Can Israel Defeat Iran’s Precision Guided Missile Threat?

By Yaakov Lappin

BRIG. GEN. ZVIKA HAIMOVICH (IDF, RET.)

BRIG. GEN. SHACHAR SHOHAT (IDF, RET.)

Hezbollah’s precision-guided missile (PGM) arsenal is Israel’s leading conventional security threat, surpassed only by Iran’s nuclear program.

While Hezbollah is not believed to have crossed Israel’s red line on this issue—a threshold that could trigger a preemptive attack on stockpiles of PGMs on Lebanese soil—it is continually taking steps towards it.

With Iran’s help, Hezbollah has recently explored ways to manufacture PGMs in Lebanon to avoid Israel’s effective grey zone campaign to disrupt the proliferation of advanced weapons from Iran to its regional proxies.

The ability to set up an indigenous PGM production capability in Lebanon—in which Hezbollah would merely receive components and independently assemble them, rather than rely on Iran for fully-built imports—represents a truly dangerous situation that Israel cannot tolerate in light of the instability that this scenario would cause.

“We have to go back in time and ask ourselves, how did we get to this stage?” says Brig. Gen. (ret.) Zvika Haimovich, former commander of the Air Defense Forces in the Israeli Air Force and a senior research fellow at the MirYam Institute.

Haimovich notes two processes that have led to the current situation. The first is a learning process by Iran and Hezbollah. Tehran and its proxy examined the estimated 20,000 projectiles fired at Israel—most of them by Hamas in Gaza—over the past fifteen years and found that only minimal damage was caused.

“Statistical (unguided) weapons had a big cognitive effect on the public but little practical effect,” says Haimovich. The second factor he notes is the revolution in standoff guided weapons technology. Whether rocket, missile, or drone, the latest technology enables these weapons to be fired from the ground, air, or sea to accurately strike targets, creating major damage, Haimovich says.

Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shachar Shohat, former Air Defense Forces Commander in the Israeli Air Force, describes PGMs as “the air force of terror organizations.”

To illustrate the difference between the threat of guided and unguided projectiles, he states: “Until now, around 25% of statistical, unguided weapons fired at populated areas were on course to their targeted areas. The entry of precision-guided munitions changes these parameters.”

Given that Iron Dome has intercepted approximately one-quarter of all incoming rockets from Gaza and is programmed to shoot down only threats heading for built up areas, the accuracy level of unguided rocket barrages is fairly clear, Shohat says, adding that “This strike level for statistical rockets of around 25% hasn’t changed since the 2006 Second Lebanon War.”

In contrast, PGMs can not only ensure that areas of interest are hit but can fire projectiles at an accuracy of between five to ten meters from the target, representing a completely new level of precision strike capability.

“If a simple rocket with a 20-kilogram warhead lands 20 meters from a building, it causes heavy damage to it. When a 250-kilogram warhead rocket accurately hits a building, it will take it apart and topple it. A 250-kilogram warhead can destroy multiple buildings,” Shohat cautions.

“What was once the reserve of a trained air force with pilots—the ability to hit precise targets, like a power station or a research center, can now be done with PGMs,” says Shohat.  “If an adversary had to fire four munitions to hit one target, today one munition is enough.”

These conclusions became clear to Iran and Hezbollah, Haimovich says, and in the decade that followed the Second Lebanon War, the shift to PGMs became apparent.

“Hamas is also trying to get PGMs into its inventory,” Haimovich warns.

“In the end, it all comes from a single catalyst—Iran. The Iranians provide the knowledge and the technology. In the past, they went for the “easy” option of transferring the missiles pre-assembled. Then they understood that these smuggling runs are discovered easily by Israel, and that Israel’s intelligence community had become far too adept at recognizing missile convoys, cargo flights, or shipments,” he adds.

“So, in the past ten years, they started with the idea of transferring knowledge to local proxies,” continues Haimovich.

Israeli officials have in past years warned about “suitcases” containing guidance kits that can be placed on unguided rockets, turning them into guided rockets. The guidance kits, complete with navigation fins, can turn powerful yet unguided rockets into precision-guided missiles.

Iran and Hezbollah have made multiple efforts to get such GPS guidance kits into Lebanon. Israel has made it abundantly clear to its enemies that if its red line on this type of proliferation is crossed, action will follow.

The reason, Haimovich explains, is because even an ability to hit a small number of key strategic targets in a war will change the course of the conflict to Israel’s considerable detriment. And that means only a small number of PGMs are sufficient to pose an intolerable threat.

“If Hezbollah decides to only hit five strategic targets with a projectile that has a 10 square meter radius accuracy in one day, that’s enough to change the picture,” notes Haimovich. “This is a changing reality. As a state, we can’t tolerate the other side having accurate weapons in big scopes that can threaten strategic assets.”

Shohat states that even if Hezbollah gets hold of the Iranian guidance kits, “we will defeat them.” However, he says, “we do not want this ‘grass’ to grow and create problems. This is a good example of Israel drawing clear red lines and doing it seriously—not just at the rhetorical level.”

Although the Iran-Hezbollah axis is continuing its efforts to create a PGM arsenal, it is doing this “much less than it would want to,” says Shohat.

And in places like Syria, used as a conduit to smuggle the weapons, “each time something gets ‘lost’ on the way” to its destination, he adds. “Most importantly, this gives Israel a better opening position on the day that a war begins. This is cutting the grass. It doesn’t mean that the grass isn’t growing, but when the war starts, the grass will be as low as possible.”

Haimovich explains that Israel’s red lines are designed to prevent two intolerable threats from materializing. The first is allowing Hezbollah to possess large numbers of accurate weapons that can threaten strategic assets such as oil refineries and power stations. “Even if these sites recover from attacks within days, the cognitive effect will be major,” he warns.

The second is the ability of Hezbollah to disrupt the IDF’s own continuous functionality. “If Hezbollah strikes air force bases, and even if it only takes five to six hours to repair the runaways, that would create a very significant effect nevertheless,” he says. “Hence, we cannot accept a reality in which the other side can impact civilian and military continuous functions. Israel must do everything that it can to reduce these enemy capabilities.”

Cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles are also part of the precision strike club, explains Haimovich, regardless of whether they carry five kilograms of explosives like a UAV, or 300 kilograms like a Scud B missile.

Hezbollah is not the only nearby threat possessing these capabilities. “Hamas also has a precision project,” he adds.

Expanding Air Defenses and Preparing Preemptive Options

With PGMs giving attackers a far higher chance of destroying a selected target, the obligation for more advanced air defenses is paramount, compared to previous levels of defenses, says Shohat.

“We need more interceptors. The ‘quarter principle,’ in which we only needed to shoot down around 25% of statistics projectiles, no longer holds against PGMs,” he says. “With PGMs, we need to be able to intercept everything.”

That, in turn, has economic consequences, Shohat adds. “While the cost of air defenses should be measured in terms of the damage and losses that they prevent, not just the cost of the interception itself, it is undeniable that air defenses against PGMs are more expensive than defenses against statistical weapons,” he says.

Haimovich explains the threat of accurate weaponry “obligates us to prepare differently. Systems must be able to examine threats selectively and focus on those that form strategic threats, while still also acting as area-based defenses to protect populated areas,” he says. “This calls for a robust concept, which integrates both specific site protection with regional defense—and mutual coordination between them.”

Another challenge for air defense systems posed by PGMs, notes Haimovich, is being able to recognize and distinguish PGMs from inaccurate projectiles in a crowded sky.

“Israel has highly advanced capabilities that enable a high-level performance. Still, this is a major challenge, to pick the right threats out of a barrage of rockets, to find the needle in the haystack,” he says.

Asked to discuss the option of a preemptive attack on PGM stockpiles, Haimovich says this would be a cabinet decision and that the topic constitutes a “legitimate decision on the table of the political echelon.”

He adds that questions about what would trigger such an attack remain open, pointing to potential thresholds such as the quantity of PGMs amassed by Hezbollah. In any case, Israel is “acting all of the time to delay the need to deal with this” in the form of its grey zone campaign in Syria to disrupt weapons smuggling.

“I think that every day that passes brings us closer to the stage where we will have to deal with this threat in one way or another,” he adds.

Multiple disclosures by senior Israeli officials of PGM production sites in Beirut are part of the “cognitive” struggle by Israel to expose the other side, reveal that its activities are visible, and create both an Israeli and global consensus against PGM force build-up, he explains.

Shohat agrees that the question of a preemptive strike is very difficult to answer. Like Haimovich, he points to Israel’s preemptive campaign in Syria as “putting us in a better opening position” for the next war, meaning that the PGM threat is “less severe than it would be otherwise.”

“While no campaign delivers 100% success, I believe there have been successes here, and there is no doubt that Israel reduced the threat, in relation to its potential, in a dramatic manner,” says Shohat.

The campaign is about how much the threat can be delayed and reduced, he says, before concluding: “It prevented a very bad picture from forming, which we otherwise would have had to face. To a certain extent, the preemptive campaign is an application of the lesson that the IDF learned between 2000 to 2006, when Hezbollah was allowed to build up a large arsenal without challenge.”

---

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Zvika Haimovich served as Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces from 2015-2018. He was Active Defense Wing Commander during Operation Pillar of Defense (2012) and Operation Protective Edge (2014). Read full bio here.

Shachar Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Improved Iron Dome stands up to tougher, newer challenges

By Shachar Shohat & YAIR RAMATI

The recent round of escalation between Israel and the Gazan terror factions, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), saw Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system intercept a variety of rockets and drones, in an extremely high stress environment.

Based on the available information and reports by the IDF Spokespersons Unit, it is possible to observe the improved performance of this unique air defense system,  which only recently celebrated a decade since its first real-world interception.

Hamas and PIJ launched some 4,360 rockets, at least six attack drones and many mortar shells at the State of Israel within a relatively short time frame –  just 11 intensive days.

Their fire rate averaged at around 400 rockets per day, most through intensive salvos, designed to overwhelm and defeat the Israeli Iron Dome batteries. This seems to represent a new threat era, with the recent conflict being a microcosm of the coming decade’s global threat and response trends.

Unlike previous conflicts in which standard rockets with low-lethality warheads were launched at Israel, this time the threat we saw was upgraded with domestically developed and produced rockets, carrying medium-weight warheads.

One of the important lessons that emerged from Operation Guardian of the Walls is that Hamas and PIJ have been able to establish a local rocket production capability,  clearly based on Iranian know-how. The enemy arsenals also included a few high precision drones whose design originates in Iran. None however were able to successfully hit Israeli territory.

Hamas and PIJ sought to saturate Israeli air defenses with large salvos fired rapidly, in some cases with around 100 projectiles in the air simultaneously. They fired from different azimuths at the same time, and used depressed trajectories with lower flight altitudes and shorter routes to targets in Israel.

Defending most of the Israeli civilian population and critical defense sites against such salvos, at various ranges, day and night, was no simple task for Israel’s air defense systems.  

The question of whether other air defense systems can cope with a quantitively similar threat, and also reach a reasonable performance within budget limits is very much an open one for all Western observers.

An additional and key aspect of defending air space in this conflict was the challenge of managing the air-situation picture.

Managing this complex, crowded event was made possible by an array of advanced sensors, radars, electro-optical devices, and sophisticated battle management algorithms, which meant that the IDF could deal with time-critical scenarios.

 As the rocket salvoes flew to their intended civilian targets in Israel, and many thousands of debris pieces created by previous interceptions fell from the sky, over 160 airborne platforms were flying nearby.

Fortunately, there was only a single report of an incident of Israeli friendly fire at an air platform (a drone), while the air defense batteries successfully conducted dozens of simultaneous rocket interceptions.

 Some observers attribute this success to the coherent, advanced, and centralized engagement structure of the Israeli air defense system, and the utilization of robust multiple sensors.

Quantitative figures published by the IDF spokesman, can be summarized by the following analysis: Despite the tragic cases of Israeli casualties in this conflict – 11 dead from rockets, many wounded, and some physical damage, this translates into roughly one casualty for every 400 launched rockets/mortar shells.

In light of the extent of the threat, the role of Iron Dome in preventing hundreds of casualties is obvious.

Nevertheless, the casualty count does not reflect the terror experienced by the civilian population in Israel. Millions of Israelis were forced to seek shelter from incoming rockets during day and night hours, while also dealing with physical damage and economic losses.

The combination of active air defense and passive defense (the latter made up of accurate warnings for the general population and compliance with those warnings by heading to safe zones) was a key factor for minimizing loss of life in Israel.

Some 15% of the rockets fell within Gaza, reflecting poor local design and production. These failed launches killed around 25 Gazans. 

Iron Dome, which is programmed to only intercept projectiles heading to populated areas, ended up engaging almost half of the rockets fired into Israel. This reflects an improvement in the accuracy of enemy rockets. During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, a quarter of Hezbollah’s rockets reached built up areas.

All of the drones launched at Israel were intercepted by Iron Dome or air-to-air missiles fired by the Israeli Air Force, or other ‘soft defense’ means.

At the end of the conflict, Iron Dome was able to keep up its unmatched 90% kill rate. Iron Dome has now intercepted over 4,000 projectiles since first becoming operational in 2011.

Maintaining a robust inventory of interceptors has been proven to be a key capability in dealing with the new projectile threat.

It is fair to assume that the latest conflict with Hamas and PIJ will not be the last. As a result, Israeli air defense systems must remain on the path of ongoing upgrades, and to systematically remain a step ahead of the enemy.

The combination of professional air defense teams, support from the United States Missile Defense Agency, and local creative industry solutions mean that this is a mission that can be met.

---

Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Here’s how Israel can maintain an advantage in the aerial systems race

By Shachar Shohat & YAIR RAMATI

For the past century, ever since the arrival of the aircraft on history’s stage as an effective and significant military combat tool, a race has been underway between offensive aerial platforms and defensive ground systems.

The basic process by which aerial platform capabilities are developed and then followed by a ground-based response has been with us for over a century. It is a cat-and-mouse game: Once an operational or technical gap appears, and the defense system finds itself lagging behind the attacking air power, the attackers gain air control, with all of its implications. Then the gap is closed, meaning that air defense systems regain an ability to extract high prices from attackers, to the point of being intolerable for them.

In the Middle East, this dynamic was illustrated when, toward the end of the War of Attrition in 1970, dense Egyptian air defense systems challenged the Israeli Air Force’s aerial freedom of operation for the first time.

At the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Egyptian and Syrian air defense systems were so effective that air support became an almost impossible mission. Israel lost no less than 102 aircraft during the war; and at its end, it was clear that dealing with air defense systems had become the Israeli Air Force’s biggest challenge.

But in the First Lebanon War of 1982, the Israeli Air Force proved it had developed a clear edge over Russian air defense systems, as it destroyed 19 Syrian batteries and downed 97 Syrian jets without suffering any losses of its own. It was a milestone in the race and formed a revolution in the attacker-defender balance. Yet, it caused Middle Eastern adversaries to turn to new directions.

Even prior to the 1982 war, a new gap had appeared — the threat of ballistic projectiles — one that was left unanswered for years. During the First Gulf War in 1991, Israel was hit by some 40 Al-Hussein missiles fired from Iraq, a ballistic missile that had been used extensively in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq War.

The late internalization of the threat dealt Israel a significant strategic blow. In March 2000, however, a partial reply appeared when Israel deployed an operational Arrow system for the interception of ballistic missiles.

The second aspect of the gap created by ballistic threats arrived through rockets and artillery shells. During the Second Lebanon War of 2006, Israel was hit by some 3,500 rockets without the ability to defend against them.

This gap was reduced, at least in the Gaza arena vis-a-vis Hamas, when in April 2011 the Iron Dome air defense system conducted its first interception. Since then it has continued to provide a defensive umbrella throughout several rounds of conflict.

Further afield, we have seen the cat-and-mouse dynamic continue: In September 2019, Iran launched a surprise attack on oil and gas facilities in Saudi Arabia using attack drones and small Iranian-made cruise missiles, placing a question mark over the kingdom’s air defense systems.

The 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan saw the collapse of Armenian front-line air defenses, exposing its Army to systematic destruction through a combination of precision-guided weapons, loitering munitions and armed drones.

Two basic insights arise from these developments. The first is that threats develop in jumps, while responses usually require lengthy development phases. The second is that the timing of conflicts determine whether the defender will have an adequate response to the threat, and what price the attacker or defender will pay accordingly.

For those developing solutions, a built-in conflict exists between working according to procedure and working quickly. Those who want to complete the full processes will need longer. We suggest more daring efforts and more risk-taking, and recommend assessing the form of future threats to guide development.

For example, low-grade rockets evolved into industrial-made rockets, which then morphed into heavy projectiles before becoming accurate missiles. These have been joined by drones, mortar shells and cruise missiles. The Iron Dome can tackle all of these.

Looking ahead is crucial. In addition, spiral development, involving step-by-step innovations, is the right course.

In terms of risk-taking, those unwilling to accept failures during trials will experience incremental progress rather than breakthroughs. At its core, this struggle is an arms race, and if adversaries catch up, the price will be high.

If in the past 50 years the dynamic of threat development was moderate, today the rate has accelerated, while the technological amplitude and range of threats is almost endless.

This is a complex and challenging combination for air defense system developers and operators, which sometimes finds expression in the need to deal with painful dilemmas, such as giving a reasonable response in certain areas only.

As the rate of new threat appearances grows rapidly, air defenders are tasked with the difficult mission of finding rapid solutions. This entails taking risks and breaking rigid development principles, such as systematic technological learning. It also calls for daring in the management of development, including the willingness to absorb failures, and the close cooperation between intelligence elements as well as development and operational personnel.

Israel must win this cat-and-mouse game to maintain its aerial supremacy.

---

Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Ten years since Iron Dome’s first interception, the system has revolutionized air defense

By SHachar Shohat

Rafael, Israel’s national defense laboratory, is marking ten years to its Iron Dome air defense system intercepting its first enemy rocket in Israeli skies, since when it has revolutionized the world of rocket interceptions.

Today, the system has become a global brand, with countries around the world interested in Iron Dome and its proven capabilities. The U.S. Army has ordered two Iron Dome batteries as part of its deep examination of the system.

By any international benchmark, Rafael invests large amounts of funds in research and development to prepare itself for the future, and to prepare future building blocks that enable rapid technological breakthroughs that find expression in military systems. 

Iron Dome’s story began at the end of the Second Lebanon War, when Hezbollah fired some 4,000 rockets at Israel, which had no response to the threat.

The Israeli Air Force had total air superiority over Lebanon and was able, thanks to precise intelligence, to launch a brilliant opening strike at the start of the war, destroying Hezbollah’s mid-range rocket launchers.  However, the terror organization’s short-range rocket array was almost completely unaffected during the remainder of the war.

This event served as a wake-up call for the State of Israel.

 It removed several layers of resistance that until then had existed with regard to air defense solutions against this type of threat.

Objections included the argument that the only way of winning wars is through offense, not defense, and that it was better to deal ‘with the swamp, not the mosquitoes.’ The Second Lebanon War exposed this approach as being wholly ineffective. Subsequent conflicts, such as the 2008-2009 conflict with Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Operation Cast Lead), also upended this argument. The rate of enemy rocket fire remained high despite the IDF offensive, and the idea that attacking maneuvers alone would result in victory lost credibility.

The government could no longer tell the public that it had to absorb all of the rockets, damage, injuries and deaths, without any defensive systems.

Another objection was based on doubts concerning whether it was technologically possible to intercept these types of rockets. A third layer of resistance claimed that it would cost too much money to create this capability. Others claimed that the system would not be ready in time.

 Rafael stuck to its belief in its technological capability. Taking advantage of its close working relationship with the IDF, Rafael understood the precise operational needs. This effort was bolstered by the keen awareness that the system was being developed to protect the people of Israel, and that it would soon face real-world tests.

Out of fourteen suggested solutions, Israel chose Rafael’s Iron Dome system in 2007. Rafael came together with Israel Aerospace Industries subsidiary Elta, which designed the system’s radar, and the mPrest company, which was responsible for designing Iron Dome’s unique command and control and interface system.  

In less than five years after the decision was made, the first operational Iron Dome battery was handed off to the Israel Air Force’s Air Defense Array in 2011. 

This extraordinary short time frame was made possible through, among other things, the use of parallel development processes. Rather than first developing the system, passing it on to the client, and then waiting a long time for the client to become qualified for operational readiness, in Iron Dome’s case IAF air defenders were involved with the system from day one.

Air force personnel worked closely with developers, studying the system as it was being developed, and directly influencing its design. The speed was driven by the sense of urgency to get the system’s first battery out into the field as soon as possible to defend southern Israel from Gazan projectile attacks.

 In April 2011, Iron Dome made its first real-world interception. Since then, the system has gone on to intercept more than 2,500 enemy projectiles, achieving an interception rate of over 90 percent of projectiles headed toward populated areas in Israel.

The use of spiral development, in which developers look at the next innovation step to take with the system already working, means that Iron Dome undergoes ongoing upgrades. Iron Dome’s robust design, its many interceptors, and its radar capabilities give it the ability to take on unprecedented quantities of projectiles with success – despite enemy attempts to saturate the system.

 The Iron Dome of 2021 is not the same system that it was in 2011. Today’s system can work at sea, assist military forces that are launching ground offensives, protect national strategic sites, and deal with targets at higher and lower altitudes compared to ten years ago.

It can also intercept drones, and take on rapid low-flying targets.

Today, Iron Dome forms a vital part of Israel’s ability to conduct offense as well, since it defends bases that are essential for attacking enemy targets.

It stands guard against threats from the northern and southern fronts.

Rafael is now thinking about introducing inherent components into the system, such as laser technology. In addition, it is installing Artificial Intelligence capabilities to give Iron Dome the ability to learn and recognize new threats on its own.

As adversaries continue to develop rapid threats capable of complex flight paths, the challenge of remaining a step ahead of the enemy remains paramount.

---

Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Short-range air defense is making a comeback

By SHachar Shohat

Recent events in the Middle East have led some to wonder how countries, including Israel, can protect their own strategic installations. 

Israel's adversaries, such as Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, have threatened to strike sensitive Israeli targets. 

Saudi Arabia absorbed a painful strike in September 2019, an Iranian drone swarm combined with cruise missiles struck oil fields, causing heavy damage. 

The attack on Saudi Arabia is the latest tangible example of the evolving threat: precision guided, sophisticated enemy air attacks. 

Each country designates its own strategic sites for special defense. They range from nuclear power plants to air force bases, to Olympic stadiums, and the hardening of defenses around strategic sites was especially prominent until around three decades ago. 

At that time, attackers using close-range munitions had to approach a given site in order to attack it. Visual contact was often required and simple air to ground munitions would suffice for an attack. Defense systems of that time were similarly simplistic. 

Air force bases might be protected by a forty-millimeter anti-aircraft cannon, for example, in order to prevent a direct attack on a runway. That same concept would be applied to any sites deemed critical by a state. 

In addition to being limited in range, though, such defenses required many munitions and high numbers of personnel. 

The 1980s and ‘90s witnessed a revolution in the world of weaponry. 

Precision, long-range (standoff) munitions entered the battle arenas and close-range air defenses became largely obsolete. Once attackers no longer needed proximity to their targets, close range defenses could not hit either the longer-range munitions or their launchers.

But over the past decade, we have seen the addition of GPS-guidance systems to those munitions. advent, combined with the overall revolution of the 80’s and 90’s, has heightened the need for states to return to close-range air defenses – but in a new configuration.  

With the Iron Dome and the Drone Dome defense systems, Israel has pioneered that return, because it has had to do so.  

It is able to effectively defend against very short-range threats. Drone Dome, for example, can detect threats at a distance of 3.5 kilometers. 

Additional systems are now in the pipeline. 

Small, affordable interceptor missiles, and laser beam defenses the answers to the new categories of close-range threats seen around the world, including gliding bombs, cruise missiles, and drones. 

In 2019, the Iranians proved that if they have intelligence on their target and the ability to send munitions to the 'blind spot' of radars, attacks can be successful. 

That attack should serve as a "wake up call" for countries around the world. If states want to protect strategic sites, radars that look in every direction, 360 degrees, 24 hours a day, are needed.

Effective new defense systems must now be multi-directional in their detection of incoming threats, a response to the enemy’s ability to turn, steer and evade radar coverage and detection. That coverage must be combined with multiple layers of defense, including defense mechanisms very close to the asset being defended. 

Examples of what is now needed for strategic site defenses are already evident in the realm of military vehicles. 

The IDF installed the Trophy defense system on a growing number of tanks and armored personnel carriers, as a result of a series of incidents in Lebanon and Gaza. 

Airframes also need such systems, as the downing of an Israeli transport helicopter by Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War demonstrated, as do ships - and so too do strategic assets.  

The age-old military axiom asserts that lines of defense will always be breached. As such, we must develop the maximum number of opportunities for interception possible.

Longer-range air defense systems, such as the Patriot, David's Sling, or S-400 can intercept threats at tens or hundreds of kilometers away, but today, because state enemies can bypass long range defenses, countries must always have the ability to directly intercept the actual munitions.

Without close defense capabilities forming part of a country’s multi-layer defense systems, strategic sites are simply not adequately protected.

In the context of multi-layer defense development and deployment around strategic sites and sensitive targets, Israel has taken on the role of global leader. 

In 2020, short range air defenses are making a comeback, and this time, they are set to remain as a permanent fixture.

---

Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012.

PODCAST: AIR DEFENSE: HAVE WE GOT IT COVERED?