David Hacham

PODCAST: DEFENSE MINISTER GALLANT FIRED: HERE’S ONE OF THE PRIMARY REASONS!

 
 

In this episode, MirYam Institute In-House Analyst, Yaakov Lappin, is joined by Col. (res.) David Hacham, former Arab Affairs Advisor to multiple Israeli Defense Ministers, to discuss the future of the Gaza Strip. 

He asserts that only ongoing Israeli security control coupled with a temporary Israeli military administration can ensure that Hamas is uprooted.

They then explored why this proposal faces such fierce opposition from some voices in Israel, including from recently dismissed Israeli Defense Minister, Yoav Gallant.

Enjoy and be sure to subscribe to the show!

MirYam In The Media: Israel ‘one of the world’s top cyber powers’

Yaakov Lappin IN CONVERSATION WITH: PROF. CHUCK FREILICH

Israel’s position as a cyber superpower places it in an exclusive club of world powers, despite having a population a little larger than New York City, according to former Israeli defense official Chuck Freilich.

Freilich, a senior research fellow at the MirYam Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies and a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, recently published a book on the subject, titled, “Israel and Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Cyber Power.”

A former senior fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School who teaches at Columbia and at Tel Aviv University, Freilich said Israel’s cyber capabilities are prominent at both the civilian and military levels. The number of cyber start-ups in Israel equals the total number of cyber start-ups in the world, excluding the United States, he noted.

“This is a stunning statistic. It’s the result of a really unique contribution to the Israeli hi-tech scene in general, and the cyber realm especially, by the defense establishment and intelligence agencies,” said Freilich.

Graduates of the Israel Defense Forces cyber units, mainly Unit 8200 and Unit 81, as well as intelligence agencies, enter the private sector and become a primary source of commercial start-ups, he explained.

This in turn acts as a driving force behind cyber innovation. The fact that the Israeli defense establishment funds incubators and technological innovation programs also contributes to this prosperity of the local cyber scene, according to Freilich.

The military units “find and train Israel’s cyber personnel, and most importantly, the really top-level personnel. In the cyber world, a few geniuses make all the difference,” he added.

Between 2011 and 2020, some 100 veterans of Unit 81, who served in the years between 2003 and 2010, went on to found 50 start-ups, with an accumulated evaluation of over $10 billion, Freilich noted. “That’s 100 veterans alone,” he said.

“Another mind blowing statistic is that the NSA [the U.S. National Security Agency] has about 40,000 personnel, while Unit 8200 [its Israeli equivalent] reportedly has a quarter of that, 10,000 people. Most of what Unit 8200 does is cyber based. Here you have little Israel on the scale of a global superpower. Each year, between a few hundred and a thousand cyber personnel are discharged in Israel. China’s 2022 graduating cyber school count was 1,300. So we have a cyber force on the scale of global superpowers,” he stated.

Pointing to compulsory military service as the core secret sauce behind this success, Freilich argues that this enables the IDF to track down the best and the brightest, with the military scouting high school databases and beginning to locate suitable youths by the 10th grade.

“One percent of the best high school graduates go to Atuda [a program that enables them to study and delay military service] and Talpiyot [a program that sends students to complete BAs in mathematics and natural sciences as part of their service]. Talpiyot looks at the top 2%, and then begins an intensive testing process. Only 10% of that 2% pass and are then further winnowed down through a grueling aptitude testing process,” said Freilich, describing the rigorous screening process.

With regard to Unit 81, while 10,000 candidates passed initial annual screening, only a few hundred went on to be selected.

“All told, the IDF trains 10,000 people a year in cyber programs. This is a huge training program, not only giving people computer skills, but also reaching the real geniuses,” he said.

Freilich added that a third of graduates of a Unit 8200 high school program that teaches university-level cyber come from peripheral areas.

He also drew attention to Israel’s national style, which he described in his book as “hutzpah gone viral.”

“Israeli society has a never-ending propensity to challenge authority and reject accepted norms, refusing to take no for an answer, and thirsting for new ways of achieving things,” said Freilich.

“Our strategic circumstances means we have a greater willingness to take risks, and we are non-hierarchical and informal,” he added. “That’s the same culture you find in R&D firms around the world. So cyber fits Israel like a glove.”

On Aug. 8, the Mayanei HaYeshua Medical Center in Bnei Brak announced that it had been struck by a cyber-attack, forcing personnel to switch to pen and paper before recovering computer networks.

Despite Israel’s cyber achievements, problems still exist in protecting the civil sector, Freilich admitted.

“There is reason to be concerned about that and critical national infrastructure, like water and communications—the type of sites that the Israel National Cyber Directorate defends the most. They get specially tailored defense packages, but there is still reason for concern,” said Freilich.

Iran, for its part, woke up to the cyber realm after sustaining the devastating 2009 Stuxnet attack, which international media reports attributed to Israel and the United States.

“Be wary of the law of unintended consequences,” said Freilich. “Until 2010, Iran wasn’t doing much in this area. By 2012, it was launching offensive attacks around the world.”

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

MirYam In The Media: Hamas’s al-Arouri and the Iranian connection

Yaakov Lappin IN CONVERSATION WITH: COL. DAVID HACHAM

Hamas’s deputy political bureau chief, Saleh al-Arouri, currently based in Lebanon, is interested in surrounding Israel with rocket and terror bases, and so is Iran.
That common interest has enabled al-Arouri to create new levels of cooperation between his Sunni-Islamist terror faction and the radical Shi’ite regime in Tehran.

“This is actually one of the strong people within Hamas. I would actually say that he is among the top three of the movement,” said IDF Col. (res.) Michael Milshtein, head of the Palestinian Studies Forum at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, and a senior researcher at the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Reichman University in Herzliya.

According to Milshtein, al-Arouri is responsible for the Judea and Samaria arena on behalf of Hamas, including Jerusalem. In addition, al-Arouri coordinates Hamas activity with other members of “the axis of resistance,” said Milshtein, ex-head of the Department for Palestinians Affairs in IDF Military Intelligence.

Al-Arouri is also responsible for a large portion of Hamas’s military operations abroad, said Milshtein. He “manages to direct tactical military activity but also be involved and think strategically, and basically ‘swim’ between the two worlds,” he added.

IDF Col. (res.) David Hacham, a senior research associate at the MirYam Institute and a former adviser on Arab affairs to seven Israeli defense ministers, said al-Arouri joined Hamas’s military in the early 1990s, during the First Intifada.’

“He was responsible for establishing Hamas’s military wing in the Judea and Samaria region. For his activities, he sat in an Israeli prison for 18 years. After his release, he went o to Syria, where he settled. Later, in 2012, he left Syria after the outbreak of the country’s civil war, and came to Turkey where he headed Hamas headquarters,” said Hacham.

“In 2015, after Israeli and American pressure on Turkey, he moved to Qatar along with most of Hamas’s overseas leadership. After a short stopover in Malaysia, he arrived in Lebanon where he currently operates,” Hacham said.

In 2014, the Israeli military demolished his home in the village of Aroura, near Ramallah, believing him to have been involved in the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in Judea and Samaria.

Al-Arouri, like the head of Hamas in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, represents the younger generation in the Hamas leadership, according to the Israeli observers. Both have operational experience and have served lengthy prison terms, speak Hebrew and are familiar with Israel, unlike members of the older Hamas generation, such as Khaled Mashaal, said Hacham.

Milshtein described al-Arouri as a major connector between Hamas and other members of the radical Islamist camp opposed to Israel’s existence. For example, al-Arouri’s role in the launch by Hamas of 34 rockets at northern Israel from Lebanon in April this year was a prominent one, he said.

Al-Arouri’s unique role is enabled by two factors, according to Milshtein. “One is Arouri’s location in Beirut. And the other is his basic approach for vigorous promotion of jihad in several arenas. Especially in Judea and Samaria and the newer arena—Lebanon. This makes him a favorite for Tehran and Hezbollah,” said Milshtein. “In this context, he is involved in formulating strategic relations, but also in practical terms, he is involved in weapons procurement, training, organization, military cooperation and more.”

Hacham cautioned that Arouri’s objective of unifying fronts against Israel directly contradicts Israel’s essential interest of differentiating between the arenas.

“This is particularly true for Israel’s differentiation between Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Hamas, on the other hand, wants to create as close a connection as possible between the various conflict arenas—Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Jerusalem, the Arab sector in Israel and Lebanon—and to gain effective control over the power switch of escalation,” he said.

“Hamas strives to ensure its ability to ignite and activate the arenas, individually or together, at an appropriate time according to the circumstances,” he added.

According to Milshtein, Al-Arouri’s intense efforts help him greatly with regard to fortifying his status within Hamas as someone who succeeds in preserving “the jihad,” and who found a way to activate arenas against Israel.

“I would describe al-Arouri and Sinwar as two halves of the same whole. Each is responsible for another major activity area in Hamas. They share the same concept, and I believe both are strategically coordinated,” said Milshtein.

Hacham said Israel has so far avoided eliminating al-Arouri for a number of reasons.

First, he spent many of the past 15 years in sovereign countries, some of which have diplomatic ties with Israel, Hacham noted. Second, previous targeted killings have shown that leaders are quickly replaced in terror factions, and third, there is concern that his elimination would increase motivation for terrorist revenge attacks on Israeli targets, or could spark a wider escalation.

Nevertheless, said Hacham, al-Arouri could certainly become a future target for assassination.

“Targeted killings are the number one worry of the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leaderships,” said Hacham, who spoke with JNS before Israel launched “Operation Shield and Arrow” on Tuesday with the assassination of three senior PIJ commanders in Gaza.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Hamas’s attack from Lebanon is part of plan to take over West Bank

By David Hacham

The rocket attack against northern Israel in which Hamas fired 34 projectiles from southern Lebanon on April 6 reflects a clear attempt on the group’s part to advance a broader and highly dangerous strategic goal.

Hamas is seeking to create an offensive ring around Israel that constitutes a multi-front threat. As such, it is working to build terrorist infrastructures in Lebanon, in addition to its existing fronts against Israel – the Gaza Strip, which has been under the organization’s control since 2007, and the West Bank, where the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by President Mahmoud Abbas, is growing weaker, and where Hamas is working to build a foothold.

Hamas’s grand strategy and its actions in Lebanon are ultimately aimed at boosting its quest of toppling the Fatah-run PA in the West Bank. The PA is gradually losing control there, especially in the Jenin region, and, to a partial extent, in Nablus.

Hamas exploited tensions on the Temple Mount, a highly sensitive Islamic site, to launch its attack from southern Lebanon, likely in full coordination with Hezbollah and Iran.

A Hamas rocket attack of this scope could not have occurred without coordination and a green light from Hezbollah, which is the strongest organization in the Lebanese system. At the time of the April 6 attack, Hamas Politburo chief Ismail Haniyeh was visiting Lebanon, accompanied by his deputy, Salah Arouri – and that is no coincidence.

Hamas - Gaza’s operational approval was not required for this attack, but it was notified in advance by Hamas in Lebanon.

The rocket attack carried out by Hamas from Lebanon against Israel was pre-planned, with Hamas’s intention being essentially a limited escalation.

The rockets were aimed at areas near the Lebanese border but were not intended to hit infrastructure targets of strategic significance. Given that, Hamas' rocket attack was not a declaration of war, or an attempt to deteriorate the situation in a way that would create a general escalation and bring about a renewed military confrontation with Israel on a large scale.

The Israeli response -- selected airstrikes in Gaza and southern Lebanon -- was measured and limited. It was designed to prevent an uncontrolled deterioration and overall war. Israel's limited response to the rocket fire indicates that it is not interested in war at present and that it does not want a confrontation involving several arenas simultaneously.

The internal crisis in Israel surrounding attempts by the government to promote legal reform has eroded Israel’s deterrence, and its enemies assess that it is vulnerable.

All of this is tied to Hamas’s strategic goal of toppling the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank with the end of the Mahmoud Abbas era. The April escalation boosted Hamas’s standing at Fatah’s expense.

Hamas is taking advantage of the governing vacuum in the PA, which is made worse by internal Fatah power struggles. In recent years, several potential candidates, all from Fatah, have entered into a destabilizing competition for the leadership position.

In practice, Hamas has already taken concrete steps to exploit this instability and to position itself to challenge the PA for the Palestinian leadership as soon as the opportunity arises. This has included a reshuffling of Hamas operatives in the West Bank and east Jerusalem, with an emphasis on command levels, as well as cultivating operatives from the younger generations. These operatives include organizationally affiliated Hamas members, and other more loosely affiliated individuals with close ties to Hamas, such as academics, trade unionists, and public sector figures in the West Bank, and they are active in the Islamist stream within Palestinian local councils and civil society institutions.

Hamas is focusing on two major courses of action. The first is the democratic path to power, through a voting process, and the second – a fallback position – is the military takeover of the PA using violent means if necessary. All the while, Hamas labels Fatah as a traitor to the Palestinian people due to its security coordination with Israel.

One of the most prominent operatives among Hamas ranks in the West Bank is engineer Wazan Jaber, a representative of the younger generation in the terror group. A few weeks ago, an attempt was made to assassinate him, likely by Fatah members. Jaber was not injured.

It is worth noting that Fatah is well aware of Hamas's intention to replace it. Fatah is actively engaged in an effort to limit Hamas' power in the West Bank. This includes the continued existence of security coordination with Israel – albeit in a more discreet and limited manner since the PA’s January announcement of its cessation of coordination, in protest against an IDF security operation in the Jenin refugee camp.

The PA is also working to dry up sources of financial aid to Hamas, and Abbas has taken a series of measures to prevent Hamas from gaining a foothold in the Palestinian government system, such as keeping the Palestinian parliament dissolved, thereby preventing Hamas-linked parliament speaker Aziz Dweik from being considered a legal heir to Abbas.

Instead, this power has been transferred to the Palestinian National Council and its Fatah chairman, Rawhi Fattouh (Abbas’s appointment of Hussein Al-Sheikh, the Minister for Civil Affairs, as secretary of the PLO's Executive Committee in May 2022, should not, despite initial impressions, be seen as promoting a desired heir, since Abbas can eject Al-Sheikh from that position at any time).

A Hamas military attack on Fatah positions is possible as soon as Hamas recognizes an opportunity to launch it.

As far as Israel is concerned, there is no replacement for the PA; who would rule Area A of the West Bank in the PA’s place? Should Israel once again enter the Palestinian cities and assume direct responsibility over millions of Palestinians, in addition to being responsible for water and electricity? This is a delusional concept.

As such, Israel must work to ensure the preservation of the PA in the post-Abbas era, despite the PA’s many failings.

It is likely that Israel would intervene in one way or another militarily to prevent a Hamas coup in the West Bank since this would breach an Israeli red line.

David Hacham served for 30 years in various intelligence and political-strategic positions in the IDF, including eight years in the Gaza Strip as advisor for Arab affairs to successive commanders of the Southern Command and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. Read full bio here.

Israel's new government braces for Palestinian escalation

By David Hacham

With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu forming his new government, the Palestinian Authority has little to no expectation that the diplomatic process with Israel will be resumed in the near future. Since Netanyahu’s victory in the November 1 election, Palestinian rhetoric toward Israel has been radical and antagonistic.

From the Palestinian perspective, the new Netanyahu government with its overtly right-wing coalition partners places a breakthrough with Israel in the realm of the impossible. In late December, the Fatah Revolutionary Council led by Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas described the incoming government as “a gang of murderers who will prove beyond question that Israel is an apartheid state.”

The council added that the government’s planned agenda for the future of the West Bank will trigger a major explosion if the international community does not intervene “and prevent Israel from realizing its bloody ambitions.” The council also endorsed Palestinian resistance measures, noting that these should be conducted in accordance with international law.

Abbas addressed the council meeting in Ramallah and offered his pessimistic outlook. Radical figures have risen to power in Israel, he said, obligating Palestinians to oppose the fascist new government.

Of the many, potentially unacceptable decisions, from the Palestinian perspective, that are likely to be made by Israel, legalizing outposts in the West Bank and paving new byroads for settlers are some of the most immediate concerns. The PA states such moves will make a future Palestinian independent state essentially unattainable.

Netanyahu will act responsibly, but the Palestinian arena is volatile

Netanyahu is clearly aware of these worries, which exist not only on the Palestinian side but also among pragmatic Sunni Arab states, including the Gulf States that are now in open partnership with Israel under the Abraham Accords.

Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf States, the United States administration, and European Union members have all recently declared their unwavering support for the goal of an independent Palestinian state.

As a result of these pressures, Netanyahu will likely act as a responsible adult and support a balanced, pragmatic approach toward the Palestinians while reigning in his government’s more radical elements. In addition, Netanyahu’s stated goal of broadening the normalization circle to include Saudi Arabia will depend on the adoption of such a pragmatic approach.

In the meantime, the Palestinian arena is volatile, with escalating security incidents reaching near-boiling points. The determination of terrorist organizations and individuals operating outside of organized frameworks to conduct attacks against Israeli targets is currently sky-high, as is planning for the execution of such attacks.

The significant spike in tensions and security incidents in the West Bank, the continued protests by Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails, particularly around the issue of administrative detention, combined with growing fears about the Israeli government’s capacity to manage radical ideological elements within its ranks could set the stage for a third intifada.

EARLY SIGNS of such a scenario are already visible. Frequent violent clashes occur regularly between the IDF and Palestinian terrorists, as well as between Israeli civilians living in the West Bank and Palestinian civilians.

Attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians by Palestinian gunmen who have a clear organizational affiliation, as well as those with no such affiliation, have risen starkly this past year. Clashes are also taking place in known flashpoints between the IDF and Palestinian rioters, as well as between Israeli and Palestinian civilians.

Meanwhile, there have been numerous incidents of firebombings, rock throwing, and the planting of explosives by terrorists along West Bank roads and at other flashpoints in the territory. According to figures from various sources, some 170 Palestinians have been killed in clashes with the IDF since the start of the year, with most of them, although not all, involving armed combatants and terrorists.

As a result, the PA leadership is attempting to take advantage of the large number of Palestinian casualties in order to destroy Israel’s credibility, undermine its worldwide reputation and rally the international community against the incoming Netanyahu government.

Abbas voiced this escalatory and adversarial strategy in his comments to the Fatah Revolutionary Council when he vowed that the PA would expand political and popular protests, though he did not go into details regarding what those protests would look like.

Abbas has long-held a dual approach to the issue of Palestinian violence, condemning armed terror attacks on Israelis in the past but also supporting all recent terrorists, irrespective of whether they opened fire, stabbed or threw explosives at Israelis.

It is worth noting that in a recent media interview, Abbas stated that he had previously opposed armed conflict with Israel but warned that his opinion could change in light of Israel’s behavior. Such comments reflect the stress and frustration that Abbas and the PA are currently experiencing. Nevertheless, security coordination between Israel and the PA is continuing at this stage.

Under these circumstances, Palestinians continue to stand still, failing to move toward any of their political and strategic objectives. Meanwhile, against the backdrop of increased tensions and violence in the West Bank, the relative calm in Gaza stands in stark contrast.

From its vantage point in Gaza, Hamas will keep a close eye on events at sensitive ignition points, particularly the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, and on the escalating situation in the West Bank, searching for new ways to boost its foothold there.

Hamas is exploiting the current escalation, planning its next moves and marketing itself as the future leadership of the entire Palestinian people in place of the PA and Fatah.

In light of this, PA security forces have begun a campaign of arrests of Hamas operatives and it is fair to assume that Israeli intelligence is enabling some of these arrests.

Under these conditions, Israel must project the message that the political process has not been removed from the table, as part of an effort to prevent escalatory patterns that could quickly spin out of control.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

IRAN'S PROXY PIJ, BEHIND ESCALATION HAMAS STAYING OUT, FOR NOW

By David Hacham

Iran’s puppet in the Palestinian arena, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), is a purely military-terrorist organization with a clear pro-Iranian orientation.

With some 10,000 armed members, it is the second largest armed faction in Gaza behind the ruling faction, Hamas, which, while expressing support for PIJ so far, has not rushed to join in the combat – and for good reason, though this could change.

Designated as a terror organization by the United States, Britain, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan, the PIJ was founded by Gazan radical Islamists, who fused fanatical Islamic ideology with nationalism as a tool to promote the goal of destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamic state. PIJ was the first organization to position itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah party.  

The Sunni PIJ is hugely dependent on external supporters, first and foremost, the Shi’ite Islamic Republic of Iran. It is no coincidence that PIJ’s leader, Ziyad Al-Nakhalah, has spent recent days in Tehran with his backers, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

PIJ is also dependent on support from the Assad regime in Syria, which permits Nakhalah to run a PIJ headquarters from Damascus, as well as from Beirut.

While the PIJ makes local operational decisions, they are in tune with the overall expectations and instructions that Iran transmits to its Palestinian proxy. Iran is actively behind the current escalation and is far from being a passive onlooker.  

Tehran finances almost the whole of the PIJ’s annual budget, and while it directly armed PIJ in past years, today PIJ produces rockets in Gazan factories, based on Iranian know-how.

The central question at the time of this writing is whether Hamas will join the fighting. At this stage, the impression is that Hamas is in no rush to get involved, and this is due to the fact that Hamas absorbed a painful blow from Israel during its own May 2021 conflict with Israel. Since then, Hamas has been licking its wounds, recovering militarily, rebuilding its rocket stockpiles, and encouraging civilian-economic-humanitarian rehabilitation efforts in Gaza as well.

Hamas thus has no immediate and real interest to join the fighting against Israel. It fears that doing so would set it back considerably in terms of military, civilian, and economic damages.

It is fair to assume that Israel’s combat objectives are designed to avoid encouraging Hamas from jumping into the fray. Israel has been focusing its military activity on pinpoint strikes on targets designed to avoid drawing Hamas into the fight.

Still, none of this guarantees that Hamas will remain uninvolved. In the event of an IDF operation resulting in the unintentional killing of large numbers of Palestinian civilians, not only would large-scale international pressure come down on Israel to end its campaign, but also, Hamas would be far more likely to join hostilities. As long as the operation continues, the risk of operational errors grows.

Precisely for this reason, Israel has an interest in limiting the extent of fighting to the extent that it can. On the other hand, PIJ has an opposite interest – in dragging out hostilities in the hope that the IDF makes a mistake, resulting in Hamas joining forces with PIJ on the battlefield.

Either way, even if a ceasefire is implemented in Gaza, observers should have no illusions. An escalation could erupt anew at any time. The conflict between Israel and Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a story that has no end.

Still, Israel does not want to get dragged into the Gazan mud in the form of a large-scale ground operation, which would result in Israeli casualties and damage national morale.

In addition, Israel has a clear set of priorities in terms of its security challenges, and Gaza is not at the top of the list. Iran and its nuclear program are very much at the top of the priority list, followed by Iranian entrenchment efforts in Syria, and Tehran’s military assistance to Hezbollah.

Hence, Israel cannot invest all of its energy in Gaza, when it has other threats to prioritize.

Israel took the initiative, launching Operation Breaking Dawn on August 5 and assassinating PIJ northern commander Taysar Jabari in a surprise aerial strike, along with additional strikes on PIJ attack cells approaching the Israeli border.

This was a similar opening to move to that employed in Operation Black Belt in November 2019, which began with the assassination of Baha Abu al-Atta, Jabari’s predecessor. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi presided over both targeted killing operations.

In both 2019 and now, the IDF worked to attack PIJ targets exclusively and tried to avoid an escalation with Hamas.

Jabari, 50, had previously served as deputy to his late predecessor, Abu al-Atta, as head of PIJ operations, and as a coordinator of PIJ activities with Hamas. Jabari coordinated hundreds of rocket launches at Israel during the May 2021 conflict. After surviving past assassination attempts, he met his end on Friday.

During the current operation, the head of PIJ’s southern division, Khaled Mansour, who was involved in rocket fire against Israel during the May 2021 conflict, was also killed by the IDF in a targeted strike.

After the May 2021 conflict, southern Israel experienced almost total quiet, something not seen in Gaza for years. Hamas and PIJ exploited this to rebuild their military capabilities, including replenishing their rocket stockpiles.  

Hamas reaped the benefits of international efforts aimed at rebuilding Gaza’s civilian infrastructure, led by Egypt, and ongoing Qatari financial support for needy Gazan families, as well as fuel for Gaza’s power plant. Israel also encouraged this process by providing permits for 15,000 Gazan workers to enter Israel for employment.  

This escalation could torpedo the process of Israeli civilian gestures toward the Gazan population.  

In the end, civilians on both sides are, once again, paying the cost for the uncompromising radical ideology of Gaza’s terror organizations, which are willing to sacrifice the lives of Palestinians for their own extremist goals. This operation is one more station in what Gaza’s Islamic terrorist groups see as a never-ending journey of conflict.  

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Hamas is preparing to exploit the PA’s security vacuum

By David Hacham

The Hamas terror organization is preparing to exploit what it believes to be an impending security vacuum in the West Bank to undermine the stability of its rival, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority.

In recent days, Palestinian media reports said PA security forces uncovered a Hamas bomb lab near Ramallah, which was part of a wider reported bomb plot to attack the PA’s government headquarters in the West Bank city. The report is the latest sign of Hamas’s plans to destabilize the PA.

Hamas senses that the PA will soon enter into an internal power struggle. Since taking power in elections in January 2005, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has ruled, but now, according to senior Fatah sources, he is considering ending his historic 17-year term.

While rumors of Abbas’s departure have so far been premature – rumors that Hamas made sure to spread and amplify – the succession battle is inevitably heating up as the countdown to the end of his rule continues to gain speed.

Hamas sees an opportunity to boost its status and influence through increased terror attacks against both Israeli and Fatah targets. It believes this will strengthen its attractiveness on the Palestinian street and enable it to challenge the PA’s leadership.

Abbas eventually quashed rumors of his death in a telephoned speech to a conference in Ramallah on the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, in which he vowed that “Jerusalem is not for sale” and promised to fight the Israeli “occupation” of the Temple Mount. Abbas also held an official visit to Cyprus on June 13 to boost his visibility and counter rumors of his demise.

While he is certainly aware that he cannot remain in power for much longer, the leader, who turns 87 this November, is also interested in grasping the steering wheel for as long as possible. In line with calls from the PLO Central Committee, Abbas is threatening to take unprecedented steps in the PA’s diplomatic conflict with Israel, such as terminating its recognition of Israel and ending security coordination with it.

These threats, Abbas believes, improve his image as a Palestinian leader who is committed to patriotic goals, such as not “giving up” on Jerusalem, the so-called right of return for Palestinian refugees, and gaining recognition of east Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state. Abbas also remains committed to the goal of a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank to the 1967 borders.

On a personal level, Abbas is also seeking to ensure the economic well-being of his sons.

Meanwhile, it appears that Abbas has begun actively grooming his preferred successor, Civilian Affairs Minister Hussein al-Sheikh, who was recently appointed Secretary-General of the PLO Executive Committee.

Abbas is increasingly showing preferential treatment to Al-Sheikh, including through the PLO Central Committee appointment, a step that was seen as provocative by other candidates to succeed Abbas as they view it as harming their chances.

With Al-Sheikh’s influence clearly on the rise, rivals like Jibril Rajoub are watching, and quietly preparing themselves for the future power struggle. There are several potential successors in the ring, but Al-Sheikh, who has the backing of the influential head of the PA General Intelligence Service, Majed Faraj, and Rajoub, are the two most prominent ones. The imprisoned Fatah terrorist Marwan Barghouti; the Deputy Chairman of Fatah’s Central Committee,  Mahmoud al-Aloul; and the UAE-based exile, Muhammad Dahlan, who has been banished from Fatah’s ranks, are all candidates as well.

 Hamas too is preparing itself. In addition to its covert terror cells, it is using social media to entrench its status as the leading force on the Palestinian street, and as part of its propaganda campaign aimed at eroding the PA’s influence.

Hamas candidates are winning elections on West Bank Palestinian university campuses and Hamas rhetoric routinely accuses Abbas of being a “collaborator” with Israel and Fatah of being a corrupt entity that has abandoned the Palestinian fight for east Jerusalem.

Other, external actors are trying to stabilize the situation, as demonstrated by recent visits to Ramallah by the Jordanian Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi, and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Barbara Leaf.

These visits are aimed at assisting efforts for calm and preventing the development of chaos and escalation following Abbas’s departure. These actors are joined by Israel in the common desire to see as smooth a transition of power as possible.

The U.S. should now continue to persistently seek stability and prevent a violent power struggle, which would only benefit extremist terrorist elements. The U.S. should also seek to establish channels of contact with would-be successors to Abbas.

Israel too has to prepare for all scenarios, and it too has a central role to play. While it cannot intervene overtly, Israel must prepare for the possible scenario of an attempted Hamas takeover of the West Bank, a red line that Israel can never accept.

This means being prepared to rebuff any Hamas efforts to capture PA posts or sites, based on the understanding that Israel has no option to allow a repeat of the Hamas violent coup in Gaza to play out in the West Bank – an area that overlooks the heart of Israel’s population center and economic hub.

All moderate Sunni-Arab states share the same interest in preventing a Hamas takeover, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Israel, in the meantime, must continue its contacts with the Palestinian Authority and seek to allow Abbas to complete his term honorably. At the same time, it must prepare for multiple scenarios that may emerge and preserve its freedom of action in the West Bank.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Jerusalem will determine the course of this wave of violence

By David Hacham

There is a reason the latest Palestinian terror wave in Israel proper and the West Bank has coincided with Ramadan: The Muslim holy month is an occasion for religious fervor and for some can serve as motivation for launching attacks.  

The current wave of terror has been characterized by a new generation of Palestinian assailants: young, acting alone or in small cells, lacking clear organizational affiliation, and working independently without receiving instructions from any established Palestinian organization.

From a broader perspective, it appears to be occurring as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict shifts to the margins after decades in which it topped the priorities and captured the attention of the Arab regional system since the establishment of the State of Israel.

This is a direct result of the process in which Israel and the moderate Arab camp are growing closer, as expressed by normalization agreements signed between Israel and Arab Gulf states – the UAE and Bahrain – and Morocco, and by the military-security cooperation that is being forged with Sudan.

Against this background, the Palestinian problem has been shoved into the corner. The Israeli government, with its political paralysis, is unable to take any political steps vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority, and the conflict has been pushed into a deep freeze as a result.

Another feature of this wave of terror is Arab-Israeli operatives subscribing to the ideology of ISIS. This was the case in attacks in Beersheba and Hadera in recent weeks. The involvement of attackers subscribing to this ideology exposed a basic weakness in the detection capability of Israel’s security forces, which rely on Shin Bet intelligence monitoring, exposure, and identification of suspicious elements to prevent attacks in time.

The attacks have also shined a fresh spotlight on the ideology of ISIS, which, unlike Hamas, strives to establish a pan-Islamic caliphate here and now.   

Hamas, in contrast, a Muslim Brotherhood branch that rules Gaza, strives in the first stage of its plan to set up a Palestinian Islamic state on the ruins of Israel, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, and only in the future to create the conditions for an Islamic caliphate.

The terrorist attack in Tel Aviv earlier this month is unusual and deserves special attention for another reason. It was carried out by the son of a senior Palestinian Authority security officer, whose organization holds coordination meetings with Israeli counterparts, and works with Israel to foil attacks.

Yet the terrorists’ father praised the atrocity committed by his son, telling crowds gathered outside of his Jenin home, “You will see the victory with Allah’s help in the coming weeks and months. And your eyes will enjoy the change. You will win freedom and will win with Allah’s help and liberate Al Aqsa’s Mosque.”

The IDF and Shin Bet have focused on Jenin and the town’s refugee camp in a series of counter-terror operations. Search and arrest operations have been taking place daily and have sparked exchanges of fire with Palestinian gunmen.

Dozens of Palestinians have been arrested on suspicion of terror activities in Jenin and its environment, as well as other areas across the West Bank.

Further fueling the flames have been ongoing incitement on social media, as well as on Palestinian television and radio. These messages express hostility and hatred to Israel in a way that can increase motivation to attack, among those who consume such content.

At the same time, incitement is surging against the security coordination in place between Israel and PA, not only among left-wing Palestinian terror organizations or Hamas but also within Fatah -- the ruling party in the Palestinian Authority. 

And yet, despite the above, the Gaza Strip has maintained almost absolute quiet for the past year.   The quiet in the Gazan arena derives first and foremost from a decision taken by the Hamas leadership to avoid border fence disturbances or attacks on Israeli targets with ballistic rockets or mortars.  

This is part of a clear trend by Hamas to secure and maintain quiet and prevent scenarios of escalation.

This is a direct result of clear priorities set by Gaza’s rulers, who are prioritizing the recovery and development of Hamas’s military-operational capabilities after the severe blows it absorbed in Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021.

Hamas is also advancing the rehabilitation of civilian infrastructure, with a focus on building roads and setting up new residential neighborhoods in northern Gaza, which are being built by Egypt. Gaza continues to receive monthly payments from Qatar for needy families and for subsidizing the entry of fuels from Egypt that nourish Gaza’s power station.

Hamas under current conditions has no interest currently in launching a new military conflict with Israel. In addition, the Hamas regime in Gaza is even using force in stopping Palestinian Islamic Jihad from firing rockets at Israel in response to PIJ casualties inflicted by Israeli security forces on its members in the West Bank.

Hamas’s reluctance to launch new attacks against Israel from Gaza does not stop senior Hamas members from calling for terrorist attacks against Israel and encouraging attackers to pounce in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

According to media reports, Israel sent warnings messages to Hamas via the Egyptian General Intelligence Service telling the group to restrain itself or face severe consequences.

To further consolidate the security calm in Gaza Israel is continuing to allow 12,000 Gazan workers into Israel for daily work trips. In addition, Israel is weighing the option of increasing the Gaza work permit quota to 20,000.

At the same time, any significant deterioration in clashes, particularly in the Temple Mount and Jerusalem during the sensitive period of Ramadan would increase the chances of a scenario in which Hamas joins in the clashes with Israel.

That would see a renewal of violence along the Gaza- Israel border fence, rocket attacks on southern Israeli communities and cities beyond, and infiltration attempts from Gaza via land and sea routes into Israeli territory to carry out terror attacks.

Despite the above, it is possible to cautiously conclude that at this current time there is no sign that the region is on the brink of a new intifada. Still, further lone-wolf attacks and IDF counter-measures can increase the violent dynamics to the point where the Palestinian side takes on an organized and planned dimension. Under these circumstances, the Israeli defense establishment will do well if it continues in its efforts to prevent collective punishment of Palestinians, thereby avoiding the risk of spreading the unrest and the integration of new, currently uninvolved sectors of Palestinian society into the terrorist circle.  

The military must also work rapidly to block the gaps in the security fence.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Gantz-Abbas meeting strengthens PA ahead of ‘changing of the guard’

By David Hacham

The meeting between Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas at Gantz’s home in Rosh Ha’ayin on December 28 was undoubtedly an important event, but exaggerations of its significance should be avoided.

The meeting – the second between Gantz and Abbas since August, when they met in Ramallah – was held with the full knowledge and approval of Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. The meeting also paved the way for Gantz’s subsequent meeting with Jordan’s King Abdullah in Amman.

The two meetings were the first between the PA leader and a senior Israeli minister for over a decade. They occurred after teams from both sides smoothed over and clarified positions before the discussions, including attempts from Abbas’s office to get Gantz to weigh in on violence by some Israeli settlers, and Israel’s decision to ban six Palestinian NGOs in October that are tied to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) terrorist organization.

These preparations and exchanges of messages mean that the meeting was far more than just a technical discussion on daily affairs.

Still, for a number of reasons, the meeting was of only limited significance. In Israel, the coalition government that has been in place for the past six months is paralyzed and unable to make dramatic decisions on the Palestinian issue, due to its composition. On the Palestinian side, Abbas is in the twilight zone of his rule, and power struggles are already raging under the surface over who among Fatah’s senior ranks will succeed him.

The positions that each side put forward before the meeting accurately reflect the true nature of the gap between their respective expectations. The Palestinian side stressed ‘on the ground’ issues, civilian-economic affairs, and the importance of diplomatic progress on the horizon to promote a political solution that grants the Palestinians statehood.

In a tweet, the PA’s Civilian Affairs Minister Hussein El-Sheikh said the meeting represents the last opportunity “before the explosion” that will result from a dead end. He described a “serious attempt” to open a political path based on “international legitimacy that will end escalatory steps against Palestinians.”

During the talks, it is fair to assume that Abbas took advantage of the fact that Gantz is in charge of ties with the PA to flag potentially explosive developments on the ground that can lead to a security escalation, as well as arguing for the necessity of taking steps to restart political talks between the PA and Israel.

Abbas also likely related the message that despite the covert battle to succeed him, he remains the only authorized representative of the Palestinian people capable of working with Israel to promote a political process and prevent an uncontrollable security deterioration. However, even if the political process came up, it is also fair to assume that it was discussed in a shallow manner.

From Abbas’s perspective, arriving at Gantz’s home and risking harm to his image on the Palestinian street looks like the right call, since he was able to send a message to Israel warning of an escalation around the corner. 

Gantz, who was IDF chief of staff during the 2014 conflict between Hamas and Israel, is perceived among Palestinians as a war criminal who killed thousands – yet Abbas still chose to visit him at his home.

In Israel, efforts to minimize the importance of the meeting were clearly made by the government, as well as the claim that no political dialogue took place, and that only civilian-security matters were discussed.

Gantz’s office said that the two-and-a-half-hour meeting saw talks on strengthening security coordination, boosting stability, and preventing terrorism and violence. According to this narrative, the political dialogue, if it occurred, was marginal.

Still, it seems unlikely that Abbas would have left Ramallah and entered the Israeli defense minister’s home only to talk about civilian-humanitarian issues.

The Palestinian public holds tense expectations for changes on the ground, particularly in reining in provocative steps by some settlers, limiting settlement construction, promoting Palestinian construction in Area C of the West Bank, and promoting economic projects.

Palestinian sources also said that Abbas called on Gantz to reverse the decision to ban the Palestinian NGOs, reduce tensions in both east Jerusalem and the West Bank, and return the bodies of Palestinian terrorists killed carrying out attacks.

And indeed, the meeting saw Israeli steps taken subsequently to reduce tensions, including the decision to allow 6,000 West Bank residents and 3,500 Gazan residents into the Palestinian population census, thereby assisting people who had no defined resident status until now.

Israel also agreed to facilitate early payment of taxes it collects for the PA, to the tune of NIS 100 million, and to provide 600 entry permits to Palestinian businesspeople. Senior PA officials have been promised VIP permits granting them free travel.

The PA is also set to benefit from a new Israeli pilot program that allows shipping containers to enter from Jordan via the Allenby Crossing and the creation of an online platform for Israeli employers to pay Palestinian employees.

The online system will lead to a rise in bank transfers, and the PA is expected to make some NIS 40 million per month in taxes from this.

Palestinian opposition elements, meanwhile, fiercely criticized Abbas since they perceived the meeting as a tool for tightening security coordination with Israel.

Hamas operatives published a cartoon that showed Abbas as a pathetic, mocked, surrendering figure, shining Gantz’s shoes. A Hamas spokesperson described the meeting as a knife in the back of the Palestinians, while a Palestinian Islamic Jihad figure said the meeting demonstrates that Abbas is a “contractor” for Israel.

In the broad historical perspective, Abbas’s meeting with Gantz is not unusual – past Israeli prime ministers such as Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Ehud Barak met with the late PLO chief leader Yasser Arafat in their own homes too.  Yet unlike past meetings, the current meeting was held under conditions of Israeli government paralysis on the Palestinian issue.

From the Israeli perspective, the meeting was useful in further boosting security coordination, mutual confidence-building, and strengthening the PA’s position while weakening Hamas and its goal of increasing its influence in the West Bank, before going on to take over the entire Palestinian government system.   

It is reasonable to assume that Israel will continue to pursue its interests in the Palestinian arena overtly and covertly in the post-Abbas era, and that means not allowing Hamas to take over, while working with both Abbas and whoever replaces him.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

West Bank terror is a reminder of Gaza’s ‘deceptive calm’

By David Hacham

After arresting four terror suspects on suspicion of carrying out the deadly attack near Homesh, in which Israeli civilian Yehuda Dimentman, 25, was murdered, Israel Defense Forces spokesman Ran Kochav said on Sunday that the attack was likely orchestrated from the Gaza Strip.

It has since transpired that the terror cell belonged to Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, a former Arab-affairs adviser to seven Israeli defense ministers and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, told JNS such incidents are the latest reminder of just how deceptively calm the Gaza Strip really is.

While Hamas and PIJ maintains calm in Gaza, it works around the clock to set the West Bank and Jerusalem alight with violence and terrorism.

“The calm in Gaza does not come from a dramatic change in Hamas’s fundamental stance or ideology towards Israel, but rather, from a sober assessment by Hamas, based on the needs of the hour and a need to create economic assistance for Gaza,” he stated.

“What stands out is Hamas’s double game. In Gaza, Hamas safeguards quiet and continues indirect talks with Israel on a larger arrangement for the Strip. Hamas is also negotiating for a swap deal in which Israel would release many security prisoners and receive in exchange the bodies of two IDF personnel killed in action, and two civilians being held captive. At the same time, Hamas and PIJ are working to escalate the situation in the West Bank and Jerusalem,” said Hacham.

These attempts include both directly orchestrating large-scale terror cells and glorifying the recent series of knife and gun attacks on Israeli civilians. “Hamas hugs the terrorists and hands out candy when they attack. They often rush to take credit for attacks,” he said.

The ability of security forces to kill or capture terrorists soon after the attack helps douse the flames of motivation to carry out further attacks, said Hacham, but only up to a certain point.

“Hamas is operating this double game because it is less deterred by Israel than before. It allows itself to play this game because it feels it has more room for maneuver,” said Hacham. “The resulting situation is highly unusual. Israel keeps opening up more resources for Gaza and assists the Gaza economy, receiving quiet from Gaza. At the same time, Hamas and PIJ keep exploiting the situation to ignite the West Bank and Jerusalem.”

Hacham called on Israel to reject this situation and to send a message to the Hamas leadership in Gaza, “telling them that they are playing with fire, and that over time, Israel will lose its patience or that its future steps will be different.”

A recent visit by Foreign Minister Yair Lapid to Egypt may have been used by Israel to send just such a message. Egypt, for its part, is continuing is mediating role between Israel and Hamas in order to enable a prisoner swap deal and the wider Gazan arrangement. To that end, a delegation of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate arrived in Gaza on Sunday in order to promote these efforts.

Egypt’s efforts are occurring against the background of an IDF exercise in southern Israel, simulating escalation scenarios with Hamas in Gaza. Hamas, for its part, is planning a parallel exercise in its own territory. Both sides are applying operational lessons learned during the May conflict between Hamas and Israel in their war exercises.

Egypt has pledged $500 million for Gaza, but this money has yet to be transferred, creating tensions with Hamas.

Rebuilding the military wing

Since the end of the May conflict between Israel and Hamas, the terror organization has spent months rebuilding its armed wing in Gaza, consolidating the movement’s position while building terror infrastructure in the West Bank and eastern Jerusalem.

This has seen large-scale rocket building, said Hacham, since the May conflict showed Hamas that it can use rocket launches to consolidate its position as “guardian” of the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, and to beef up its position in Lebanon and other areas.

Hacham named Salah Al-Arouri, the deputy Hamas political bureau chief and the head of a headquarters dedicated to launching terrorism from the West Bank, as a central figure, saying “he works from Lebanon and from Turkey to oversee West Bank terror.”

“Hamas works according to a planned out assessment, but sometimes it stretches the rope too far, and this can lead to uncontrolled escalations,” he cautioned.

On Dec. 14, Hamas marked the 34th year since its founding. This year the commemoration was held against the background of an escalating security situation in eastern Jerusalem and the West Bank, said Hacham.

Still, the ongoing security coordination in place between the IDF and Shin Bet intelligence agency on the one hand, and the Palestinian Authority security forces on the other continues to help prevent attacks from going ahead, he said.

“The P.A. also has an interest in restricting the steps of Hamas in the West Bank and stopping it from lifting its head. When two Israeli youths entered Ramallah [on Dec. 1], it was P.A. forces that saved them and stopped a lynching from happening. Had this not have occurred, the incident could have turned out to be extremely significant,” said Hacham.

Aid from Egypt and Qatar

Meanwhile, the Hamas armed infrastructure taken apart by the Shin Bet in October represents a major attempt by the terror faction to regain its foothold in the West Bank, he cautioned.

Ultimately, Hacham said, Hamas has not and will not budge by a millimeter from its religious ideology to launch an “uncompromising fight against Israel until its destruction.”

To that end, Hamas is also maneuvering in such a way that it can exploit the post-May conflict time frame to rebuild Gaza. Israel, which has an interest in keeping Gaza quiet, has opened up the Kerem Shalom goods crossing and allowing thousands of trucks per day to inject basic supplies into Gaza.

Egypt is sending industrial construction equipment and building vehicles through the Rafah border crossing, and Qatar is sending Hamas $350 million per year.

To help pay Hamas’s estimated 30,000-strong civilian regime employees, Qatar has begun paying $10 million to Egypt to purchase fuel, and Hamas receives it free of charge, selling it to the Gaza power station.

Qatar sends $10 million per month through banks to 100,000 needy Gazan families under U.N. supervision and sends another $10 million to Gaza’s power plant directly.

This arrangement enables Gaza to “keep its head above water,” said Hacham. It allows Qatar to market itself as a supporter of Hamas, Palestinians and the Muslim Brotherhood. “Qatar wants a place under the sun, to have influence,” he explained.

Despite all of the above, Hamas is still threatening a new escalation if its demands for the gradual lifting of the “blockade” are not met. This means more Gazan workers allowed into Israel, the entry of more goods into Gaza, promoting the reconstruction of Gaza after “Operation Guardian of the Walls” in May and progress on the prisoner-swap deal.

Since August, “like magic,” all arson balloons, shooting attacks and other security incidents from Gaza have stopped, said Hacham, “once again illustrating Hamas’s exclusive control of the situation in the Strip and over other armed factions. Hamas decides whether there will be quiet or not, and if not, the scope of violence.”

By definition, Hacham warned, this situation is temporary, and Israel should avoid any delusions that this can go on for years.

“It can reverse itself immediately because of tactical, unplanned incidents or because of a decision to initiate conflict by Hamas,” said Hacham. “Israel cannot rest on its laurels. The IDF has to monitor the situation closely all of the time and prepare for every scenario.”

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The PA sobers up on expectations from the Biden administration

By David Hacham

Just over a  year on from President Joe Biden’s election victory, the Palestinian Authority is showing signs of adopting more sober, realistic expectations from his administration.

One clear example is the understanding in Ramallah that the United States will not return its embassy to Tel Aviv from Jerusalem, and that the move to Israel’s capital is a fait accompli. Biden can’t simply turn the clock back.

In addition, the PA also appears to be coming to terms with the limitations of what Israel’s fragile coalition government can do in the Palestinian arena.

Despite the lack of any significant diplomatic-political developments on the Palestinian front, no new major crisis has developed in relations between the PA and Israel, or the U.S. That is because Ramallah now anticipates  a freeze in any diplomatic progress.

This was far from being inevitable. Following President Donald Trump’s failure to gain re-election, the PA and its President, Mahmoud Abbas, initially expected new American trends and gestures toward the Palestinians, characterized by support and more active American attention to the Palestinian problem.

Those expectations were accompanied by hopes that the U.S. would lead attempts to reignite diplomatic talks between the PA and Israel over a peace settlement, after almost a decade of stalled talks.

Today, however the Palestinian leadership is aware that current conditions simply do not allow for such developments. Israel’s unusual coalition make-up, in which right-wing and left-wing parties make up the government, means that policy changes on the Palestinian issue are practically impossible. In the U.S., the Biden administration is preoccupied with rebuilding the American economy, ending the pandemic, and dealing with China.

It is now clear to the PA that chances of any diplomatic breakthrough are slim to none.

This did not stop Ramallah from sending a detailed document to Washington containing a list of 30 concrete suggested steps to take in the Palestinian arena. These include consolidating the PA’s rule in the West Bank, strengthening the Palestinian economy, and raising the standard of living for West Bank Palestinians.

The rational for sending such a document is that the American administration can promote some of those recommendations quietly and discreetly. Specific steps listed in the document include increasing the number of permits for  Palestinians to work in Israel, enabling more family unifications of Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, and enabling Palestinian construction in Area C of the West Bank.

Despite the aspirations detailed in the list, the overall assessment in Ramallah is that declarations on the Palestinian issue in Washington are little more than lip service.

This attitude found expression in a PLO Executive Committee meeting held on October 19 in Ramallah, chaired by Abbas. The Committee assessed relations with the U.S. after nine months of the Biden administration being in power, and noted the slow-motion political-diplomatic activity regarding Washington’s Palestinian policies, and the economic hardships faced by  the PA.

Still, the low expectations from the Biden administration can be seen in a different light when compared to Ramallah’s experience of four years of the Trump administration, which the Palestinians viewed as nothing short of a nightmare.

During that time, the U.S. recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, moved its ambassador to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, froze annual financial support to the PA, and ceased aid to UNRWA. The U.S. shuttered the PLO Office in Washington and sent the PLO ambassador packing. It also stopped financial assistance to the PA’s security forces.  

All of these steps were however overshadowed by Trump’s ‘deal of the century’ peace plan, which paved the way for significant Israeli annexation of the parts of the West Bank, and buried the idea of a peace agreement between Israel and the PLO based on the 1967 borders, which is the only concept that Ramallah supports.

When Biden dismissed the ‘deal of the century,’ sighs of relief in Ramallah could be heard loud and clear. That relief, however, quickly gave way to a realization that American activity to renew the political process between Israel and the Palestinians would be slow and sporadic.

Still, Washington restarted funding programs to the PA and UNRWA, and the Palestinians were clearly glad that Biden had won, despite the limitations that have come to light since his election victory.

This satisfaction, however, is intermixed with sober, limited expectations, after hopes that the U.S. would take a stronger stand on Israeli settlement construction were left unanswered.

When Biden said during his UN General Assembly speech on September 21 that the two-state solution cannot be realized at this time, the U.S.’s lack of any rush to invest resources in new peace talks became more apparent than ever.

Biden is busy with dealing with the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic and kickstarting the American economy. His administration has no plans under the current conditions to allocate attention to the effort to reach new Israeli – Palestinian political agreements.

The administration’s failure so far to appoint a permanent representative for Israel and Palestinian affairs is another sign of the low priority Washington assigns to this issue. Instead, it makes do with sending Hady Amr, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli and Palestinian affairs, to the region on visits.

According to media reports, Israeli sources who met Amr on his visit in mid-July heard concerns from Washington about the PA’s economic situation, and pressure on Israel to assist Ramallah to avoid a cashflow crisis. This request was answered by Defense Minister Benny Gantz, who approved a 500-million-dollar loan to the PA, based on tax collection funds that Israel transfers to Ramallah (Israel has withheld some of this money over the PA’s practice of paying salaries to security prisoners and families of terrorists). In addition, Amr discussed ways to assist Gaza’s humanitarian situation following the May armed conflict between Hamas and Israel.

During his meeting with PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayah, Amr called for tighter relations between Washington and Ramallah, and for Israel to facilitate  Gazan reconstruction efforts. UNRWA announced a new cooperation agreement with the U.S. during the visit, according to which the agency will receive 136.8 million dollars, in addition to the 150 million dollars it already received from Washington, and a payment of 33 million dollars sent in May. Still, this assistance likely represents the limits of what the U.S. plans to do in the region for now.

Secretary of State Blinken’s harsh criticism of Israel’s decision to build 3100 housing units in the West Bank in October (alongside approval for 1400 Palestinian units) – all in Area C – represents minor pressure on Israel.

The administration’s condemnation of Israel’s decision to declare six Palestinian human rights organizations as entities tied to the PFLP terror organization led to a need by Israel to clarify its decision, and to explain the background and intelligence that drove it.

Ultimately, the U.S. is aware that applying too much pressure on the Bennett government and forcing its hand would expose it to destabilizing domestic pressure from the Israeli Right. This is something the American administration apparently wishes to avoid.

The Palestinians, for their part, have adopted a wait-and-see approach, and are patiently biding their time to see whether the Biden administration will provide them with more significant gains further down the road.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Gaza: An unofficial calm takes hold

By David Hacham

The current situation in Gaza can best be described as de facto, but not de jure calm.

It is a calm that has been led by Egypt's effort to promote a longer-term arrangement in Gaza, as part of its interest in re-establishing itself as a leading player in the Arab arena, by fulfilling an active central role in Palestinian affairs.  

In addition, Cairo wants Egyptian companies to take part in projects aimed at rebuilding Gaza and to take advantage of budgets allocated for that purpose.

Hamas, for its part, is motivated to maintain the calm in order to reap maximum benefits from it. Meanwhile, Hamas is diverting the conflict with Israel toward the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and it hopes to also get Arab-Israelis involved.  

The ongoing calm in Gaza has been bolstered by the authorization of 6,000 work permits for Gazan workers and traders to work in Israel on a daily basis. Tens of thousands of Gazans signed up at trade bureaus in Gaza to work in Israel, signaling the importance of working in Israel for them in light of Gaza’s severe economic crisis.

There is a continuous flow of goods entering Gaza from Israel via the Kerem Shalom crossing, including products and material such as wood and steel. Humanitarian assistance enters the Strip on a daily basis.

Reconstruction of civilian infrastructure, following the May security escalation between Hamas and Israel, is occurring under the leadership and auspices of Egypt.

There has been no significant progress on negotiations between Hamas and Israel to secure the release of the remains of two IDF personnel killed in the 2014 conflict in Gaza as well as two civilians being held captive in the Strip. There has been plenty of psychological warfare and disinformation by Hamas on the issue, giving false impressions of progress, when in fact no such progress has been made.

Although Israel has conditioned significant Gazan recovery efforts on progress on the MIA issue, it has not objected to Egyptian efforts to lead Gazan recovery programs from its side, via the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Sinai.

Egypt has been moving construction equipment, workers, engineers, and infrastructure and road-building materials into Gaza, with the backing of the U.S., and in coordination with Israel.

This role serves Egypt’s interest of playing an active role in Gaza following the May military escalation, and as part of Cairo’s campaign to display its centrality to regional stability to the Biden administration, which recently reduced its annual military aid to Egypt in protest over human rights issues.

Meanwhile, Egyptian Intelligence Minister Abbas Kamel is leading the mediation efforts between Israel and Hamas over the MIA issue, with Germany also taking a part. However, those efforts are largely redundant in light of the fact that Egypt has become the outlet for Gaza’s construction – and large-scale Gazan construction efforts have been a key Hamas condition for undeclared calm.

Ultimately, Egypt’s interest is also to keep Gaza contained and to prevent a new escalation, as such an escalation can also spill over into the Sinai, where ISIS remains active. The U.S., recently sent its Deputy Assistant Secretary for Israeli and Palestinian affairs, Hady Amr, to the region to promote Egypt’s efforts.

The above factors contribute to an overall assessment that Gaza is headed for a quiet period, albeit temporary. Israel is certainly a part of these efforts, easing certain security restrictions, and allowing materials that it previously barred to enter from its territory into Gaza.

In October,  Hamas sent a delegation for talks in Cairo, after an Israeli delegation visited the Egyptian capital.

Hamas sent its upper leadership to Egypt. The delegation discussed the MIA issue, assistance to Gaza from Israel, and possibilities leading to a fuller arrangement with Israel.

The Hamas delegation was headed by the organization’s political bureau chief  Ismael Haniyeh and included the head of Hamas in the West Bank, Lebanon-based Salah Al-Arouri, who is responsible for terror activity in that sector, as well as the head of Hamas’s overseas bureau, Khaled Mashaal, and the head of Hamas’s Gazan political bureau, Yahya Sinwar.

The delegation held prolonged talks with Kamal, and with members of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate.  It was the first time in a lengthy period in which the most senior Hamas operatives from leadership ranks – from both the territories and abroad – visited Egypt.

Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate holds the Israeli-Palestinian portfolio, and it is in charge of coordinating contacts with the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. The Directorate’s chief mission is to deepen the calm in Gaza.  

The visit displays a willingness by Hamas to acknowledge Egypt’s leadership role, and to hold a dialogue with Cairo over ways to promote a longer-term arrangement with Israel.

As behind-the-scenes diplomacy continues, Gaza is entering a time of several weeks of quiet, with Hamas seeing some of its core demands accepted and met – albeit unofficially.  

Qatari cash has also been flowing in for needy Gazan families, and recent Hamas demands for more Qatari money to enter are fairly standard. Qatar’s envoy to Gaza, Mohammad al-Emadi, visited the Strip in recent days, signifying that the Qatari involvement and cash assistance remains active and in motion. Hamas is intent on setting up a fixed mechanism for allowing the third part of the Qatari grant money to arrive, and assist some 30,000 Hamas government employees receive their salaries.

Hamas shares an interest in promoting calm, to serve its current goal of improving the socio-economic situation of Gazans – a goal it has pursued through violent extortion. It is therefore allowing a rise in the number of traders and workers who can work in Israel (and the West Bank).

As Hamas focuses on promoting an unofficial calm in Gaza, it has recently escalated its terrorist activities in the West Bank. A large-scale IDF counter-terrorist operation, based on Shin Bet intelligence alerts, earlier this month to disband an imminent Hamas plot to attack the Jerusalem area is evidence of these efforts.

Hamas’s demands of Israel to release large numbers of Palestinian prisoners in exchange for releasing Israeli MIAs and civilians are impossible for Israel to meet. While in the past it appeared as if this was a major stumbling block to stabilizing Gaza, it now seems that Hamas, Egypt, and Israel, backed by the U.S. and with Qatari cash, have found unofficial ways to enter into a period of calm – although no one knows how long it will last.

Despite Hamas’s maximalist demands on the MIA issue, Gaza has cooled off – for now. Hamas’s long-term objectives remain unchanged: Non-recognition of Israel’s existence, together with war against it and the establishment of an Islamic state on Israel’s ruins. 

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Palestinian and regional players prepare for life after Abbas

By David Hacham

The Palestinian Authority’s rule in the West Bank is facing a series of challenges, ranging from regular clashes between Palestinians and the IDF and settlers to Hamas’s strategic program to consolidate its foothold in the territory.

Nevertheless, the PA has been able to maintain overall security control, even as the era of President Mahmoud Abbas appears to be in its last lap.

The question of whether the PA will be able to maintain its grip, in light of its significant political weakness, is however becoming acute as fears grow over the scenario of a post-Abbas era marked by instability and violent clashes.

Abbas himself has done little to ease concerns, since he, like Arafat before him, has avoided fostering a clear successor to replace him.

Sources in Fatah remain optimistic that even if a post-Abbas succession power struggle creates tensions, it will not deteriorate into all-out chaos and conflict. According to this assumption, the relevant external power players involved in the Palestinian arena – Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and the international community – mainly the United States and the European Union –  will activate their influence to prevent this scenario from coming to pass.

Jordan has already tried to introduce stability by suggesting to Abbas that he appoints three deputies – one in charge of political affairs, the second to supervise security, and the third to run economic affairs – so as to safeguard Abbas’s position and ensure a continuous, functional PA government in the post-Abbas era.

It appears as if Abbas has yet to answer this proposal. This has led observers in Ramallah to the conclusion that following Abbas’s departure a temporary transition council made up of senior Fatah members will take over –  with three separate figures for the PA, the PLO, and Fatah –  until conditions ripen for an approved leader to take over the Palestinian leadership.

Meanwhile, conditions on the ground are marked by tensions and security incidents, as demonstrated by Israel’s recent arrest of two escaped Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists in Jenin. Israel is now making a concerted effort to avoid Palestinian casualties in its operations, including during the Jenin operation, out of an awareness that significant casualties could undermine the PA’s stability. The PA is encouraged by Israel’s restraint.

The IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, asked Central Command to reduce incidents of deadly clashes after a recent period in which over 40 Palestinians were killed in clashes with the IDF in regular hot spots.

Despite these incidents, the scenario of a broad popular uprising does not look near, or realistic.

Still, should new incidents lead to new casualties, a broader security deterioration could very much be back on the agenda.

Over the past months, known friction zones have stood out as sources of a potential escalation. These include Kfar Beta, south of Nablus, located near the Israeli outpost of Evyatar, where settlers have been evicted by the IDF, but soldiers remain. Palestinians have employed the tactics of Hamas ‘nighttime harassment operatives’ on the Gaza border at this West Bank site, and engaged in nocturnal incidents.

Other hotpots have included Silwad, Abu Dis, and elsewhere.

In Palestinian refugee camps in Jenin and in Balata near Nablus, the sight of gunmen marching in the streets has recently become more common. Firefights between armed terrorists and Israeli security forces have increased in recent months in these camps.

The battle for succession is growing more intense

Meanwhile, within Fatah and the PA, the succession battle over who will replace Abbas is growing more intense. Would-be successors include the current Palestinian Prime Minister, Mohammad Shtayyeh; Fatah Deputy Chairman Fatah, Mahmoud Aloul; Fatah Central Committee Secretary General, Jibril Rajoub; Minister for Civilian Affairs, Hussein al-Sheikh; General Intelligence Services chief, Majed Faraj; and imprisoned Fatah terrorist Marwan Barghouti. Additional candidates include former Fatah senior member Mohammed Dahlan who Abbas expelled from Fatah a decade ago due to an intense personal rivalry.

All of the aforementioned  are in a state of heightened expectation and are closely following developments as they prepare for ‘D-Day’ – the day that Abbas departs the arena.

Other senior figures are fearful that once D-Day comes, their careers will end, and that perhaps their personal safety will be at risk. These include Intisar Abu Amara, the influential head of Abbas’s bureau; PA Police Chief, Hazem Atallah, and PA Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki. 

These figures are examining options and preparing possible escape routes, lest it become too late for them to move.

Meanwhile within the PA, al-Sheikh and Faraj are both growing stronger and they are closest to Abbas due to their position as members of his inner most circle. They take part in Abbas’s meetings in Ramallah and accompany him on official international visits.

Abbas is gradually losing his power and within Fatah itself there are those who see him becoming a lame duck leader. As a result of the above conditions, the PA can be described as being strong security wise and in possession of security forces with proven capabilities that continue to wield deterrence – but weak politically.

The first visit from an Israeli minister

On August 30, Defense Minister Benny Gantz visited Abbas in Ramallah, becoming the first senior Israeli minister to do so in over a decade. Abbas reported to the PLO’s Executive Committee after the meeting that Gantz stressed Israel’s commitment to the two-state solution as a basis for a future arrangement, but that he also recognized that the political reality in Israel meant that the Israeli government in its current make-up could not take steps toward a political process.

The meeting nevertheless produced a series of practical steps with the most noteworthy of them being an Israeli loan of 500 million shekels to Ramallah in order to strengthen the PA. According to Fatah sources, this loan, which comes from cleared tax funds that Israel collects on behalf of the PA,  but that are withheld due to the PA’s payment to terrorists and their families, is likely to turn into a grant.

Abbas also sought Israel’s approval for  PA police to act against criminals in Area C – the area of the West Bank under Israeli security and civilian control  – and for Israel to decrease its counter-terror activities in Area A, which is under PA security and civilian control.

Both sides share an interest in blocking Hamas’s goal of building a foothold in the West Bank and preventing it from expanding out of its Gazan home base.

Meanwhile, Hamas continues to pose a problematic threat for the PA’s rule in the West Bank due to its strategic objective of taking over the Palestinian government there.  

Hamas is working to improve its influence via social-welfare organizations, as well as in professional unions, student organizations, and other civilian society institutions.  

Hamas is not waiting for Abbas to depart, and is already working on the ground to consolidate its position as a lead force challenging the present Palestinian leadership.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

MIRYAM IN THE MEDIA: Hamas Demands The Impossible From Israel

By David Hacham

Hamas in the Gaza Strip is pursuing terms that are impossible for Israel to accept as part of its extortion attempt to “change the rules of the equation,” a former defense official and expert on Gaza has said.

Col. (res.) David Hacham, an Arab-affairs adviser to seven Israeli defense ministers and a senior research associate at the Miryam Institute, told JNS that a central impasse blocking the path to a broader arrangement between Israel and Gaza is Hamas’s refusal to come up with realistic proposals to facilitate a deal for the release of the remains of two missing-in-action Israel Defense Forces’ soldiers who were killed in the 2014 war, in addition to two living Israeli civilians who entered Gaza and are being held by the terrorist organization.

With Israel linking progress on this issue to progress on a broader arrangement for Gaza’s reconstruction and economy—and Hamas refusing to budge on its unrealistic demands for facilitating an exchange deal to secure the release of the Israelis—a structural problem is in place, noted Hacham.

“Israel says that if Hamas wants progress on a broader arrangement, progress must be made on an exchange deal. Hamas says these are two separate issues, and it wants separate talks on increasing the entry of commodities and services into Gaza, and the entry of Gazan workers into Israel,” he said. “This is the key issue on the agenda. It is the central reason for all of the incidents we are seeing on the border. Hamas demands that Israel ‘lifts the siege.’ ”

In exchange for the release of Israeli civilians Avera Mengistu and Hisham Al-Sayed, and the remains of MIA personnel Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, has demanded that Israel release 1,111 Palestinian security prisoners.

“Hamas is raising impossible standards for Israel,” said Hacham.

“In principle, Hamas is seeking to change the terms of the equation that has existed for a long time between Israel and Hamas,” he said. “Their slogan of ‘lifting the siege’ means opening up Gaza’s border crossings to Israel and the outside world, the naval arena and the air arena.”

Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate has played the central role in mediating talks between Israel and Hamas, with most of the talks taking place in Cairo.

With no progress being made on the swap deal, the other negotiations channel is designed to achieve what Israel calls an “arrangement” and what Hamas calls a hudna (“calm”).

To that end, talks have revolved on enabling more traffic of goods, merchants and businesspeople through the Gaza-Israel border crossings. Even though no final arrangement has been reached, Israel recently took the step of allowing 1,000 Gazan merchants and 250 businesspeople into Israel.

Throughout the deliberations, Israel has ensured a constant humanitarian flow of basic goods, food and medical supply into Gaza though trucks that pass through Kerem Shalom Crossing.

Hamas is also demanding the entry of funds for rebuilding sections of the Strip and repairing damages following the May conflict it prompted and fought with Israel.

Yet the fact that the talks are stuck on the swap issue means there is “no moving forward,” said Hacham.

This will not change as long as “Hamas does not allow progress on the MIA’s remains and captive issue,” he stated. Hamas’s initiative to jump-start Gaza’s economy and see large-scale infrastructure projects take place is thus being stalled by Hamas’s own refusal to compromise on its demands.

As a result, the fact that an agreement was reached in recent days allowing some $100 million a month of Qatari assistance cash for needy Gazan families to come has not altered the impasse.

That agreement will see the United Nations allocate the funds through special ATM withdrawal cards, after a list of recipients was authorized by Israel, which is a far cry from the old allocation method, when Qatar’s envoy to Gaza, Muhammad Al-Emadi, would arrive with suitcases brimming with cash.

In the old arrangement, Hacham said, “Israel didn’t fully supervise where this money went. We can assume that not all of it went to needy families; some went to developing Hamas’s terror infrastructure and local rocket-production centers.”

As a result, Israel refused to consider going back to the old arrangement. Yet now that the deal was reached, Hamas is far from being satisfied or willing to scale back its escalation tactics on the border.

‘Hamas believes its charger was drawn up by God’

Hacham said that those who are holding out hopes for a change in Hamas’s radical worldview are clinging to fantasies.

“Hamas is an enemy. It is guided, conceptually and ideologically, by a call for Israel’s destruction. It does not recognize Israel. Hamas has not changed its ideology, concepts or objectives,” he said. “And it can’t change them. I remember speaking with Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, who founded Hamas during the First Intifada in 1987, and asking him if the movement’s stances could change, whether mutual recognition could change. He told me, ‘Our charter was drawn up by God. So humans cannot change our charter.’ ”

Hamas’s 1988 covenant continues to reflect its ideology and policy towards Israel, said Hacham. “But we have to distinguish between Hamas’s practical actions and ideology. For tactical reasons, it is willing to reach ceasefires (hudnas), but not at the cost of recognition of Israel or acceptance of Israel as a legitimate element. Only as part of a tactical need.”

As a result of these dynamics, the chances of a long-term quiet with Hamas are slim, he assessed. However, stepped-up Israeli offensive actions and an Israeli determination to respond to each act of Hamas aggression could boost Israeli deterrence, he argued.

Boosted Israeli deterrence would, in turn, enable Israel to prioritize its strategic task of preventing Iran from breaking out to a nuclear weapon and dealing with Iran’s entrenchment in Syria, and Hezbollah’s threatening force build-up in Lebanon. “These are the issues at the top of Israel’s priority list. Hence, Gaza is a problem that has to be confined,” he said.

Deterrence can be improved through steps such as “commando raids or destroying their weapons storehouses, tunnels or even targeted killings—a tool that has proven itself,” said Hacham, while stressing that he is not in favor of a reoccupation of Gaza.

“But Israel can’t exclude retaking Gaza either. It has to take this option into account, but only in a scenario in which there are no other options,” he said.

Such a maneuver would involve heavy casualties among young IDF soldiers, he said, as well as civilians on both sides, despite Israeli efforts to avoid this; as such, it must be reserved as a last option.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Gaza will remain a powder keg, Qatari cash or not

By David Hacham

Three months after the end of the May conflict between Israel and Hamas, it appears as if the Egyptian-mediated talks between the two sides are moving in an extremely limited manner toward the goal of reaching a post-conflict arrangement to stabilize the ceasefire and reach a long-term calm. Qatar and the United Nations are also involved in mediation efforts.

There appears to have been some progress toward finding a solution on how to inject Qatari financial assistance for the needy, with a mechanism enabling ten million dollars to reach 100,000 families per month seemingly close to being finalized.

Egyptian General Intelligence Service chief Abbas Kamel recently met with Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to push this initiative toward completion.

However, the remainder of the arrangement designed to boost Gaza’s recovery and decrease tensions hinges on the completion of a deal in which Hamas releases the remains of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 war with Israel, and two Israeli civilians who crossed into Gaza in recent years. On that front, it appears as if there is no concrete progress.

Even the issue that does appear to be making some progress, the Qatari assistance, has seen deep divisions between Hamas and Israel. Israel, fearing the money would reach Hamas’s military wing, called for the cash to be transferred to the families through the UN’s food assistance program to Gaza. Hamas rejected this call. A workaround solution appears to have been found, involving the allocation of special debit-type cards to the families, who can then withdraw the money from Gazan cash machines. Under this proposal, the money would be transferred under UN supervision.

Israel has insisted on strict supervision of this money to ensure it goes to needy families alone, and that the list of recipients does not include Hamas members, or other terror operatives.

In recent weeks, banks located in the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank rejected a proposal to get them involved in the Qatari cash’ transfers, fearing that this would expose them to legal action over terror financing violations.

Hamas, for its part, gave up on its earlier demand to be the one that allocates the assistance funds – 100 dollars per family.

The new mechanism, if finalized, would see an end to past practices of suitcases full of cash entering Gaza, carried by Qatar’s special envoy to the Strip.

Hamas is keen to reach an arrangement on this money as soon as possible, and to this end, it green lighted the release of arson balloons toward Israeli communities near Gaza in recent weeks, while threatening to repeat this action if progress remains stuck – an action that could quickly lead to an escalation.

As part of Israel’s attempts to prevent a new escalation, it recently authorized the entry of 1,000 Gazan merchants and 350 businesspeople into Israel.

The Strip’s factions however agreed to restart open demonstrations against Israel along the border starting on August 21. This decision appears aimed at sending an immediate and unequivocal message – particularly to the Egyptian mediators – to fast-track progress on the Hamas-Israel arrangement, particularly regarding the transfer of financial payments needed to rebuild civilian infrastructure destroyed during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May.

An additional signal was sent by Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad during meetings held between their leaders – Ismail Haniyeh and Ziad Nakhaleh – and the new Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. The meeting symbolizes the positioning of Hamas firmly within the Iranian camp, with PIJ being a well-established Iranian proxy.

Outstanding issues

Additional issues that appear to be no closer to resolution as part of any potential arrangement include salary payments for 30,000 Hamas government employees – officials appointed by Hamas after its violent takeover of Gaza in 2007.

These officials are not recognized by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas fears that the PA could drag its feet over sending money for them.

Other central issues that the sides seem very far apart over include the critical question of a deal that would see Israel release security prisoners in exchange for the release by Hamas of its captive civilians, Avera Mengistu and Hisham Al-Sayed, and the remains of its MIA personnel, Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul.

Hamas has resolutely rejected Israel’s attempts to link financial assistance to Gaza with progress to a deal for their release, or the attempt to link an increased flow of goods into Gaza via the Kerem Shalom Crossing to progress on such a deal.

Hamas insists on separating the issues; Israel rejects that approach completely. This disagreement is blocking progress on the core pillars of any future arrangement.

Meanwhile, Hamas’s leaders are using conflict with Israel to beef up their internal political credentials. Yahya Sinwar, who was voted in March 2021 to a second term as head of Hamas’s political bureau in Gaza in internal Hamas elections, has tightened his political grip on power in the Strip following the May conflict with Israel. Sinwar accomplished this after a narrow win in the March elections, which led to previous questions about his power and support within Hamas.

Saleh Al-Arouri, who is head of Hamas’s activities in the West Bank but is based in Lebanon, and who is also the deputy of Ismael Haniyeh, head of Hamas’s overall political bureau, is working to destabilize the West Bank through terror cell activity.

At home in Gaza, Hamas faces no opposition to its regime. Despite its highly problematic track record and lack of tangible achievements in civilian matters, and despite Gaza’s distressing figures in the employment, health, and education sectors, Hamas’s position as the regime is assured.

Its security control of the Strip is unchallenged, and its rival, the Fatah movement, is almost totally restricted and inactive in Gaza.

Still, it appears as if many Gazan civilians are suspicious and distrustful of Hamas’s messaging – just as they are of Israel’s messages.

Some Gazans even suspect that Hamas and Israel exist in a state of undeclared ‘harmony,’ with undeclared coordination between them.

In actuality, Hamas and its supporters hold an extreme and uncompromising position toward Israel, are genuinely dogmatic, and claim to be marching on a path of ‘divine victory’ over Israel.

As a result, it is possible to assess with a high degree of confidence that even if partial agreements are reached between Hamas and Israel, Gaza’s problems will not vanish from the daily agenda, but instead will remain as fixed, disturbing issues, and they will continue to act as trigger points leading to potential security escalations.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The final countdown to Abbas’s rule is gaining pace

By David Hacham

Recent events in the Palestinian Authority indicate that the countdown to the rule of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is gaining momentum. This does not mean that the PA is about to collapse as an organized institution of government, but it does raise serious questions about the viability of the Abbas administration.

The recent apparent torture and killing of Palestinian dissident Nizar Banat – now widely called the ‘Palestinian Khashoggi’ by the Palestinian public – seems to signal the approach of a new era in the PA, and it is not at all clear that Abbas and his inner loyalist circle will be able to continue to govern.

In the West Bank, the PA has responded to protests that erupted in the aftermath of Banat’s death with force and with frequent violence.

Abbas might still be able to repel the waves of criticisms and protests he is facing, safeguard the PA’s status, stabilize its rule, and continue to function as a central authority. But that scenario is being cast into doubt by senior Fatah operatives in Ramallah, who assume that Abbas is likely moving toward the final station of his long career.

Demonstrations held to protest Banat’s death saw protesters shout slogans such as “Abbas, leave!”

Added to this combustible mix is the ongoing power struggle that has been raging in recent years among possible successors to Abbas.

Many of Abbas’s critics point out that he led himself to this junction through several critical mistakes. The most prominent of these is his public, celebratory call for holding elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council [originally scheduled for May 22,] as well as elections for the PA’s Presidency and the PLO’s National Council. The elections were canceled by Abbas due to a well-founded fear of a Hamas victory. Abbas justified his reversal using the pretext of Israel’s refusal to allow elections in East Jerusalem.

These actions created a vacuum, which Hamas rushed to fill without hesitation. Hamas seized on the opportunity to present itself as Jerusalem’s defender and projected its patronage over the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

After Operation Guardian of the Walls ended, a bitter struggle raged between Fatah and Hamas over who would manage and allocate funds intended to develop civilian infrastructure in Gaza. 

The PA’s image on the Palestinian street was dealt a severe blow, and Ramallah is today widely seen by Palestinians as a corrupt authority seeking to use Palestinian funds for its narrow interests. The PA has lost control over much of the social media narrative, and Hamas has gained the upper hand.

This has allowed Hamas to present the PA as a corrupt entity that uses its security forces to cooperate with Israel and repress the Palestinian population.

This development demonstrates clearly that no power vacuum in the Palestinian street remains unfilled: When the PA weakens, Hamas grows stronger.  When waves of angry demonstrators rise up against the PA, clashes can also quickly turn against Israel in the form of violent disturbances and terrorism.

The PA’s management of the Banat affair was a poorly calculated maneuver that could turn out to be one mistake too far. Banat was able to remain an opposition figure without affiliating himself politically. He did not hesitate to use social media to blast the PA and its leaders, the Fatah movement, and the PA’s security forces. He was also extremely critical of a deal reached between the PA and Israel over the use of coronavirus vaccines that were set to expire.

Banat’s death opened a pandora’s box within the PA. Accusations have been flying between senior officials over who was responsible. Various security forces are trying to evade direct responsibility for the incident. Abbas is trying to contain the public anger, reinstate calm and stability, and thereby lengthen his political life, in the wake of the demonstrations against him.

He has sought to do this through the official announcement, publicized by Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh, on the setting up of a committee of investigation (PA security force members who were allegedly involved are in custody), and through the intention to replace key position holders in the security establishment (in the Preventative Security Force, Military Intelligence, and the Palestinian police), as well as among district governors (Ramallah and Hebron) and the diplomatic senior staff (PLO ambassadors abroad).

In this context, it now seems unlikely that Abbas’s initial intention to replace Shtayyeh will go ahead (Shtayyeh was seen as having ministerial responsibility due to his position as Minister of the Interior). This is in light of support by sections of Fatah for Shtayyeh.

At the same time, former PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s intention to return to public life, through the setting up of a new ‘compromise government,’ has been blocked  

Hussein El Sheikh, PA Minister for Civilian Affairs, and Majed Faraj, head of the General Intelligence Service, both of whom are in Abbas’s inner circle and wield major power in the PA, have also been involved in the political mix in the aftermath of the Banat affair. They have pushed aside potential rivals and worked to consolidate their position in the Palestinian leadership.

This has occurred as other senior Palestinian figures opposed to Abbas’s rule have been active to promote their agendas too, including Muhammad Dahlan, Marwan Barghouti, and Nasser Al-Qidwa.  

In this context, Azmi Bishara, a former Israel Knesset Member from the Balad party, pulled strings from afar from his Qatari exile (where he fled after being suspected of espionage and assisting Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War). Operatives close to Bishara were recently arrested by PA security forces in the West Bank.

The PA has in recent weeks taken steps to stabilize the situation and has been able to significantly reduce public rage over the incident.

Despite the decrease in protests, the PA’s investigation into the affair is unlikely to truly calm the thousands of people who took part in demonstrations across major West Bank cities, foremost among them, Ramallah, the seat of government, and in Hebron, Banat’s home city.

To further calm the situation, PA security forces have avoided direct clashes with protesters and deployed only at the entrances to cities.

The PA is keenly aware of the potential far-reaching consequences that could develop from this affair, and fears for its legitimacy and ability to function.

Ultimately, Abbas has been able to contain the crisis so far, and restore a level of calm, while maintaining a ‘business as usual approach by visiting Jordan’s King Abdullah, and President Erdogan in Turkey.

Yet a scenario of renewed rallies and calls for Abbas’s departure could certainly return.  Should that occur, the pressure, together with Abbas’s advanced age, poor health, and many would-be successors, could spell the end of his rule.

In summary, the protests against the PA and the calls that have been made in recent weeks during demonstrations for Abbas’s exit from power are not accumulating at this time into a critical mass. At the same time, the assessment that the Palestinian arena is witnessing the twilight of Abbas’s rule is growing stronger.

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.