How Intelligence Diplomacy Strengthened Israel-Egypt Ties

By Yaakov Peri

At the end of August, reports emerged in Hebrew media that Ronen Bar, the director of Israel’s Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency had traveled to Egypt for a meeting with his counterpart, Abbas Kamel, the head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate.

The purpose of the meeting was reportedly to overcome a crisis in bilateral relations following the end of the three-day Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Operation Breaking Dawn against Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Gaza.

The diplomatic tensions stemmed from the IDF’s continued actions against PIJ operatives in the West Bank, contrary to the Egyptian belief that under the ceasefire they had brokered between Israel and PIJ to end Operation Breaking Dawn, the IDF would ease military pressure on the terror organization in the territories. The Egyptians also demanded the release of PIJ prisoners to consolidate the truce.

But Israel did not release the prisoners, and increased pressure on PIJ, acting contrary to Egyptian expectations. Immediately after the operation, Israel conducted a series of arrests of PIJ members in the West Bank, during which several Palestinians were killed in clashes with the IDF in Nablus.

Egypt acted as the key intermediary to bring about the truce after three days of conflict, and Cairo perceived these developments as an affront.

Signs of tension were visible when Kamel canceled a planned trip to Israel after the Gaza operation. Political and security sources assessed that this was a mid-level crisis that would not be difficult to resolve.

During talks with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid said that “Egypt has a most significant role to play in preserving the stability of regional security.” This statement reflects an important fact: recently, Egypt has been practically the only political element that can act as an intermediary and is able to secure ceasefires between Hamas, as well as other armed organizations in the Gaza Strip, and Israel.

It is clear that the reason Egypt took offense was Israel’s lack of cooperation with its understanding of the ceasefire agreement. Cairo saw this as a blow to Egypt’s honor and status, in line with Egypt’s self-perception in the region and its important role in Gaza.

For many years, Egypt has invested greatly in preserving its status as the leading power in the Arab world—a role Turkey has attempted to infringe upon in recent years with varying degrees of success. After some erosion, Egypt has begun to recover its predominance. This recovery is mainly attributable to Sisi’s calm and moderate leadership.

Egypt also perceives itself as a state able to resolve regional issues, including the never-ending confrontation between Israel and Gazan terror factions, primarily Hamas and PIJ.

Cairo is keen on preserving this role, and to that end, it regularly dispatches intelligence delegations to Gaza, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

Israeli and Egyptian intelligence communities enjoy excellent relations, both at the personal and professional levels.

Egypt also regards good ties with Israel as critical for ensuring proper relations with the United States and the West, particularly after being greatly disappointed in its history of dealings with the Soviet Union.

All of these factors have helped propel Egypt to the forefront of the region, a position it wishes to maintain. 

It seeks to do this despite its conflict with Hamas’s Egyptian sister movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, which has harmed state security. In order to avoid inflaming clear tensions with Hamas, Egypt busies itself with dealing with political and diplomatic issues and stays clear of theological disputes with Gaza’s rulers.

Egypt is wary of Islamist forces, and combats extreme Islamic terrorists in Sinai on a non-stop basis, including losing many members of its security forces in the fight against ISIS in recent years.

A History of Intelligence Diplomacy

The dispatch of Israeli intelligence chiefs to defuse diplomatic tensions has a good precedent.

In the past, heads of the Shin Bet also set out for political missions to resolve crises with states and organizations. But this was usually done covertly and did not attract headlines. Conditions have changed, however, and the journey of a Shin Bet chief today attracts both media coverage and analysis.

Meetings between intelligence chiefs are routine and acceptable worldwide. Often, government cabinets feel that the head of an intelligence agency is optimally positioned to carry out diplomatic missions, and, as such, entrust them with confidence and credibility.

Intelligence cooperation brings states together, and requires a high degree of trust and intimacy. Hence, both sides often trust the “messengers” more than the average politician. Intelligence chiefs are apolitical figures, despite being appointed by the highest political echelons. They enable unique and very close relations between intelligence services.

When a government sends the head of an intelligence agency to handle what appears to be a diplomatic-political issue, it is sending a figure that is often free of political baggage. This approach has proven itself over time. For example, when Israel was able to patch up relations with Jordan following the botched assassination attempt of senior Hamas member Khaled Mashaal on Jordanian territory, and ongoing contacts between Israeli intelligence chiefs and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas. Similarly, intelligence diplomacy played a central role in growing relationships between Israel and Gulf Arab governments prior to the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords. Whole foundations for relations were founded on contacts between the states’ intelligence agencies. Each agency received instructions and guidance from the highest levels of government during such contacts.

Ultimately, the Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic affair appears to be of mediocre severity, neither very serious nor trivial. It is not difficult to overcome such an issue, and it seems likely that bilateral relations between the two state systems will continue without harm.

Mr. Yaakov Peri concluded his distinguished career as Director of the Shin Bet (Israel Security Service). He served in that position from 1988-1995. Prior to that role he held the position of Head of the Shin Bet Northern Command and the Judea & Samaria Command. In 2013 he joined the Yesh Atid party, was elected to the Knesset and was appointed Minister of Science, Technology and Space.

The Palestinian Tragedy Is Israel's Too

By Chuck Freilich

 

In his recent speech at the United Nations, Israeli prime minister Yair Lapid breathed some life back into the long-dormant two-state solution process. Some believe that it is too late and that the point of no return has already been crossed. There is certainly not much time left before the Palestinians permanently reject themselves out of having any state and Israel settles itself out of a Jewish and fully democratic future.

Since 2009, when Benjamin Netanyahu returned to office, the number of settlers in the West Bank has grown by 60 percent, to over 475,000, gradually but inexorably creating a binational reality. Moreover, the land available for potential territorial swaps is increasingly being used for other purposes. The status quo is an illusion.

The Palestinians have similarly contributed to the emerging binational reality. They repeatedly rejected dramatic proposals that would have given them a state on essentially all of the contested territory and remain paralyzed by a seemingly immutable adherence to an all-or-nothing approach that has, indeed, left the Palestinians with nothing—and deep internal divisions. No end is in sight to the split between the West Bank and Gaza, Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas is in the twilight of his reign, the Palestinian Authority is tottering, and Hamas remains implacably opposed to any accommodation with Israel. Indeed, a Hamas take-over of the West Bank may be the most likely end to the ongoing rupture.

The Palestinians are thus in dire danger of missing a historic opportunity to have a state of their own. That is their tragedy. Unfortunately, it is also Israel’s. The fate of the Zionist movement, one of history’s most successful national movements, is inextricably linked to that of the Palestinians, who have one of history’s most dysfunctional national movements.

Lapid’s resurrection of the two-state solution notwithstanding, the Palestinian issue will play virtually no role in the upcoming elections, much like all elections since 2015. For most Israelis, the Palestinian issue has little bearing on their lives, seemingly played out in a distant country that they have never visited and which only penetrates their consciousness after particularly heinous acts of terrorism. Israel has become a global high-tech power, its economy is booming, and the Abraham Accords demonstrated that regional normalization is possible without the Palestinians. More pressing issues present themselves.

Today, however, just 60 percent of the combined populations of Israel and the West Bank are Jewish—hardly a Jewish state—and a majority would have been Arab had Israel not withdrawn from Gaza. Most Israelis are cognizant of the long-term demographic threat to the nation’s character, but they believe there is nothing Israel can do to change Palestinian rejectionism in any event. Thus, they have adopted Israel’s tried and true approach of yehiye beseder (“things will work out”) and simply moved on.

Binational states, as exemplified by Syria and Iraq, are often a recipe for disaster, and a nearly wall-to-wall consensus in Israel opposes an outcome of this nature. The never-ending violence that plays out on Israel’s TV screens, along with the repeated rounds of conflict with Hamas, should be proof enough of what a binational future holds in store. Remarkably, however, right-wing voters continue to vote for parties whose policies will lead directly to this. A disconnect between voter preferences and voting patterns is hardly unique to Israel, but rarely is it so pronounced.

A revitalized peace process should build off the Abraham Accords. The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, along with Egypt, Jordan, the European Union, and others, should be invited to help broker the talks, under the auspices of the United States. Inclusion among the “conveners” would be based on a number of principles.

First, Israel’s final borders, as stated in President George Bush’s 2004 letter, will reflect “demographic realities” (i.e. the settlement blocs). In practice, this means that Israel will retain 4 to 6 percent of the West Bank, in which nearly 80 percent of the settlers live, in exchange for land swaps, but will withdraw from the rest. The United States and the EU have long accepted the need for land swaps, as, in fact, have some Arab states and even the Palestinians.

Second, Palestinian refugees would be offered a choice between a “return” to the Palestinian state, remaining in situ, or moving elsewhere with compensation, but not to Israel itself (with the exception of limited numbers). In effect, this would result in a de facto international disavowal of the Palestinian claim to an unlimited “right of return,” which together with Jerusalem, constitutes the two ultimate issues dividing the sides.

On Jerusalem, the most feasible solution would likely be akin to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s 2008 proposal: the division of the city along its national lines, with an international body to govern the “holy basin” (the Old City and additional holy sites), pending final resolution of the issue. Whereas Olmert had proposed that the international body include the United States, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the Palestinians, an updated proposal would add the Abraham Accords states.

Finally, the conveners would reaffirm that the Oslo Accords, contrary to the public image, never predetermined the negotiations’ final outcome and that the possible establishment of a Palestinian state remains contingent on the successful completion of two critical tests, at which the Palestinians have so far failed abysmally: the establishment of effective self-governance and the prevention of terrorism. The conveners would be expected to finally hold the Palestinians to these conditions. Israel, for its part, would be expected to cease settlement activity beyond the fence line during the negotiations.

Should attempts to reach a negotiated agreement along these lines fail to achieve rapid progress, Israel should act unilaterally to determine its boundaries, renounce sovereignty over the 90 percent of the West Bank beyond the security fence, and begin a phased withdrawal of settlers. The thousands of rockets fired into Israel from Gaza demonstrate the need for ongoing Israel Defense Forces deployments throughout the West Bank for defensive purposes.

Disengagement from the West Bank, as in Gaza, would be unilateral vis-a-vis the Palestinians, but it should be coordinated this time with all of the conveners, not just the United States. It should also be made contingent on a significant quid pro quo —on the refugee issue, for instance—and public recognition that Israel had fulfilled most of the measures expected of it. The actual extent of Israel’s withdrawal might serve as an inducement to do so.

U.S. leverage over Israel is, and should remain, constrained both by the fundamental closeness of the relationship and Israel’s ongoing need for assistance in the face of the threats of Iran and Hezbollah. Even limited American pressure, however, has major resonance in Israel and, if applied in conjunction with the other conveners, the impact would be magnified. Overall, a “carrot” approach would be most effective, including even greater American assistance for missile defense and potentially even a defense treaty; an upgrade of EU ties with Israel, just short of membership; open formalization of ties with Saudi Arabia and others; and a significant expansion of regional cooperation. The impact on Israel’s strategic circumstances and public opinion would be dramatic.

With the Palestinians, American and convener leverage is more straightforward, and the demands must be stark: abandon the rejectionist all-or-nothing approach, agree to a state on almost all of the territory, but not all, and compromise on refugees and Jerusalem, as proposed above, or lose outside support for a Palestinian state. In addition to what should be the ultimate inducement for the Palestinians, the prospect of finally having a state, the conveners would also offer major development aid.

Both Israel and the Palestinians are past masters at stonewalling and derailing unwanted peace initiatives. A breakthrough should only be attempted if and when the appropriate political circumstances prevail on both sides, and even then, only if Washington is truly willing to apply pressure and offer significant inducements.

Bitter experiences with the corrupt dictatorship established by the Palestinians in the West Bank and the radical theocracy in Gaza indicate that a future Palestinian state is more likely than not to be another failed, authoritarian, unstable, and irredentist Arab state. This, then, begs the question of why one would continue to pursue a two-state solution. The answer is simple. The alternative, a binational state, is far worse.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

The Long-Term Competition doctrine – Israel’s theory of victory vs Iran

By Yaakov Lappin

In May this year, Maj. Gen. Eyal Zamir, the former deputy chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces, published an important paper that provides a glimpse into a new doctrine increasingly shaping the Israeli defense establishment’s view on how to deal with Iran.

In the paper, published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Zamir, laid out a concept known as Long-Term Competition (LTC), and, specifically, how Israel should apply it to take on the threat posed by Iran.

Iran, Zamir pointed out, is dedicated to the long-term goal of destroying Israel and becoming the regional hegemonic power. It seeks to achieve this by creating heavily-armed proxies and partners, surrounding Israel with rings of rocket and missile bases, and placing a nuclear umbrella over this tightening noose.

Citing the American foreign policy scholar Hal Brands, Zamir noted that any LTC doctrine must include a theory of victory – meaning defining a state’s long-term strategic goal and how it plans to achieve it.

Other key tenets of an LTC include leveraging one’s asymmetric advantage, embracing ideological competition, competing comprehensively and holistically, operating multilaterally, and exploiting “the strategic importance of time.”

Ultimately, a country engaged in an LTC against an adversary must pace itself for the long haul.

Zamir proposed that Israel’s LTC against Iran apply seven core principles, which are as follows:

·         A multilateral, long-term campaign organized regionally in which roles and players (meaning other states in the Middle East also threatened by Iran) are clearly defined.

·         Targeting the Iranian Islamic Republican Guards Corps, in Iran and throughout the Middle East. The IRGC was defined by Zamir as Iran’s “center of gravity,” and weakening it means undermining Tehran’s regional influence

·         Denying the ability of Iran to operate indirectly, through proxies, by responding to such actions with direct deterrent reprisals – meaning targeting Iran directly for the actions of its proxies.

·         Hitting targets belonging to Iran’s proxies continuously.

·         Applying direct pressure on the Iranian regime due to its terrorist actions whether a nuclear agreement is signed or not.

·         Expanding Israel’s deniable shadow war actions, currently active against Iranian interests in Syria, to target the whole of the Iranian regime, the IRGC, and regional Iranian assets.

·         And waging an “ideological cultural” campaign to win over Middle Eastern hearts and minds among sects, tribes, and other populations to highlight the advantages of moderate Islam and democracy, with Shi’ite communities being the prime target audience.

Signs that this doctrine is increasingly shaping the Israel defense establishment’s thinking have been emerging steadily over the last few years. In 2021, Maj. Gen. Tal Kelman, head of the IDF’s Strategy and Third Circle Directorate (a reference to countries in Israel's third-circle periphery with Iran being the focal point), which was founded in June 2020, told the Hebrew daily Maariv newspaper, “The Shi’ite axis is expanding, and Iran is engaged in a long-term strategic competition with us. The incredible thing is that despite the heavy prices paid by Iranian citizens… the internal-economic low, which is perhaps the worst in Iran since its war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran continues to strive to implement its strategy.” 

Thus, Iran is engaged in a long-term campaign aimed at Israel’s eventual demise, and the response by Israel’s defense establishment is an Israeli long-term campaign designed to thwart all of the Iranian regime’s strategic goals and to contribute to its weakness, with the end goal being defined by Zamir as “the extended isolation and weakening of the enemy until its surrender, where surrender equals the defeated camp being forced to accept its enemy’s terms and losing its motivation to continue fighting given the high cost of the campaign.”

This view was echoed by Kelman, who stated last year, “The significance of the campaign against Iran is not that, in the end, I conquer Tehran and plant a flag there, but a campaign in which I cause Iran to pay very heavy prices, harm its centers of gravity, military capabilities, force it to pay a significant economic price for its aggressive conduct against the State of Israel,” he stated.

Such an Israeli campaign needs to play out across multiple sectors simultaneously, such as Syria, Iran itself, and other locations, and it must become Israel’s top priority, Kelman argued. “Part of the reason that for the past ten years we have been engaged in a campaign between wars in Syria [to roll back Iran’s entrenchment there] and not allowing Iran to build a Hezbollah-like organization there is exactly this,” he stated.

Previous conversations this author held with sources from the IDF’s Strategy and Third Circle Directorate found that the IDF has adopted a comprehensive, holistic view of developing challenges to Israel from Iran, and is assembling ‘puzzle pieces’ that were once seen separately to form a complete picture of threat. The picture begins on Iranian soil and reaches the borders of Israel (in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza) through an integrated lens, rather than viewing each incident or sector isolation.

"Against this, we have to develop a range of capabilities – both to be ready at any minute for any development and also for the other side to be sufficiently deterred – and to know that Israel has the ability to respond unequivocally to any action or desire by the enemy," a source from the Directorate told me in 2020.

Zamir’s paper published in May this year seeks to take this LTC doctrine to the next stage and to bring moderate Sunni powers on board this struggle.

“More than ever before, the anti-Iran nations of the Middle East together with the United States must formulate a joint smart strategy to confront the geopolitical and regional changes appropriately,” Zamir stated. The fact that China and Russia are engaged in intense great power competition with the United States over the global order will also directly influence the Middle East and the long-term struggle in the region between the Islamic Republic’s radical axis and the anti-Iran bloc, he argued.

“The United States is the enemy of the Iranian regime, which views it as the Great Satan. The regime plans to seize control of the Middle East; the global power it intends to partner with is China. The strengthening of this strategic partnership was signaled in March 2021 when China and Iran signed an agreement of economic and security cooperation agreement that includes significant Chinese investments in Iran in exchange for a twenty-five-year supply of oil, which is so critical to the Chinese economy,” said Zamir.

He added that in the military field, China-Iran cooperation is growing, including the transfer of military technologies and advanced Chinese weapons deals, while at the same time, Iran’s navy holds joint exercises and maneuvers with the navies of China and Russia.

Zamir called on Israel to set itself the target of weakening Iran and its deterrence capabilities, denying it the ability to use its forces and resources to destabilize the region, and curbing its expansion to regional states, before forcing it to withdraw.

The contours of the Iranian and Israeli long-term competition doctrines are becoming clear; and while Israel’s campaign is motivated entirely by defensive requirements, the campaign will likely increasingly focus on the need to go on the attack beyond Syria, and to onboard new allies wherever possible.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Beyond Killer Robots: How AI impacts security, military affairs

 

By Daphne Richemond Barak

For too long, the conversation on AI and militaries has been narrowly focused on autonomous weapons and the ethical issues that come with them. The time is ripe to take stock of the myriad of other ways that AI will impact security and military affairs.

Just as AI is dramatically changing a range of sectors in the civilian world, improving efficiency, reducing costs, and automating processes, there is no reason to believe that militaries, too, will not be joining the AI revolution.

Israel is a world leader in developing autonomous military capabilities, from Iron Dome interceptors to unmanned aerial vehicles to ground-based platforms – though all currently rely on human approval before kinetic firepower can be activated, in line with the values of the Israeli defense establishment.

The question of what will happen when adversaries deploy autonomous weapons that do not seek a person in the loop for approval to use lethal firepower looms on the horizon for all militaries defending democratic states.

It seems reasonable to believe that even those states that have set some limits on AI capabilities will encounter adversaries who have no qualms about doing so, putting the states that limit integrating AI for national security at a considerable disadvantage. Thus, it’s imperative for states to understand the full extent of what AI can do.

While autonomous weapons attract a lot of attention, much of the conversation about this technology is negative, causing analysts to overlook the positive application of AI in areas such as force protection and the reduction of civilian casualties.

The many benefits of artificial intelligence

Other AI functions – including optimizing chain-of-command communications, human-machine teaming in areas like logistics, and predicting adversary maneuvers – offer equally promising avenues. Many are already being developed by western militaries, including by the Israel Defense Forces.

As time goes by, military commanders will feel increasingly comfortable relying on this technology, just as consumers have in the civilian world. Whether AI is introduced in the civilian or military realm does not mean suspending human involvement or judgment, but rather, receiving a new tool to boost performance.

Military commanders will use AI to minimize the fog of war. While they will continue to make maneuver decisions, AI capabilities will augment their decision-making capabilities during battle by providing a more accurate picture of the reality on the ground and keeping to the speed of modern warfare, thanks to continuously updated sensor data.

AI technologies will also help decision-makers and analysts combat the effects of information overload, and to better organize and process growing data pools on enemy behavior. AI will not only alleviate this information clutter, but it will allow for forces to make predictions about future events and outcomes, allowing states to better prepare for war.

The use of AI to better understand an adversary is shaping up to be one of the most promising and fascinating aspects of this tool. This will enable faster, real-time gathering of information, detecting patterns, mapping out communication networks, and even better understanding of how the enemy ‘feels,’ in terms of its morale, by analyzing its language on social media and other platforms. These new AI capabilities amount to intelligence gathering 2.0.

This type of analysis can be extended to both military communications and social media activities by civilians in adversarial states, to better understand a nation’s will to fight based on societal trends on any given day. The will to fight remains the most critical factor in human warfare, and being able to identify when this will decrease, in real time, could prove enormously beneficial for decision-makers in the civilian and military worlds.

In the area of military logistics and maintenance, AI can create revolutionary cost-saving efficiency, which is why most militaries are prioritizing making progress on this front. Typically considered a more technical aspect, logistics will probably lead to the most radical changes in how militaries “do business.”

AI systems can also optimize the procurement process and automate supply chains. They can forecast the need to repair equipment and order resupplies while minimizing costs. They can also be used in personnel allocation by helping militaries figure out which soldier is best suited to what unit. And unlike other aspects of AI, these applications are unlikely to raise any significant legal or ethical issues.

AI-based technologies can also enhance the capabilities of individual soldiers, and this should not be seen as unethical or dangerous across the board. In the past, amphetamines and caffeine have been handed out to soldiers for similar purposes.

What are the applications for AI in defense?

Just as limiting blood loss and boosting resistance to extreme conditions are worthy goals to help soldiers, providing them with new situational awareness and command capabilities are equally legitimate objectives. Human enhancement calls for certain limits – but those have yet to be (publicly) set. Such limits should consider force protection and the preservation of a soldier’s autonomy to choose to undergo a given enhancement, whether it can be reversed, and if it poses long-term health risks.

At the strategic level, AI can boost the capabilities of air defense systems. Emerging weapons, such as hypersonic missiles, can avoid detection from defense systems due to their speed. Air defense systems integrated with AI processing capabilities will be able to properly detect and intercept these incoming missiles.

In the area of information warfare, AI can, of course, help fabricate deep fakes and spread misinformation. Ironically, it can also help governments quickly verify information or recognize efforts by a hostile actor at shaping public perception in a harmful or disruptive manner.

This could give NATO states an ability to know, in real-time, if Russia is trying to use fake news to destabilize its security environment and threaten the alliance.

Ultimately, such capabilities extend far beyond the area of autonomous weapons and fears of ‘killer robots.’ The security community must broaden its grasp of AI capabilities and acknowledge positive as well as disruptive AI applications.

Dr. Daphné Richemond-Barak is Assistant Professor at the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy, and Strategy, and Senior Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at the IDC Herzliya. She is also an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point and a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. Read full bio here.

Israel's core curriculum failure

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

The comprehensive investigative report by the New York Times into the issue of the teaching of core curriculum in New York State ultra-Orthodox schools did not cause anyone in Israel to fall off their chair.

In little Israel, there is no need for an investigative piece to understand the reality of ultra-Orthodox school systems. If the New York Times had just called, we would have been happy to tell them.

According to the report, ultra-Orthodox schools in New York receive billions from state budgets, and yet, even though they are supposed to teach basic core subjects to give pupils tools to deal with the modern world, these institutions function as if they were an autonomy.

In New York, that’s a legal offense, but here in Israel, there is no equivalent law. Despite oceans separating the two places, there are, however, certain parallels, such as the intervention of wheelers and dealers in politics, and the harm that this causes to the economy. In both places, children are left behind and coerced into ignorance.

Why is it that important to learn core subjects?

The answer lies in the symbolic date of 9/11 when the American newspaper chose to publish its piece. The ultra-Orthodox community claims that the publication date symbolizes a kind of terror attack against them in New York, though the newspaper apparently chose this date to underline the view that children who do not acquire basic tools grow up ignorant and live in poverty, leading to social disaster if not stopped.

The day that this reality knocks on our door isn’t far away. In Israel, the percentage of ultra-Orthodox men in employment is around 50%, while among secular men, the employment rate stands at over 80%.

If the ultra-Orthodox male employment rate ever matches the secular one, the Israeli economy would, every year, receive another 29 billion shekels. In effect,  billions of shekels would enter the collective fund of Israeli citizens, through which the state finances its defense budget, police, education, health infrastructure, and more.

If a change does not occur, the State of Israel will not be able to continue to fund these vital systems, and the burden will fall on the shoulders of working people, who will have to pay higher taxes: National bankruptcy won’t be far behind.

And what about Torah studies, some will surely ask? There is no contradiction between religious studies and teaching core curriculum. The only ones exploiting the situation are politicians who hold an entire public hostage. In Israel, like in the state of New York, a community that does not support itself, and lives in poverty, is a community that needs economic assistance and support, and it is easier to manage such a community. The stipend comes with a voting ballot.

To grasp the full picture, let’s zoom out of the present day, and go back in time by a  year to 2021 when Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman issued a call to ensure core curriculum by conditioning budgets to ultra-Orthodox institutions that taught it. This was done to strengthen the Israeli economy and increase the cycle of employment among ultra-Orthodox men (a similar push is needed regarding Arab Israeli women).

It did not take long for positive momentum to build. The Belz Hassidic community took the initiative, and in a bold move, the community’s rebbe announced that he would insert core curriculum into the education system in the coming year. The firestorm quickly appeared too, with critics claiming that such a move would harm religious studies. Ultra-Orthodox Members of Knesset demanded to know why the government thought it had the right to intervene in children’s curriculum.

The investigative report published overseas encountered an Israeli political reality that has been hit by storms over exactly the same issue. Opposition Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu understood that he had to prevent a split between the Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael parties (who jointly form the United Torah Judaism list) since this could damage his chances of returning to power. So he promised to match the funding for institutions that do not teach core curriculum subjects to the budgets of the state education system.

The promise worked, and the political parties again merged into a single list. It is clear to all that if ultra-Orthodox politicians Aryeh Deri and Moshe Gafni are partners in the next government, Liberman’s historical achievement will begin to fade.

Meanwhile, New York State decided that in December 2023, budgets will be denied to educational institutions that fail to teach core curriculum. In Israel, if a government headed by Netanyahu is formed, not only will the situation be the opposite of that in New York, but rather, educational institutions will receive a special bonus for failing to teach basic subjects.

This would be the case even if the current Defense Minister Benny Gantz or Prime Minister Yair Lapid join a coalition including ultra-Orthodox parties.  In such a scenario, core curriculum subjects would also be thrown under the bus, and this would constitute a disaster for the Zionist vision and the Israeli economy.

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

Democratic norms and the rule of law at stake in Israel’s elections

 

By Dan Meridor

The upcoming November 1 Israeli national elections, the fifth in three years, are not merely another electoral contest, or just the latest effort to break out of political deadlock.

Rather, they represent a key junction for Israeli society, which will have to make fateful decisions about the kind of ethical and legal systems that will govern the State of Israel in the near and distant future.

Two factors are converging to threaten Israel’s democratic norms and rule of law. The first is the likely attempt by Opposition Leader Benjamin Netanyahu to disrupt the trials underway against him, and the second is the rise of authoritarian political forces that wish to undermine the system of checks and balances and make the Knesset the all-powerful branch of state. These two elements are joining forces.

Until now, the rule of law in Israel has been based on a critical moral foundation of ethical values, which have underpinned Israel’s democratic – Jewish nature. These values are what enable the balance that Israeli democracy has successfully maintained between the Jewish national cause and adhering to liberal democratic norms.

Such norms include equality of all citizens, freedom of expression, and ensuring individual citizen rights. Israelis have relied on state mechanisms like legislation, the police, state prosecutors, attorney generals, and the High Court to ensure these values.

Now, unfortunately, this system is in jeopardy.

Since Israel’s inception in 1948, there have always been substantial disputes between political camps, and in that context, between Herut (the pre-Likud party) and Mapai (the pre-Labor democratic socialist party) over multiple issues. These ranged from whether or not to accept German Holocaust reparation offers in 1952, or decades of dispute over the land-for-peace formula, as well as bitter arguments over whether a free-market economy or deep government-involved socialism should govern the Israeli social-economic sphere.

Over the years, the electorate made its decisions, and Israel continued as a functioning state and society despite these serious divisions. What enabled this to happen was a national consensus on the need for a fundamental ethical framework, which was universally accepted. Institutions made their decisions and society accepted these decisions whether people agreed with them or not.

Until now.

For the first time in Israel, the High Court’s authority, or respect for legal institutions and legal rulings, are under attack. This flies in the face of the national–liberal tradition of the Herut party, which was always committed to upholding the rule of law.

The late prime minister Menachem Begin consistently argued that the High Court should have the authority to overturn Knesset legislation if it violates human rights. I am proud to have been the Justice Minister for the Likud when we initiated legislation to guard basic human rights (known as the constitutional revolution).

In 1953, the High Court told Ben Gurion that he could not decide the balance between freedom of speech and security, and overturned his decision to close the Kol Ha’am newspaper – not very long after the 1948 War of Independence.

The legal system has not changed. The same judges, now accused of being “leftists” by the pro-Netanyahu camp, ruled against Ben Gurion. In 1977, Aharon Barak, the Attorney General at the time, was about to indict former Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, prompting his resignation. He then indicted a number of senior members of the Labor camp.  

This is what the separation of powers looks like, and this is how the judicial branch applies checks and balances on the government and the Knesset – just as it was designed to do – to prevent unchecked power or tyrannical rule.

Liberal democracy has never advocated for unchecked majority rule, and while the majority certainly can select the identity of the government and influence critical policies, it cannot decide who is guilty or innocent. A court has the legitimate and legal powers to also cancel rules that violate democratic norms.

In 1988, we in the Likud led the unusual initiative to ban the racist Kach party from running in the elections. We gathered public information about its activities and delivered it to the National Elections Committee. That is because racism has no place in a Jewish democratic state, whether one is on the Right or Left, Jewish or Arab -- according to the Basic Law, which was changed in 1985 by the national unity Likud – Labor government. The change we introduced banned racist parties.

Today, Itamar Ben-Gvir, a student of the late racist Meir Kahane -- the founder of the Kach party -- who until recently had a photograph of Jewish terrorist Baruch Goldstein in his living room, and who was convicted in the past of support for a terror organization, has gained, to our dismay, legitimacy in the political system. Netanyahu brought Ben-Gvir into the political sphere in order to reach a parliamentary majority.

This is the clearest demonstration of how values once taken for granted are now being questioned. Israel is a Jewish state because it has a Jewish majority, not because it discriminates individually against Arab citizens. The value of equality is now under assault.

The pro-Netanyahu bloc seeks to actively weaken the judicial system because it has identified it as the gatekeeper. The courts, the state comptroller (who has the power to expose corruption and who was weakened), and the police chief have all been targeted by rhetoric designed to delegitimize these institutions and to personally attack those who head them. This includes anyone who does not fall in line with the pro-Netanyahu agenda, such as the former settler police commissioner, Ronnie Alsheikh, the former religious attorney general, Avichai Mandelblit, and the former chief prosecutor and yeshiva graduate, Shai Nitzan. None have been spared from the wrath of the Netanyahu camp or dodged charges of being “leftist” conspirators seeking to dislodge Netanyahu from power in a nefarious plot.

Such unprecedented attacks are, essentially, attacks on the state as we know it. A state cannot exist without agreed-upon methods for resolving disputes.

Now that the trials have already begun, Netanyahu, who has already accused the judges of being ‘leftists,’ is probably examining options to stop them. The past four elections held in Israel since 2019 were about one issue: The likely effort by Netanyahu to gain legal immunity and prevent criminal trials against him from starting.

A weakened court system, which could then be passed to cancel the trial using a step like the ‘French Law,’ is one such scenario that Netanyahu may hope to achieve.

While Netanyahu has the right to be assumed innocent until proven otherwise, a failure to complete his legal process would constitute a significant blow to the concept of equality in the face of the law.

Zionism is a just cause. Justice is critical to it.  Today, those that espouse values like democracy, human rights, and rule of law, are tagged as ‘leftwing,’ although these are the precise values that were espoused by Begin, Herut, and the older version of the Likud party.

Ultimately, all of these developments project onto the core of the Zionist movement. Zionism holds that after 2,000 years of not employing sovereignty or force – with disastrous consequences – the time for the Jewish people to return to statehood has arrived. However, the right to use force comes with the responsibility to preserve righteousness, and that, in turn, is based on the preservation of democratic rights and values.

It is this mix of national and liberal values that the old Herut party once championed, and which the current pro-Netanyahu bloc is threatening to weaken and largely disable.

Dan Meridor is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence in the Israeli Government from 2009-2013. Read full bio here.

Israel's political merry go round must stop

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

In Israel, elections have become a new Olympic sport. One round of elections after another has cost the country roughly NIS 12 billion over the past five years, not to mention the economic losses caused by the absence of a national budget for government ministries, the direct damage to our personal finances, and the persistent turmoil that has damaged every national institution.

The political merry-go-round makes it harder to govern and run the state effectively. In the absence of a clear planning agenda, combating the rising cost of living, addressing the housing supply shortage, building a stable national health system, combating crime, reducing road deaths, and implementing comprehensive infrastructure plans become a challenge, to say the least.

What could have been accomplished with NIS 2.4 billion (the cost of each round of elections)? Numerous institutions in Israel would benefit substantially from a fraction of that sum.

Political instability in Israel is nothing new: Calls for a change in Israel’s electoral and governing systems have been around since the days of Mapai. Few Israeli governments have completed their full term, but the past four years have seen Israel’s political instability hit new lows.

Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu has mastered the game of rewriting the rules of the political system. From his perspective, securing his future, evading justice, and paving the path for his return to the Prime Minister’s Office are the most crucial objectives to pursue.

As far as Netanyahu is concerned, governmental stability should only occur after he accomplishes these objectives. In the meantime, Netanyahu has violated unwritten political norms, among them his refusal to resign after being indicted on corruption charges – a far cry from his insistence that former prime minister Ehud Olmert step down when he was indicted.

The current state of affairs endangers the State of Israel and generates a crisis of confidence between the people and their elected officials that worsens with each election cycle.

Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman recently noted that politicians are dragging the Israeli people through a fifth round of elections, and that, looking ahead, it is therefore essential to secure governmental stability in the simplest and most straightforward way possible.

Liberman proposed passing new legislation to boost governmental stability. According to his proposal, the new legislation would adopt the model of the existing Knesset Chairperson Law. According to Liberman’s proposal, instead of the current setup, in which 61 votes are needed to both swear in a Knesset and disperse it, 90 votes would be required to disperse a future Knesset, after the Knesset passes a two-year budget. This legislation would adopt an existing formula and apply it in the Knesset to boost governmental stability. By linking the legislation to the passing of a two-year budget, this maneuver would introduce at least two years of government stability.

This is now the story of these elections. The time has come to stop the merry-go-round.

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

17 Years Later: Did Israel’s Gaza Withdrawal Aid Peace?

By Chuck Freilich

 

Seventeen years ago this week, Israel withdrew from Gaza and dismantled the seventeen settlements that existed there. To demonstrate that it was prepared to go ahead on the West Bank as well, Israel dismantled four settlements there, too. Israel’s preconditions for further progress were straightforward: a demonstration of the Palestinians’ ability to govern responsibly and end terrorism.

The Palestinian response was similarly straightforward. Hamas seized control in Gaza from the Palestinian Authority (PA), established a radical theocracy, and together with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), fired tens of thousands of rockets at Israel’s civilian population, over 1,100 in the recent round alone. The PA, in the West Bank, became a corrupt, if feckless, dictatorship.

No criticism of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians can excuse, or explain away, the intentional and indiscriminate targeting of civilians: that is terrorism and murder. The fact that some Palestinian civilians are unavoidably killed when Israel responds is heartbreaking, but there is no moral equivalence. Israel’s right to defend its citizens is inviolate.

There is no purely military solution to the problem that Gaza proposes. Tragically, there may not be a political one either.

Despite decades of efforts, Israel’s ability to prevent and suppress rocket fire is still limited. Fortunately, Israel’s Iron Dome defensive system has proven extraordinarily effective and its casualties, since the system was first deployed in 2012, have been comparatively small. Had it not been for Iron Dome, Israel’s casualties would have been severe, and it would have been forced to launch a major ground operation. As it is, disruption to the economy and national life is significant.

The only way to truly cut Hamas and PIJ’s large rocket arsenals down to size, and Hezbollah’s mammoth one, is through a ground operation. Israel would have to occupy all of Gaza, or Lebanon, and go house-to-house for months in a bloody battle to root out the rockets. Once Israel withdrew, however, Iran would rapidly replenish the arsenal and the period of calm gained—at the price of hundreds of Israeli casualties (and far more Gazans or Lebanese)—would likely be short-lived. Some suggest that Israel topple Hamas or Hezbollah, but they would probably just rapidly reconstitute or be replaced by something even worse, e.g., ISIS.

For these reasons, every Israeli government in recent decades, regardless of political complexion, has refrained from doing so. Israel may ultimately have no choice, but at least for now, the remedy exceeds the threat.

Unsurprisingly, the repeated rounds of conflict in Gaza, following the withdrawl, have convinced many in Israel that it is a proven failure. If so judged, this would certainly cast a pall over recommendations that Israel undertake a far riskier withdrawal from the West Bank; indeed, over the entire concept of a two-state solution. The West Bank literally abuts central Israel, where it is just 8.7 miles wide, and is in easy rocket and artillery range from Tel Aviv and Beersheba, even small-arms range from Jerusalem.

On the one hand, Israel was unable to prevent Hamas from firing thousands of rockets even before the withdrawal, when it was in complete control of Gaza. In that sense, the withdrawal has not fundamentally changed the situation, even if the repeated rounds have exacerbated it. On a more positive note, Israel no longer occupies 2 million people. Moreover, had Israel not withdrawn, more than half of the population under its control today would not have been Jewish. As such, the withdrawal was a critical step towards full separation from the Palestinians and a future two-state solution.

Conversely, detractors correctly assert that Israel’s post-withdrawal experience has greatly dampened prospects for this. Israel simply cannot allow the West Bank to become another rocket launching pad, and widespread public recognition of this has greatly undermined support for further progress with the Palestinians. Whether truly effective security arrangements can be devised is debatable—and without them, no one in Israel, Left or Right, will withdraw.

If Israel cannot ignore withdrawal’s disappointing consequences, it also cannot allow them to dictate future policy. For all of the greater near-term certainty in the current situation, it, too, poses grave risks. The absence of a political horizon feeds into Palestinian despair, increases the likelihood of a further armed uprising in the West Bank—or at least a surge in terrorism—and ultimately endangers Israel’s national character.

For decades, various overly optimistic analysts have predicted Hamas’s eventual moderation and pursuit of a more diplomatic course, as some terrorist organizations have done in the past. In practice, Hamas’ fundamental enmity toward Israel remains unchanged. However, this fact does not preclude Israeli from pursuing peace negotiations with the PA or taking measures to improve the quality of life in Gaza. Hamas, however, has proven to be an only partial partner even for such limited measures, repeatedly launching rockets at Israel just as it was opening the border. This seemingly self-defeating behavior only appears inexplicable if one refuses to accept Hamas for what it is, a jihadi organization bent on Israel’s destruction.

The situation in Gaza deteriorated so severely in recent years, however, that even Hamas was forced to support some economic reconstruction and growth measures. As the de facto government, Hamas seeks to ensure that the public does not become so disaffected that it rises up against it, but also not so satisfied with the new status quo that it ceases to support ongoing operations against Israel. In practice, the periods of calm between the rounds have grown shorter, not longer, despite Israel’s repeated attempts to promote economic growth.

Palestinian rejectionism has, unfortunately, not been limited to Hamas. PA presidents, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, both rejected dramatic proposals for peace, which would have given the Palestinians a state on essentially 100 percent of the territory, a capital in East Jerusalem, and a limited return of refugees, years ago. One cannot ignore the truly wrenching question, whether the Palestinians are prepared to accept any deal that requires that they live in peace alongside Israel.

Israel heads to the polls again in November and a new centrist government is not unimaginable. The battle to succeed Abbas is also underway and, though less likely, a more moderate Palestinian leadership, too, may emerge. Such are the faint glimmers of hope in the Mideast.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.