Alon Levavi

The Israel Police is facing its worst-ever crisis

By Alon Levavi

The Israel Police is currently facing the most severe crisis in its history, as multiple causes converge to create a perfect storm.

The first cause is long-standing: Over the years, the issue of public security has not received the place it deserves on the national agenda. Crises are mounting – climate change, cyber-crime, pandemics, terrorism, violent crime – and it is becoming increasingly clear how vital it is in a democratic state to have a strong, effective, service-oriented police force.

Israel’s founding prime minister David Ben-Gurion once said that the military is responsible for state security, and the police for its honor. He understood deeply the role that the police play in a democratic state.

And yet, due to the ongoing Israeli security situation and years of wars against external enemies, the center of gravity has traditionally been on security and defense. This found expression in national resource investment, the police’s image, its low place in decision-making, and more.

In reality, the police have always been involved in all aspects of life, and acted as the national emergency room, investigating public officials, tackling corruption, fighting crime, and combating terrorism. Yet the police in Israel are an eternal punching bag for the public. There will always be those unhappy to get a fine, to be arrested, or face indictment. Police are easily and quickly slandered here – and this damages the organization.  

Ultimately, the ability of the police to function is based on public faith. When this faith is eroded, the public stops cooperating with it. On the flip side of the equation, criminals stop being deterred and become ever bolder about committing crimes. This sends the country into a sharp, downward slippery slope.

On top of this, the way the police force is seen from the outside seeps into the organization. Police officers want to feel motivated, but the more the media attacks the police, the harder it is for officers to find the will to stay. Growing numbers are finding reasons to leave. The fact that their salaries are ridiculously low, that they work 24-7, endanger their lives, have no extra paid hours, no union rights, and have poor employment conditions only adds to the desire of some officers to quit.

Despite public perceptions, not anyone can become a police officer. It’s a profession that requires over a year of training, followed by further on-the-job qualifications. When an officer leaves that means that major resources get thrown away.

Personnel shortages mean that qualification processes have been shortened, leading to police officers with lower professional capabilities – and creating another vicious cycle.  

Today, in the post-pandemic era, when a new generation has no hesitation about moving jobs, when police officers no longer receive budgetary pensions, but rather, cumulative ones, and when there are many tempting job opportunities in the civilian market, including comfortable work-from-home jobs, many are leaving the force, unwilling to risk their lives for low salaries and widespread contempt.

Meanwhile, public security ministers avoided appointing commissioners for years, choosing to work with acting commissioners instead, meaning that long-term planning and force build-up programs were impossible. The ministers’ refusal to appoint commissioners was also a statement on how they viewed the importance of the police. Apparently, an organization that doesn’t ‘need’ a commissioner isn’t very important.

It is against this backdrop that National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir took office.  Ben Gvir has been convicted of several offenses and has a highly aggressive policy regarding his ministerial mandate and approach to the police chief.

If someone convicted of criminal offenses becomes head of police, what does this mean? Could something similar happen to the Shin Bet or IDF? This development further suggests that the government doesn’t think the police is very important.

The coalition agreements that stipulate the National Security Minister’s right to directly activate the police, and Ben Gvir’s call to set up a national guard under his direct authority rather than that of the police, all send the same message about the force’s low standing. Worse still, they threaten to infect the police with politics, something that must never happen in a country that wants to remain democratic. Only the police commissioner should activate the police, while the minister should focus on policies.

Today, after the coronavirus pandemic, the Mount Meron stampede in 2021, Operation Guardian of the Walls in the same year that saw widespread rioting in Arab-Israeli areas, and the current political deadlock with 30 weeks of mass protests, skyrocketing Arab sector crime, and an almost full neutralization of the police’s ability to employ technology like cyber and signals intelligence, the police has hit rock bottom.

It has very few tools and abilities to deal with the challenge sit faces. It is being told to fight crime blindfolded.

Looking ahead at the next decade, bold decisions are in order. First, the police must be defined as a critical pillar in national resilience. Next, governments must allocate to police suitable financial and personnel resources -- billions of additional shekels and thousands of extra personnel.

The billions that were promised to the police currently do not appear to be materializing.

Police must also be allowed, under supervision, to employ technological means, or there will be no meaningful war against 21st-century crime. State leaders need to begin publicly backing the force, and that also means not ignoring police during the annual torch-lighting ceremony on Independence Day, for example, and promoting a new national narrative that isn’t exclusively focused on the military.

When the public receives good service from a police force that receives proper investment, when calls to the emergency hotline are answered effectively, when community police officers check in, and investigations don’t end abruptly, when patrol cars arrive within 20 minutes and not an hour, the public will naturally warm to the police.

Finally, the new Israeli national guard must operate under police command, not under a civilian ministry headed by a minister.

If Israel’s ‘ER Room’ is to start working properly again, these are the minimal steps necessary, and there isn’t much time to waste.

The commanders, officers, fighters, and volunteers in the Israel Police are dedicated and professional. At one moment, they foil terrorism, at another, they foil homicides, prevent accidents, and fight drugs. The second largest organization in Israel must receive a higher spot on the national priority list, and it must also get practical recognition as a critical pillar in national security and resilience.

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

An outline for Israel’s new national guard

By Alon Levavi

As protests and political tensions in Israel reach large-scale proportions, the Israel Police is, once again, back in the limelight, acting as the country’s emergency room. The protests are just the latest challenge to the police’s ability to juggle its multiple and unusual responsibilities—a challenge that must be answered by the formation of an Israeli national guard.

Israel’s National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are continuing steps begun by the last Israeli government to accomplish this goal. A new national guard headquarters is up and running under the command of a police lieutenant. According to reports, Ben-Gvir has been able to secure an NIS 4.5 billion addition to the National Security Ministry’s annual budget for the next two years. The Israel Police’s annual budget in 2022 was NIS 14.4 billion.

This budget addition can help reverse the trend of police officers quitting their jobs due to poor conditions, but the establishment of a national guard will also be essential to taking some of the pressure off the Israel Police.

Much of that pressure stems from the simple fact that the Israel Police’s current configuration is insufficient to meet the challenges it must take on. The entire police force is made up of some 32,000 civilian police officers and 8,000 Border Police officers. Some 5,000 officers are in headquarters and management positions.

This limited force must fight crime, traffic accidents, illegal narcotics and cyber-crime. It must also deal with public disturbances, act as a counterterrorism force and prepare for all kinds of emergency situations such as earthquakes and mass rocket attacks.

Currently, the Israel Police simply lacks the numbers it needs to do all these things—and the challenges are only growing.

Israel is not a typical state. It has numerous security challenges and social fractures, which means that each police officer must be versatile in order to handle a plethora of missions. This harms the police’s professionalism because it prevents the force from optimizing its abilities in its core functions.

Officers are deployed from one district to another—often from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv and back—as events develop, taking on Temple Mount tensions in Jerusalem, then a large parade in Tel Aviv and then mass political rallies. This prevents officers from focusing on specialist areas.

The overall erosion in the organization is significant and the low pay for starting officers—combined with the need to be on constant standby—does not help matters. Add to that the consistently negative public and media portrayal of the police, and you get a force prone to demoralization and resignations.

A case in point is the mixed Arab-Jewish city of Lod in central Israel, which went up in flames in May 2021 during Israel’s conflict with Hamas. Mass rioting, mostly by Arab-Israeli youths, and hate crimes rocked the city. Lod’s police station has an average of three to four patrol cars available to it at any given time and a maximum of 200 officers. This limited force had to deal with thousands of rioters before backup arrived.

That backup took the form of the Border Police, which is part of the Israeli National Police, a natural home for an Israeli national guard.

Originally established soon after the founding of Israel in 1948 to counter terrorist infiltrations from Arab countries, the Border Police evolved over the years into a semi-military police force with military-type unit categories (battalions and companies).

The Border Police conducts a variety of missions in rural areas, some of which are related to agricultural crime; engages in counterterrorism with special units; and provides continuous security in urban areas.

Currently, when Border Police units enter an area under the jurisdiction of a police district or station, it is activated by the local commander in a coordinated manner. This is the primary reason why a national guard must be part of the Israeli National Police: To prevent the appearance of a third force on Israeli territory that would lack clear territorial command structures. Such a scenario would, in a state about the size of New Jersey, cause chaos.

The Border Police is also well-suited to take on rioting and disturbances, since it is not attached to any police district and is free of daily missions such as investigations, traffic enforcement and combatting drug trafficking.

Once a national guard is up and running, the civilian police will be able to continue conducting its core activities even as emergency scenarios erupt, since it would fall to the guard to mobilize large forces and send them where they are needed quickly.

The future national guard should be made up of thousands of officers, including currently serving Border Police conscripts, professional Border Police officers, reserves and volunteers.

During routine times, the national guard should work daily with the civilian police force, assisting it with missions and maintaining high visibility to reassure Israeli civilians. It should also train and build up its forces. During emergencies—for example, major rioting—the guard will go into action and allow classic police duties to continue uninterrupted.

Ultimately, the opportunity to create a new and critical force has arrived and it is vital to do so without undermining or confusing the police chain of command.

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Israel Police key to Jerusalem security, regional security

By Alon Levavi

In the wake of a deadly wave of terrorism that hit Israeli cities beginning in March 2022, the IDF launched Operation Break the Wave to reduce the threat and it has been ongoing since then.

Operations focused at first on the northern West Bank city of Jenin and later Nablus, where the core hubs of Palestinian terror activities are presently located.

Throughout the security escalation, it seemed reasonable to believe that mixed Jewish – Arab cities including Ramle, Lod, Jerusalem and Acre could, from one moment to the next, erupt in violence just as they did so dramatically and disturbingly in May 2021, as Israel fought Hamas in Gaza in Operation Guardian of the Walls.

The spark for that conflict was lit in Jerusalem, where clashes between Palestinians and the Israel Police on the Temple Mount, together with subsequent incidents of violence, provided Hamas with the pretense to fire rockets from Gaza. Islamist agitators used the violence to incite unrest among Arab-Israelis.

In mid-October, violence once again tore through eastern Jerusalem, only this time it was rapidly quelled by police without spreading to new arenas. While it has resurfaced on occasion as the month progressed, police have so far kept the flames low, preventing them from spreading out of control.

That development is a reminder of a core principle that underlines regional stability: the key lies in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem has always been the issue that could blow up the region. It’s the volcano that’s always smoldering and the Israel Police is the lid on that volcano. If the volcano blows, it takes the West Bank with it and as recent events have shown, Gaza and Arab areas inside Israel, as well.

Jerusalem is under the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of the Israel Police, meaning that it and no other agency has the main say on how to respond to the daily challenges that arise there.

Policing Jerusalem is a constant balancing act between the need to be forceful in the face of Palestinian aggression and attacks on Israeli police and Jewish residents of eastern Jerusalem, and the need to pull back and push for calm. Much is at stake and depends on the good judgment of police commanders on the ground who are always walking a tightrope.

The Israel Police achieves this balance by deploying top-level commanders to the front lines to take direct charge of policing operations. These commanders do not leave the Border Police and other units on their own to deal with the difficult issues that land at their doorstep.

This means directly overseeing orders on when to open fire in cases where lives are at risk and when to deploy non-lethal crowd control means, including smoke bombs and stun grenades to deal with disturbances in a controlled manner.

During October’s rioting, Palestinian youths hurled firebombs and rocks and launched fireworks directly at security forces, as well as at buildings in which Jews reside. Such attacks are potentially lethal but police nevertheless employ careful consideration when responding.

Equipping riot police with the most advanced protective gear makes personnel feel safer and prevents them from choosing the fiercest responses in such situations, police have learned.

Dealing with such intense rioting and dispersing the rioters is a full profession, and the Border Police and the special patrol units excel in it.

The fact that there are members of Knesset who knowingly come to the area to take part in provocations only makes life more complicated for the police, which must deploy larger numbers of forces to the scene to prevent such situations from spinning out of control or being further inflamed.

Intelligence plays a critical role in both containing and thwarting such incidents. In 2021, the police, the Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency and the IDF discovered that intelligence coordination between them was lacking. Since then, they have taken steps to optimize intelligence-sharing and have significantly improved their capabilities not just in Jerusalem but throughout Israel.

Police made dozens of arrests in mid-October and were able to significantly calm the situation down, reflecting a satisfactory performance and one that has improved from past years.

The eastern Jerusalem neighborhood of Shuafat, where a terrorist gunman exited a vehicle and shot dead an Israeli Border Policewoman on October 8, represents a unique operational challenge.

The terrorist (who was later killed after opening fire outside another Israeli community in the West Bank) fled the scene, compelling police to place the area under a local, temporary closure to facilitate the search for the gunman.

Despite these incidents, prayers at the Western Wall went on as normal and visitors continued to ascend the Temple Mount. Tens of thousands of Jews prayed at the Western Wall and tens of thousands of Muslims worshiped at al-Aqsa Mosque. The police’s ability to enable such mass religious activities, while proactively tackling rioting in neighborhoods a stone’s throw away from the religious sites is an exceptional achievement that cannot be taken for granted.

During this month of unrest, the Border Police flexed a new muscle that it received as part of the lessons learned from the events of 2021. Known as the Israeli National Guard, the Border Police called up reserve companies as means to help deal with personnel requirements. These forces are heavily focused on counter-rioting and counter-terrorism missions, and this is their specialty.

Throughout the month, police followed up on intelligence to thwart attacks, swarmed hot spots in large numbers, made arrests based on accurate information, and were able to home in on inciters and rioters. This included fishing out the main agitators on social media and arresting those using online platforms to instigate violence. All of these actions helped create deterrence.

Frequent situational assessments are carried out by the Jerusalem District of the Israel Police to keep its organizational finger on the pulse of events, together with the Shin Bet and the IDF. These assessments resulted in decisions such as placing police officers along the streets of the Old City just tens of meters apart, creating a high degree of security.

The Israel Police finds itself facing the most sensitive decisions regarding Jerusalem, including those that touch on the Temple Mount. The area’s sensitivity, especially around the Mount, is so great that many of these decisions are brought to the attention of the government and the prime minister.

The past two years have demonstrated beyond any doubt how internal security is critical. While external threats are major, Israel has invested far more in dealing with them than it has in domestic security. Yet the threat within is clear to all.

Adding a few hundred extra police officers to the force won’t solve the problem. Police must receive additional support from the government, such as increasing the size of the force substantially, equipping it with better technology and boosting its presence in the Arab sector, where police can provide a better service, and enforce sovereignty and law enforcement. Failure to implement these steps will have dire future consequences for the entire country.

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Enlarging the Israeli Police is critical for national resilience

By Alon Levavi

The current challenging security situation in Israel reflects a key fact: National resilience and domestic security are just as important as the ability to defend borders against external threats.

Add the ongoing terrorism threat faced by Israeli cities to the threat from projectiles from Lebanon and Gaza and it becomes clear that the Israel Police is simply too small to carry out its many missions.

Since 1991, the State of Israel has doubled its population, yet the police force has increased by a mere 20%. The officer-to-civilian ratio in Israel is one of the worst in the West.

To fill the gaps, the Israel Police has grown used to improvising solutions, through measures such as temporarily deploying backup forces from one district to another.

This is now occurring in the Jerusalem District, the center of friction and disturbances during the Ramadan holiday period. The technique of moving police units from place to place has plenty of costs as well. It generates organizational demoralization and creates endless logistical headaches.

Temporary measures will not enable the government to evade the need to make a decision. If the government wants to seriously boost national resilience, it would be well advised to go beyond seat-of-the-pants ‘solutions,’ like getting IDF units to go on patrol with police. It needs to strengthen the police during routine times too.

The Israel Police is the only force of its kind in the West that is responsible for both classic policing missions and emergency security situations. A life-affirming state that seeks democracy, law and order, public discipline, and the rule of law has to therefore strengthen its police force during routine.

Civilians want to see police on the streets in order to regain their sense of security. They want rapid response times to security and criminal incidents. But the resources for those expectations are simply not currently in place.

The Israel Police’s personnel are highly motivated. Recent terror attacks have, once again, demonstrated their willingness to sacrifice their own lives to protect the public’s lives and safety. Police officers ask no questions before jumping on motorbikes and taking on terrorist gunmen on city streets.

Yet the dominant narrative in Israeli society during quieter times is that the police force is ‘no good,’ incapable of providing decent service, and is of poor quality.

This narrative does not take into account the fact that the police force receives eight million calls per year, and that a million of those turn into police field responses.

When terrorism is inactive, the police becomes the public’s favorite punching bag. Only when officers go out and get killed as they tackle terrorists does the force begin to receive public credit for its dedication. This narrative harms the police’s morale in a significant manner.

This can help explain why 600 police officers quit their positions in the past year alone. If Israel wants to achieve domestic stability and prosperity, it will have to save its police, and reshape the public narrative – and not only during emergencies.

There are also many bright spots when it comes to the police’s development. Its ability to cooperate with the Shin Bet intelligence agency and the IDF is stronger than ever. Together, they form the three pillars for quashing terrorism that emanates from Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and from within Israel.

This cooperation is critical going forward.

While security forces will have to investigate how the latest string of attacks occurred, for every four or five attacks that take place, literally hundreds of terror plots have been foiled. This is accomplished through close cooperation on a daily basis between the civilian police, the Border Police’s Counter-Terrorism Unit, the Border Police, the Shin Bet, and the IDF.

Years of relative security quiet have always been deceptive. Every day, these units thwart murderous terrorist attacks.

Yet it is only when waves of attack occur that the police’s neglect comes into public focus. As such, there is no way around the need to increase the police’s budget, currently NIS 11 billion. All told, this budget is absurd in light of the quantity of missions faced by the police force.

After money is spent on salaries and pensions, barely one percent of the police budget is left for development. Fortunately, police salaries were recently raised after being intolerably low for years. But funds for development are still lacking.

In addition, building a reserves model for the Border Police can also go a long way to building a new emergency response force for domestic crises. Such a system could also retain knowledge that would otherwise get lost when Border Police officers leave their positions.

Another tool that can enable police to conduct large-scale security campaigns is the volunteer force. At its peak, the police’s volunteer force totaled 70,000. Today, it is less than half of that due to the decreased age requirements, and more stringent operational security and professional standards in place for approving new volunteers.

Volunteers act as a key bridge between the community and the police. They can help shift the toxic narrative while boosting the public’s sense of security.

In addition, it is time to examine the need to free up resources by turning some uniformed policing roles into civilian roles, particularly in office positions. There is no reason why civilians cannot fulfill some of these roles, and this is an accepted norm in other forces in the Western world. That could help increase the police’s size.

At the end of the day, if the size of the police force is not increased, the country will not be able to escape the vicious cycle of inadequate domestic security response capabilities.

A police force that is too small cannot afford the luxury of allowing officers to train, study, and gain new tools, thus creating additional harm. Afterward, complaints become common about unprofessional officers.

It is difficult to send officers for more training when they spend 24-7 dealing with crime, terrorism, and traffic. All of this stems from a lack of personnel.

The current wave of terrorism in Israel crashes on civilians, who are the intended target. The goal of terrorism is always to spread fear. To counteract this evil, building national domestic resilience during routine times is necessary. That can only be done by police, acting as the ceramic vest of the state. The time to invest is when things are quiet, rather than remembering to take improvised action during emergencies.

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

How Israeli Police Counters Lone Wolf Attacks Despite Intel Shortfalls

By Alon Levavi

The recent escalation in terrorist incidents in Israel has shed light on the critical role of the overstretched Israel Police and Border Police.

The number of terrorist attacks in Israel has been on the up since the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza in May. Many of the attacks have occurred in Jerusalem, and this is no coincidence, due to the centrality of the city in fanatical Islamist rhetoric – rhetoric that is at odds with traditional Islam.

Armed with knives or firearms, many of the terrorists perpetrating the latest attacks have pounced on their victims in East Jerusalem’s Sheikh Jarrah Region, as well as the Damascus Gate area of the Old City.

The dynamics of this latest trend are not complicated. Intense online incitement falls on attentive ears, and some of the audience, often in mental and sometimes economic distress, decide to act.

They have been promised 72 virgins in paradise if they become martyrs, and they decide on their own to stab or shoot civilians.

Instead of an organized system of terror cells being activated, individuals get up in the morning and say to themselves that the time has come to kill Jews. They use the simplest of weapons – and due to these factors, preventing their actions becomes very complicated for security forces.

Still, most of these incidents end with the attackers neutralized in little time, with civilians injured in some cases, and killed in others. The speed of the reaction of security forces means civilian deaths and injuries are minimized.

When intelligence is lacking, readiness, alertness, and rapid response abilities are what is left to deal with terrorists.

Police saturate known hot-spots, such as the Old City and Sheikh Jarrah with forces, and as a result, those forces are not available for crime-fighting and other missions elsewhere.

The officers’ determination to bravely engage terrorists saves lives. They must operate under difficult, crowded conditions, where civilians could easily be hit.

On Dec. 4, Border Police officers engaged a terrorist armed with a knife, who had stabbed an Israeli civilian, shooting him before he was able to carry out his murderous intentions. A public storm has since raged over that incident, as the two officers involved were immediately called in for questioning by the Justice Ministry’s Police Investigations Division, and their weapons confiscated. Ultimately, the right decision prevailed, and the investigation ended quickly without any rebuke of the officers. The Police Investigations Division will need to rethink its protocol for cases in which police acted heroically to save lives, and its decision to confiscate weapons automatically was fully unnecessary.

The officers should have been given a little time to process the incident, to meet with commanders, and if necessary, to receive psychological care, after just having prevented a terror attack.

The backing that they received from police command and the government was fully appropriate in this case.

The Israel Police’s unique and difficult mission

The Israel Police, and the Border Police, which is a part of it, face challenges unlike those faced by their counterparts in many other countries.

In the State of Israel, the police have officially been responsible for domestic security and counterterrorism since 1974, in addition to classic policing missions, from crime-fighting to traffic enforcement.

There are no other police forces in the world that within a period of just one month neutralized six terror attacks on the streets. This demands resources and attention that takes away from other sectors, such as personnel availability and training.

The Border Police is at the forefront of this mission. While the regular blue police also play a role, each police district has Border Police companies operating with it, and these units have a semi-military orientation.  

The green Border Police include both conscripts and career officers, and it is subject to the commands of police district chiefs under whom they operate.

Thus, the Border Police can receive specialized missions, such as controlling riots, tracking down Palestinians who have entered the country illegally, or protecting farmland from theft.

These units can go from one district to another, and this is in fact what they are forced to do because the police force suffers from chronic personnel shortages. When police send thousands of reinforcements to the Jerusalem District, the Tel Aviv District is left exposed.

One question that has arisen over the years is whether this modus operandi is the right one. Instead of splitting up thousands of Border Police personnel, perhaps focusing them en masse on a single mission would lead to its rapid completion. For example, sending thousands of Border Police to take on illegal marijuana farms run by Bedouin in the Negev region could stamp out the issue in a single swoop.

Aside from such specialized missions, the Border Police could also be assigned to the role of being uniquely responsible for emergencies, freeing up the Israel Police for its classic missions. This would follow the model of the National Guard in the United States, or the Gendarmerie in Italy – a military force with law enforcement powers.

In the West Bank, the Border Police play a critical role in riot control as it is better trained than the IDF to deal with such incidents. The military’s focus is on defeating enemies with firepower, and not on breaking up rioting in the streets. 

Israel is in a tough neighborhood, surrounded by Hezbollah, Syria, Hamas in Gaza, ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula, and threatened by Iran to the east. The Iranian axis’s threat to the Israeli home front is considerable, and it is on the home front and not along the country’s borders that the next war will be fought.

This means that the Israel Police and the IDF Home Front Command are at the forefront of dealing with this threat.

With this being the situation, Israel’s national resilience – and not only its national security – becomes paramount. Israel’s ability to win the next war will not just depend on buying more F-35s and missiles, but also on investing more in the police, in firefighters, hospitals, the ability of authorities to communicate effectively with the public, and the entire collective resilience system.

The role of the police, the Home Front Command, the National Security Council, the National Emergency Authority, and others must be clearly defined now so that when the emergency arrives, the nation’s resilience will be optimal.

As part of that new clarity, the place of the Israel Police in the national agenda must be strengthened and enlarged significantly, including through greater allocation of resources, as part of a new balance between defending the nation’s borders and building up internal resilience.

N.B. Just before publication, we received news about a murderous shooting attack in the northern West Bank, in which Palestinian terrorists shot dead Israeli citizen Yehuda Dimentman and wounded two others. The incident makes clear that what begins with a wave of lone attacks does not end with sporadic incidents, and that Hamas's incitement to hate, together with the 'inspiration effect,' continues to nourish terrorists. 

The resilience of a country is based on the resilience of the individual, the society, the community, and the local authority. The ability of a country to continue onwards is based on its resilience and not only on its tactical capability.  

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

The Israel Prison Service’s resilience is put to the test

By Alon Levavi

The recapture of last two escaped Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists in a pre-dawn raid by Israeli security forces in Jenin on September 19 will go some way to restoring deterrence after they and four others dug their way out of the high-security Gilboa Prison almost two weeks earlier. But their capture does not cancel out the massive failure that enabled their escape in the first place.

The fact that Israel’s most secure prison, built after the Second Intifada, was the scene of a tunnel breakout, without any prior intelligence obtained by prison authorities and without any attempt made to stop the prisoners’ flight, represents an unprecedented and even surreal failure in the recent history of the Israel Prisons Service.

On the other hand, the rapid and silent  Jenin arrest operation that ended successfully without a single soldier – or escaped terrorist – suffering a scratch, is testament to the determination and skill of all of the security forces involved.

The Jenin operation came after the center of gravity of the pursuit shifted toward the intelligence sphere. Initially, the operation focused on the deployment of thousands of police officers and soldiers, but at a certain stage, spreading out such large forces on the ground was no longer useful. This is when the lead role went to the Shin Bet domestic intelligence agency, which activated its varied intelligence sources and technology to home in on the dangerous fugitives.

From the moment that the intelligence indication came in, security forces - the Shin Bet and its operational arm, the Israel Police’s elite Counter-Terrorism Unit, together with the IDF, and the Israel Police began planning a sophisticated operation.

It is safe to assume that from that point onward, the messaging  the authorities were putting out were not always a full reflection of what was taking place on the ground  – this in order to avoid giving away sensitive information and harming the operation.

The escaped terrorists and their collaborators were monitoring Israeli media. Security forces planned a deceptive decoy maneuver. It seems safe to assume that large forces were sent to one section of Jenin – a city that contains neighborhoods that are filled with gunmen – and conducted a ‘loud operation’ to attract attention, while a separate force went to the location where the Shin Bet knew the two escaped prisoners were hiding to carry out the   real, and quiet, escape operation.

The Israel Police’s Counter-Terrorism Unit is the go-to address for the most extreme security missions. Police have invested much in this elite unit, in terms of training, developing its fighters, investing in their facilities, and providing them operational technologies.

How the pursuit was managed

Prior to the recapture of the escaped terrorists, the various security branches joined forces in a unique manner to manage the largest-scale pursuit Israel has seen in years.

The Israel Police’s Northern District, which is still recovering from its own trauma dating back to the deadly Mount Meron stampede in April, took center stage in this pursuit. The first objective was to prevent the terrorists from escaping to nearby Jordan or  crossing the Green Line into the Jenin area of the northern West Bank.

All of the security organizations joined up with the Israel Police, bringing their capabilities to the pursuit. The Israel Prisons Service’s area of responsibility stops at prison walls, and anything beyond that in Israeli territory falls under police jurisdiction. The IDF led the search in Judea and Samaria with its forces, while the Shin Bet was injecting intelligence into all of the organizations’ efforts, and receiving intelligence from them.

The police force threw everything it had into the pursuit – helicopters, drones, night-vision, scouts, officers on horseback, canine units, the bomb squad, and its Counter-Terror Unit.

The Northern District’s personnel is simply not big enough to cover such a large area, and it had to receive back up from other police entities, such as Traffic Police, Border Police, and other districts.

The initial objective: To flood the ground with as many flashing blue lights and forces as possible, to make the terrorists hunker down in their location and stop them from crossing any borders. This made the terrorists aware that large forces were nearby looking for them at all times, and would stop most of them from advancing far. 

Since the escaped prisoners had no phones, it was not possible to track them technologically, making the mission far more challenging.

In the end though, most of the terrorists were caught alone, unarmed, unharmed, hungry and thirsty. The photos of their captures are of major significance for public perception in Israel and among the Palestinians. The fact that law-abiding Arab Israeli citizens called the police to report suspicious movements also had significant effect on the narratives surrounding the escape. 

Ultimately, despite their daring and sophistication in the early stages of the escape plan, the fact that the terrorists were found in poor condition was a twist in the plot, demonstrating no planning for the second stage of their flight , and harming the Palestinian euphoria that accompanied the escape.

The Israel Prisons Service: A time for review and rebuilding  

The Israel Prisons Service is currently facing one of the most significant leadership tests in its in history. The organization’s resilience is now being put to the test. It did not have the time to review the series of failures that allowed the escapes, and fix the problems – as it was busy dealing with prison riots, and the after-effects of its initiative to end the organizational separation of Palestinian Islamic Jihad prisoners in their own cells. It has been in ongoing crisis management mode.

To its credit, the Israel Prisons Service has not blinked as it pushes ahead with the break-up of terror factions inside prison wards, despite protests by the terror factions and threats of hunger strikes.

As it does this, the service is at the center of a government commission of inquiry, and a criminal investigation being run by the Israel Police into the escape. The police is investigating the Israel Prisons Service even as the two organizations worked shoulder to shoulder to recapture the prisoners – an extraordinary dissonance that the two organizations have had to learn to live with.

The Israel Prisons Service has absorbed an obvious shock following the escape. As an organization that is usually in the shadow of larger security organizations – ones that do not deal with the volcanos known as prisons, the current challenge forms an enormous test.

Yet it is also an opportunity for the service to seize on the situation and to begin to prioritize issues that it struggled to focus on until now, such as new security technologies, personnel development, and building better infrastructure. Many of Israel’s prisons date back to the British mandate of the 1920s and 1930s, and the escape crisis is a real opportunity to reexamine prison facilities and to start properly addressing the weak links within them.

Organizations are measured by their ability to cope with crises. In order to do that, they must build organizational resilience ahead of time. It is up to the organization’s leaders to build this resilience, which will be tested by its ability to rapidly exit this crisis, and to do so in a manner that leaves the service stronger.

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP). Read full bio here.

Amid pandemic, Israel Police must balance between enforcement, support

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By Alon Levavi

As a result of the government's vacillation between reopening some parts of our country while limiting others, the Israeli National Police now faces extreme challenges during the pandemic era. 

While in the first wave that struck Israel, the public's top concern was the disease itself, in the second wave, its fears have turned to its economic well being. Meanwhile, the pandemic has provided a stage for political and social crises. Political paralysis and instability preceded the pandemic, and have been intensified by it. 

This has caused state systems to suffer a significant shake-up, and ultimately, the police finds itself in the role of the responsible adult, forced to act as a mediator in Israeli society - between Right and Left, the desire of ultra-Orthodox to enter synagogues, and the desire of protesters to crowd together in demonstrations and manifest their democratic rights. 

This trend is accelerated by the fact that vast sections of the public are facing personal financial hardships and the failure of their businesses. 

When a crisis hits, it is the police that must bear the brunt. Currently, it finds itself having to handle the pandemic's extraordinary after-shocks, while at the same time continuing to combat crime, deal with traffic accidents, and fight the war on drugs. As it conducts these missions, the police now must also enforce mask wearing, social distancing, and engage in situations where otherwise law-abiding citizens gradually enter into a state of civil disobedience. 

As it does so, Israel's police cannot decrease its anti-crime, counter-terrorism, or traffic operations. 

The scope of this challenge is only growing. 

The fact that the police entered this situation with an acting commissioner, not an appointed commissioner, does not make things easier. A commissioner must be appointed as soon as possible, and the government’s procrastination in getting this done is causing real damage to the police's ability to act in an organized and effective manner. 

At the same time, it is worth noting that the acting commissioner, Motti Cohen, is executing his role in a very professional manner, and is taking correct operational decisions during one of the police's most difficult hours. 

With time, the police are slowly learning how to enforce the new public health laws, but those are changing and being updated frequently, leaving the force to adjust each time, something that makes enforcement even more difficult. 

In terms of the relations between police and the ultra-Orthodox population, it is vital to point out that this sector is not monolithic, and is made up of various streams. Most ultra-Orthodox citizens have a full understanding of the dangers posed by the pandemic and have abided by the law. There are, however, a number of elements in this sector that explicitly ignore regulations and present an enormous challenge to the state's efforts to break the chain of infection. 

The police have, despite the myriad challenges, been able to build strong relations with the ultra-Orthodox sector. It employs community policing techniques, has drafted women investigators from the ultra-Orthodox world, and managed to build bridges to the community. The police have ultra-Orthodox volunteers, and work closely with ultra-Orthodox paramedics and with the Zaka emergency response teams. 

Despite these positive attributes, there are extreme streams that disregard national laws, and these provocations end up at the police's door.

The police are also learning to deal with the risk of its own officers becoming infected with the virus when policing mass demonstrations and events. Hundreds of police officers have been infected so far, and thousands have had to go into self-isolation. When the number of missions it must conduct is examined, it becomes clear that police have too few personnel and too many missions. 

And yet, the Israeli Police is managing to conduct enforcement that is smart and appropriate. 

Israel in general is lacking when it comes to communicating with the public on enforcement and public health rules that are designed to prevent infection. This creates an additional layer of challenges that officers on the ground must deal with.   

Still, with time, the world will exit the pandemic crisis, either by learning to live with it or by defeating the virus. The police must therefore think about the day after the public crisis of confidence in the state and its authorities and consider how to rehabilitate the collateral damage to trust it has suffered.

The Israel Police has an enormous role in our national resilience. While it must conduct determined enforcement against disturbances or blatant public health violations, law enforcement must also see things from the perspective of a civilian. A civilian who has lost their job, or perhaps lost a loved one to disease, is fearful and often faces extreme pressures. The police must know how to contain that, and to be sympathetic to such civilians. 

Ultimately, in such an unusual, challenging time, the police will not be able to bridge all gaps. Extreme times bring about extreme actions. These are not normal times; it is critical for police to be smart, and to avoid incidents in which officers have to activate force against young children in synagogues or schools, for example. 

The police must enforce public health laws with economic sanctions, and receive assistance from other sectors of the state, since provocations against the law are ultimately directed at the state itself, not only at police. 

Ultimately, for the police, successfully navigating these challenging times requires striking the balance between determined enforcement and supporting the population they are here to serve. 

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP).