By Tomer Barak
The peace between Israel and Jordan forms one of the essential pillars of Middle East stability. In both Jerusalem and Amman, as well as in Washington, the accords, in addition to the basic stability of the Hashemite Kingdom, are viewed as a top priority strategic asset.
Yet, 26 years after the signing of the treaty, the peace remains “cold” and animosity toward Israel among the Jordanian public is still high. Moreover, political clashes erupt from time to time.
In recent years, mutual relations have been shaped by two contrary directions:
On the upside, common security challenges, from ISIS to Iran, saw the countries maintain extensive security cooperation. The main element of which is defending the border (and common strategic interests) from criminal organizations and other radical elements aiming to harm both countries as well as the peace. Such cooperation has prospered even during periods of diplomatic tensions.
At the same time, non-security initiatives were introduced in support of Jordan’s economic needs. Usually, with low publicity to soften public pressures. Top examples are the supply of Israeli natural gas to the Kingdom, and the export of Jordanian goods through Haifa port.
On the downside, despite the abovementioned mutual interests, in the political and public dimensions, Jordanian-Israeli relations are in a poor state.
Relations hit an all-time low in 2017 following Jordanian fury over the perception of how Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu managed the Israeli embassy shooting crisis, in which an Israeli security guard was attacked and shot dead two Jordanian men.
The public embrace of the guard by Netanyahu fueled anti-Israeli sentiment, endangered the gas agreement, and lead finally to King Abdullah`s decision (2018) not to extend the land lease agreement that gave Israeli farmers access to land in the Tzofar and Naharaim enclaves. A year later, a move by Jordan to flex its muscles at the Al-Aqsa Mosque (a push to change the status-quo at the Bab-Al Rahma gate), put the countries on another political collision course.
Moreover, the fact that Jordan did not play a role in the U.S.-brokered Abraham Accords, and the Israeli government’s announcement of its intention to apply sovereignty to parts of the West Bank placed the king in an uncomfortable position. This state of affairs left Jordan as second choice for the United States behind the Gulf states, threatened Jordan’s regional role regarding the Palestinian issue and its precedence over the Al-Aqsa Mosque site in Jerusalem.
The hostility was fueled further by Jordanian fears that Israel could try to ‘dump’ the Palestinian question at Jordan’s doorstep, by encouraging the idea that Jordan is a Palestinian state.
This was the baseline of the relationship, but in recent weeks new faultlines have emerged. The current crisis began with the cancellation of Jordanian Crown Prince, Hussein Bin Abdullah’s visit to Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem in March (allegedly, due to disagreements over security arrangements), and the subsequent last-minute calling off of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s flight to the Gulf through Jordanian airspace.
In recent weeks, an alleged coup attempt by the King`s half-brother, Prince Hamza bin Hussain, has rocked the kingdom’s stability. Whether this was mere frustration that was portrayed too publicly, or a real move designed to strengthen Hamza’s role, it seems that the current incident is over and the family understands the need to show some unity in order to maintain stability.
Jordan navigates through many other basic challenges: severe economic challenges, a refugee problem, radical jihadist terrorism, and external threats.
The Covid-19 pandemic is taking a great toll on the Kingdom. The country is struggling to cope with a second and severe wave of the virus, and public frustration and mistrust toward the government is on the rise.
Yet King Abdullah, after more than 21 years on the throne, is skilled at conducting a balancing act and reinventing Jordan time and again. The king succeeded in attracting highly needed foreign aid to support Jordan’s economy. A third of the Kingdom’s state budget comes from foreign aid, mostly from the West (U.S., IMF, World Bank and Europe), though Gulf states inject cash during crises.
The fact that multiple powerful players have a vested interest in keeping Abdullah’s rule stable is of high significance.
Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz recently stated that Israel has a clear interest to safeguard its peace treaty with Jordan, which is a strategic asset. A stable and prosperous Jordan is an explicit Israeli interest.
In light of Israel’s interest in keeping its longest border stable, there are some steps Jerusalem can take to promote this objective. This includes extending the existing gas deal; creating new cooperation on the supply of water –for example hosting Jordanian desalination plants on Israel’s Mediterranean coastline that would nourish Jordan’s water supply system; assistance in the field of desert agriculture; further employment of Jordanians in the tourist sector in Eilat, and more.
Such initiatives should be placed on the table despite the current climate, since Jordan’s economic development is an Israeli interest. One way to get around Jordanian public opposition to such cooperation is to offer it in the form of multi-lateral frameworks with the involvement of third parties such as a Gulf state.
But it takes two to tango. There is a need to educate the Jordanian people about the benefits of peace. Embracing the Abraham Accords and showing a willingness to publicly join the regional winds of change could stimulate public criticism, but in the long run, it will have beneficial impact. Israel and the U.S. must do more to show that the way forward includes a better acceptance of Israel as an integral, constructive, and essential part of the region.
Israel, Jordan and the U.S. have an obligation to work together to bolster relations and to add layers of civil cooperation on top the security dimension. The way to move forward in a bilateral manner will be slow and will face political and public friction. A quicker path is through multilateral-regional initiatives with international support. Our policy makers should seek out both paths at the same time.
Lieutenant Colonel Tomer Barak concluded his military career in 2021 after 21 years of service in the Israeli Military Intelligence and in the Strategic Planning Division. Read full bio here.