Israel lacks a coordinated public diplomacy system.

By Arthur Koll

The five-day escalation between Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and Israel in early May produced a mixed diplomatic result for Israel, and, above all, underlined the lack of a long-term Israeli strategy regarding the Hamas-controlled enclave as well as an ineffective Israeli public diplomacy system.

On the positive side, the escalation demonstrated that despite President Joe Biden’s negative perception of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu following the latter’s attempt to reform Israel’s judicial system, the American commitment to Israel remains strong.  This vital commitment continues to extend into international organizations, as demonstrated by Washington’s blockage of an attempt to pass an anti-Israel decision at the United Nations Security Council.

During this last escalation, the international media and the international community’s criticism of Israel’s actions was not extraordinarily voluminous. This resulted from the fact that the escalation was short-lived with a relatively low number of casualties and limited destruction in Gaza, when compared to previous rounds of fighting against Hamas.

At the tactical-military level, Israel achieved its goal in the first few seconds of Operation Shield and Arrow, when it simultaneously hit three senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad )PIJ( commanders in Gaza, in three different locations. At this point, after regaining at least some of its lost deterrence power vis-à-vis the terror organizations, Israel would have preferred a swift end of hostilities.

However, the operation dragged on for five more days, due to the absence of an effective completion mechanism to bring it to a halt. Iran, which finances and trains the PIJ, encouraged its proxy to continue firing on Israel.

In addition, the operation exposed a gaping hole in Israel’s ability to coordinate a unified public messaging campaign that involves various components, such as the Prime Minister’s office, the Foreign Ministry, the IDF Spokesperson Unit, and others.

To this day, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to appoint a head of the public diplomacy division, which is stationed in his own office and is answerable to him directly. Nor has he yet appointed a spokesperson to the international media. Luckily, this last Gaza operation ended before international pressure started to mount.  Israel cannot however afford the luxury of lacking a functioning professional public diplomacy apparatus.

To make things worse, The Israeli Minister for Public Diplomacy, Galit Distel Atbaryan, lacks any experience in this line of activity. She appeared to be caught off guard by the military operation and released amateur and ineffective video messages during the escalation, which appeared to be a diversion from her focus of acting as a divisive internal Israeli voice that attacks protesters against the judicial reform.

Prime Minister Netanyahu, who has always given great attention to public diplomacy should urgently pay attention to this matter and repair what is now clearly a dysfunctional structure -- before a much more serious regional or international challenge erupts.

During this minor escalation with the relatively marginal PIJ terror organization, Israel did not pay a heavy price for this governmental chaos. But future, larger conflicts, will surely extract heavier prices from Israel on the international stage.

This latest round, therefore, is a clear warning that the prime minister must take significant steps to put his house in order.

Israel’s diplomatic standing is also harmed by the fact that Jerusalem lacks a strategy for Gaza, and the Palestinian issue in general. This lack of strategy has a knock-on effect on all other aspects of the state’s performance in this context, including public diplomacy. Rather than looking for an arrangement, or at least some sort of long-term agreement, it seems that Israel is dragged into endless bursts of violent eruptions against Hamas, PIJ, or both. And it seems that the intervals between these rounds are getting shorter.

The lack of any new strategic concept that can fundamentally chip away at the old Gaza equation is taking a toll, internally, regionally, and in the wider international arena. Thus, it is clear that the next round is around the corner.

The world is preoccupied with burning global issues, like Russia’s assault on Ukraine and economic challenges, and is getting tired of repetitious clashes between Gazan terror factions and Israel.

This is not welcome news for Israel, which needs active international attention directed to Iran's nuclear advances and its network of terror.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a small part of the Iranian web of client terror organizations that constantly threaten to destabilize the region. Much more significant members of this network are Hamas and, of course, Hezbollah. The likelihood of simultaneous attacks on Israel by Iranian proxies on more than one front is growing.

The IDF is preparing for such developments. It is essential that Prime Minister Netanyahu also uses this time to put his public diplomacy structure in order. It may be needed sooner rather than later. 

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Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

How Israel and Lebanon Settled Their Maritime Borders

By Arthur Koll

Last week, Israel and Lebanon, two countries that officially designate each other as enemy states, signed an agreement settling a long-standing maritime border dispute. While definitely not as important as Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt or Jordan or the Abraham Accords, which normalized Israeli’s ties with the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco, this latest agreement reduces tensions in the region and provides an opportunity for Lebanon to break out of its economic collapse and political mayhem. 

In order to make sense of the agreement, it is important to differentiate between two types of maritime zones as far as international law is concerned.

The first category covers territorial-sovereign waters, which stretch from the coast to the 12-mile mark. States have the same level of sovereignty over these types of waters as they do on land.

The second category is exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which begin 12 nautical miles from a country’s coastline and extend up to 200 miles away from the coast (unless an EEZ encounters that of another country).

The concept of economic waters developed in international maritime law as a group of principles for states to divide exploration rights and benefit from resources found in or under the waters, such as fishing zones, energy resources, and minerals.

Until the first decade of this century, no urgency was felt by the eastern Mediterranean states to mark out their EEZs. However, discoveries of large natural gas fields under the waters of Israel, Egypt, and Cyprus, and most likely in Lebanon, made matters more pressing.

In 2007, Israel unilaterally marked out, with floats, its territorial maritime border with Lebanon, based on its understanding of international maritime law. Lebanon, for its part, declared its own wish list on maritime borders, which consisted of its maximalist positions.

Later, in 2010, Israel and Cyprus, which also discovered a very large natural gas field in its waters, reached an agreement to demarcate their EEZs. Similarly, Cyprus and Lebanon reached their own agreement earlier in 2007 (though Lebanon has yet to ratify it).

These hasty diplomatic developments were a direct result of the understanding that hiding under the waters of the eastern Mediterranean are significant hydrocarbon resources, and that to fully benefit from them it is necessary to settle border issues.

After Cyprus and Israel, on the one hand, and Cyprus and Lebanon, on the other, settled their maritime borders, the one unresolved dispute left open in this Mediterranean triangle was the border between Israel and Lebanon. Over the last twelve years, the two countries engaged in indirect negotiations led by the United States.

For over a decade, Israel and Lebanon were unable to reach an agreement on this boundary. What made it possible now? The answer to this question seems to involve three critical elements falling in place at the right time.

The first involves the preliminary testing that has occurred in recent years north of the now-established boundary, revealing a significant gas field, mostly on the Lebanese side. While Lebanon made no headway in developing its gas resources, Israel made dramatic progress, building offshore platforms and benefiting from multiple fields within its EEZ.

Secondly, Lebanon’s economy is in complete shambles and the country’s political paralysis prevents the formation of a government capable of providing for the basic needs of its citizens. Blackouts are the norm rather than the exception, there is a chronic shortage of basic products such as food and oil, and the banking system is dysfunctional. These ills are joined by the destructive role played by Hezbollah, the Iran-backed terror organization.

It is no wonder, therefore, that Lebanon is eager to begin exploiting the natural resources it hopes lie waiting for it under the sea. This would be a game changer for both Lebanon’s economy and its volatile internal and regional political situation.

Thirdly, the Biden administration appointed a new energy envoy to the region, Amos Hochstein, who invested significant efforts into kickstarting talks. He earned the trust of both the Lebanese and Israeli sides and was able to break a ten-year freeze, conducting shuttle diplomacy between Beirut, Jerusalem, and Washington.

Hochstein created an American compromise formula, which on the one hand followed the Israeli position regarding sovereign waters and answered its security needs, but on the other hand relies on the Lebanese position regarding EEZs, thus making it possible for Beirut to make progress and hopefully produce and profit from its field, dubbed Qanna.

From a security perspective, Israel gained what it desired: The demarcation of a border with Lebanon that recognizes Israel’s territorial-sovereign waters.

From an economic perspective, the deal is consistent with Lebanon’s desire to gain possession of the waters up to a boundary known as Line 23.

Additionally, Israel will be compensated, if and when natural gas is produced from the mostly Lebanese field, a field where the existence of commercial-scale gas reserves has yet to be verified. The scope and terms of this compensation have yet to be negotiated between Israel and Total, the French company that has the exploration rights for the Lebanese gas field.

Within Israel, challenges to the deal from the political Right were rejected by the Israeli Supreme Court and the signing took place as planned.

The current agreement is not a peace treaty—far from it. Hezbollah will continue to threaten regional stability. However, not wanting to be perceived as being the force that quashed hope for a better economic future for the Lebanese people, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared that he would honor any agreement reached by Lebanon. 

Ultimately, settling the maritime boundaries is a win-win for both Jerusalem and Beirut. Israel reduced the threat to a major economic asset (the Karish natural gas field) and signed a bilateral agreement with an enemy state—a diplomatic achievement in its own right. Lebanon can act on the hope of dramatically improving the fate of its people. A stable Lebanon is in the best interest of Israel too.  

The increased role of the United States and France in the Lebanese arena is also a positive development and is preferable to leaving Lebanon under the sole grip of Hezbollah and Iran, which led that country to misery. And who knows, now that the precedent of a maritime border agreement has been set and the ice has been broken, perhaps there is increased potential for a future agreement on the land border between Israel and Lebanon. That, however, still seems far away.

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Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

Israel’s delicate navigation options in the face of Russia’s war

By Arthur Koll

When considering Israel’s diplomatic maneuvering options in the face of Russia’s war on Ukraine, it is important to first take stock of the fundamental, relevant facts.

The first of these is that Russia shares a common border with Israel. In northwest Syria, Russia is present in large air and naval bases and maintains a significant military presence. This forms a central consideration for Israel.

Russia has been a strategic pillar for Assad’s political (and physical) survival. Without Russian-provided military equipment and air power, the Assad regime could not have won its civil war.

Russian surface-to-air missile batteries – the most advanced in the world – are on Syrian soil, including the S-300 battery that Syria received from Russia, and the S-400, the peak of Russian air defense capabilities, operated by Russian forces in the country.

These assets could potentially form a major threat, not only to Israel’s military freedom of action in the crowded Syrian skies but also to civil aviation in Israeli airspace. As a result, Israel places enormous weight on the dialogue with Russia.

This dialogue occurs as Israel works to prevent the entrenchment of Iran in Syria. Understandings with Russia play a hugely important role in this context, and undermining these understandings could have significant consequences.

In addition, Israel is dealing with a two-dimensional Iranian threat. The first is the Iranian nuclear program. The Russian war on Ukraine has led to a delay of the signature on the revived Iranian nuclear program, despite America’s desire to fast-forward completion of the talks so that it can focus on Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the world has developed a new thirst for oil after disruption to Russia’s exports, and a post-nuclear deal Iran can help quench some of that thirst, particularly if the West upgrades the sanctions on Russia to include import of oil.

Surprisingly, while both the Iranians and the West have exhibited willingness to complete the deal, it has been Russia that introduced a new clause demanding exception from sanctions placed on it when it comes to its ties with Iran.

This has led to a return to consultations, which took several days to resolve until Russia said it received the necessary guarantees from Washington.

Whatever happens with the nuclear agreement, from the Israeli perspective, it is vital that it remains free to deal with the second dimension of the Iranian threat, namely its regional military-terrorist entrenchment program, particularly in Syria.

These factors form Israel’s principal considerations, which do not vanish as Russia mercilessly pounds Ukraine. While Israeli public opinion is firmly on the side of the Ukrainian people, Israel’s government does not have the luxury of ignoring key national security calculations.

Thus, Israel has adopted a policy that condemns the aggression by Moscow. It co-sponsored the UN General Assembly condemning the Russian invasion, provides humanitarian and medical aid, and has also made clear that it will not become a route to bypass economic sanctions on Russia. However, Israel has declined Ukraine’s request for Israeli military equipment.

To date, the United States has a full understanding of Israel’s array of considerations and its careful maneuvering.

Furthermore, Washington has found Israel’s role as a mediator between Kyiv and Moscow useful, although, so far, both sides remain too far apart for compromise solutions at this time.

There is no doubt that Israel’s stance and the practical steps are being tested and examined every day by decision-makers in Jerusalem. This is not a ‘fire and forget’ policy, and it may not remain static if the war drags on for months longer.

As warnings of chemical attacks by Russia continue to hover in the background, they serve as a reminder of the fact that critical changes in the situation in Europe, such as a WMD attack, or continued unrestrained Russian shelling, will obligate Israel to reassess its current position.

This would lead Israel to lose its position of mediator, but this is less important compared to the fact that it could lead to undesired elevated tension between Israel and Russia in the Middle East, should Russia choose to escalate.

In addition, should the situation change, the US could demand more categorical statements and actions from Israel as part of an alignment with Washington.

Israel is after all a part of the Western camp and enjoys a special alliance with the US. American support for Israel, past, present, and future, is of strategic vitality that cannot be exaggerated. This is backed by shared Israeli – American values. Hence, if the US demands a stronger Israeli posture on the European war, Israel will not be able to remain aloof.

Lastly, Israel’s handling of the Ukrainian refugee crisis began poorly but has improved steadily with time. Many of the Ukrainians headed for Israel are eligible for automatic citizenship under the Right of Return.

Should tens of thousands arrive, this will present a considerable event for a state the size of Israel.

At the same time, unforced and morally inappropriate errors were made by Israel in the initial reception of non-Jewish refugees. As Jews, we remember the dark days of the 1930s when the world shut its doors to us, and we could not escape the inferno of the Holocaust. As a nation that experienced this, we can’t turn away the small number of Ukrainian refugees who knock on our door. Most of them do not view Israel as their final destination.

Fortunately, on March 13, the Israeli government improved its policy and enabled thousands of additional Ukrainian refugees to claim asylum in Israel.

With no end to the crisis in sight at this time, Israel must prepare to keep adapting its policies as the situation evolves.

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Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

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TURKISH OVERTURES TO ISRAEL. TREAT WITH SUSPICION

By Arthur Koll

In recent weeks, Turkey has made diplomatic overtures toward Israel, signaling a desire to repair damaged relations between the two countries. But Ankara will need to go significantly further than sending feelers to Jerusalem if it is serious about rebuilding ties. 

In the past, close relations between Israel and Turkey formed an important anchor in Israeli foreign policy, spanning diplomatic, political, and military-intelligence cooperation. The ties also included large-scale trade, and hundreds of thousands of Israeli tourists visited Turkey annually. 

These ties developed gradually, when Turkey was still under the control of a secular government, led by the ideology of its secular founder, Ataturk, and backed by the military, which had a special status. 

When Recep Tayyip Erdogan was first elected Prime Minister in 2003 and came to power with his Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), security and intelligence cooperation with Israel were not immediately harmed, and neither were trade or tourism, which continued to break records year after year. 

Yet with time, the Turkish military’s secular chiefs and civil service were replaced with Islamists, and the relationship with Israel began to deteriorate as Erdogan and the AKP tightened their grip on power. 

The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident marked the start of a deep crisis, when Turkish citizens who sought to break Israel’s security restrictions on Gaza sailed to the Strip with Erdogan’s approval, violently clashing with the IDF, resulting in the deaths of Turkish extremists.  

Erdogan’s language towards Israel became more extreme, as he attempted, unsuccessfully, to act against Israel through international legal maneuvers. Rounds of conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza saw Erdogan position himself openly and vocally on the side of Hamas, and employ language that bordered on anti-Semitic. 

In 2018, Turkey ejected Israel’s ambassador after deadly clashes on the Gaza border, sparked by Hamas’s ‘return marches.’ Since then, the chargé d'affaires at the Israeli embassy in Ankara has managed what is left of the bilateral relationship. 

But Ankara seems to have gained little, if anything, by its hostility toward Israel. Jerusalem has found strategic alternatives to Turkey, in the form of important new Mediterranean alliances with Greece and Cyprus, where special relations, joint military training, and shared economic interests, including cooperation on offshore gas reserves, are creating powerful partnerships. 

Israel has also nurtured open, strategic cooperation with a number of key Sunni Arab states in the Gulf and North Africa. 

Yet Ankara and Jerusalem still find themselves, sometimes, on the same side, with similar strategic interests. The latest example of this could be found in the recent war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Media reports suggested that Turkey and Israel were principal backers of Baku, creating a clear merger of interests. 

Still, Israel has been badly burned by Turkey in recent years. Past attempts by Jerusalem to reconcile were only met with hostility, as exemplified by Turkey’s reaction to a decision by Prime Minister Netanyahu to compensate the families of the Mavi Marmara casualties and to express regret over the incident – a decision that did nothing to ameliorate relations. 

To make matters worse, Turkey spent years providing asylum for senior Hamas members on its territory, from where they coordinate operations against Israel. 

Erdogan ultimately views himself as the leader of the Islamic world, resulting in his decision to create an alliance with Hamas, which is a designated terror organization in many Western states. He has also been attempting to gain a foothold in the Temple Mount compound in Jerusalem. 

As a result, it has been surprising to see statements by a senior Erdogan advisor on foreign relations about a new desire to restore relations with Israel, including renewed defense cooperation. 

It is possible that Turkey came to the conclusion that fixing the damaged ties is in its interest for both geopolitical as well as economic reasons. In this context, Ankara is seeking a way to connect and gain from the large gas reserves found in the eastern Mediterranean, from which it has been left out. 

Unlike in the past, so far Jerusalem seems to be reserved in response to Turkey’s overtures. Israel has simply been ‘burned’ too many times by Erdogan’s hostility. Clear confidence building measures are now needed to restore trust.

If Ankara’s intentions are genuine, it would have to shut down Hamas’s activity on its territory to prove it. This would serve as an important confidence building act. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect that Israel will abandon its new Mediterranean allies for a possible improvement in relations with Ankara. 

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Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

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TRUMP'S BALKAN AGREEMENT DOES ISRAEL MORE HARM THAN GOOD

By Arthur Koll

Kosovo and Serbia have a bloody and troubled history. As they attempt to reduce tensions and to create new economic agreements between them, Israel has been bizarrely dragged into this delicate Balkan mix. 

Since its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo, which has an Albanian ethnic majority, has been recognized by the U.S. and by most EU states, but not by the United Nations. Russia and China, would veto any such recognition by the UN Security Council. Kosovo is thus yet to be admitted to the UN as a fully-fledged member, despite the fact that over 100 states already recognize its independence. 

Even in the EU, some have refrained from recognizing Kosovo for the simple reason that they themselves have separatist movements that could be encouraged to unilaterally declare their own independence following the Kosovo precedent. 

Examples of such states include Spain, which contends with a Catalonian independence movement, and Cyprus, which has a separatist northern Turkish entity that is recognized only by Turkey. Slovakia and Romania also have their own minorities that could be encouraged by the Kosovo precedent, leading them to avoid granting recognition. 

Historically, Albanians and Jews have enjoyed positive relations, including Albanian assistance to Jews fleeing the Nazi death machine during the Second World War. 

In 1999, during the war in Kosovo, Israel sent significant aid to the refugees fleeing the war zone. We established field hospitals in neighboring Balkan states and accepted some of those fleeing Kosovo into Israel.

Since becoming independent, Kosovo has applied a fair degree of pressure on Israel to officially recognize it, due to the significance that it attaches to Israel's international status. 

From the outset, Israel informed Kosovo that while it has nothing against the Kosovan people, Israel must take its own interests into account. Israeli recognition of Kosovan independence would impact the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. 

Kosovo declared independence not through a negotiated agreement with Serbia; but unilaterally. That reality is too close to home for Israel given that the Palestinians are also seeking to achieve recognition from the international community on a unilateral basis, bypassing direct talks with Israel and any negotiated agreement. 

Israel’s options for granting recognition of Kosovo was therefore based on one of two developments coming to pass: either Kosovo and Serbia reach an agreement, or Israel and the Palestinians do. 

Recognizing Kosovo before one of those two things took place could serve to boost and a predicate for a Palestinian initiative to demand recognition from the UN for a unilaterally declared Palestinian state in the West Bank, with Jerusalem as its capital. 

Furthermore, the Palestinians would be reluctant to return to the negotiating table, believing instead that more could be gained by turning to the UN and the international community. 

Once explained to leaders in Kosovo, these concerns were greeted with some understanding. Efforts to change Israel's position continued, however. 

The biggest lever Kosovo had at its disposal to dislodge the Israeli policy was the U.S., but even that was insufficient to get Jerusalem to change its diplomatic principle. 

All of that suddenly changed on September 4, 2020, when U.S brokered economic agreements between Serbia and Kosovo were signed in Washington D.C. by President Donald Trump, Aleksandar Vucic, the President of Serbia and Avdullah Hoti, the Prime Minister of Kosovo. Those agreements are aimed at regulating the interaction between the large Serbian minority living in northern Kosovo and Serbia. The scope of those agreements includes the handling of interests, assets, and the movements of goods and people between Belgrade and Pristina.

Oddly, and in a manner that is out of place, one of the clauses of this economic agreement between the two Balkan rivals is that Israel recognizes Kosovo, and that both Kosovo and Serbia establish embassies in Israel's capital of Jerusalem. 

This diplomatic turn of events should be viewed with deep suspicion, for several reasons. 

Serbia, for its part, interprets an Israeli recognition of Kosovo as a significant diplomatic blow. It is therefore less than likely to reward such a development by moving its embassy to Jerusalem. Indeed, in recent days, Serbia has more than hinted that it will not move its embassy if Israel recognizes Kosovo. The chances of a Serbian embassy in Jerusalem by summer 2021, as the agreement calls for, look slim at best.

On the subject of Kosovo, Israel is departing from a long standing foreign-policy principle in return for a vague promise of a Kosovan embassy in Jerusalem. 

An EU statement further added to the skepticism. It warned both Serbia and Kosovo that moving their embassies to Jerusalem would undermine the Union's collective stance on the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, and that it would harm the prospects of both countries being accepted into the EU – a key objective of both Belgrade and Pristina. 

As such, Israel appears to have been dragged into a Balkan conflict against its own interests, and regardless of the manner in which this strange situation ends, Israel does not stand to benefit. 

Israel must now move swiftly to ensure that its ties with Serbia, which have been excellent to this point, are not harmed as a consequence of this process. 

Ultimately, one has to ask why Israel was ready to surrender a key policy principle in such an awkward and clumsy manner. 

The likely explanation is that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is returning a political favor to Donald Trump. 

Just as the American president has made multiple gestures of support to Netanyahu in the build up to successive Israeli elections, including moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, so now has Netanyahu agreed to help Trump's campaign. 

Trump boasted a foreign policy 'success' and has scored points with his base through the announced agreement. 

As for whether either Serbia or Kosovo will move their embassies to Jerusalem - to say the least, that remains to be seen. 

In the meantime, a key Israeli policy interest may well have been sacrificed. 

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Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

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VIDEO: Ambassadors Avivi & Koll brief the I-SAP Tour (2019)

In June 2019, our organization brought forty I-SAP delegates from the U.S. Military Academies to the state of Israel. During that tour, they received a "Diplomacy Masterclass" featuring two former Deputy Directors General of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The lecture was entitled "Israels Geo-Political Positioning In The Modern Era."

The Israel Strategy and Policy tour (I-SAP) is a unique initiative, specifically tailored for military cadets and future officers of the United States Armed Forces. Cadets are recruited from the US Military Academy at West Point, the US Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs and Virginia Military Institute, Virginia.