My View On The American Withdrawal From Afghanistan

BY Daniel Calbi

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The events of the past two weeks in Afghanistan do not completely surprise me. The speed and swiftness with which they occurred was unforeseen. Prior to the U.S. invasion in winter 2001, the Taliban provided safe harbor to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The United States’ primary mission in Afghanistan since 2001 was counterterrorism, not nation building. My thoughts on the United States withdrawal come from the perspective of counterterrorism, not nation building.

There are many questions that appear unanswered regarding the sudden and rapid downfall of the Afghan Government. In the forefront are the following questions that need to be addressed– who were the leaders in the United States telling Donald Trump in late 2019 and early 2020, and Joe Biden in 2021 that Afghanistan was stable enough to be turned over to the Afghan Government? Was stability a concern, or was a war weary nation the driving factor in the removal of U.S. troops and their support for the Afghans? What steps prior to the U.S. withdrawal were taken to ensure that the Afghan military had the ability to supply their troops with ammunition, food, ensure wages, repair their equipment (most importantly air assets), and that they would not capitulate without a fight?  

President Biden has highlighted that the Afghan military and police are unwilling to fight for themselves, a now proven fact. In countless provinces, and specifically the major cities of Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Kabul the military did not counter the Taliban advancement. The Afghan military was underequipped and minimally supported by their government, making it nearly impossible to gain the initiative and defeat an advancing enemy. I reference my list of earlier questions – did the decision makers in the United States convey to our President that these Afghans were severely depleted of supplies, had little to no air support and little conviction to the fight? Afghan President Ashraf Ghani refused to resign, a tenet of a two-week ceasefire between GIRoA and the Taliban in early August. Yet, he fled the country as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. If the leader of a country is unwilling to lead, is it fair to expect it from his military?

It has become clear over the last few days that throughout the withdrawal process the plan of the United States was an imminent departure regardless of the situation on the ground. During the week of August 16th, 2021, there were over 7,000 troops in Afghanistan, the majority of whom were surged to the country as a response, not a planned tactical withdrawal, to accommodate the rapid exit of our remaining citizens and partners. It is possible that the United States government expected the Taliban would regain control, and simply miscalculated the timing in which it would occur. One can argue the morality of that decision, but the premier issue in the execution of the United States withdrawal is that it was not completed before the country fell. The misjudgment regarding the power of the Taliban and the fragility of the Afghan Government cannot be overlooked.

The Wall Street Journal reported on August 17th, 2021, that senior military and intelligence officials warned the Biden administration that a rapid, untimely exit from Afghanistan could have dire consequences. It seems that the reality of this exit was even more serious than they anticipated. No matter the circumstance of the discussions between senior officials and the White House the U.S. military answers to the American people, and acts at their will via elected officials.  It is unnerving that military, intelligence and other governmental agency leadership were unable to conjure a plan that met the timeline provided to them by the Biden administration or that the White House disregarded the findings of their senior leaders.

During my tenure in the country, 2015-2019, the Afghans were incapable of fighting on their own and relied heavily on logistical and military support of coalition partner nations. What was done at the strategic level to alleviate this issue or ensure that the United States had the necessary time and assets for an orderly and safe exit? I’m not confident that senior leaders of the United States can  provide a clear answer. America is beyond fortunate that we suffered no casualties from the blitzkrieg-like advancement of the Taliban. What has and will continue to suffer is the Afghan people and the greater Central Asia region.

Will this new, emboldened Taliban revert to their old ways, or will they honor their pledge to not allow Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to operate within their borders? Time will tell, but what is certain is that the manner in which the United States departed from the region is a calamitous black eye that will have repercussions for years to come.


Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. Read full bio here.