A U.S.-Saudi deal could bring down Israel’s government

By eitan dangot

A possible agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia that would involve Saudi- Israeli normalization, is above all a maneuver that is designed to strengthen Washington’s global strategic policy. Israel plays a minor consideration in this potential arrangement, but its results could nevertheless challenge the current Israeli government to the point of bringing about its dissolution.

The U.S.’s primary considerations are the Chinese and Russian challenges to its already degraded status in the Middle East. In this context and on the eve of an American election year, the Biden administration understands that it needs a regional agreement with the Saudis to stabilize the Middle East and give Biden a boost ahead of his bid to retain the presidency.

Moreover, Washington, as it observes the Chinese infiltration of its alliance with Saudi Arabia, does not want to be drawn into instability in the region.

Under the proposed agreement, Saudi Arabia will be formally recognized as a new and primary member of the Abraham Accords bloc, which is designed to create a check against Iran. An agreement would also create a status quo against Russian penetration, which often goes hand in hand with Chinese infiltration. As far as the U.S. is concerned, this is the ultimate goal of the agreement, and hence Israel itself is not the most important element. But as part of a deal, normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia can also boost American policy in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Israel is in the second circle of Washington’s considerations.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is looking on with obvious displeasure at the deterioration of relations between the Israeli leadership and Washington that is taking place against the background of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions, as head of the ‘all right-wing’ government.

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement is designed to boost its regional and global status. This follows a Saudi policy of continued dependence on the United States, while at the same time opening channels in the opposite direction, reflecting the lack of Saudi confidence in the U.S.

Riyadh wants a deal to affirm its place as a prestigious and valuable U.S. ally, in a reversal of the current American attitude to it. The Saudis also want a deal to include a U.S. commitment to a strategic defense alliance, similar to the U.S. commitment to NATO.

As Saudi Arabia looks a decade or two ahead at a changing world, against the backdrop of Iran's provocations, it also sees in the deal an opportunity to gain early nuclear technological know-how. And this signifies a challenge for the future Middle East.

Saudi Arabia would also receive advanced military technology platforms and capabilities that put it in the first class of powers, and through sales of F-35 and air defense systems, give it capabilities against the Iranian axis. This will also give the Saudis confidence in facing the Houthis in Yemen.

Israel will have to deal with the risk of losing regional aerial superiority due to Saudi Arabia acquiring F-35s, and Riyadh’s planned nuclear program, will also see a major erosion of Israel’s qualitative military qualitative edge.

Perhaps, as a compromise solution, the U.S. will agree to the first civilian nuclear steps over a longer timeline, with other steps put on hold. We cannot ignore the risk of an unconventional arms race developing, with additional countries following the Saudis, like Egypt and Turkey. And this dilemma is something the US and Israel will have to seriously discuss.

Yet for Riyadh, all of this will give the Kingdom the security to continue with its economic plans to become a global superpower with the confidence to navigate threats.

Israel, therefore, does not form the premise of the three-way Saudi – American – Israeli deal. It is more like a distinguished passenger who is invited to the business train car and is able to take advantage of what is on offer.

Israel’s involvement will make it easier for Biden to get the deal approved in Congress, where both Democrats and Republicans have raised objections to Saudi Arabia over human rights and extremism, issues that have prevented better U.S. ties with Riyadh.

Regionally speaking, Saudi-Israeli normalization will create a high wall and underground barrier to fortify the Abraham Accords in the coming years, creating a new bloc in the Middle East in the face of the Iranian threat.

Implications for Israeli politics

Neither Saudi Arabia nor the U.S. are happy about the political situation in Israel or about the risk of policies that could lead to a multi-arena escalation event. The common interest of the US and Saudi Arabia is regional quiet.

Saudi Arabia will demand significant changes from Israel. As the leading Muslim state, it will not be able to afford to give up the Palestinian issue. Normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will not be served without Israeli concessions, including an Israeli commitment to a concept that falls within the space of the two-state idea.

In practice, Israel will be required to take steps such as the cessation of annexation of territories for several years in the West Bank, to make land available to the Palestinian Authority in Area C and to promote Palestinian economic projects. Saudi Arabia may demand a renewed and approved mechanism to keep the Al Aqsa Mosque quiet as well.

Israel will be required to transfer funds to the Palestinian Authority. It may also be time for Israel to request Saudi financial involvement in the development of infrastructure in the West Bank.

The Saudis can also provide jobs outside of the West Bank to Palestinian tech personnel and academics, some of whom were employed in the Gulf in the past but have returned to unemployment in the West Bank.

Therefore, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have to take critical decisions ahead of his meeting with President Biden in September. Does he want to return to being a legitimate leader on the international stage? If he accepts the terms of normalization, this could speed up the departure of the Ben Gvir-Smotrich alliance from his coalition and the demise of the full right-wing government, leading to the formation of a new government that could deal with these issues in a matter-of-fact manner.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

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Israel must prepare a counter-strategy against a multi-arena threat.

By Eitan Dangot

Hamas has been strengthening its cooperation with the Iran-Hezbollah axis for years and the process only seems to be accelerating. The result is the formation of six fronts of aggression against Israel—a “ring of fire” composed of radical Sunni and Shiite axes.

Previous signs of this cooperation could be found in how the Palestinian Sunni Hamas and the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah helped one another upgrade their capabilities. Hezbollah began digging cross-border tunnels into Israel from Lebanon (though these were demolished by the IDF in 2018), just as Hamas did for years from Gaza.

Hamas learned from Hezbollah how to overcome its military inferiority and set up rocket bases in civilian areas. Both terror armies have set up elite cross-border ground infiltration units—Hamas’ Nuhba force and Hezbollah’s Radwan force.

The relationship grew even closer after Saleh Al-Arouri, a senior Hamas official, was expelled from Turkey and relocated to Lebanon several years ago. He began building a Hamas headquarters in Lebanon, from which he both orchestrates terrorism in Judea and Samaria and oversees a growing Hamas presence in Lebanon.

Al-Arouri can be seen as Hamas’ own Qassem Soleimani. Like the late Iranian Quds Force unit commander—assassinated by the United States in 2020—Al-Arouri is drawing up a multi-arena attack strategy to surround the State of Israel and he is doing so with Iranian help.

The hub of Al-Arouri’s activity is Judea and Samaria, where Hamas works day and night to both incite and directly orchestrate terrorist attacks.

The fruit of Al-Arouri’s work in Lebanon became apparent on April 6, when Hamas fired 34 rockets at Israel from Lebanon, the largest such salvo since the 2006 Second Lebanon War. A day earlier, after Passover eve, Palestinian terrorists in Gaza fired some 50 rockets towards Israel.

According to the terror organizations, the rocket fire was a response to clashes between Palestinian youths and Israeli police at the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, but in fact, it was a sign of something far more significant.

The attacks are the latest indication of the accelerated convergence between the Palestinian terror axis and the Iran-Hezbollah axis, creating the multi-arena threat Israel now faces with ever-growing intensity.

The common denominator that unites the Iranian-led axis is the goal of combatting Israel. In addition to Gaza and Lebanon, Israel’s enemies are striving to create a front in Syria, where Hamas could soon be sending operatives after reconciling with the Assad regime, and where Hezbollah is working with Iran-backed Shiite militias to set up offensive positions.

Hamas has become a significant partner in the Iranian quest to surround Israel with a ring of fire. The establishment of a coordinated headquarters in Lebanon with Hezbollah and Palestinian terror factions in 2021 was a milestone in this development.

Iran pours funds and weapons into its regional proxies and partners, giving them the capabilities to realize their objectives. In addition, Iran and its Lebanese and Palestinian proxies have entered a mutually-supportive deterrence framework with Hamas operating from Lebanon under the umbrella of Hezbollah’s arsenal of 160,000 projectiles.

Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and Yemen are also preparing to enter the multi-arena strategy against Israel through missile and drone attacks.

Meanwhile, the notion of state responsibility over what occurs in their territory has long been irrelevant in Lebanon and Syria, and the ability of the joint Shiite-Sunni radical axes to disrupt life in Israel grows consistently.

These forces don’t need to enter into a full-scale war with Israel. All they need to do is continuously identify optimal points in time to escalate the security situation when they judge Israel to be unwilling or unable to respond forcefully, thus creating regular threats to the ability of Israelis to lead a secure life.

This is precisely what occurred, in the broadest fashion to date, during this year’s Ramadan period.

The pattern we are now witnessing is a direct continuation of the 2021 conflict fought between Hamas and Israel, when Hamas was able to activate another arena—the internal Israeli arena. Widespread violence tore through mixed Arab-Jewish cities, serving as a warning to Israel of what a future multi-front conflict could look like.

All of this serves Iran’s goal of keeping Israel distracted as Iran makes rapid progress in its nuclear program. Iran hopes its program faces fewer disruptions while Israel is busy dealing with Iran’s multi-arena strategy.

This obligates Israel to immediately formulate a counter-strategy, which should be based on high-end Israeli operational capabilities and international cooperation with the U.S. and Sunni states that seriously addresses the dilemma of preemption.

Israel needs to consider the benefits and risks of launching surprise preemptive strikes on Hezbollah targets in response to the force build-up and growing boldness of this primary Iranian regional proxy. In addition, Israel must eliminate its internal crisis as soon as possible by focusing on rapidly building its new national guard, under the command of the Israel Police.

Ultimately, Israel must prepare to operate in multiple arenas, just as its dangerous enemies do.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

The IDF is being dragged into Israel’s political crisis

By Eitan Dangot

When the new IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi took over from his predecessor Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, he didn’t anticipate finding himself in his current predicament. He was sure he’d be able to concentrate on two primary objectives: Identifying the main security dangers to Israel and crafting a vision for Israel’s response. He also expected to be busy with ethical and operational messaging to the IDF’s branches and commanders.

Usually, a chief of staff oversees extensive new plans to improve IDF readiness. In this case, Halevi is focused first and foremost on the Iranian threat. It is also fair to assume that he was preparing to deal with challenges to the “people’s army” model and find new ways of keeping career officers, commanders, operational and technical staff, and NCOs in their positions, as well as boosting the number of recruits from the Israeli periphery into technological units.

Instead of all that, within just two months of Halevi’s appointment, a judicial reform program and a national crisis have thrust him into the role of a military commander navigating a national domestic crisis.

The main issues that Halevi wanted to deal with have been pushed to the side, as opponents and supporters of the judicial reform program focus on the domestic battle, which increasingly threatens to drag in the military. A refusal by reservists to serve if the judicial reform passes is a red warning light, and there are also concerns about disruptions to service by conscripts who object to the judicial reform.

The chief of staff does not want to tackle these issues. They interfere with his main role of identifying and preparing for defense threats against the State of Israel, which are growing more serious. Yet Halevi finds himself having to deal with letters to IDF commanders from reservists in strategic units declaring they will not be reporting for duty in the middle of a socio-political storm.

Such letters, sent by reservists from units that have a significant military history and vital future role in achieving IDF goals, have triggered replies from many politicians, some of whom had no prior military experience or only a brief period of IDF duty.

Halevi is wisely making every effort to avoid political declarations and keep the flames of political dispute low in the military and prevent them from spreading further. But despite those efforts, a significant change has occurred over recent weeks. The conversation has changed. It has evolved into a deep social and national argument that incorporates numerous sectors and is far broader than a dispute over democratic values.

Halevi, who had previously avoided making any public statement on the subject, joined forces with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant after realizing that his personal involvement will have a significant impact.

In response to letters written by former IAF pilots, as well as by reservists with illustrious combat histories in intelligence, technology, ground warfare, elite forces and air defense, Halevi began speaking out publicly. He spoke to members of various protest groups in the reserves, outlining his plans for not only resolving this immediate crisis, but also how to handle additional problems that could arise during his tenure and the future of the IDF.

Halevi recognized that the processes he is now seeing didn’t begin during the current political crisis. Disunity within the IDF has been brewing for years. A significant number of soldiers are graduates of religious seminaries who volunteer for combat service in the ground forces, and some of them have a far-right political orientation. Already during the 2005 Israeli disengagement from Gaza, soldiers with ties to the evacuees discussed the possibility of refusing to serve.

The chief of staff must take all necessary measures to resolve the issue and move quickly to exclude the IDF from any further political discussions. He must be firm with several irresponsible individuals who are calling for refusal to show up for service immediately, while expressing greater understanding for others who are concerned about what may come next.

Halevi prefers to conduct a discreet and quiet conversation with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government over these issues, but in this dialogue, it is vital that he and the other defense chiefs voice their opinions with as much force and courage as they displayed on the battlefield.

A discussion like this can jeopardize the chief of staff’s standing with lawmakers, but it is still necessary for someone in his position to help preserve democracy.

Halevi’s troubles don’t end there. He has also had to watch coalition agreements grant unprecedented and confusing power to the new position of Junior Minister in the Defense Ministry occupied by Bezalel Smotrich. From the ministry, Smotrich, who is also Israel’s finance minister, can interfere with the IDF’s Civil Administration, which runs Israeli civilian policies in the West Bank.

Halevi also had to witness the granting of power, at least in theory, over Border Police in Judea and Samaria to the new National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

If these ministers are allowed to implement their new powers in this way, it would be detrimental to the IDF’s ability to work in a unified, coordinated manner, especially for IDF Central Command in Judea and Samaria.

Domestic strife has harmed Israel’s readiness against the Iranian threat. Iran has enriched uranium almost to the 90% military-grade level. This is a warning siren. Meanwhile, Hezbollah is building up its arsenal.

As we approach the beginning of Ramadan, an explosive time in the Palestinian arena, the chief of staff will continue to oversee the campaign against Iranian entrenchment in Syria, build up Israeli war readiness, increase cooperation with the U.S. military regarding the potential need to confront Iran militarily, and actively contribute to Israeli resilience in the face of a potential escalation in the Palestinian arena or within Israel by Arab Israeli extremists.

It would be appropriate for Netanyahu to allow the IDF brass and security forces to concentrate and mobilize all their professional and command energies against the enemy at this time, rather than drag them into complicated situations that put them in the spotlight against their will and hinder their ability to perform their roles effectively.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Ramadan to 75th Independence Day: A challenging period ahead

By Eitan Dangot

The murderous terrorist attack that tore through Jerusalem last Friday evening served as a stark reminder of the terrorism challenges faced by Israel. The shooting, in which seven civilians were murdered, was the latest and worst of several gun attacks over the past year and marks a peak in the latest round of the struggle between Israel and terrorist factions.

The arenas generating terrorism against Israel today are Judea and Samaria, eastern Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and from within Israel itself. A secondary front in this context of Palestinian terrorism is the Lebanese front, which stretches from Rosh Hanikra to the tri-border region where Israel, Lebanon and Syria meet, and where Hamas has operated in the past two years.

Globally, Israeli and Jewish overseas targets remain under threat, mainly from Iranian elements, Hezbollah and ISIS.

Judea and Samaria form the core of the terrorist escalation that Israel faces. The region is saturated with firearm attacks of the type seen in the deadly attack in Jerusalem’s Neveh Ya’acov neighborhood and bands together localized terrorist elements and lone attackers. It is filled with terrorists who are not affiliated to any one faction, thereby constituting a new trend.

Terrorist attacks in Judea and Samaria include shootings, stabbings and car rammings perpetrated by lone or localized groups of attackers. This forms an escalation from the wave of lone-wolf attackers in 2015, which was largely based on stabbings and car-ramming incidents.

A primary engine for encouraging and inciting terrorism is provided by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Hezbollah, who operate out of Gaza and Lebanon. It is they who orchestrate the modern terrorism model of 2022-2023.

New kinds of armed groups

In Judea and Samaria, a new kind of armed group has emerged that is defined by local geography and includes the participation of elements from PIJ, Hamas and Fatah. This model of terrorism is prominent in Jenin, where the Palestinian Authority lost control, along with control of the Jenin refugee camp, more than four years ago. On the ground, the Jenin terror model has served as an inspiration for others, as seen in Nablus and to a certain degree in Ramallah and its surroundings.

The PA’s loss of control over events in its territory, alongside the Palestinian population’s hatred and lack of faith in the Authority, due to its corruption and disdain for its people as well as deep national frustration, converge to create a precipitous decline in the security situation.

On the other hand, the majority of Palestinians in Judea and Samaria vote with their feet every morning by not taking part in terrorism and instead, going out to work – including over 130,000 of whom work in Israel or in the settlements. The economy is restraining mass terrorism and is distancing us from scenarios of a full-blown third intifada.

Such an intifada is still, however, on the horizon and could take the form of large numbers of shooting attacks and members of Fatah joining the cycle of violence.

Following the significant security operation in Jenin last Thursday, January 26, in which several terrorists were killed, resulting in a major blow to PIJ, which is leading the terrorism on the ground, the spotlight turned to the core threat: eastern Jerusalem.

For years, east Jerusalem has been a target for terrorist inciters. Over 300,000 east Jerusalem Palestinian residents are targeted with messages designed to generate hatred and promote attacks in the lone attacker format, as seen in neighboring Judea and Samaria.

In this context, the eastern Jerusalem population has advantages, as it is an intrinsic part of the fabric of Israeli life with unrestricted entry to greater Jerusalem thanks to Israeli residency cards, though not citizenship, out of their choice.

THE SITUATION of the eastern Jerusalem neighborhoods contributes to resentment against Israel. Many do not view themselves as part of Israel and the religious hatred that burns there is the core of the fire that is driving the current escalation. Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount is a frequent theme in the growing terror activities, which endanger Jewish civilians throughout the city and country.

Future mass casualty incidents are certainly a possibility. Security on this front is under the control of the Israel Police since Jerusalem is a domestic security zone.

Last Saturday’s shooting attack on an Israeli father and his son, perpetrated by a 13-year-old Palestinian boy in eastern Jerusalem armed with a handgun and resulting in serious injuries to both of them, testifies to the severity of the risk posed by the eastern Jerusalem population, the incitement and the deeds some members of this community are prepared to commit. A culture of hate is implanted in these youths from a young age.

Contact between eastern Jerusalem Palestinians and Israelis has not brought them closer together and even though many work in Israel, when they return home, they switch from economy mode to hatred mode.

Two central incitement elements are behind this trend: Hamas and the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, headed by Raed Saleh. Social media, mosques and even official channels are used to spread the hate.

In response, Israel’s government and security cabinet must immediately formulate a strategy and policy for the short-term and medium-term regarding eastern Jerusalem. In the first stage, a thickening and reinforcement of the security presence are required in areas bordering eastern Jerusalem and for the protection of sites that are prone to attacks.

Flooding the streets with security forces in sensitive areas will enable a rapid response to shooting attacks, potentially saving tens of lives in each attack.

To that end, the organizational structure and the technological and intelligence means used by the Israel Police must be upgraded, with more resources allocated and legal backing for the deployment of advanced capabilities used by the defense establishment in other arenas.

This will be a long process but it must begin now, in time for the sensitive period of Ramadan (beginning in March), Passover and Independence Day, a period in which Israel is committed to flattening the curb of terrorism.

The rapid demolition and sealing of homes used by terrorists, economic punishment against terrorist elements in eastern Jerusalem and examining the option of expelling family members of terrorists – a problematic legal procedure – should be on the table.

In Gaza, the situation is more clear-cut. Some 17,000 Gazans head out to work in Israel every day, the two million-strong Gazan population is behind a border and security barrier, the Iron Dome air defense batteries protect Israel from rocket fire and the threat that Hamas will pay a heavy price if it decides to escalate the situation all act as a deterrent.

Israel must decide on an offensive policy against those leading terrorist incitement from Hamas, PIJ and others, whether they live in Gaza or Lebanon. This will certainly lead to escalation but they are necessary in order to foil and deter terrorism.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Will Temple Mount Tensions Spark Another Arab-Israeli Crisis?

By Eitan Dangot

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, the Temple Mount has served as a narrative that Palestinians and extremists from the Arab-Israeli community have used to institutionalize the culture of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. This is a culture that arouses the masses, is emotional, and can mobilize the Arab-Israeli street and the Palestinians, as well as the Arab street in other Sunni countries.

Events surrounding the Temple Mount can pour fuel on the fire of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and ignite an inferno, literally, within hours.

On the Israeli-Jewish side, the issue also serves as a detonator for extremist radical elements, who preach incessantly for the establishment of a Jewish foothold on the Temple Mount and wish to fly a red flag in front of the bull. Activities of this nature can upend Israeli government policies and the State of Israel’s ability to maintain law and order in Jerusalem.

In Benjamin Netanyahu’s new cabinet, several parties have full-fledged right-wing lawmakers coming to power for the first time. The Temple Mount is part of the political hardcore environment that they grew up in.

National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s ascension to the Temple Mount on January 3 has far-reaching implications as it threatens the delicate security balance in Jerusalem, in the territories controlled by the Palestinian Authority, and in Gaza. His decision to ascend the Temple Mount in one of his first acts as a minister was a deliberate provocation against Arab citizens of the State of Israel, Palestinians, and the Arab states of the region. It is clear that from now on, every move and every statement made by Ben Gvir and some of his colleagues will come under scrutiny and in the near future will trigger a response, perhaps in words but also possibly in actions.

Before ascending to the Temple Mount, Ben Gvir should have adopted the maxim, “think first, act later.” Still, it is important to clarify that the status quo on the Temple Mount has not changed, and there is no plan to change it.

Netanyahu had the option—one that he has adopted in the past—to instruct his ministers to refrain from visiting the Temple Mount and allow only rank-and-file ministers of the Knesset to do so. So far, he has yet to implement such a policy this time around.

At the same time, Hamas has good reasons to avoid going to war over this issue. The current situation (where Gaza is quiet, but the West Bank is witnessing an increase in terrorist attacks and clashes between Palestinians and Israeli forces), together with the declining status of the Palestinian Authority, serves Hamas’s strategy well. This has been the case since May 2021 when Hamas initiated a conflict with Israel to portray itself as the protector of Al Aqsa.

Hamas is currently hard at work rehabilitating its military force in Gaza, while at the same time exploiting opportunities to improve the strip’s economy and alleviate some of the pressure on it.

Israel has granted some 20,000 work visas for Gazans, who bring much-needed cash into the Gazan economy. Meanwhile, Hamas is strengthening its collaboration with Hezbollah, Iran, and regional terror elements to optimize its position on the day the ceasefire is called off.

In the near future, the Islamic holiday of Ramadan, which begins on March 26, could have game-changing potential in the conflict between the Palestinians and Israel. And the Temple Mount’s role could be critical here.

The month preceding Ramadan is historically associated with an increase in hatred and religious agitation. This is when it will be easiest to spark an explosion among Palestinians and Arab Israelis on the streets of East Jerusalem and in Israel. Israel’s strategy, particularly that of this new government, must be aimed at preventing this scenario wherever possible. 

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

For new Israeli government, urgent security decisions await

By Eitan Dangot

The next Israeli government will not have a grace period. Before its ministers settle into their new offices, the government must deal with urgent security matters.

The Islamic month of fasting, Ramadan, is quickly approaching and will commence in late March 2023. The Ramadan period is notorious for a surge in religious extremism, clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinians, Israeli-Arab domestic terrorism, and other incidents.

On day one, the clock will start ticking for the new government to make quick policy decisions to deal with such scenarios.

A key priority for the new government will be to formulate a policy on how to deal with the ongoing wave of terrorism in the West Bank, which has been carried out both by organized cells and lone-wolf assailants. It will also need to chart its course on Hamas in Gaza.

Within Israel itself, the government will need to deal with the out-of-control availability of firearms in the Arab-Israeli community.

It will also have to decide immediately how to handle the fractured Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank, which has seen a systematic loss of sovereignty and control.

The power vacuum has been filled by local terror groups that have banded together based on their geographical location, rather than organizational affiliation. This has occurred in Jenin and Nablus, and Hebron could be next.

This is occurring against the backdrop of a developing economic crisis within the PA stemming from an inability to cover a growing deficit, sustain its administrative machinery, or initiate future development projects.

At the same time, the United States, which heads the international system, is signaling to the incoming Israeli government that it intends to be more involved in the Palestinian arena, especially in the West Bank. This in turn has led to growing European involvement, as neighboring Arab states, primarily Jordan and Egypt, are closely observing what will be done in response to the PA’s situation.

Countries that are part of the Abraham Accords and are internally affected by events in the West Bank are closely watching too.

Likud Chairman and incoming prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu views establishing ties with Saudi Arabia as a major goal for expanding the Abraham Accords and seeks to achieve swift diplomatic success with Riyadh in his first year in power.

Yet this goal is overshadowed by the objectives of Netanyahu’s right-wing political partners, who want to transform the status of the West Bank, known in Israel as Judea and Samaria. They wish to see these territories become a de facto part of Israel and their strategy includes removing the Israel Defense Force’s (IDF) Civil Administration from the Defense Ministry, legalizing illegal outposts, and changing laws governing the Jewish population of Area C of the West Bank.

It is also worth asking what kind of policy Netanyahu and his government could adopt regarding Gaza and Hamas, the terror entity that rules the Strip. For its part, Hamas is attempting to ignite the West Bank, undermine the PA, weaken President Mahmoud Abbas, encourage terrorism within Israel, and pursue its strategic goal of taking over the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and increasing its power in the West Bank.

Israel, under both outgoing Prime Minister Yair Lapid and during previous Netanyahu governments, sought to create a truce in Gaza and reinforce it by offering humanitarian-economic steps for the Strip. Currently, that means enabling some 17,000 Gazans to enter Israel for work daily even as Hamas builds up its military-terrorist capabilities and calls for Israel’s destruction while enhancing cooperation with Hezbollah, Iran, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Syria. Meanwhile, there has been no breakthrough in efforts to secure the release of two Israeli civilians and the remains of two IDF personnel held by Hamas.

Judging from his past record as prime minister, Netanyahu supports the current Israeli policies in place in the West Bank and Gaza. There is no reason to believe that Netanyahu would have chosen a different course of action than the one recommended and implemented by the defense establishment (the IDF, Shin Bet, and Israel Police) over the past two years.

Had he presided over a balanced centrist government, Netanyahu could well have chosen to maintain the status quo in the coming six months: Fighting terrorism in the West Bank, working to avoid the economic collapse of the PA—but not considerably strengthening it politically—and sustaining the status quo in Gaza, which has seen Israel grant de facto recognition of Hamas’s rule there. Yet Netanyahu will face challenges from some of his new coalition members if he does this.

In an era in which the world is experiencing an energy crisis and heightened superpower tensions, the challenges of preserving Israel’s global standing and freedom of maneuver will be another issue knocking on Netanyahu’s door. It is a challenge that will be exacerbated by the fact that Israel’s policies toward Palestine will be the first significant discussion between Netanyahu and the Biden administration.

The divisions and historical baggage between the Democrats and Netanyahu are well documented and go back to the Obama administration. While Netanyahu and Joe Biden appear to have a good personal relationship, the Democratic Party’s internal dynamics oblige Biden, a supporter of Israel, to strike a certain balance on the Palestinian issue.

Israel, for its part, has a vested interest in safeguarding the critical strategic military and political alliance with the United States and working with Washington to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions, as well as its military-terrorist activities throughout the Middle East. It is not possible to truly disconnect Israel’s ability to work with the United States against Iran from the Palestinian issue.

These factors can help Netanyahu explain the need to prevent maneuvers by his new government that would isolate Israel and harm its supreme strategic interests.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

In light of Hamas’s new ‘Jerusalem strategy,’ Israel must update Gaza policy

By Eitan Dangot

Jerusalem Day, marked this year on May 28 – 29, brought with it predictable threats and tensions with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. These tensions came close to bringing the region to a new round of conflict, exactly one year after the last, but stopped short of doing that.

Now that Israel got past this potential flashpoint on the calendar without a significant escalation, it will need to update its policy regarding Hamas in Gaza immediately going forward.

Ever since Hamas fired multiple rockets at Jerusalem at the end of Ramadan in 2021, sparking the 12-day Guardian of the Walls conflict during the start of a Jerusalem Day flag march, it has been pursuing a new game plan.

The rocket fire came after days in which Hamas warned Israel about events underway in east Jerusalem, including at the Al Aqsa Mosque, and disputes over homes in the Sheikh Jarah neighborhood.

The decision by Hamas to launch a military conflict last year was not, in reality, a tactical event, but rather the planting of the seeds of a new Hamas strategy, which remains in place to this day.

According to this strategy, Hamas will do whatever is necessary to market itself to Palestinians, and the wider Muslim world, as the ‘guardian of Jerusalem.’

Its target audience is first and foremost Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, as well as Arab-Israelis, and its marketing strategy is designed to promote the idea that Hamas is the defender of Jerusalem and the Al Aqsa Mosque.

More recently, this very same strategy found expression in the form of rockets fired into Israel from Lebanon. The rockets turned out to have been fired by Hamas operatives, likely from the Tyre region.

Through this strategy, Hamas is expanding its activities away from its core area in Gaza and seeking to boost its foothold in the West Bank where it relies on support from the general population. Hamas is stepping up incitement to violence on social media, creating the conditions for a wave of terrorism that has thus far claimed the lives of nineteen people.

Thus, Hamas is engineering a broader atmosphere of terrorism among Palestinians in the West Bank who do not formally belong to the faction.

As Hamas continues to build up military force in Gaza, it is also building terror cells in the West Bank and enjoys the backing of Turkey, Qatar, and Hezbollah – despite Sunni-Shi’ite complexities.

Hamas maintains an open channel with Iran, which enables it to benefit from weapons, know-how, and financial support.

When Hamas began applying its new strategy in May 2021, Israel chose a military response against Hamas targets in Gaza. The Israeli operation was mainly directed at the power and status of Hamas in Gaza as the second-largest military-terror threat to Israel in the region, after Hezbollah.

During Operation Guardian of the Walls, Israel caused significant damage to Hamas, disrupted its capabilities, and somewhat damaged the organization’s sovereignty in Gaza – but it did not do much more than that.

At the end of the conflict, the region saw the return of a familiar mechanism: Egypt filled, and continues to fill, a central mediating role between Hamas and Israel, and, taking advantage of the fact that it is the only outlet that Hamas has to the world via the Rafah Border Crossing, Egypt even worked with its hated rival Qatar, to stabilize the Strip. Over the past year, quiet was for the most part preserved in this manner.

In exchange for not launching attacks from Gaza, Hamas received from Israel humanitarian concessions for the residents of Gaza, as well as the start of reconstruction of buildings and infrastructure in the Strip damaged in the 2021 conflict.

Israel then went a step further and enabled 12,000 Gazans to enter Israel for work, creating direct economic relief for Gaza’s population – and indirect assistance to Hamas’s sovereignty.

In doing so, Israel gave up on pre-conditions it previously set for such relief, such as the release of two Israeli civilians illegally held captive by Hamas, and the return of the bodies of two IDF personnel killed in the 2014 Hamas-Israel conflict.

Yet Israel’s approach has not been effective in combating Hamas’s new strategy of building itself up as the ‘defender of Jerusalem,’ and increasing its influence in the courtyard of the Al Aqsa Mosque, Jerusalem, and the West Bank.

Hamas is also fighting for the attention and affiliation of younger Israeli Arabs, albeit in relatively small numbers.

In the West Bank, a generation has grown up that does not remember the traumas of the Second Intifada and Operation Defensive Shield in 2002. This generation has adopted the Hamas-led narrative that connects religious faith, nationalism, and a confrontational approach with Israel, leading to a spike in murderous attacks by terrorists that have various affiliations.

All the while, Hamas is enjoying the calm Israel is enabling in Gaza and taking advantage to build up new capabilities such as UAVs, and ground and sea commando cells.

Hamas has not stopped for even a minute its maneuvering and preparations for the day Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas departs the scene.  

In response to all of this, Israel has chosen a policy based on differentiating Hamas Gaza from the West Bank. In the latter, Israel launched a series of counter-terrorism operations. In Lebanon, Israel is working in a minor way against Hamas, and diplomatically, it is working individually with Turkey and Qatar to search for formulas to contain Hamas.

Yet this does not deal with the dangerous connection Hamas has been able to create between religious war cries under the banner of the Al Aqsa Mosque and the confrontational attitude it has instilled in Palestinians beyond Gaza.

Now that Jerusalem Day has passed without major escalation, Israel must recalculate its route and adopt a proactive stance against Hamas’s religious-nationalist incitement.

Israel’s toolkit must include a renewal of targeted assassinations of senior Hamas personnel, such as Salah Al-Arouri, who heads the West Bank terror ‘file,’ and is mostly based in Lebanon. Initiating moves against Hamas and taking it by surprise is crucial. The more this is done covertly, the better.

This change will not lead to instant solutions, but rather, to a process in which Israel will damage Hamas’s centers of gravity, including its leadership structure, and will go beyond just responding to Hamas as a Gazan territorial unit.

In any case, Hamas will end up escalating the situation, so Israel should choose to take the initiative and go beyond what Jerusalem has done in the past.

This also means maintaining total sovereignty over Jerusalem, while ensuring Muslim freedom of worship, and cooperating with moderate Arab elements that can help stabilize the Temple Mount, including Jordan, despite its weakening presence there.

The PA too is increasingly weak and losing power and is already transitioning to the post-Abbas era. Israel has to strengthen the PA in various ways, as part of a bigger effort to prevent its collapse on the day after Abbas’s departure.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

MIRYAM IN THE MEDIA: WHAT ISRAEL'S MOVE TOWARDS ABBAS MEANS

By Eitan Dangot

Hamas has good reason to be concerned by the recent meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Ramallah, a former senior Israeli defense official said.

According to Maj. Gen. (res.) Eitan Dangot, Israel's former coordinator of government activities in the territories, or COGAT, and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, the meeting between Gantz and Abbas was overdue and sent important signals that Hamas will find troubling.

"The very fact that the meeting took place is the central change," said Dangot, who also served as military secretary to three defense ministers. For Hamas, the meeting represents a signal of Israel's intention to continue to separate Gaza from the West Bank, he argued.

Israel is emphasizing, through the meeting, that it will hold highly contrasting policies towards these two territories, according to Dangot. Security tensions will dominate Israel's approach to Gaza, ruled by a radical terrorist regime, while Israel will seek ways to improve a variety of issues in its management of policy towards the PA.

"It is also a signal to Hamas that Israel might weigh up a future option, under which it could go back to the idea of seeing PA elements return to Gaza, with international backing. Israel could decide that this scenario does stand a chance. That could significantly weaken Hamas," said Dangot.

The fact that a senior Israeli decision-maker met with Abbas for the first time in 10 years is highly significant, he stated, adding that the meeting should have occurred sooner.

"It is a mistake to make Gaza more important than Judea and Samaria," said Dangot. "In my view, Judea and Samaria has much more importance for the internal security of Israel than Gaza. Gaza has clear boundaries, and Israel is facing a radical extremist movement that has the ideological goal of shedding the blood of its civilians and soldiers, and harming its existence. While there are criticisms of the PA's conduct, its residents, more than 2.7 million Palestinians, are living in daily coexistence with over 400,000 Israelis who live in Area C."

Daily interaction on the roads, at checkpoints and even during shopping at stores means Israel has a clear interest in boosting its influence over the PA, Dangot argued.

Meanwhile, the PA is facing its own especially sensitive period, with an unsettled Palestinian street, made more agitated by the power struggles of would-be successors to Abbas. Public demonstrations against the PA have rocked the Ramallah government, with members of the West Bank public also expressing disgust with corruption and the cost of living, according to Dangot's assessment.

During their meeting, Gantz and Abbas discussed political, security, civilian and economic issues. Following the event, Israel moved to provide the PA with a 500-million-shekel ($156 million) loan to help stabilize its troubled economic situation.

According to the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, the meeting received widespread coverage in Palestinian media, Fatah welcomed the event, while Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad condemned Abbas and accused of him being a traitor.

"They agreed to continue communicating further on the issues that were raised during the meeting," a statement from Gantz's office said.

The meeting was also attended by the current head of COGAT, Maj. Gen. Ghasan Alyan, PA Minister Hussein al-Sheikh, and the head of the PA's General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj.

Dangot said such meetings "were routine when I was military secretary and head of COGAT," adding that "not holding meetings caused a degree of damage. Personal dialogue can lead to changes."

Preparing for a post-Abbas era

Traditionally, the PA has faced obstacles to its rule in the Hebron area, where there is a concentration of Hamas supporters, Dangot noted. The fact that the PA is facing cracks in the stability of its rule – which began to emerge in earnest after Abbas cancelled Palestinian elections in April – means that the post-Abbas era has effectively begun, he warned.

"As a result, the PA is taking a certain risk in holding a meeting with senior Israeli figure, since many would-be successors of Abbas from Fatah are positioning themselves at this time, and are not interested in affiliating themselves with Israel. Abbas took a certain risk," Dangot said.

"On the other hand, this gives the PA an advantage since Abbas projected stability to the Palestinian street. He sent the message that security and civilian coordination with Israel will continue in face of threats at home, led mainly by Hamas, which is seeking to incite and fracture his rule. Hence, this meeting delivers a message that a large part of the Palestinian public is looking for – continued economic stability," the former officer stated.

Dangot stressed the importance of personal dialogue as a mechanism for better dealing with future crises.

"In the present, the goal of this meeting was to improve the PA's economic capabilities, and as a by-product, to prevent parts of the Palestinian public from joining violent incidents."

"Since 2008, large parts of the Palestinian public have demonstrated that economy comes before national issues for them. They understand the cost of losing, and were not part of Middle East revolutions. Hence, Israel's obligation is to exercise its ability to continue to advance the lives of Palestinian civilians, promote economic development, and helping economic initiatives," said Dangot.

Israel needs to seriously prepare for the post-Abbas era, he said, by getting a better sense of the Palestinian public mood and a better understanding of who potential Abbas successors will be.

Dangot said there is "no argument" over the fact that the PA is involved in multiple troubling activities, such as its push to place Israel on trial at the International Criminal Court, ongoing incitement, and the policy of paying stipends to security prisoners and the families of terrorists killed in their attack efforts.

"All criticisms of these things are fully justified," he said. "But a country has to set its strategy based on an ongoing assessment and of the alternatives that are at its disposal. Due to the high importance of Judea and Samaria for Israeli security, Israel cannot stick its head in the sand and fail to lead on a policy that it set. It has to deal with these problems as part of a general dialogue with the other side."

Dangot argued that while Abbas is not a fan of Israel and "not the ideal leader," he is still "the one who is signed onto agreements that commit the PA. It is his security forces who, almost daily, return Israeli civilians who got lost and found themselves in Area A safely to the IDF. There is a clear joint interest for the PA and Israel to prevent a radical movement like Hamas from entrenching itself in Judea and Samaria. This interest becomes the strongest."

This has led Dangot to the conclusion that it is possible to continue to keep levels of violence low in the West Bank, while still "not ignoring the other problems" that stem from the PA's conduct as described above. Israel must demand a decrease in the use of money by the PA for supporting families of terrorists and security prisoners, he said.

During Abbas's era, he added, "there will be no political agreement. Abbas won't end his role in the PA with a legacy of giving up on the 'right of return' in an agreement with Israel. But he won't want to collapse his entire concept by losing control and seeing chaos take over in Judea and Samaria either," he added.

Past experience has shown that Israel, backed by American pressure, has been able to cause Abbas to reign in his diplomatic and legal attacks on Israel, Dangot noted.

Israel must demand that the PA decrease its payments to families of terrorists and security prisoners, and halt its activities at the ICC, he added. "Together with the U.S., it is possible to stop these processes."

This has led Dangot to the conclusion that it is possible to continue to keep levels of violence low in the West Bank, while still "not ignoring the other problems" that stem from the PA's conduct as described above. Israel must demand a decrease in the use of money by the PA for supporting families of terrorists and security prisoners, he said.

During Abbas's era, he added, "there will be no political agreement. Abbas won't end his role in the PA with a legacy of giving up on the 'right of return' in an agreement with Israel. But he won't want to collapse his entire concept by losing control and seeing chaos take over in Judea and Samaria either," he added.

Past experience has shown that Israel, backed by American pressure, has been able to cause Abbas to reign in his diplomatic and legal attacks on Israel, Dangot noted.

Israel must demand that the PA decrease its payments to families of terrorists and security prisoners, and halt its activities at the ICC, he added. "Together with the U.S., it is possible to stop these processes."

Since August 21, Hamas has continued to escalate the border region with Israel through a series of violent disturbances. Border Policeman Barel Hadaria Shmueli, who was killed by a Hamas gunman at the border during a violent disturbance on August 21, was laid to rest on Monday. Several Palestinian rioters were shot during the disturbances, some fatally.

On August 28, Hamas restarted its harassment and attrition activities at nights along the border fence, sending activists to hurl explosive devices and launching arson balloons towards Israeli communities. Hamas is demanding that Israel loosen security restrictions around Gaza, and enable rebuilding projects to go ahead, even after an arrangement to facilitate the transfer of $10 million of Qatari cash per month has begun for needy Gazan families.

Israel has announced a series of measures to ease conditions in Gaza, including the entry of building material for the first time since May's conflict. Egypt reopened Rafah Crossing after closing it for six days. On Wednesday, Israel expanded the Gazan fishing zone to 15 nautical miles, and opened the Kerem Shalom Border Crossing for more equipment and commodities to pass through it. It also increased Gazan entry permits for traders, from 2,000 to 7,000. Yet none of this seems to be enough for Hamas, which continues to threaten further escalation.

"I sense a desire by the Israeli government to prevent an escalation for the coming months," said Dangot. Should Israel give up on its conditions, stipulated after the May conflict, such as conditioning widespread rebuilding projects on Gaza on Hamas's release of the remains of two IDF personnel killed in action in 2014 as well as two captive civilians, that will not lead to calm, Dangot warned.

Should Israel continue to insist on conditioning a breakthrough arrangement on Hamas meeting those conditions, he believes that too will lead to an escalation.

"In either case, both routes lead to one clear thing: an escalation with Hamas," said Dangot. "This is inevitable. The question is the timing."

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Video: MirYam Institute Expert: Eitan Dangot, I:24 News

MirYam Institute Expert Eitan Dangot Interviews with I:24 News about the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict.

The Six Day War’s message for Israel in 2021

By Eitan Dangot

The 54 years that have passed since the 1967 Six Day War have demonstrated beyond all doubt that this conflict was a turning point in the history of Israel, and that the war’s achievements and results continue to influence Israel’s existence, character, and security to this very day.

There are several key comparisons between 1967 and 2021 that help drive home how this 54-year-old process is continuing to shape national and regional realities.

Israel is currently transitioning from the second to the third generation since the Six Day War, and the new generation is dealing with many matters from that time that  half a century later are still burning issues.

Jerusalem

The Six Day War saw the reunification of Jerusalem, and the unity of Israel’s capital must be preserved.

The city’s explosive potential and its use as a trigger for incitement and violence is a constant factor. The issue of Jerusalem remains highly sensitive, and alongside its role as the eternal capital of Israel, the city also requires a sensitive strategy, something that in many cases requires prioritizing being smart over being right, and thinking before acting.

 In the years following 1967, and principally during the period of the Trump administration, Jerusalem’s status as Israel’s capital received a tailwind from the United States.

At the same time, careful thought and strategic daring on the part of future Israeli leaderships will be necessary to deal with Palestinian demands to express an affiliation with the city. Israel should generate a formula that separates the religious context of the city, by leaving Islamic religious responsibility for the Temple Mount in the hands of Jordan (and no one else). Jerusalem’s enlarged municipal size today includes Arab villages that are not a part of the city, and it is those outlying village areas that can be used as the basis for negotiations with the Palestinian Authority in the future over the establishment of a Palestinian capital.

Within Jerusalem itself, internal Israeli security forces must be responsible for security across the entire city, with as little involvement of the military as possible. During sensitive incidents, security forces should be injected and deployed to Jerusalem in large numbers in order to back-up police there. The city should be managed without tactical mistakes that create an inflammatory atmosphere of the kind that extremist elements constantly seek out to leverage for their strategic and religious agendas.  

Ultimately, the Six Day War’s achievement of uniting Jerusalem must be preserved.

The Six Day War’s strategic legacy

Since the Six Day War, the Jewish state’s existence has been consolidated beyond all question in the perception of many Arab-Muslim countries. They perceive Israel as a permanent fixture in the region, and besides terrorist organizations and a single Shi’ite Iranian state no one any longer questions Israel’s right to exist.

The dramatic 1979 Israeli – Egyptian peace treaty created a gate for Israel to the region, one that opened very slowly, but in recent years, especially during the Trump administration, much of the Arab world has opened up to Israel to one degree or another. This trend matured into the Abraham accords and much of the Sunni Middle East is perfectly able to discern its central enemy – the Shi’ite Iranian threat –  from a potential ally – Israel. This is a completely different reality from the one faced by Israel in 1967.

Today, Israel is also an independent energy supplier, a situation that stands in stark contrast to the embargos and boycotts that Israel faced from 1967 until recent years. The discovery of large natural gas reserves off Israel’s Mediterranean coastline has placed it in the club of Middle Eastern energy producers. The fact that Israel supplies its Arab neighbors, Egypt and Jordan, with natural gas, is creating joint interests that could shape regional events for many years to come.

Had Hezbollah not hijacked Lebanon, Israel today could be helping solve Lebanon’s severe and deteriorating energy crisis, acting as a rapid, cheap source of energy supplies for years.

Relations between Israel and pragmatic Arab states can reach ever-growing heights in the coming years, in the areas of economy, technology, and the creation of a counter-bloc against the radical Iranian-Shi’ite bloc.

A major obstacle to this development is the Palestinian issue. While the leaders of Arab states  have matured in their view of the Palestinian cause, the Arab street has not. The costs that Israel and Arab states will have to pay will be very significant if a solution to the Israeli – Palestinian conflict is not found, and if there is no way to calm Arab public opinion in every regional state.

In the fallout of the Six Day War, a Palestinian leadership headed by PLO chief Yasser Arafat took over the reins of the conflict with Israel from the Arab states. Since then, the conflict has morphed into a standoff between Israel and radical extremist organizations, who are building up their force, do not recognize Israel’s existence, and are using state arenas (Lebanon Iraq, and Syria) and Gazan territory to build terrorist armies.

These forces are funded by an extremist Shi’ite Iranian state and by a number of terror supporting, radical Sunni (Muslim Brotherhood) actors, primarily Qatar.

This has seen cooperation in terrorism between Shi’ite and Sunni extremists, united in their fight against Israel despite their sectorial animosities.

Hezbollah and Hamas have transformed the face of combat, pioneering asymmetric threats against Israel and joining up with the symmetric strategic threats posed to Israel from Iran and Syria.

This picture means Israel must continue being the strongest state in the 1,500-kilometer radius from Jerusalem, and needs to be able to cope with varying levels of threat, requiring huge investment and sophisticated technological military developments. These investments have enabled Israel to shield itself from harm and continue to operate as a sovereign independent state.

The transition between the reality of 1967 – from Israel facing Arab state armies to facing modern radical non-state terror organizations –  included key turning points, such as the rise of Hezbollah in place of Fatah beginning in 1984 in Lebanon, until its present status as the largest terrorist non-state entity in the world. It has teamed up with Hamas, a smaller terror organization, influenced by the Sunni Islamist part of the regional map, and funded by Qatar, which, as stated previously, supports Muslim Brotherhood extremist causes.

 In recent years, the Shi’ite axis has created an international threat that stretches from Tehran through to Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut. This axis is pointing growing numbers of offensive strike capabilities at Israel’s civilian population. Such a threat to Israel’s soft underbelly did not exist in 1967.

Ballistic missiles and rockets stationed at many points around the region have become an intolerable challenge to Israel’s security, and these arsenals are improving their accuracy and payloads. They serve as a key stage in Iran’s overall goal of entering the nuclear stage. 

Israel has in response developed world leading air defense and attack capabilities, spending huge sums to cope with arsenals that are relatively cheap to produce.

 Unlike 1967, in 2021, the Israeli home front and its battle front are one and the same.

Military legacy – the preemptive attack

In 1967, Israel’s success in thwarting a threat to its existence from Arab states came from an opening maneuver that was surprising, deep and unexpected. This has seared the value of preemptive attacks into the national consciousness. Yet since 1967, Israel has not used this tool significantly in any of the three central wars that followed 1967: The 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1982 First Lebanon War, and the 2006 Second Lebanon War.

The change in essence of the enemy and in the fact that the new enemy’s force build-up is becoming intolerable means that Israel must go back and review the value of 1967-style opening maneuvers as a new strategic decision-making junction that the next government will need to examine.

The tools of preemption must make a comeback, not necessarily to declare open war, but also in the campaign between wars in order to remove advanced enemy capabilities.

The question of whether it is right to launch a preemptive attack, with good timing and deep risk assessment against Hezbollah or Hamas, and especially against Iran’s nuclear program, is a highly relevant one.

Israel employed this doctrine against the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981, and the Syrian nuclear program in 2007.

Safeguarding Israeli air power as the regional air superiority asset is a key aspect of this doctrine.

In 1967, the IAF took advantage of its qualitative edge to conduct depth missions. Its human and technological advantage has only consolidated further since 1967, resulting in the evolution of a supreme military branch that safeguards Israeli skies, and the skies of the entire region.

 It is this air force that has helped convince many Arab states of Israel’s power and permanence.

The Israeli ground maneuvers that accompanied the Six Day War’s opening waves of air strikes created facts on the ground. In recent years, in light of the many changes to enemy structure and doctrine, including the use of terrorism from civilian populations (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and others, such as ISIS in Syria), Israel has found itself needing to create new ways of thinking about future ground maneuvers.

The tool of a ground maneuver is what establishes facts on the ground. It must be maintained as a sharp tool that integrates efficiently with air power to enable Israel to achieve rapid objectives during future conflicts. In addition, withdrawing ground forces from captured territories within relatively little time is also key to enabling the Israeli government to translate future military accomplishments into political gains. The Six Day War's legacy drives home these lessons.

The fact that for the past 54 years Israel has been present in Judea and Samaria and that it continues to exercise a military government for the Arab civilian population, sharpens the need to disconnect  military contexts from future areas that the IDF might be forced to fight in and capture.

Lebanon has taught Israel that staying on the ground too long creates an erosion of operational and strategic advantages. The disengagement from Gaza was a reflection of that realization by late Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

The only area in which such a clear solution cannot be implemented is Judea and Samaria.

On the other hand, this area, conquered from Jordan in 1967 in the defensive Six Day War, has, since 2006, and following much blood shed in the Second Intifada, seen the stabilization of a Palestinian autonomy with economic independence and internal security forces.

The big question is whether a brave Palestinian leader, currently not visible on the horizon, will agree to realistic end-of-conflict conditions that would require the Palestinians to give up the claim to a ‘right of return.’

The connection between extremist religious movements and lack of requisite maturity on the Palestinian side that would enable it to give up on a right of return has been evident repeatedly, even in the face of far-reaching Israeli compromise offers, such as Camp David in 2000. This underlines the fact that the issue will accompany us for many years.

Ultimately, the new Israeli government faces a heavy responsibility to plot new strategic paths on wide ranging issues, many of which can trace their development to the 1967 Six Day War.

Applying the preemptive model to threats such as the Iranian nuclear program must be included as a realistic possibility, but Israel also needs new thinking to create a model of co-existence between Jews and Palestinians.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

PODCAST: Priority Iran: Nuclear Program Or Terror Proxies?

Prof. Chuck Freilich & MG Eitan Dangot Analyze.

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Abbas has proven himself to be a first class strategist

By Eitan Dangot

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is implementing a highly efficient strategy in multiple arenas and maneuvering an array of challenges with visible success.

Since the election of the Biden administration, Abbas has reached an optimal point in his moves to reposition the PA both within the Palestinian arena and internationally, and it is clear that Abbas has been waiting for years for the Trump administration to pass before implementing his recent maneuvers. 

Months before the elections in the United States, Abbas and his inner circle assessed that Biden would likely win, and began signaling their change through a number of ‘softener steps’ designed to move away from Ramallah’s absolutist posture that had rejected cooperation with the U.S. and Israel.

These steps, conducted on the eve of the U.S. elections, included the return of security coordination with the Israel Defense Forces, after many months in which it had been suspended, and a resumption of receipt of tax payments from Israel, which had been frozen for months, creating a significant burden on the PA’s economy and its residents.

Abbas’s goal was to signal to the Biden administration that he is embarking on confidence-building measures vis-à-vis Israel in order to gain Washington’s faith.

As an inseparable part of this policy, Abbas understood that he must also achieve quiet with his hated Islamist rivals, Hamas, whom he will never forgive for the humiliating coup and ejection of Fatah from the Gaza Strip in 2007.

Despite the enmity, Abbas recruited senior PA official Jibril Rajoub to hold  contacts with Hamas – thereby decreasing friction within the Fatah leadership as a side product – and made Cairo the scene of Hamas-Fatah reconciliation talks, thereby returning Egypt to the stance of senior regional mediator, a position it is keen to play.

Meanwhile, Abbas significantly decreased public criticism of the Gulf states that signed normalization deals with Israel, and returned the PA’s ambassador to the UAE. In doing so, he placated Saudi anger at Ramallah, since Riyadh was the main regional power backer of the Abraham Accords, and had increasingly come to see the Palestinians as an obstacle in creating a regional bloc against Iran.

Within the Palestinian arena, the 86-year-old Abbas appears to have set a personal objective of completing his term in the coming years by positioning the PA as the central, exclusive, lead representative of the Palestinians, thereby creating a strong legacy that is designed to justify the manner in which he has ruled since being elected president in 2005.

To further this goal, Abbas’s acceptance of tax funds form Israel and his safeguarding of the economic status quo has provided the PA with stability, which, when viewed in comparison with the economic crises of other Arab states, is particularly prominent.

Abbas’s decision to proceed in a phased manner with Palestinian elections to the national parliament and presidency in May and July respectively is a signal to the U.S. and to the international community, designed to indicate this leadership is striving to repair ‘holes’ in Palestinian governance and make it more democratic.

The elections were also designed to reduce resentment felt by Hamas after Abbas renewed security coordination with Israel and cancelled the reconciliation process.

The elections carry with them major risks should Fatah and Abbas lose, while also carrying a promise of quiet since they attract the support of most Palestinian factions. The decision to move in this direction stems from Abbas’s need to have quiet on the Hamas front at this stage – but he still can cancel the process at any time and blame Israel for the abortion of the elections, using Israel’s refusal to allow them to take place in east Jerusalem as an excuse.

Israel, for its part, is addressing the issue cautiously in order to avoid being accused of disrupting the Palestinian democratic process. Yet any new Israeli government that forms after Israel’s own elections will have very little time to formulate responses on whether to allow Hamas to take part in West Bank ballot counts, or for voting to go ahead in east Jerusalem. 

Abbas also took advantage of the fact that Hamas is holding its own parallel internal elections, a process that is taking up the terror organization’s focus, leaving Hamas less able to focus on campaigning in the wider elections.

The Hamas elections in Gaza resulted in a win for the incumbent Yahya Sinwar, but only after four rounds of elections – a testament to the fact that Hamas’s current path of seeking truce arrangements faces major opposition by the veteran generation that is radical and extreme. This will complicate the manner in which Sinwar will lead, together with whoever wins the elections for the overseas political bureau, Khaled Mashaal or Ismael Haniyeh.

Hamas, for its part, is playing the long game, and views the elections as an opportunity to dominate the PA and the PLO, in line with its central objective of being the future ruler of the Palestinians.

Within Fatah itself, Abbas is working intensively to neutralize almost every attempt to undermine his power, focusing particularly on his sworn enemy, Mohammed Dahlan, as well as Marwan Barghouti, who is imprisoned in an Israeli jail for deadly terror attacks, and political threats from his rival (and the nephew of the late Yasser Arafat) Nasser Al-Qudwah.

Ultimately, Abbas has been able to achieve recognition of his leadership status, portray himself as a unifying figure in the Palestinian arena, and is able to celebrate his achievement of dragging Israel to the International Criminal Court in Hague – a threat that Israel must formulate a practical and wise response to.

He is regaining traditional international support for the PA from the U.S. and Europe, and there can be no doubt that Abbas forms a serious challenge to Israel.

Abbas will now be able to issue demands to return Israel to negotiations with the PA. Despite past regional forecasts, he has proven his ability to bring the Palestinian issue back as a central issue on the Middle Eastern agenda.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

Mid-East adversaries: Signaling Conflict, Avoiding War

By Eitan Dangot

The Middle East has entered a new and significant stage in recent weeks, as all regional actors position themselves around the key question of whether or not the Biden administration renews the Iran nuclear agreement. Failure to achieve an improved nuclear deal and to cause Iran to downgrade its regional destabilizing activities will have long-lasting effects, could create an economic disaster in Iran, and could lead to a military escalation between Iran and America’s regional allies.

The issue of whether sanctions on Iran will be lifted, and the outline of a possible new agreement, is the leading factor that will shape the face of the Middle East in the coming years.

The new American administration is maneuvering through a minefield, in which various developments could impact its decisions on the region.

To understand the new complex Middle Eastern puzzle, it is first necessary to recognize the fact that the Biden administrations is dealing with Iran on two fronts: The first is Tehran’s radical activities and support for armed movements that stretches from Yemen through to Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, as part of a grand strategic attempt to change realities in the region. The second is Iran’s nuclear program.

Every attempt by the United States to solve one of these fronts without linking it to the other is doomed to fail. Iran strives to become both a nuclear regional power and to shape a new geo-political era through the rise of terror armies and militias, of which Hezbollah in Lebanon is the most powerful. Hezbollah is in fact the most heavily-armed non-state actor in the world and is in possession of advanced weapons systems.

The moment of reckoning for American policy in the Middle East is approaching in the form of the decision on the nuclear agreement, and this central junction is also influenced by other important events: The upcoming Israeli elections, and the scheduled presidential elections in Iran in June, before which the Islamic Republic may suspend any major decisions.

The formation of a regional bloc made up of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel has, in the wake of the Abraham Accords – a successful leftover from the policy of the Trump administration  – created a challenge to American flexibility on the Iranian issue.

Now, the new administration is presenting a cold shoulder to Israel, and at the same time is reassessing its relationship with Saudi Arabia.

As it reviews its regional policies, Washington should take into account long-term consequences of the way it deals with its central partners in its maneuvering with Iran.

The main threat to the Abraham Accords bloc now could come due to tensions between Washington and Riyadh, which was the main silent partner enabling Israeli-Gulf relations.

Iran is not resting on its laurels, and is actively working to beef up the terrorist-military channels that it has built throughout the Middle East. It is this activity that has led the entire area into an escalatory dynamic, and it is through it that the Iranians send out psychological warfare messages to the U.S. and its principal allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Iran has chosen the naval arena as the main sphere in which to send out these signals. Its actions have created a significant threat to maritime shipping routes, and it is worth noting that more than 90% of Israel’s trade is conducted via shipping.

In its recent attack on an Israeli-owned ship in the Gulf of Oman, Iran has notified Israel of an equation according to which reported Israeli air strikes on Iranian military assets, targeting ground-based attempts to beef up the Iranian crescent, will be answered by attacks on Israeli shipping.

Simultaneously, Iran is activating its proxy in Yemen, the Houthis, and other militias in the region to create a ground-based threat to shipping.

The American strike on an Iranian militia in eastern Syria and the reported Israeli strike on targets in Damascus following the ship attack strengthens the idea that Syria has been selected by both Israel and the U.S. to respond with their own signals to Iran.

This escalation dynamic has not so far caused real harm to the other side, and most of the decisions are still being made in the political-diplomatic sphere, with all sides complimenting their postures with cyber attacks and other low signature activities. All sides are keen to avoid pressing the ‘escalation button’ too soon.

Iran may choose to escalate significantly after a new nuclear agreement is reached, and it has yet to retaliate for the assassinations of former Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and the chief Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakrizadeh. Such a development could certainly ignite the region.

Washington must take into consideration the core interests of its allies, Israel and the Gulf states, who in the meantime are setting up their own independent capabilities for taking on the Iranian nuclear threat. These efforts could in future take individual-state form, or be coordinated under the framework of an alliance.

As a result, no one should be surprised if local military solutions surface as being highly realistic options to deal with the Iranian nuclear program.

Ultimately, Washington should view the spread of the Shi’ite axis, its weapons proliferation, and proxy consolidation program, as being inseparable from the nuclear deal.

The Iranians have proven and continue to prove that despite severe pressure from multiple directions – the pandemic and economic distress – their scheme to expand terror tentacles and their murderous radical ideology will not stop even for a second.

Only a combination of a firm stance in negotiations, the listing of conditions, a show of force, and leaving space for maneuver will pave the path to a contraction of Iran’s nuclear program and a curtailment of its regional activities. A U.S. failure on these counts could well lead Israel to consider a variety of operations against Iran and its militias, including the option of launching a preventive offensive against Hezbollah.

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Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.