Zachary Shapiro

Israel’s coalition is on life support

By Zachary Shapiro

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The Knesset took its first step towards dissolving the government and setting the country on the path to its fourth round of elections in two years. In a 61-54 vote, the opposition, joined by Defense Minister Benny Gantz’s Blue and White Party, moved for new elections. While the bill requires three more readings before it is passed, this development is yet another sign that Israel’s coalition government is on life support.

With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing a February 2021 trial, Gantz facing trouble in his own party and Israel facing a third wave of COVID-19, another election is the last thing that Israel needs. An election is estimated to cost Israeli taxpayers NIS 3 billion (about $925,000)—all while the government is overstretched and overburdened by the coronavirus pandemic. To make things worse, Netanyahu and his cabinet still have not passed a budget for 2020. For months, they have been operating on a pro-rated re-authorization of the 2019 budget. Gantz has long insisted on the need to pass a new budget, while Netanyahu has stalled the approval process.

Amid all this political uncertainty, I interviewed  Nachman Shai, former Knesset member and Israel Defense Forces’ spokesperson, and Danielle Roth Avneri, political correspondent and editor at Israel Hayom, to discuss the fate of Israel’s fraying coalition. They explored the legal and political challenges ahead for Netanyahu and Gantz’s precarious position. Shai and Roth Avneri also assessed Yamina Party chief Naftali Bennett’s rapid ascent in the polls and the future of Yesh Atid and the Israeli left. Four key takeaways emerged from our discussion:

Netanyahu may be up against the wall, but he remains in the driver’s seat. Without doubt, the embattled prime minister’s upcoming trial in February is his primary concern. As well it should be, given the gravity of the Attorney General’s corruption charges and the number of former Netanyahu advisors who have turned states’ witnesses. Just this week, one of Netanyahu’s archrivals, Gideon Sa’ar, announced a bid to bring him down. From the outside, Netanyahu’s situation may look bleak. But the reality is that the prime minister is still a cunning political operator in his prime.

Over the last two years, he has survived three close elections while courting a dismayed Israeli electorate. He has outfoxed the most potent challengers he has ever faced, recruiting Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi into his government, and relegating Lapid and Yesh Atid to the opposition. He has mustered many polarizing and unparalleled foreign-policy achievements, extracting unprecedented political concessions from U.S. President Donald Trump while advancing Israel’s normalization campaign to new heights. And in a stunning development, Netanyahu may well engineer a historic political realignment after reports emerged of a newfound partnership with Joint List Knesset member Mansour Abbas.

Nobody puts Gantz in a corner; he put himself there. Gantz’s political predicament is largely one of his own making. He ran a tough campaign by assembling a broad anti-Netanyahu coalition that agreed on little else. After making many emphatic campaign promises, Gantz joined his sworn enemy in an ill-fated rotation agreement. In doing so, he made a new enemy in a perceived betrayal of Lapid. Only a few months later, Gantz is losing control of his own party while facing elections that are likely to weaken him significantly. Altogether, he has placed himself in a difficult and unsustainable political position. Sooner or later, something has to give.

Don’t believe the hype about Gadi Eizenkot. The former IDF chief of staff may become the latest general to throw his hat in the ring. Reports indicate that he is considering a bid to unseat Netanyahu. But Gantz’s struggles remind us that military credentials do not a politician make, especially when running against a man of Netanyahu’s political talents.

Furthermore, Eizenkot faces an uphill battle if he does decide to run. It’s unclear which party he would join, but Yesh Atid, Blue and White, and Knesset member Moshe Ya’alon’s Telem Party are all in the running. In any event, Eizenkot would be competing in a crowded field of former generals and staunch opponents of the prime minister—all of whom thought their military backgrounds could be a gamechanger, and all of whom failed to defeat Netanyahu. The prime minister, after all, has outmaneuvered the generals of Blue and White, and presided over the left’s deep decline.

A new chapter may be in store for the Arab List. While the new partnership between Mansour Abbas and Netanyahu may be an alliance of convenience, it’s still a major departure from the Arab factions’ policy of noncooperation with sitting coalitions. For the time being, it is in Netanyahu’s interest to court Abbas, as it helps him divide the Joint List and blunt its power. And working with Netanyahu serves Abbas’s political goals. An alliance with the prime minister could help Abbas bring crucial funding, support and infrastructure to the Israeli Arab community. This, in turn, may bolster his standing with constituents. As long as these mutually beneficial interests hold, more cooperation may well be on the horizon.

What did not come up in our conversation was Sa’ar’s dramatic decision to leave Likud and form his own party in his latest effort to defeat Netanyahu. No doubt this is an intriguing development. Sa’ar’s defection is a wildcard, but not a game-changer. He may pull votes from Likud, but the odds are not in his favor. His past attempts to take on Netanyahu have failed spectacularly. In December 2019, Sa’ar challenged the prime minister in a Likud leadership primary and lost by a whopping margin of 72-27 percent. As payback, Netanyahu did not offer Sa’ar a ministerial post during the last round of coalition negotiations in May. And this was after Netanyahu had forced his rival into political exile for a few years before the primary.

Sa’ar may take a page out of Gantz’s playbook and vow not to join a Netanyahu government. Still, Netanyahu has a knack for wearing down his enemies by enticing them to defect. He could tempt his eager rival to break his promises with the right cabinet post—just as he did with Gantz.

As usual, Israel’s political future remains uncertain. Ultimately, the measure to dissolve the coalition must survive three plenum votes before new elections are official—leaving Netanyahu and Gantz time to break the stalemate. Reports indicate that the two are negotiating a secret deal to avoid elections. Deal or no deal, Israel is in for a challenging few months, yet more political deadlock and a riveting trial.


Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Israel Must Seize Its Moment in Abu Dhabi

By Zachary Shapiro

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Last week, the Trump administration announced that Israel and the United Arab Emirates reached a landmark diplomatic agreement to normalize relations. President Donald Trump hinted that the deal could be the first of many accords with other Arab states. 

Of course, Israel should celebrate this historic achievement. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government should resist the temptation to sit back and rest on their laurels. Instead, they should seize upon this breakthrough by prioritizing non-military cooperation, choosing a fitting ambassador to Abu Dhabi, investing in public diplomacy, and moderating Israeli policy towards the West Bank. Taking these steps would help solidify the agreement while advancing Israel’s broader normalization campaign in the Middle East and beyond—a cornerstone of Israeli doctrine.

Israel has long tempted unlikely partners with access to its defense and technology sectors. According to the White House’s statement, security ties will be a pillar of this normalization deal, along with environmental, medical, and technological trade, and more. No doubt Israel’s security cooperation with its Emirati counterparts is crucial to countering Iran. However, Netanyahu and his diplomats should work tirelessly to advance relations in non-military sectors first and foremost. Ultimately, the long-term success of this treaty hinges on broad and deep economic cooperation. By focusing on non-military commerce, Israel can diversify and deepen a critical partnership for years to come.

Second, the Israeli government should choose its first envoy to Abu Dhabi carefully and strategically. And Netanyahu should vet candidates more cautiously than he has in the past. In 2016, he nominated former settler leader Dani Dayan as ambassador to Brazil. Israel suffered an embarrassing setback when Brazilian officials rejected Dayan’s credentials, citing his past in the settler community. Ultimately, Dayan became Consul General in New York, where he made impressive headway with critics of the Israeli government. On other occasions, Netanyahu has used diplomatic appointments to exile potential political foes like Danny Danon, Israel’s outgoing ambassador to the United Nations. 

This time, Netanyahu should resist the urge to politicize the appointment. Instead, he should select an ambassador who can speak to the Emirati people articulately: an Arab-Israeli official. Two in particular would make strong choices. George Deek, Israel’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, has been called “Israel’s best diplomat.” Ishmael Khaldi, who in July became Israel’s ambassador to Eritrea, is Israel’s first Bedouin diplomat. He, too, would make a fine nominee.

After selecting a qualified ambassador, Netanyahu and the Foreign Ministry should invest heavily in exchange and cultural diplomacy programs in the United Arab Emirates. If handled properly, Abu Dhabi could be a steppingstone to Manama, Muscat, and beyond. Accordingly, normalization with the UAE is a golden opportunity for Israel to break down barriers and to change long-hostile Arab attitudes. A robust public diplomacy strategy could help Israeli diplomats reach Emirati audiences and lay the groundwork for long-term change. The Foreign Ministry excels at this sort of diplomacy, so it should make these programs a strategic priority as soon as the Embassy opens its doors. 

Finally, Netanyahu should moderate Israeli policy toward the West Bank. Emirati leaders have already faced blowback across the Arab world. Beyond keeping its word to avoid annexing the West Bank for the foreseeable future, the Israeli government should refrain from further settlement activity for at least the near term. In the wake of the normalization deal, each new settlement is effectively a threat to Israel’s relationship with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed. 

Furthermore, settlement construction, especially in more controversial areas understood to comprise a future Palestinian state, could preclude the possibility of more official relationships with other Arab countries. Much like the possibility of annexation, building in these areas could jeopardize this potential realignment—a focal point of Israeli foreign policy and its strategy to counter Iran. Though the Israeli right has condemned Netanyahu’s concession on annexation, this historic victory gives him sufficient political cover to continue pursuing other pragmatic policy objectives while pivoting towards the Israeli center—and away from wayward settlers on his right.

Overall, the Israel-UAE agreement marks a watershed moment for Israeli foreign policy and for Netanyahu. A string of accords with other Arab states may well be on the horizon, and Israel’s longtime goal of greater normalization may finally be within reach. Netanyahu should be pleased and proud, but he should also lean forward. He must capitalize on this opportunity to secure Israel’s place in the region and among the nations.


Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Annexation Would Undermine 70 Years of Israeli Foreign Policy

By Zachary Shapiro

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As the July 1 annexation deadline looms, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a fateful opportunity to write his foreign policy legacy. Should he decide to annex even part of the West Bank, he will jeopardize his own foreign policy strategy—as well as over seven decades of the Israeli doctrine.

Despite the many variations in policy between successive prime ministers, Israeli foreign policy has consistently revolved around five overarching goals: normalization; pursuing or maintaining regional stability through cold peace with Jordan; improving Israel’s standing at the United Nations; sustaining strong alliances with Western powers; and finally, cultivating a strong and bipartisan strategic partnership with the United States. A decision to annex would undermine each of these objectives and do lasting damage to Israel overseas.

Israeli leaders have long sought normalized ties with various countries. Netanyahu has made marked progress in Israel’s quest for normalization in the Middle East. He has carefully cultivated ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Annexation in July would render Israel politically radioactive in the eyes of these new partners, halting and likely reversing Netanyahu and his predecessors’progress on this front. In a recent op-ed in Yedioth Aharonoth, Yousef Al-Otaiba, Emirati Ambassador to the United States,warned that “Israeli plans for annexation and talk of normalization are a contradiction.” He added that “Annexation will certainly and immediately upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and with the UAE.” Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Zayed tweeted a pointed rejection of annexation, calling it an “illegal move.” 

Applying sovereignty in the West Bank would similarly imperil the stability of Israel’s cold peace with Jordan. Israel sought a détente with Jordan for decades and has enjoyed the comforts of cold peace since 1994. Despite some challenging moments, Israel has maintained its relationship with the Hashemite Kingdom. Yet King Abdullah recently stated that “If Israel really annexed the West Bank in July, it would lead to a massive conflict” with Jordan.

All the while, annexation would set back Israel’s hard work at the United Nations by decades. In recent years, Israel’s emissaries to the UN have labored to narrow the margins of defeat on anti-Israel measures while cultivating quiet ties with unexpected partners. Outgoing Ambassador Danny Danon is proud of this recent trend in voting patterns and has touted it as one of his accomplishments. Applying sovereignty would all-but guarantee a rapid reversal of that shift, along with a litany of measures against Israel in various committees. 

Annexation would sabotage Israel’s longstanding interest in maintaining solid alliances with Western powers. Israeli ties with Germany and France in particular have been useful; both countries have sold crucial military equipment to Israel and been important trade partners. 

But the specter of annexation means Jerusalem can no longer count on Berlin or Paris. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas released a joint statement with Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh opposing Netanyahu’s possible plan. Adding insult to injury, a statement from the French Foreign Ministry cautioned that “This could not be without consequences for the European Union’s relations with Israel.”

Finally, a decision to apply sovereignty in the West Bank would create unprecedented instability with Israel’s most important partner, the United States. That relationship has withstood tumultuous moments under Democratic and Republican presidents alike. However, the bipartisan foundations of the relationship have shown cracks in recent years.  

Since the Obama administration’s pursuit of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, the relationship has become increasingly partisan. And the Trump administration has politicized its ties with Israel like no prior presidency. Coupled with anti-Israel trends within the Democratic Party, annexation could accelerate and strengthen these political forces. Multiple Democratic presidential candidates floated the possibility of conditioning aid to Israel—a paradigm shift away from decades of liberal policy. 

Prime Minister Netanyahu is a polarizing figure, but he clearly is a shrewd strategist. He has embraced all five of these strategic goals in his career. He has touted progress towards each as major achievements and has even used them in campaigns. He is clearly aware of the many drawbacks of annexation.  

Critics argue that annexation will unfold like U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Many pundits predicted major political consequences that never came to fruition. But annexation is more than a de jure recognition of a de facto reality. It is a statement about the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Ultimately, threatening any one of the five tenets of Israeli foreign policy on its own could be seen as a reasonable, calculated risk—even for a prime minister who is extremely risk-averse. Taken together, they amount to an overwhelming case against annexation. 

At its core, Netanyahu’s talk of annexation is political gamesmanship. That is a dangerous game for Israel to play, one that may jeopardize 72 years of Israeli strategy and tireless efforts by its diplomats.


Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.