Danny Ayalon

Israel Must Balance International Standing with Domestic Policy

By Danny Ayalon

A unique synergy of regional and global trends has meant that Israel's international stance has grown stronger over the last two decades; yet, while this growth trend could continue, it is being overshadowed by the country’s judicial reform crisis.

The global market recognizes the importance of Israel's leadership in the high-tech sector, and because the future rests in the technological sector, Israel, by definition, has become a major asset, leading many countries to want to grow closer to the Jewish state.

Israel offers assets not just in the fields of AI, quantum computing, IT, or medical systems - but also in water technology, food-tech, and agro-tech, all of which can ensure global food security and water availability, particularly in the parched Middle East.

Another factor that has made Israel appealing as an asset is the discovery of Mediterranean gas fields in in its economic waters. This has turned Israeli into a regional energy supplier, sending gas to Jordan, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority, as well as to Europe via Egypt.

Israel's standing was further significantly strengthened by the Abraham Accords, which have demonstrated that the country is perceived as the only force that can stand in the way of Iran's expansionist agenda, as well as Tehran’s subversion, terrorism, and its nuclear ambitions.

Furthermore, Israel has been successful in detaching the Palestinian issue from its regional and global standing and diplomatic relations with Arab states. It has maintained strategic relations with Jordan (despite routine crises in bilateral relations), Egypt, the European Union, and, of course, the United States, despite substantive divisions over the Palestinian issue.

Now, the Abraham Accord states have bypassed the Palestinians, after the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco realized they can no longer be held hostage by the Palestinian Authority’s veto power. They have instead recognized the importance of ties with Israel and cooperation on technology, food and water, counter-terrorism, and halting Iran's nuclear program. These states recognized that their own interests take precedence over the Palestinian issue, which is not a core national security issue that they share.

This recognition by Arab states has, in turn, assisted other countries, particularly those in the European Union, which have always been sensitive to the Palestinian issue, to move forward on cooperation with Israel.

On top of these factors, global changes are underway, in the form of superpower competition between China and the U.S. on one hand, and the war in Ukraine on the other, which have boosted Israel’s standing as well, adding to its importance and attractiveness.

Israeli military technology is among the most advanced in the world - whether it be precision weapons and ammunition, anti-ballistic missile defense systems, or cyber defenses. Israeli cooperation with NATO members is expanding significantly these days, due to the deterioration of the global security situation.

Germany, for example, is increasing its defense budget exponentially, and there is a good chance that some of that budget will go to Israeli military technology. This strategically binds Europe to Israel.

Another important consideration is U.S.-China competition. When the Americans speak of pivoting to the East to contain China with a ring of pro-American alliances, there is a significant concern among pro-U.S. Arab states that they will do so at the expense of Washington’s Middle Eastern presence.

But the U.S. feels it can conduct this pivot because it knows that Israel is its most reliable ally, which has the capabilities that can reassure Abraham Accord states regarding the Iranian threat. Even though America's main focus is now on China (Chinese aerostats have infiltrated American skies), and on Ukraine, Arab states and the U.S. find it convenient to have Israel around to back-up American capabilities in the Middle East, and to provide a solution to all of the regional threats – Iran and its radical terrorist axis, and its nuclear program.

As a result of these global, economic, technological, energy, and strategic trends, the attractiveness of Israel grows over time.

In this context, it almost doesn't matter which government is in power in Israel. There is sufficient international agreement on core issues like Iran among the Abraham Accords states, and on Ukraine, Russia, and China by the EU states and the US, to make it clear that Israel’s assets are essential in the new regional and global orders taking shape.

However, from here on, much will depend on Israeli policy. Israel is currently suffering a murderous wave of Palestinian terrorism. Instead of dishing out collective punishment, Israel's response has been expanding settlements and recognizing nine settlement outposts, something that has never been acceptable to the international community, including Jerusalem’s great friend the United States. However, the Americans did not go into crisis mode over this decision. Instead, Israel and the U.S. agreed to disagree.

With the exception of the Obama administration in 2016, the U.S. has always vetoed Palestinian attempts to generate UN Security Council condemnations against Israel.

This shield was recently tested once again, and found to be solid, due to the genuine friendship and shared interests and values between Israel and the U.S. It is not in America's best interests to break with Israel over the Palestinians, since Washington has enough pressing issues around the world to tend to, and it does not want to change the dynamics of this relationships.

It is also in America's interest not to internationalize the Israeli - Palestinian conflict because that will ensure there will be no progress on it.  However, a new black swan has arrived, and it is the Israeli government’s push for judicial reform. This will undoubtedly harm Israel's international standing, including relations with the U.S., even if not immediately. If a perception takes hold that the reform will make Israel less democratic, the country’s democratic image -- one of its major strengths -- will be seriously harmed.

It is impossible to overstate how important this is for the U.S., and for Israel’s ability to maintain its special ties with the world’s most powerful superpower. For Washington, the rule of law, separation of powers, and human rights are not just values in and of themselves; they are empirically proven ingredients that create democratic states that are economically stronger and more peaceful.

As a result, American officials are watching events in Israel, and sending very sharp messages, not just through quiet channels, but also in press conferences. This creates a shadow over the future of Israel’s international standing, which will only be lifted if Israel preserves its democratic character. 


Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Israel Still Should Not Provide Weapons to Ukraine

By Danny Ayalon & CHUCK FREILICH

The first anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is an appropriate time to assess Israel’s policies toward it, chiefly its refusal to sell weapons to Ukraine. The need for this assessment is particularly acute given the close strategic relationship that has emerged between Russia and Iran and the ramifications for U.S.-Israeli relations.

Israel’s sympathies lie squarely with Ukraine. Nevertheless, its response to date has been limited to significant, but not overwhelming, humanitarian aid, including a field hospital, ambulances, protective vests, helmets, food, water purification equipment, and more. Israel has reportedly also provided Ukraine with intelligence information and voted with it in the United Nations. Conversely, Israel has steadfastly rebuffed Ukrainian requests to provide weapons, including defensive ones, such as Iron Dome.

A wounded bear is particularly dangerous and Russia can cause Israel severe harm. We thus believe that Israel’s refusal to sell Ukraine weapons remains appropriate, but that this may change depending on Russia’s actions. For now, we propose a number of semi-military measures that would be of great utility for Ukraine and position Israel firmly within the Western camp but mitigate Russia’s response.

There are seven primary reasons for our caution.

First, Iran has supplied Russia with 1,700 drones, is apparently building a factory in Russia to produce as many as 6,000 more, and may provide it with ballistic missiles. In return, Russia has reportedly agreed to supply Iran with SU-35s fighters, helicopters, and possibly the S-400 air-defense system, warships, submarines, and satellites. Russia and Iran already cooperate in the cyber realm. They also recently signed two agreements designed to promote bilateral economic ties and circumvent international sanctions: a “transportation corridor” from Russia to Iran and out to the Far East; and an alternative mechanism to the global SWIFT system. Israel must avoid measures that may lead to an even closer Russian-Iranian strategic alliance.

Second, Russia and Iran are the two primary players in Syria. At times, Russia has sought to counterbalance Iran’s efforts to expand its influence there, including the build-up of a significant military presence and use of Syria to transfer weapons to Hezbollah. Wartime needs forced Russia to withdraw some forces from Syria, but not the S-400s. If used against Israeli aircraft, Israel’s ability to counter Iran’s buildup would be greatly constrained. So far, Russia has refrained from doing so, but that could change at any time. No less than NATO countries, Israel is on the front lines with Russia today and can find itself at war at any moment with Iran, Hezbollah, and Iranian-supported Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Israel cannot allow this to happen.

Third, Russia is a party to the nuclear agreement with Iran and ongoing international negotiations. At times, Russia has played a constructive role in this regard, but it has been supportive of Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency recently and can be highly disruptive. A desperate Russia might even provide Iran with concrete assistance for its nuclear program. Israel cannot afford to alienate Russia too much.

Fourth, Israel is not a global power with major weapons stockpiles, does not have the spare capability, and cannot transfer critical systems to Ukraine without endangering its own security. Indeed, it has the minimum number of Iron Dome batteries necessary and a shortage of interceptor missiles. Moreover, as Ukraine’s defense minister indicated, other systems are better suited to its needs, including American ones, which the United States has abjured from supplying so far. What Ukraine really wants is to drag Israel into the conflict on its side. That is understandable, but Israel must weigh its overall interests, not just sentiments.

Fifth, some 15 percent of Israel’s population has roots in the former USSR and 600,000 Jews still live in Russia. Russia has already taken measures designed to demonstrate its ability to stop emigration. The ingathering of the exiles is Israel’s raison d’être.

Sixth, unless the United States changes the policy of partial disengagement from the Middle East pursued by four consecutive presidents, Russia will remain a critical player in the region. In addition to support for Iran, Russia is providing Turkey and Egypt with advanced weapons and nuclear power reactors that could morph into military nuclear programs, has proposed similar deals with the Saudis and others, is an important player in OPEC+ and Libya, and more.

Seventh, France, Germany, Japan, and other leading states have provided only limited aid to Ukraine, belatedly and hesitantly. South Korea has refused to provide any weapons. Even the United States has imposed strict limits on the kinds of weapons it provides, for example, aircraft, missiles, air-defense systems, and until now, tanks. Israel does not have to be at the forefront of this issue. Some question Israel’s commitment to the Western camp because they have high expectations of it; others because they wish to use this issue as part of a broader delegitimization campaign. Most understand that Israel’s strategic circumstances require painful compromises between moral and strategic considerations.

Changes to Israel’s refusal to supply weapons to Ukraine might be warranted if, for example, Russia decided to limit its freedom of aerial maneuver in Syria; supplied certain weapons systems to Iran, e.g. the S-400s; adopted a clearly obstructionist position in the nuclear talks; or provided direct assistance to Iran’s nuclear program. In each case, the details would determine the nature of Israel’s response. Russia must be made to understand that Israel has the ability to significantly harm its interests, if pushed too far.

What Israel should be doing, were it not engulfed in its domestic convulsions, is providing Ukraine with outsized humanitarian assistance. It should send the field hospital back to Ukraine, if necessary, by turning it into an Israel Defense Force (IDF) operation; dispatch IDF search and rescue teams; expand rehabilitation programs for wounded Ukrainians; and complete the transfer of the rocket alert technology promised to Ukraine, all areas in which Israel is a global frontrunner. It should again provide emergency supplies for Ukrainian civilians.

Expanded assistance such as this would be of significant benefit for Ukraine, but likely not lead to an excessive Russian response. All sides understand that there are certain rules to the game.


Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Military Aid to Israel Must Remain Unconditional

By Danny Ayalon & CHUCK FREILICH

Israel’s new hard-right government has yet to be inaugurated and a crisis is already brewing in United States-Israeli relations. Unsurprisingly, it is starting with the Jewish community.

Aaron Miller and Dan Kurtzer, highly respected former administration officials, argued in The Washington Post that the US should continue to support Israel’s legitimate security needs, but should not provide offensive weapons or other assistance for malign Israeli actions in Jerusalem or the occupied territories.

Tom Friedman bemoaned the demise of Israel that we once knew, which probably existed more in his fond imagination than in reality. Abe Foxman, the grand doyen of American Jewish leaders, whose support for Israel was always emphatically unconditional, now says that it is and that he will be unable to support an Israel that is not an open democracy.

Statements such as these, by prominent and mainstream American Jews, should terrify any Israeli premier. As Benjamin Netanyahu understands better than most, little is more important for Israel’s national security than the special relationship with the US. Netanyahu, however, has far more important strategic considerations today: how to stay out of jail.

The anguish over the new government’s impending policies could not be more appropriate. Netanyahu has already demonstrated that there is no outrage, no damage to Israel’s democracy and legal system, that is too great, to secure the support of his nationalist, ultra-religious and even racist coalition partners. The Likud itself is no longer just a nationalist party, but a radical and corrupt one.

Israeli society will undergo unprecedented stress, including to the already fraught relations between Jews and between Jews and Arabs. The IDF chain of command and its organizational unity are already under strain. The final opportunity to curtail the runaway Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) population explosion has probably now been missed and by 2060 they will constitute fully one-third of Israel’s Jewish population.

They already present a growing burden to Israel’s society, economy, democracy and national security. Israel’s secular plurality, the phenomenally creative population that has long provided for its scientific and high-tech prowess, and carried the defense burden, is severely demoralized. Many will emigrate.

Netanyahu’s dependence on his coalition partners means that massive settlement and at least de facto annexation will soon be underway. A two-states solution, or some other means of separating from the Palestinians, are likely now things of the past. Israel’s critically important ties with the Abraham Accords states (UAE, Bahrain and Morocco) cannot but be badly affected.

The special relationship with the US, including the Jewish community, the world’s second-largest and critical pillar of the relationship, may also be severely damaged. The relationship is far more than just military assistance and includes a de facto security guarantee, joint strategic planning, intelligence cooperation, support for Israel’s negotiating positions and the US veto in the Security Council, which has shielded Israel from sanctions for decades, including over its purported nuclear capabilities. It also includes deep economic, scientific and cultural ties.

Will Netanyahu straining Israel-Diaspora Jewry ties impact military aid?

NO ONE in Israel is more deeply concerned than the IDF, which fully understands the critical importance of Israel’s dependence on the US. It will take years to undo the damage. Some will prove irreversible.

There is a fundamental difference, however, between alienation and even fury towards specific Israeli policies and governments, and Israel. That is where Foxman and others go too far. It took the Jewish people 2,000 years to restore our national sovereignty. It is far too early, after a mere 75 years, to distance oneself from Israel. Sorry, it’s unacceptable. Support for the state must remain unconditional and inviolate.

It might also behoove Jewish critics to demonstrate greater humility nowadays; American democracy has not been at its best. In Israel, transfers of power have been unchallenged. Israel’s Supreme Court remains a beacon of moderate jurisprudence.

The US dodged a bullet in the recent elections, barely. Israel was less fortunate, but only due to electoral hubris and miscalculation by the Labor Party. The pro-Netanyahu camp actually won by just a few thousand votes, a majority magnified in the Knesset by a quirk of the electoral system.

Moreover, antisemitism in the US is rampant in a way that most American Jews probably thought could never happen. Israel, for all its myriad faults, remains the ultimate haven. We have your backs.

Although JStreet and others tend to blithely ignore this, Israel is far more than the Palestinian issue, critical though it is, and it continues to face dire threats. Iran’s advancing nuclear program may once again pose an existential threat to the Jewish people. Hezbollah’s mammoth rocket arsenal threatens unprecedented destruction to Israel’s home front. Hamas is a growing threat.

In this light, Miller’s and Kurtzer’s words cannot but feed into the growing calls on the Democratic Left for a dangerous change to US policy, that would condition military aid to Israel on the nature of its policies. Even if they were careful to limit conditionality to a specific policy area, it is the principle that is so troublesome. In the real world, distinctions between offensive and defensive weapons are rarely truly feasible and those between legitimate and malign actions are entirely in the changing mind of the beholder. Military aid must remain unconditional.

It may be hard to remember, but the US-Israeli relationship was quite limited until the late 1960s and even many American Jews had little to do with Israel until its dramatic victory in the Six Day War suddenly made them proud to be Jewish. Now, many are sincerely distressed, others merely ashamed. Tough. Israel never promised the Diaspora a Jewish Disneyland, or a rose garden, and the level of knowledge most American Jews have of Israel’s complex society and security is embarrassingly superficial.

Those of us who live in Israel and who are trying to build a vibrant Jewish state, society and culture, do not have the luxury of hand wringing or ill-advised expressions of conditionality. We still have to send the kids to school and defend Israel’s borders until conditions improve.


Ambassador Danny Ayalon served as Israel’s Ambassador to the United States from July 2002 to November 2006. Read full bio here.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.