My View On The American Withdrawal From Afghanistan

BY Daniel Calbi

The events of the past two weeks in Afghanistan do not completely surprise me. The speed and swiftness with which they occurred was unforeseen. Prior to the U.S. invasion in winter 2001, the Taliban provided safe harbor to Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. The United States’ primary mission in Afghanistan since 2001 was counterterrorism, not nation building. My thoughts on the United States withdrawal come from the perspective of counterterrorism, not nation building.

There are many questions that appear unanswered regarding the sudden and rapid downfall of the Afghan Government. In the forefront are the following questions that need to be addressed– who were the leaders in the United States telling Donald Trump in late 2019 and early 2020, and Joe Biden in 2021 that Afghanistan was stable enough to be turned over to the Afghan Government? Was stability a concern, or was a war weary nation the driving factor in the removal of U.S. troops and their support for the Afghans? What steps prior to the U.S. withdrawal were taken to ensure that the Afghan military had the ability to supply their troops with ammunition, food, ensure wages, repair their equipment (most importantly air assets), and that they would not capitulate without a fight?  

President Biden has highlighted that the Afghan military and police are unwilling to fight for themselves, a now proven fact. In countless provinces, and specifically the major cities of Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Kabul the military did not counter the Taliban advancement. The Afghan military was underequipped and minimally supported by their government, making it nearly impossible to gain the initiative and defeat an advancing enemy. I reference my list of earlier questions – did the decision makers in the United States convey to our President that these Afghans were severely depleted of supplies, had little to no air support and little conviction to the fight? Afghan President Ashraf Ghani refused to resign, a tenet of a two-week ceasefire between GIRoA and the Taliban in early August. Yet, he fled the country as the Taliban advanced on Kabul. If the leader of a country is unwilling to lead, is it fair to expect it from his military?

It has become clear over the last few days that throughout the withdrawal process the plan of the United States was an imminent departure regardless of the situation on the ground. During the week of August 16th, 2021, there were over 7,000 troops in Afghanistan, the majority of whom were surged to the country as a response, not a planned tactical withdrawal, to accommodate the rapid exit of our remaining citizens and partners. It is possible that the United States government expected the Taliban would regain control, and simply miscalculated the timing in which it would occur. One can argue the morality of that decision, but the premier issue in the execution of the United States withdrawal is that it was not completed before the country fell. The misjudgment regarding the power of the Taliban and the fragility of the Afghan Government cannot be overlooked.

The Wall Street Journal reported on August 17th, 2021, that senior military and intelligence officials warned the Biden administration that a rapid, untimely exit from Afghanistan could have dire consequences. It seems that the reality of this exit was even more serious than they anticipated. No matter the circumstance of the discussions between senior officials and the White House the U.S. military answers to the American people, and acts at their will via elected officials.  It is unnerving that military, intelligence and other governmental agency leadership were unable to conjure a plan that met the timeline provided to them by the Biden administration or that the White House disregarded the findings of their senior leaders.

During my tenure in the country, 2015-2019, the Afghans were incapable of fighting on their own and relied heavily on logistical and military support of coalition partner nations. What was done at the strategic level to alleviate this issue or ensure that the United States had the necessary time and assets for an orderly and safe exit? I’m not confident that senior leaders of the United States can  provide a clear answer. America is beyond fortunate that we suffered no casualties from the blitzkrieg-like advancement of the Taliban. What has and will continue to suffer is the Afghan people and the greater Central Asia region.

Will this new, emboldened Taliban revert to their old ways, or will they honor their pledge to not allow Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations to operate within their borders? Time will tell, but what is certain is that the manner in which the United States departed from the region is a calamitous black eye that will have repercussions for years to come.

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Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. Read full bio here.

The US Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Implications For Israel's Security

BY Daniel Calbi and Abdulsalam Kako

In light of the Biden Administration’s announcement of the complete withdrawal of the United States military from Afghanistan, we have identified several areas that we believe could necessitate concern for Israel at some time in the future. Although we believe that the withdrawal of U.S. forces presents no immediate security concern for Israel, several threats could arise within the next five years, and their emergence depends upon whether or not the current Afghan government will be successful in maintaining stability within the country. However, if the Afghan government fails, the outcomes that may result from that scenario will likely present both direct and indirect threats to Israel. 

The Biden administration’s hope is that talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban will result in a lasting peace. However, if there is a successful deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban, some sort of an integration of the Taliban into parts of the government is likely. If the proposed peace deals between the Taliban and Afghan government are not successful, then the ongoing conflict is likely to worsen and in that event the Taliban may overthrow the Afghan government. Because the Afghan government (GIRoA) has focused most of its efforts on the defense of Kabul and other contested regions, there is a good possibility that GIRoA will not be able to maintain the bandwidth to protect the entire country and will inevitably prove to be incapable of fending off the Taliban in the long term. A full out civil war in Afghanistan where there is no U.S. military presence also provides an ideal scenario for international terrorist organizations like ISIS to gain increased influence and regional control. ISIS and Al Qaeda already utilize destabilized regions such as Afghanistan to recruit, train and fund their missions.

There are two specific reasons the U.S. withdrawal may provide an increased incentive for an international terrorist organization to gain influence within Afghanistan. The war in Afghanistan is arguably the most well-funded conflict in modern history and has an entire ecosystem that exists solely to support the coalition war effort. Due to the fact that the logistical support system that spans central Asia will no longer exist, there will be a negative economic impact on Afghan businesses who rely heavily on the war effort, and to the local economies that support the various bases throughout the country. This will leave many individuals without jobs, or at a minimum with less ability to support themselves and their families. Another issue - one that also arose when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 and subsequently when it departed in 2011 - is a massive military force of young men that are essentially jobless, or who work for a meager military force at best. This will be far more prevalent in Afghanistan and as the Taliban gain further control of the country, young Afghan men who work for the government as police, military or special operations will face exceedingly difficult situations at home and in the workplace. GIRoA lacks the leadership and support to fully maintain its police and military forces and due to this impending failure young men serving GIRoA will have two options: Fight for a losing cause, or abandon GIRoA and join groups like the Taliban, AQIS, or ISIS-K in order to survive and protect their families.

If later on the United States decides that there is a reason to take new military actions throughout the region such as in the event that an international terrorist organization gains regional control as ISIS was able to do in Iraq and then Syria, there will be a less of an ability for the U.S. to conduct deep strikes within contested regions, and future missions in the region will be more complicated. Even though the U.S. and its allies have established multiple air bases throughout Afghanistan, coalition forces will now abandon these bases. Thus, a coalition element would first have to secure an airfield, maintain its security, bring forth follow-on forces to conduct an over the horizon assault and establish a logistical support hub. These additional layers to an operation introduce a significant amount of additional planning and contingency preparation that will undoubtedly complicate, convolute and lengthen the United States ability to conduct special operations missions in the region.

It is also likely that Iran’s influence in Afghanistan will increase in any scenario. The U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan will also be itself a win for Iran because Iran will no longer have to look to its eastern border to “defend” itself from the presence of U.S. ground forces in the region. The significant presence of U.S. military personnel, the infrastructure to support them, the aerial resupply capability, and the ability to conduct strikes in the region from land and sea has helped to deter opponents of the West, such as Iran, from acting in overt manners. Iran has made considerable financial investments in Western Afghanistan over the past two decades and there is no reason to doubt that Iran will seek to expand upon these efforts throughout the region in the future. Additionally, there is considerable evidence that throughout the U.S. war in Afghanistan, Iran has helped not only the Afghan government, but also the Taliban. If the planned peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government are successful, then Iran has already established influence with both sides of the “government” that will emerge. 

Regardless of the relationship that will result between Iran and an integrated Afghan government, or a Taliban controlled one, it is very likely that Iran will seek to gain even greater influence among the Shiite minority population. This is because Iran made efforts to position itself as the regional provider of security to the Shiite minority in Afghanistan and in particular the Hazara ethnic group. Historically the Hazara have faced persecution from members of the Sunni Pashtun majority, which has  dominated the governments of Afghanistan throughout its history and currently make up a large portion of the Taliban. In more recent times, the Taliban has made some efforts to stop its own members from persecuting the Hazara; it is unclear if this will be a trend that lasts. Prior to the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, Iran trained and funded Shiite Hazara militias that were used both in the Iran-Iraq war, and against the Taliban during their original reign. More recently Iran’s Quds Force trained a Shiite militia force made up of Hazara and known as the “Fatemiyoun,” which it employed as a proxy force in Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The use of these militias in Syria provides the most direct threat to Israel, as it increases the number of militant forces near Israel’s border that are taking direction from Iran. In the event that the Taliban gets close to achieving victory in an Afghan civil war, or if an international terrorist organization is able to take advantage of the situation, then it is certainly a possibility that the Afghan government or the Shiite minority population may turn to Iran for help and request military intervention on their behalf. 

The three discussed outcomes all present challenges to Israel. The Taliban, Iran, and international terrorist organizations such as ISIS have all made it clear that Israel is a threat and thus a viable target. Of the outcomes, the most dangerous and most likely is from the spread of Iran’s influence into Afghanistan. This is a threat to Israel because Iran has fought, and will continue to fight, proxy wars for decades. More specifically Iran has long backed groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah by providing weaponry, training, and monetary support. In the case that the Taliban retake Afghanistan and overthrow the current government, it’s prudent to remember the old saying, the enemy of my enemy is my friend.  

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Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. He deployed multiple times to combat where he led special operations teams combating ISIS, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Read full bio here.

Abdulsalam Kako is a U.S. military officer and current student at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States Naval Academy and is working on an additional Master’s degree from the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Read full bio here.

CAN DEMOCRACIES defeat terrorist organizations?

BY Daniel Calbi and Abdulsalam Kako

During a live Zoom debate presented by the MirYam Institute in March, Professor Alan Dershowitz, Professor Michel Paradis, Colonel Eli Baron and Colonel Richard Kemp, the authors had the opportunity to assess the struggle that democracies face in the war against terrorism. Although each of the speakers listed above expressed differences in their beliefs about whether or not democracies can win the war against terrorism, there were many areas of mutual agreement that we believe help to clarify a path forward in this effort.

Overall, the participants were adamant that the majority of the electorate within a democracy must not only support the effort against terrorism over the long run, but that it must also perceive terrorism as an existential threat. However, it was clear to the authors that one of the greatest impediments democracies face against terrorism, is a lack of shared understanding of the problem between government and allies, as well as a failure to establish a clear and defined path to victory.

Terrorism is often defined by an overly broad description that includes individual actors devout to a cause, non-state actors, and state actors. The authors view terrorism as any action(s) by any group or person(s) with the intent to cause fear and harm for a cause. Under this definition, the Iraq was not a war against terrorism. Unfortunately, the repercussions of poor decisions and unclear objectives converted this conventional war into a war against terrorism. Echoing Colonel Eli Baron, we believe that recent wars involved convoluted objectives which led to lost support from the public. In America for instance, when the post 9/11 “we will never forget” emotions wore off, appetite for war in Iraq and Afghanistan diminished. Defeating terror groups is a long term sustained effort. Without a populace that is willing to endure that effort, there can be no successful outcome. 

The haphazard manner in which the United States has fought terrorism over the last two decades has been one of everchanging goals, opaque strategy, and wavering commitment. It is important that democracies do not consider the introduction or permeating of democracy to a fragmented nation-state, as victory. But rather the eradication of terror organizations from the safe haven in which they operate. This error in policy is best illustrated by the Iraq war. A conflict undertaken by conflicted reasoning that played out in a manner in which the American-led coalition [IE2] deposed a tyrannical ruler, created a weak government based on Western ideals, then vacillated in the civil and military support as we exited the region. This exit directly enabled an uprising by a destabilized citizenry, cultivating extremism and the eventual birth of ISIS. This faltering resulted in the United States reentering the region to quell terror that it unintentionally enabled. A clear, defined goal agreed upon by the U.S. government, constituents, and allied nations would have done far more in the destruction of terror in the region.        

In Afghanistan the U.S. coalition initially treated the Taliban as a terror organization. However, recently the U.S. has started to recognize the Taliban as a credible entity worth negotiating with, in order to establish a formal government treaty and end the ongoing Afghan conflict. This is not without precedent as there have been previous calls over the past two decades advocating for this kind of compromise. Between 2011 and 2014, one element of the Village Stability Operations and Tribal Engagement strategy, was to promote and facilitate the reintegration of Taliban personnel into the recognized local government forces. Given that the idea of negotiating with the Taliban is a reality of the conflict, the concern becomes if this strategy is being facilitated through fear of the public’s lack of support, rather than it being perceived as a wholly viable solution. Wavering public support was identified by Colonel Richard Kemp as a problem constantly faced by democracies. The moral and political conviction is insufficient to win wars today.

During the debate professor Alan Dershowitz stated that war is only one of the necessary components that must be used to defeat regional and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism must be fought primarily by law enforcement; while regional terrorism must be fought by both law enforcement and the military; and international terrorism fought primarily by the military. In contrast, Professor Michel Paradis was adamant that our counter-terrorism efforts must be through the lens of law enforcement. However, Professor Michel Paradis also agreed that even though these efforts must be led by law enforcement, the cooperation and coordination of the military is key to the success of these operations. One need only look at some of the examples over the past two decades where elite members of law enforcement have embedded with special operations teams and deployed overseas to conduct operations against high value targets such as with the capture of al-Qaeda terrorist Nazih Abdul Hamed al-Ruqai from Libya in 2013. Similarly, law enforcement personnel have deployed to Afghanistan to help combat the illegal narcotic trade, and military personnel that have been trained by law enforcement, have deployed to help conduct counter trafficking operations throughout other regions. We believe that these joint law enforcement-military interoperability exercises need to be both increased in quantity and expanded in scope, to successfully end the war on terror. 

Prior to the debate we believed that democracies had the capability to defeat terrorism but may lack the conviction and shared commitment to do so. Following the debate our opinion has not changed, yet we are now more concerned of the fact that terrorists are viewing this in terms of fighting a 100-year war. Where democracies answer to the people, the public will not have the patience to fund and fight a 100-year war. The key issue for policymakers will be to successfully appeal to the public about why this war is necessary in order for democracy to continue to thrive within and expand outside of their borders. Policymakers must champion this ideal by showcasing historical examples of success, such as those of joint law enforcement-military operations against terrorism and related criminal activities and proposing to improve upon those efforts.

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Daniel Calbi is currently an MBA Candidate at Columbia Business School majoring in Finance. Prior to school he served six and a half years as a U.S. Army Officer, primarily in Special Operations with the 75th Ranger Regiment. He deployed multiple times to combat where he led special operations teams combating ISIS, Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Read full bio here.

Abdulsalam Kako is a U.S. military officer and current student at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Engineering from the United States Naval Academy and is working on an additional Master’s degree from the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Read full bio here.