjured from supplying so far. What Ukraine really wants is to drag Israel into the conflict on its side. That is understandable, but Israel must weigh its overall interests, not just sentiments.

Fifth, some 15 percent of Israel’s population has roots in the former USSR and 600,000 Jews still live in Russia. Russia has already taken measures designed to demonstrate its ability to stop emigration. The ingathering of the exiles is Israel’s raison d’être.

Sixth, unless the United States changes the policy of partial disengagement from the Middle East pursued by four consecutive presidents, Russia will remain a critical player in the region. In addition to support for Iran, Russia is providing Turkey and Egypt with advanced weapons and nuclear power reactors that could morph into military nuclear programs, has proposed similar deals with the Saudis and others, is an important player in OPEC+ and Libya, and more.

Seventh, France, Germany, Japan, and other leading states have provided only limited aid to Ukraine, belatedly and hesitantly. South Korea has refused to provide any weapons. Even the United States has imposed strict limits on the kinds of weapons it provides, for example, aircraft, missiles, air-defense systems, and until now, tanks. Israel does not have to be at the forefront of this issue. Some question Israel’s commitment to the Western camp because they have high expectations of it; others because they wish to use this issue as part of a broader delegitimization campaign. Most understand that Israel’s strategic circumstances require painful compromises between moral and strategic considerations.

Changes to Israel’s refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine might be warranted if, for example, Russia decided to limit its freedom of aerial maneuver in Syria; supplied certain weapons systems to Iran, e.g. the S-400s; adopted a clearly obstructionist position in the nuclear talks; or provided direct assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. In each case, the details would determine the nature of Israel’s response. Russia must be made to understand that Israel has the ability to significantly harm its interests, if pushed too far.

What Israel should be doing, were it not engulfed in its domestic convulsions, is providing Ukraine with outsized humanitarian assistance. It should send the field hospital back to Ukraine, if necessary, by turning it into an Israel Defense Force (IDF) operation; dispatch IDF search and rescue teams; expand rehabilitation programs for wounded Ukrainians; and complete the transfer of the rocket alert technology promised to Ukraine, all areas in which Israel is a global frontrunner. It should again provide emergency supplies for Ukrainian civilians.

Expanded assistance such as this would be of significant benefit for Ukraine, but likely not lead to an excessive Russian response. All sides understand that there are certain rules to the game.

Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.