How Turkey and Israel salvaged their relationship

By Pinhas Avivi

After the Islamist AKP Party and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in Turkey in 2002, Ankara’s approach to Israel began to change for the worse. There were major fears at the time that the defense ties that characterized bilateral relations would vanish and create an irreparable rupture.

Within six years, ties indeed went from friendly to hostile.

And yet, the recent Israeli humanitarian delegation sent to assist Turkey in February’s earthquake disaster is the latest reminder of the fact that these days, Jerusalem’s relations with Ankara are marked by a high degree of stability. That’s not something that should be taken for granted; it took years for the two countries to reach this stage after dealing with several major crises.  

The 2010 Mavi Marmara crisis (when Israeli Navy commandos and Turkish Islamist activists trying to reach Gaza were involved in a deadly clash) marked a low point. Yet since then, the two regional powers have found a way to restore relations and maintain them – to a degree.

This was achieved primarily through civilian cooperation, as returning to the military cooperation that existed before Erdogan’s rise to power would be very hard. Israel would have to find alternative security partners in the Mediterranean – which it did in the form of Greece.

Once in power, Erdogan wanted to be the leader of the Islamic world and navigate according to a neo-Ottoman playbook. Unlike Ataturk, who turned Turkey from an empire to a state, Erdogan wants to return his country to empire mode.

On the one hand, Erdogan tried to employ a zero-conflict policy with Turkey’s neighbors, while seeking to increase its influence in the region through soft power, based on leveraging economic and cultural ties, rather than military means.

However, Turkey's military involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya, and severe tensions that developed with Greece and Israel, put a dent in the ‘zero conflict’ approach.

In addition, Turkey’s political influence on Arab Muslim states remained extremely limited. Theoretical predictions look nice on paper, but Erdogan quickly found out that reality doesn’t always align. No one in the Arab Sunni world was willing to accept him as a regional leader – Egypt and Saudi Arabia hold that position in the Sunni bloc.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia was unwilling to give up its role as the leader of the Islamic world.

As a result, Turkey took up the banner of assisting the Palestinians, as part of its regional leadership bid. Yet Erdogan quickly understood that if he wants to be influential in the Arab world, he must have good ties with Israel, or he risks losing relevance.

All the Arab powers have ties with Israel, some formally like Jordan and Egypt, and, since the 2020 Abraham Accords, the UAE and Bahrain, while others, such as Saudi Arabia, maintain informal ties. As the Arab states moved forward, Erdogan was left behind. Erdogan understood that if he remained excluded, the Abraham Accords would further decrease Turkey’s influence on the region and the Arab world – and this realization also helped convince him of the need to change his attitude to Israel.

Meanwhile, Erdogan was a big disappointment to the United States, as it moved closer to Russia and created a crisis in NATO.

Israel, in Erdogan’s view, is therefore an important means for him to repair some of that damage by enabling him to forge new connections with the U.S. and open doors in Europe via improved ties with Jerusalem. Hence, Turkey has focused on promoting civilian ties with the Jewish state.

In addition, economic trade has remained consistently high. Since Erdogan took office as prime minister in 2002, trade between Israel and Turkey has increased fivefold. Furthermore, Erdogan believes that strengthening ties with Israel will benefit his country's economy and increase its global influence.

 As a result, he has made efforts to improve diplomatic relations with Jerusalem – but without giving up his ongoing effort to stress the Palestinian issue.

This is why some Hamas members are still allowed to be active on Turkish soil, though these days, this activity mostly involves Hamas’s political wing. Hamas’s Deputy Political Bureau Chief, Salah Al-Arouri, who in reality oversees West Bank terrorism efforts, is today based in Lebanon after relocating from Turkey. The AKP party views Hamas’s political wing as a sister movement.

Erdogan’s mounting problems

Erdogan’s growing problems mean that he is keener than ever to improve ties with Europe, the U.S., Sunni states, and Israel.

Kurdish autonomous zones in northern Syria have an immediate impact on southern Turkey that Ankara finds disturbing. Millions of Syrian refugees remain in Turkey, creating a serious economic problem. Iran worries Erdogan due to its ongoing attempts to change the balance of power in Syria to the determinant of Turkish-backed Sunni forces in the north of the country. Iranians are present on the Syrian Mediterranean coastline, and this Iranian entrenchment is not viewed positively by Erdogan. Sunni Turkey sees Shi’ite Islamist regional influence as a destructive force. Despite four hundred years of quiet on the Turkish – Iranian border, these are far from being brotherly states.

Erdogan also has huge economic problems and needs to attract new investments by improving ties with Europe and the U.S. He is also interested in becoming a distributor of Israeli gas to Europe.

These factors have led to a substantial change in Erdogan’s tone. When he criticizes Israel, he uses a vastly different tone from the one he used in the early years of his government rule.

The fact that Israeli and Turkish security organizations were reportedly able to cooperate closely to thwart Iranian terror cells on Turkish soil, sent to target Israelis in June 2022, is a further reflection of this change.

Erdogan has not given up his vision of establishing himself as an important Muslim leader who promotes the Palestinian cause, but he has learned that he cannot achieve this by continually bashing Israel.

Turkey also has direct potential gains it can make from its improved ties with Israel.

Israeli companies are already involved in helping Istanbul better manage its water system, with Israeli-made sensors helping to prevent water leakages from its pipes.

There is interest on both sides in further cooperation, but this will continue to be limited to the civilian sector, because Erdogan has not shed all his neo-Ottoman influences.

Greece, for its part, has no reason to feel threatened by the Israeli – Turkish thaw, precisely because it is limited to civilian issues. The good judgement of both Israeli and Turkish decision-makers has enabled ties to become stable once more, as they should be. 

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

As Russia – Ukraine standoff escalates, Israel must tread carefully

By Pinhas Avivi

In recent days Ukraine has been pressing Israel to take a clear stand over escalating tensions between Kyiv and Moscow. But it is important to clarify that this is something Israel cannot do.

As tensions between Russia and Ukraine continue to escalate, Israel has no choice but to tread extremely carefully, and to avoid making statements in support of either side.

Doing so could cause severe harm to relations with the United States on the one hand, or with Russia on the other. Israel’s security in the Middle East relies to a large extent on maintaining proper relations with both superpowers, even though the U.S. is of course Israel’s number one strategic ally.

Israel has been able to roll back Iranian entrenchment efforts in Syria, in part through its ability to maintain good relations with Russia. Israel therefore cannot allow itself to enter into this divide– and it must hope that nothing happens that will end up forcing Israel to take sides.

Beyond Israel’s considerations, it is also important to note that troubled relations between Russia and Ukraine stretch back centuries. Ukraine was never just another country for Russia, and conflict is no stranger to that part of the world.

In the 20th century, Ukraine was Russia’s wheat basket, and its agriculture helped feed the whole of the Soviet Union. In 1932 and 33, Stalin caused mass starvation that killed millions of Ukrainians as part of a deliberate policy to punish attempts by Ukrainian farmers to gain some independence.

In addition, Ukraine’s position on the Black Sea and its Crimean Peninsula represents a hugely important strategic asset for Russia, due to its position as a passageway to warm waters further south. Russia cannot access warm waters from the north, or to the west, where the Baltic Sea freezes in winter, and its eastern coast is near Japan. Hence Russia attaches great importance to its ability to move ships to the Black Sea and from there south to the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea, as well as the Indian Ocean, to defend itself in case of a global war with the West.

Russia has always worked to secure warm water bases for itself, including in the Suez Canal under the Soviet era and the Horn Africa, and from 2015 onwards, on the Syrian coastline.

After invading Crimea, Russia is now consolidating its position in this regard.

For Moscow, Ukraine is also a passage zone of energy from Russia to all of Europe. In 2014, when Ukraine underwent a revolution that toppled a pro-Russian government, the Russians froze gas exports to Ukraine, and all of Western Europe suffered shortages as a result.

Many in Europe had to buy electric stoves to heat their homes in place of Russian gas that ran dry.

Within Ukraine itself, the eastern section is filled with mostly Russian-speaking people who support close ties with Moscow, while the western half is made up mostly of Ukrainian speakers.

Russia views the Ukraine as a safety ‘brake zone’ for perceived Western threats. During a 2018 NATO meeting in Bucharest, Romania, the alliance said it would positively consider requests to join it from Ukraine and Georgia. Upon hearing about this, several Israeli diplomats felt this would undoubtedly cause Russia to end up doing all that it could to prevent NATO’s borders from reaching Ukraine itself.

One possible outcome is Russia seeking to take control of these countries. This view was strengthened further when Russia came out against the West’s support for Kosovan independence, with the claim that minority self-determination must occur only in agreement from the state in which the minority exists.

Russia justified its invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which have Russian-speaking majorities, during the 2008 war with Georgia, by claiming that if Kosovo deserves independence, so do both of those territories.

Against this background, it is clear that Russia will not permit in any way for NATO to expand eastwards to Ukraine or northwards to Georgia. Hence, it has focused its forces on the border with Ukraine to twist the arm of the Americans on this issue.

The question of whether Russia will end up invading soon can only be answered by prophets. But what can be said is that an arm-wrestling match is underway and that Russia views Europe as weak, while it also sees that the U.S. is refusing to take responsibility for events outside of its borders. It notes that Washington has no interest in conflict in Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East. Hence, it feels that the situation is in Russia’s favor and that it can flex its muscles.

Russia’s decision to attack or not largely depends on what the U.S. is willing to do. The more muscles that the U.S. flexes, the less willing Russia will be to invade, and vice versa. 

The Russian threat to freeze gas supplies to and via Ukraine is a double-edged sword since Russia needs to sell this gas.

Ultimately, if Russia senses a real willingness by the West – militarily (less likely) or economically (more likely) to go full force in its response, this would reduce the chance of an invasion, or limit it to Ukraine’s eastern side, which in any event supports Russia. 

When the U.S. is unwilling to take bold steps, this impacts all of America’s allies, including Israel, but at the same time, there are limits to this effect – since Israel never expected anyone to fight with it or for it against its adversaries.

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

Erdogan faces his most severe challenge since coming to power

By Pinhas Avivi

Recent signs indicate that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been very keen to score foreign policy achievements. Ultimately, Erdogan’s efforts can be tied to the poor state of the Turkish economy, multiple domestic crises, and his resounding foreign policy failures. 

Turkey’s economic situation can be described as an ongoing avalanche, and this situation is made worse by Ankara’s failure to gain control of the coronavirus. Turkey’s struggle to get hold of sufficient numbers of vaccines, despite its agreement with China, is a major source of concern for Erdogan.

Unlike his first four years in power, when Erdogan was able to create a sense of economic stability, and continuity from his predecessors, using the same tools they employed to try and turn traditional central Turkey into a more prosperous region, today Erdogan is far removed from such visions. 

The Turkish lira is down by 12 percent since mid-March, over four million people are unemployed, and traditional Muslim sectors of Turkish society are losing out economically, thereby jeopardizing their support for Erdogan. Significant migration from Turkey is underway. 

Prior to the Justice and Development Party coming to power in 2002, Turkey ran a secular, free economy, but it was Turkey’s inner cities and their traditional communities that rejected the secular approach and helped elect Erdogan. 

Now that they too are part of the economic problem, Erdogan’s base, and his political situation, are under threat.  

Erdogan has little to be happy about foreign policy-wise either. Regional dynamics have seen a crystallization of an Israeli- Sunni bloc, which firmly excludes Turkey. 

Erdogan does not have many good foreign policy options and has no achievements whatsoever to point to. He has remained locked in diplomatic conflict with Europe since the failed 2016 coup and is embroiled in a long-term diplomatic crisis with the U.S., due to his purchase of S-400 missile defense systems from Russia. The latter move has seen Turkey’s role in NATO placed under a troubling question mark – a far cry from NATO’s traditional view of Turkey as a key component of its front against threats from the East. 

When taken together, such factors can explain why Erdogan has been sending out feelers to Israel, in a bid to rekindle the badly damaged bilateral relationship. 

Erdogan understands that without a connection to Israel, he will not be able to influence the Middle East. He also views ties with Jerusalem as his best bet to influence the new Biden administration – despite diplomatic tensions between President Biden and Prime Minister Netanyahu. 

As a result, Turkey’s feelers should be seen as a serious attempt to improve ties. 

The same factors have led Erdogan to attempt to salvage Turkey’s damaged relations with Egypt. 

A common interest in resolving the situation in Libya, which affects both Cairo and Ankara, has formed a backdrop to fresh Turkish-Egyptian talks, although Cairo has shown less motivation than Ankara in pursuing this channel. 

And despite agreements with Moscow, Russian forces are acting with a greater degree of freedom on Turkey’s border with Syria. 

Despite the common assumption that Iran is a partner of Turkey, the two countries are in fact in conflict. Iran is busy trying to build its hegemonic axis across Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. 

Meanwhile, at home, troubles keep mounting. Not only is Turkey suffering a serious unemployment problem, but it is also now facing a student revolt. 

Navy reserve officers are apparently turning against the Erdogan government as well, as seen in a series of arrests and investigations conducted against them by Turkish security forces. 

Erdogan has pulled Turkey out of a European women’s rights treaty and has proven himself incapable of accepting LGBT rights. 

Without a doubt, Erdogan is facing one of his most difficult moments since rising to power. He has failed to achieve a single objective that he set for himself – foreign or domestic, and is in a weak position. 

The question arises,  how can Erdogan maintain an Islamist ideology and his ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, while still sending feelers out to Israel and Egypt?  

In Erdogan’s mind, it is possible to support the Muslim Brotherhood’s social welfare and religious agendas without being seen as a terror supporter. But that hasn’t stopped Erdogan from hosting Hamas’s terrorist headquarters on Turkish soil. 

These factors can act as major stumbling blocks when it comes to thawing relations with Israel. 

Still, Erdogan views Israel as a good bet to improve his situation vis-à-vis the U.S. and Europe. 

Turkey’s announcement at the end of March that it is ready to officially exchange ambassadors with Israel after a deep freeze is highly significant. 

This is an important offer, and Israel should examine the best way to accept it. While defense relations will never go back to what they were prior to Erdogan’s appearance, economic relations between Israel and Turkey are continuing to do well and flourish.

Turkey’s geostrategic weight and trade ties with Israel mean that maintaining ties with it that are as good as possible under present conditions is a serious Israeli interest. 

As a result, Jerusalem should consider Turkey’s offer to exchange ambassadors with interest, without playing ‘public honor games.’ Israeli conditions for such an exchange should be sent privately, through diplomatic channels, while publicly, proper diplomatic relations should be reinstated. 

Those same private channels are the place to address Turkey’s relations with Hamas, rather than in newspaper headlines. 

Additionally, none of the above should harm Israel’s prospering alliance with Greece and Cyprus, which includes military cooperation and working together on natural gas, as well as bilateral tourism agreements. 

Going some way to repairing established relations with Turkey is not a zero-sum game when it comes to Israel’s strategic alliance with Greece. Both interests should be pursued simultaneously. 

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

IN THE JORDAN VALLEY, FACTS ON THE GROUND ARE WHAT WE NEED, NOT ANNEXATION

By Pinhas Avivi

The Jordan Valley must be Israel's eastern border; yet the question remains how best to achieve that outcome.

Momentum is growing for an Israeli annexation of the Jordan Valley and areas of Judea and Samaria. However, the fact that the Netanyahu government has, for more than ten years, refrained from taking that step at the practical level suggests that the potential consequences of annexation are significant.

Most Israelis, from Left to Right, believe that there are some places in the territories that must remain under Israeli control. But many are opposed to the idea of Israel becoming a binational Jewish–Palestinian state. The majority of Israelis, whether on the Right, Left, or Center, do not wish to see all of the residents of the West Bank become Israeli citizens, therefore. 

This consensus attitude views ongoing Israeli control of the Jordan Valley as critical. The dramatic changes that have swept the Middle East; including the revolutions in Arab states, the rise of radical Islam, and the danger posed by Iran's regional conduct, have forged the consensus that the Jordan Valley must be Israel's eastern border. 

But that is where the agreement ends. The manner in which Israel should secure the Jordan Valley is in dispute within Israel, as is the fate of other areas of the West Bank. 

Case studies around the world, as well as Israel's own experience, show that in order to control territory, a state must firstly have a firm civilian presence embedded therein. 

In the previous century, Chile conquered a northern area previously controlled by Peru and Bolivia. To this day, Chilean control of the area remains disputed. Yet Chile created facts on the ground within that territory, and today, no one expects it to relinquish control.  

Closer to home, no one, on the Right or Left of the political spectrum, thinks the major settlement blocs can be transferred over to a future Palestinian state for the same reason – facts on the ground preclude that from happening; specifically, communities of significant size. Whether Israel annexes these blocs or not, it exercises control over them in a de facto manner.

Israel has not created the same type of de facto reality in the Jordan Valley, despite the existence of opportunities to do so. Developments could include a new, central, north-south highway that runs parallel to Route 6, and which would connect Jerusalem to the Golan Heights. That highway would promote industry in the Jordan Valley, potentially in cooperation with Jordan. A far broader Israeli agricultural presence is also badly needed in the Jordan Valley and should be developed. 

Those are the efforts that should be undertaken and they are of significantly greater importance than the pursuit of de jure annexation measures. 

In addition, negative ramifications resulting from annexation cannot be ignored. Jordan relinquished its designs for the West Bank in favor of establishing a Palestinian state there, because it has a core, existential interest in preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state in its own territory, which would endanger its very existence. As a result, any de jure annexation steps would alarm the Hashemite Kingdom. Israel's has thus far avoided annexation, in part because it understands that problem. 

Meanwhile, Israel has made major progress developing strategic ties with regional states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. These Arab states develop such ties, not only because it helps them form a defensive wall against Iranian aggression, but also because the Palestinian issue is not a live discussion at this time. Annexation would change all of that, and place the Palestinian issue firmly back in the spotlight. Returning it to prominence is not an Israeli interest. 

As soon as de jure annexation is initiated, sleeping bears will stir. It would practically force the Gulf states to take up a position that will not be a sympathetic to Israel. 

As a result, Israeli interests would be served far more effectively by de facto development of the Jordan Valley, through the growth of communities, infrastructure, industry, and agriculture, rather than Knesset decisions on annexation. 

In the meantime, signs are growing that the Trump Administration is changing its tune regarding the prospect of a broad annexation. The voices coming out of Washington on the matter are divergent from those originally heard. 

Israelis who insist upon seizing this historic moment for annexation point out that Iran is of greater concern to Arab states than the Palestinian issue. They argue that the world is preoccupied with dealing with the Coronavirus crisis. Both points are valid points – but annexation remains likely to renew opposition to Israel, both in the region and beyond. 

None of this is to say that Israel should be passive in shaping its borders. The option of de facto steps on the ground is available, essential - and preferable. 

Even on the Israeli Right, most prefer to avoid a situation that would drag Israel into a binational reality. Annexation opens the door to that. Caution is vital. The Palestinian Authority may not survive a large-scale annexation, and that would leave Israel in charge of directly running the affairs of 2.5 million West Bank Palestinians, creating a de facto binational reality. Israel needs to avoid that path. 

The dormant status of the Palestinian issue is to Israel’s benefit - a situation that should be preserved. De jure Annexation could spark a new intifada, or foment a situation where Turkey is able to challenge and decry the improving state of Arab links with the state of Israel.  

To promote Israel's long-term interests, the facts on the ground are what matter. De jure annexation now could undercut the progress made by such facts - needlessly so. 

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Ambassador Pinhas Avivi is a former Senior Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, where he was responsible for global, strategic and multilateral affairs. Read full bio here.

VIDEO: Ambassadors Avivi & Koll brief the I-SAP Tour (2019)

In June 2019, our organization brought forty I-SAP delegates from the U.S. Military Academies to the state of Israel. During that tour, they received a "Diplomacy Masterclass" featuring two former Deputy Directors General of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The lecture was entitled "Israels Geo-Political Positioning In The Modern Era."

The Israel Strategy and Policy tour (I-SAP) is a unique initiative, specifically tailored for military cadets and future officers of the United States Armed Forces. Cadets are recruited from the US Military Academy at West Point, the US Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs and Virginia Military Institute, Virginia.