Commentary

WHEN DESIGNING CURRICULUM ON INCLUSION, INCLUDE THE STUDY OF ANTI-SEMITSIM

By Jennifer Shulkin

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In the wake of George Floyd’s murder and the nation’s calls for racial justice, many American schools have rightly committed to implementing new ethnic studies and race relations lesson plans into their curriculums. These curriculum changes encourage students to contemplate how prejudice towards and discrimination of marginalized groups of people remain infused into many aspects of our present-day world. They prioritize honest discussions about race. Yet even as inclusion becomes a higher priority than ever before, there is great risk that teaching about the dangers of antisemitism will fall by the wayside. Excluding antisemitism from this wave of anti-prejudice teaching would be a grave mistake.

The subjugation of African Americans is a unique stain on American society, and it deserves thorough treatment in American schools. I am not inviting relativistic comparisons between the African American story (or any other minority group’s story) and the Jewish story; I am only suggesting that each of these stories deserves to be told. The Jewish people have faced rampant and often deadly antisemitism in every generation and all over the world. American schoolchildren should know.

Antisemitism is easily recognizable when a shooter targets a synagogue in Pittsburgh, an attacker stabs a group of ultra-Orthodox Jews in Monsey, or a vandal draws swastikas on playgrounds. But these heinous tragedies are often written off as rare occurrences, when in fact antisemitism is far more pervasive. 

I am not an educator and know little about designing school curriculums. But I am a third generation Holocaust survivor. I am also a former prosecutor. And in that role, I learned both about how the justice system disproportionally affects black and brown people and how hate crimes embody a special type of evil. Antisemitic hate crimes reported to the FBI rose by 40 percent from 2014 to 2018. And of the 364 hate crimes reported in New York in 2019, 148 targeted Jewish people. These are staggering numbers.

Crime is not the only way that antisemitism surfaces today. College students have increasingly experienced antisemitism on campus – mainly in the form of open and outspoken anti-Zionism, which more often than not is a thinly veiled disguise for antisemitism. Separately, some people have blamed the Jews (without any logic or proof) for the global coronavirus outbreak.  As a result, antisemitism cannot be dismissed as merely a relic of our history books.

Yet to understand the antisemitism of today, educators must present antisemitism’s history. Without exploring past persecution, we cannot expect schoolchildren to recognize the warning signs of rising antisemitism today or in the future. 

New race-conscious lesson plans will generally include topics like the theft of Native American land and culture, the Jim Crow era, and the Japanese internment camps. In that spirit, these lesson plans should also include the slaughter of the Jews in Russian pogroms, the systematic murder of 6 million Jews during the Holocaust, and the widespread housing and university admissions discrimination against American Jews in the 19th and 20th centuries, as a start. 

School lesson plans should not separate distinct racial groups and draw distinct lessons from each episode of discrimination explored. Instead, the plight of various racial groups should be taught in a way that recognizes the overlapping features and patterns of discrimination so that schoolchildren can identify them when they come across them in their own lives. The fact that Jewish persecution is the world’s oldest and most geographically widespread form of hatred is instructive: Antisemitism is a mutable virus, and its many mutations and various chapters each carry valuable lessons about prejudice, hate, and race relations.

Many school districts and private institutions throughout the country have quickly responded to this spring and summer’s uproar over racial injustice by already incorporating race relations lessons into their curriculums this fall. Others have not yet done so, but are considering doing so in the future. 

There is danger in antisemitism being excluded (or demonized) in these new curriculum changes, as was the case in California’s first ethnic studies plan. The California plan valorized the BDS movement (an organized boycott of Israeli goods and services) and painted Israelis as colonizers. It also presented the “Black Hebrew Israelites” (a group known for preaching antisemitism) as an important religious movement to cover. Moreover, while an entire lesson plan was devoted to Islamophobia in the United States, there was not even a definition of antisemitism to be found in the glossary. The curriculum seemed to include every minority group except the Jews.

Many people today believe that antisemitism is separate from and less insidious than classic racism, but it is one of the world’s oldest and deepest forms of hatred. American schools must understand it as such to ensure that the next generation can recognize, define, and reject antisemitism going forward. 

As we rework school curriculums to be more inclusive, please do not exclude antisemitism.


Jennifer Shulkin is a graduate of Harvard Law School and the University of Pennsylvania. She has served as a former judicial law clerk in the Eastern District of New York and an assistant district attorney in Manhattan. She currently works as a white-collar criminal defense attorney in Washington, DC.

Can regional peace bring the Palestinians to negotiations

By Jeremiah Rozman

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Many predicted that Israel’s August 2020 breakthrough with the UAE would likely have a cascading effect. Since then, Israel has seen positive developments with Oman, Malawi, Chad, Morocco, Kosovo, Serbia and now Bahrain. Saudi Arabia opened its airspace, and Sudan’s ambassador hinted at the potential for thawing relations. President Trump predicted Israeli peace with up to nine countries soon to follow.

Some lament that peace with Arab countries reduces the pressure on Israel to pursue peace with the Palestinians. Palestinian leadership understands this. By demonstrating that Israel will not be compelled into concessions, regional peace provides the best hope yet for Israeli-Palestinian peace. 

Israel’s accords with Egypt and Jordan provided peace without free movement of goods and people. The Abraham Accords between the UAE, Bahrain and Israel, is the first Arab-Israeli “warm” peace. It was achieved without stipulations regarding settlements or a two-state solution, showing that Israel’s legitimacy and diplomatic progress will not be held hostage to indefinite Palestinian intransigence. European support and rare U.S. bipartisan enthusiasm for these accords, reinforces this conclusion.

A sign at the anti-Netanyahu “Balfour Protests” in Jerusalem read in Hebrew, “Bibi, make peace with Mars next.” The protestor argued that peace with countries not at war with Israel is less important than peace with the Palestinians. One could be forgiven for not viewing the lack of peace with the Palestinians as a personal failure of the current prime minister. None of Israel’s leaders have achieved it because the Palestinian leadership’s ideology does not allow productive negotiations. The “moderate” Palestinian Authority (PA), is unwilling to officially relinquish territorial demands in the event of a peace treaty, while obliterating Israel as a sacred duty, is a core tenet in Hamas’ charter.

The oft-repeated maxim “one makes peace with one’s enemies, not friends,” is misleading. One cannot make peace if the opposing side does not seek peace. Therefore, Israel acted rationally when it tabled futile attempts to make peace with entities ideologically opposed to a pragmatic negotiated agreement.

The only way to compel a non-state militant organization to abandon absolutist ideology central to their raison d'etre, is by credibly threatening them with decisive defeat. Despite possessing the firepower, Israel is too constrained to credibly threaten the Palestinians with military defeat. Since Israel cannot achieve peace through military victory or negotiation, its sole remaining realistic strategy has been management of the conflict. Israel has been pursuing this strategy with increasing success since the Oslo peace process collapsed in a bloody intifada. 

Israel manages conflict with the PA through a robust military presence, and security cooperation with an entity that benefits from quiet in terms of power and wealth and relies on the Israeli military to keep Hamas from overthrowing it as it did in Gaza. Israel manages conflict with Hamas with effective denial strategies including: active defense, physical barriers, intelligence, and controlled violence. 

Regional peace between Israel and its neighbors holds the possibility of changing this dynamic. It provides a pathway to socializing the Palestinian leadership to pursue pragmatism by threatening them with decisive political defeat in the form of rendering them irrelevant should they continue their intransigence.

Fear of irrelevance has driven Hamas, Hezbollah and the PA to engage in rare direct talks to figure out how to contend with Israel’s flourishing regional relations. Meanwhile, Israel actively seeks peace with neighbors whose ideology does not supersede shared interests. Hence, we see cascading peace between Israel and Arab countries that seek to be part of a prosperous and secure alliance with Israel and the United States, and fear Iranian aggression over Israel’s non-existent threat to them. 

Israel’s successful peace with its neighbors threatens to leave the Palestinian movements without a rationale. It is a sign of impotence that Palestinian factions have responded to the threat posed by peace, with “days of rage.” Palestinian leadership spoke of betrayal, livid that the Arab League failed to support them in opposition to the peace deals. 

On the day that the accords were signed on the White House lawn, both Hamas and Fatah issued bellicose statements slamming the peace deal, as terrorists fired rockets from Gaza. A senior Fatah official threatened, “peace begins in Palestine and war begins in Palestine.” This has been proven false. The longstanding truism that regional peace begins with an Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty, is collapsing. 

The new alignment in the Middle East will likely be durable. UAE’s minister of state for foreign affairs promised to foster relations with Israel irrespective of a change in U.S. leadership. With Israel’s acceptance in the region likely to be permanent, the Palestinians will face a choice; be left without a state, without attention, and without the ability to secure one through pressure or violence, or abandon their absolutist agenda in order to negotiate productively.

Although Israel agreed to forestall applying sovereignty in the territories for at least four years, creating a Palestinian state requires direct negotiations. Palestinian rejectionism would likely ensure that in four years’ time, whether Israel decides to annex or not, facts on the ground will make a Palestinian state increasingly unlikely. 

The longer Palestinian leadership hesitates, the less likely they are to gain. There is the possibility that the Palestinian people will overthrow their leadership for failing to act in their interests. However, predicting uprisings is not easy. Perhaps when Abbas retires, his replacement might bring to power a PA leadership that puts pragmatism above ideology. This would require them to be the first Palestinian leader to not view a territorial final status agreement as an act of treason.

There is no guarantee that the Palestinians will succeed in putting pragmatism over ideology, despite this being necessary for breaking the paradigm of status quo management which favors Israel, obtaining sovereignty, and achieving peace. However, by unmistakably demonstrating that continued intransigence threatens to leave them by the wayside without harming Israel, peace between Israel and its neighbors poses the best chance for socializing the Palestinians into an entity capable of making peace. 


Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Does the Israel-UAE Deal Presage a New Era of Limited American Involvement in the Middle East?

By Grant Newman

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Normalization between Israel and the United Arab Emirates is arguably one of the most significant events in Middle East politics since the establishment of the State of Israel. The deal itself is a victory for Middle East peace; that this deal could lead to more such agreements between Israel and other Arab nations is a victory for world peace. Within a month of the Israel-UAE deal, Kosovo and Bahrain have both followed the example of the UAE and agreed to open relations with Israel. Surely, more of Israel’s regional neighbors will follow: It is difficult to see Bahrain recognizing Israel without Saudi permission, and so perhaps Saudi Arabia is in line to recognize Israel as well—a crowning achievement after decades of tension. 

To the extent that the Trump administration played a role in the Israel-UAE deal, this is arguably the biggest foreign policy accomplishment for an American president in decades. Indeed, in a different era, the Israel-UAE deal would likely be grounds for awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Trump and his Israeli and UAE counterparts. By comparison, it would be difficult to argue that Trump does not deserve the Nobel Peace Prize now for facilitating an actual normalization of ties between Israel and an Arab state, but that Obama did deserve the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, just one year after being elected president and one year before the Middle East entered its most bellicose decade in recent memory. If Obama’s legacy is an award without the peace, then Trump’s legacy might very well be a peace without the award.  It is now the duty of the Norwegian Nobel Committee to determine which of these two variations is the more noble preference.

Comparing the Trump and Obama presidencies suggests that an American president can have a tremendously beneficial influence on Israel’s relations with its neighbors, or he can have an equally detrimental influence. The role of the American president in the Middle East peace process is a tool and, as with any tool, it can be used for good or evil: A hammer is just as necessary to drive a nail as it is to remove one, and just as necessary to build a house as it is to demolish one; what matters is the intent of the carpenter holding the hammer.

In geopolitical terms, with the support of the Trump administration, Israel has built a model for normalizing relations with its neighbors. The UAE is the first country to follow that and by doing so has set an example for other Arab nations to emulate. But the gains witnessed during the Trump presidency could be wiped away by a future American president who derails the peace process—even with the best of intentions. It is not difficult to see how this could happen: The Israel-UAE deal undermined at least two tennets of Washington establishmentarian thinking about Middle East peace, namely that peace in the region would require (1) concessions to Iran, and (2) concessions to the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria and to Hamas in Gaza. As the Israel-UAE deal suggests, resolving disagreements with the Palestinians is not a necessary condition to peace with other Arab nations, and combating the threat from Iran is of much greater importance to nations in the region than establishing a Palestinian state. However, it is possible that a future American president could revert back to establishmentarian thinking and (1) make efforts to strengthen Iran (perhaps by resurrecting the Iran nuclear deal), and (2) demand that Israel make concessions to the Palestinians as a condition for American support for any future Israeli-Arab peace deal. Such a reversion to the Washington foreign policy establishment's conventional wisdom could derail the broader peace process.

This possibility causes one to pause and think: Inasmuch as the role of the American president in the Middle East can still be used for ill purposes, the question must be asked whether it is in Israel’s interest in particular—and in the interest of Middle East peace in general—to diminish the role of the American president in Israel’s relationships with its neighbors. Now that there is a roadmap to regional peace, Israel must minimize any risks that could hinder progress towards that goal. A model has been developed and a permission structure has been established in the form of UAE, Kosovo, and Bahrain recognizing Israel. The model must now be implemented and replicated. Perhaps this will require less involvement from future American presidents.

Just as the Israeli president plays a mostly symbolic role in Israeli politics, with the executive powers of the state delegated to the prime minister, perhaps it is wise to modify the role of the American president in the Middle East peace process to a mostly symbolic one that serves to guarantee any peace deals entered into by Israel and its Arab counterparts, with Israel retaining the power to conduct negotiations and enter into deals.  Reducing the role of the American president in this way is perhaps one method for (1) preserving the peace achieved over the past four years and (2) protecting against any changes in Middle East policy from a future American president; a limited role would curb a future American president’s ability to derail the peace process. 

Nevertheless, it is possible that the current peace process will proceed according to plan regardless of what a future American president does. Indeed, if a future American president were to, say, resurrect the Iranian nuclear deal, then this change in policy might only serve to hasten a normalization of relations between Israel and its Arab neighbors as they work to fortify their region against a resurgent Iran. With Israel and its regional neighbors entering into deals without American involvement, this undoubtedly would have the effect of reducing America’s role in the region. So, after decades of American omnipotence in regional politics, perhaps the Middle East is entering into a new era of limited American involvement, with the regional players themselves dictating the terms of their own peace.


Grant Newman graduated from Harvard Law School where he was an executive editor of the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy. Grant was the recipient of the Federalist Society’s James Madison Award in 2019, and was active in the Alliance for Israel. Prior to law school, Grant graduated from Brigham Young University in Provo, Utah, with a degree in Business Strategy. He worked for several years at a major university in Moscow, Russia, and spent two years in Siberia dedicated to church service.

Israel's March Of Normalization. Two Ambassadors Speak

By Allan Marks

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Israel normalizing relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Kosovo alters political dynamics in the Middle East, though not entirely as intended.

If the peace dove were to fly from Jerusalem roughly 2,000 kms she would land in either Abu Dhabi, UAE or Belgrade, Serbia.  That is the same distance as Istanbul to Tehran, Frankfurt to Moscow, or Boston to Miami.  With a flurry of new diplomatic announcements, the world feels like a smaller place of late.

In ceremonies at the White House in Washington, DC this month, documents were signed that resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain and mutual diplomatic recognition between Israel and Kosovo.

As Israel, the UAE, Bahrain and the United States initialed the “Abraham Accords” on September 15, 2020, I interviewed two former ambassadors – one Israeli and one American – to discuss the implications of Israel’s march to normalization.  

Israeli Ambassador Arthur Koll and U.S. Ambassador Cameron Munter, who overlapped as diplomats in Serbia, took opposing positions in 2008 in response to Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia, consistent with their nation’s policies at the time.  The United States and most European countries quickly recognized Kosovo.  Israel, like other countries (including China, Cyprus, Spain and Russia) sided with Serbia in opposition to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.  

On September 4, 2020, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić and Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti signed separate letters with U.S President Donald Trump committing to limited economic normalization. Tacked on at the end of each letter, an incongruous short paragraph brings Israel into the Balkan dispute. In that clause, Serbia, long a close partner of Israel, commits to moving its embassy to Jerusalem while Kosovo agrees to mutual diplomatic ties with Israel and to opening an embassy in Jerusalem. Israel is not a party to the letters. Serbia’s president has since stated that formal Israeli recognition of Kosovo could severely damage bilateral relations. Israeli recognition of Kosovo also complicates Israeli-Palestinian relations, insofar as it runs counter to Israel’s stated opposition to unilateral declarations of sovereignty.

In contrast, the accords reached by Israel with the UAE and Bahrain, with US encouragement, constitute significant milestones in broadening the quiet alignment of interests between Israel and the two Gulf states. These are the first normalization treaties Israel has signed with an Arab state since the treaties of 1994 with Jordan and 1979 with Egypt. At a stroke, the new agreements make open economic and intelligence cooperation possible – mainly in opposition to Iran. This transparency comes at the expense of Palestinian nationalism, which for the UAE and Bahrain now takes a back seat to regional security and investment.

Assessing Israel’s normalization with Kosovo, the UAE and Bahrain, Ambassadors Koll and Munter offered insights about what these steps signify. These are some of the key takeaways from the retired diplomats’ discussion:

The Gulf Arab agreements highlight the limits of US power in the region.  Diplomacy is a long, grueling process of ironing out the details. The perception that the United States – withdrawing from Syria and Iraq and giving up on the Palestinians – lacks engagement has made the Gulf states turn to Israel against the twin regional threats of Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood. The United States, lacking any long-term, coherent strategic plan, is no longer seen as a “broker than can knock heads together” nor viewed as a neutral arbiter in resolving Middle East conflicts. The US administration shows little patience for the type of sustained diplomacy required to build durable relationships and confidence. Look for closer Israeli cooperation with traditional Arab states like Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, Oman and (less openly) Saudi Arabia to confront emboldened regional powers like Iran (and its proxies in Syria, Iraq and Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon) and Turkey (aligned in support of political Islam with Qatar and Hamas in Gaza).

Domestic politics, not any new diplomatic breakthrough, drove these announcements. It is unclear how the letters signed by Serbia and Kosovo help them, and they awkwardly create complications for Israel. The normalization letters appear to be driven by the US President’s desire to show some foreign policy successes before the November election, with provisions on Israel designed to build electoral support from right-wing Jews and pro-Israel evangelical Christians in the United States. Serbia and Kosovo recommitted to the European Union-facilitated Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue in a September 7 joint statement with EU High Representative Josep Borrell, stating that “they attach the highest priority to EU integration.”  Meanwhile, the EU reminded everyone that Jerusalem embassy pledges outside of an Israeli-Palestinian peace process run counter to EU policy. Politics in mind, Israel’s decision to suspend controversial Jordan Valley annexation efforts created an opportunity for the UAE to invite normalization, highlighted in a June 2020 op-ed by Yousef Al Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador to the United States, in Yedioth Ahronoth.  That gambit allowed the Israeli and US leaders to salvage a face-saving diplomatic “win” from a failed “peace” plan.  

The Palestinian situation could worsen. Two Gulf Arab states have established diplomatic ties with Israel without any preconditions for Palestinians other than Israel agreeing to suspend annexation of disputed territories (which was already on hold). The Palestinian Authority may have new incentive to seek creative dialogue with Israel. Alternatively, the Palestinians may remain divided and Netanyahu – never showing zeal for the Palestinian peace process – will continue to neglect them. Doing so could reactivate Palestinian resistance to the status quo and further set back resolution of the issues of sovereignty, security, and an equitable peace. Taking that course risks a repeat of 2000, when Israeli trade offices that had opened optimistically in Qatar and Morocco in the 1990s were shuttered in the wake of the Second Intifada and Israel faced isolation internationally and terrorism at home.  

Until Israeli-Palestinian relations are dealt with directly and comprehensively, Israel’s security and international relations remain fragile. These recent international agreements will further the goal of peace only if followed by sustained diplomatic efforts and a shared commitment to building trust on all sides.


Allan Marks is a partner at Milbank LLP and one of the world's leading project finance lawyers. Mr. Marks also serves as an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of California, Berkeley, where he teaches at both the Law School and the Haas School of Business. Mr. Marks speaks and publishes frequently on a range of topics, including finance, infrastructure investment, cross-border transactions, sustainability, and economic and regulatory policy. He is the host of the “Law, Policy & Markets: Milbank Conversations” podcast.

Short-range air defense is making a comeback

By SHachar Shohat

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Recent events in the Middle East have led some to wonder how countries, including Israel, can protect their own strategic installations. 

Israel's adversaries, such as Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah, have threatened to strike sensitive Israeli targets. 

Saudi Arabia absorbed a painful strike in September 2019, an Iranian drone swarm combined with cruise missiles struck oil fields, causing heavy damage. 

The attack on Saudi Arabia is the latest tangible example of the evolving threat: precision guided, sophisticated enemy air attacks. 

Each country designates its own strategic sites for special defense. They range from nuclear power plants to air force bases, to Olympic stadiums, and the hardening of defenses around strategic sites was especially prominent until around three decades ago. 

At that time, attackers using close-range munitions had to approach a given site in order to attack it. Visual contact was often required and simple air to ground munitions would suffice for an attack. Defense systems of that time were similarly simplistic. 

Air force bases might be protected by a forty-millimeter anti-aircraft cannon, for example, in order to prevent a direct attack on a runway. That same concept would be applied to any sites deemed critical by a state. 

In addition to being limited in range, though, such defenses required many munitions and high numbers of personnel. 

The 1980s and ‘90s witnessed a revolution in the world of weaponry. 

Precision, long-range (standoff) munitions entered the battle arenas and close-range air defenses became largely obsolete. Once attackers no longer needed proximity to their targets, close range defenses could not hit either the longer-range munitions or their launchers.

But over the past decade, we have seen the addition of GPS-guidance systems to those munitions. advent, combined with the overall revolution of the 80’s and 90’s, has heightened the need for states to return to close-range air defenses – but in a new configuration.  

With the Iron Dome and the Drone Dome defense systems, Israel has pioneered that return, because it has had to do so.  

It is able to effectively defend against very short-range threats. Drone Dome, for example, can detect threats at a distance of 3.5 kilometers. 

Additional systems are now in the pipeline. 

Small, affordable interceptor missiles, and laser beam defenses the answers to the new categories of close-range threats seen around the world, including gliding bombs, cruise missiles, and drones. 

In 2019, the Iranians proved that if they have intelligence on their target and the ability to send munitions to the 'blind spot' of radars, attacks can be successful. 

That attack should serve as a "wake up call" for countries around the world. If states want to protect strategic sites, radars that look in every direction, 360 degrees, 24 hours a day, are needed.

Effective new defense systems must now be multi-directional in their detection of incoming threats, a response to the enemy’s ability to turn, steer and evade radar coverage and detection. That coverage must be combined with multiple layers of defense, including defense mechanisms very close to the asset being defended. 

Examples of what is now needed for strategic site defenses are already evident in the realm of military vehicles. 

The IDF installed the Trophy defense system on a growing number of tanks and armored personnel carriers, as a result of a series of incidents in Lebanon and Gaza. 

Airframes also need such systems, as the downing of an Israeli transport helicopter by Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War demonstrated, as do ships - and so too do strategic assets.  

The age-old military axiom asserts that lines of defense will always be breached. As such, we must develop the maximum number of opportunities for interception possible.

Longer-range air defense systems, such as the Patriot, David's Sling, or S-400 can intercept threats at tens or hundreds of kilometers away, but today, because state enemies can bypass long range defenses, countries must always have the ability to directly intercept the actual munitions.

Without close defense capabilities forming part of a country’s multi-layer defense systems, strategic sites are simply not adequately protected.

In the context of multi-layer defense development and deployment around strategic sites and sensitive targets, Israel has taken on the role of global leader. 

In 2020, short range air defenses are making a comeback, and this time, they are set to remain as a permanent fixture.


Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012.

TRUMP'S BALKAN AGREEMENT DOES ISRAEL MORE HARM THAN GOOD

By Arthur Koll

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Kosovo and Serbia have a bloody and troubled history. As they attempt to reduce tensions and to create new economic agreements between them, Israel has been bizarrely dragged into this delicate Balkan mix. 

Since its unilateral declaration of independence in 2008, Kosovo, which has an Albanian ethnic majority, has been recognized by the U.S. and by most EU states, but not by the United Nations. Russia and China, would veto any such recognition by the UN Security Council. Kosovo is thus yet to be admitted to the UN as a fully-fledged member, despite the fact that over 100 states already recognize its independence. 

Even in the EU, some have refrained from recognizing Kosovo for the simple reason that they themselves have separatist movements that could be encouraged to unilaterally declare their own independence following the Kosovo precedent. 

Examples of such states include Spain, which contends with a Catalonian independence movement, and Cyprus, which has a separatist northern Turkish entity that is recognized only by Turkey. Slovakia and Romania also have their own minorities that could be encouraged by the Kosovo precedent, leading them to avoid granting recognition. 

Historically, Albanians and Jews have enjoyed positive relations, including Albanian assistance to Jews fleeing the Nazi death machine during the Second World War. 

In 1999, during the war in Kosovo, Israel sent significant aid to the refugees fleeing the war zone. We established field hospitals in neighboring Balkan states and accepted some of those fleeing Kosovo into Israel.

Since becoming independent, Kosovo has applied a fair degree of pressure on Israel to officially recognize it, due to the significance that it attaches to Israel's international status. 

From the outset, Israel informed Kosovo that while it has nothing against the Kosovan people, Israel must take its own interests into account. Israeli recognition of Kosovan independence would impact the Israeli – Palestinian conflict. 

Kosovo declared independence not through a negotiated agreement with Serbia; but unilaterally. That reality is too close to home for Israel given that the Palestinians are also seeking to achieve recognition from the international community on a unilateral basis, bypassing direct talks with Israel and any negotiated agreement. 

Israel’s options for granting recognition of Kosovo was therefore based on one of two developments coming to pass: either Kosovo and Serbia reach an agreement, or Israel and the Palestinians do. 

Recognizing Kosovo before one of those two things took place could serve to boost and a predicate for a Palestinian initiative to demand recognition from the UN for a unilaterally declared Palestinian state in the West Bank, with Jerusalem as its capital. 

Furthermore, the Palestinians would be reluctant to return to the negotiating table, believing instead that more could be gained by turning to the UN and the international community. 

Once explained to leaders in Kosovo, these concerns were greeted with some understanding. Efforts to change Israel's position continued, however. 

The biggest lever Kosovo had at its disposal to dislodge the Israeli policy was the U.S., but even that was insufficient to get Jerusalem to change its diplomatic principle. 

All of that suddenly changed on September 4, 2020, when U.S brokered economic agreements between Serbia and Kosovo were signed in Washington D.C. by President Donald Trump, Aleksandar Vucic, the President of Serbia and Avdullah Hoti, the Prime Minister of Kosovo. Those agreements are aimed at regulating the interaction between the large Serbian minority living in northern Kosovo and Serbia. The scope of those agreements includes the handling of interests, assets, and the movements of goods and people between Belgrade and Pristina.

Oddly, and in a manner that is out of place, one of the clauses of this economic agreement between the two Balkan rivals is that Israel recognizes Kosovo, and that both Kosovo and Serbia establish embassies in Israel's capital of Jerusalem. 

This diplomatic turn of events should be viewed with deep suspicion, for several reasons. 

Serbia, for its part, interprets an Israeli recognition of Kosovo as a significant diplomatic blow. It is therefore less than likely to reward such a development by moving its embassy to Jerusalem. Indeed, in recent days, Serbia has more than hinted that it will not move its embassy if Israel recognizes Kosovo. The chances of a Serbian embassy in Jerusalem by summer 2021, as the agreement calls for, look slim at best.

On the subject of Kosovo, Israel is departing from a long standing foreign-policy principle in return for a vague promise of a Kosovan embassy in Jerusalem. 

An EU statement further added to the skepticism. It warned both Serbia and Kosovo that moving their embassies to Jerusalem would undermine the Union's collective stance on the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, and that it would harm the prospects of both countries being accepted into the EU – a key objective of both Belgrade and Pristina. 

As such, Israel appears to have been dragged into a Balkan conflict against its own interests, and regardless of the manner in which this strange situation ends, Israel does not stand to benefit. 

Israel must now move swiftly to ensure that its ties with Serbia, which have been excellent to this point, are not harmed as a consequence of this process. 

Ultimately, one has to ask why Israel was ready to surrender a key policy principle in such an awkward and clumsy manner. 

The likely explanation is that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is returning a political favor to Donald Trump. 

Just as the American president has made multiple gestures of support to Netanyahu in the build up to successive Israeli elections, including moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, and recognizing Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, so now has Netanyahu agreed to help Trump's campaign. 

Trump boasted a foreign policy 'success' and has scored points with his base through the announced agreement. 

As for whether either Serbia or Kosovo will move their embassies to Jerusalem - to say the least, that remains to be seen. 

In the meantime, a key Israeli policy interest may well have been sacrificed. 


Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

Hamas: Masters Of Negotiations

BY Grisha Yakubovich

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Earlier this week, Hamas and Israel declared a long-term cease fire agreement.

Some view Hamas as a simple terrorist organization that limits its activities to digging tunnels, firing rockets, and preparing suicide bombings. In reality, Hamas has evolved into an organization with clear long-term goals, and a strategy to achieve them.

Others believe Hamas is a democratically elected political party that acts on the will of its people. In truth, it censors domestic criticism. Gazans opposed to Hamas’ authority face merciless retribution.

So, what is Hamas, and how have they become such sophisticated, formidable negotiators, able to force Israel to the negotiating table? Hamas rose to power in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, ousting the Palestinian Authority in a violent coup. Since then, it has fought three conflicts with Israel, and the socio-economic situation in Gaza has inched ever closer to collapse. Yet, Hamas’s rule is strengthening, and it governs the Strip with a firm hand, wielding unchallenged power.

Furthermore, after every major armed conflict with Israel, Hamas emerged seemingly victorious from post-ceasefire negotiations.

Their playbook is simple. First, they escalate hostilities. Second, they agree to a ceasefire on the condition that post-violence negotiations are mediated by Egypt. Third, they anchor their negotiating positions with unreasonably high demands. Last, they extract concessions from Israel to which Israelis would not have conceded during peacetime.

Hamas has studied the Israelis. Their demands yield increasing effectiveness. Hamas has learned Israel’s priorities, red-lines, and non-negotiables.

Hamas acts first to improve Gaza's humanitarian situation. Second, they seek to lift Israeli security restrictions on Gaza, which it describes as a blockade. Third, Hamas wants to dominate the international narrative. 

Lastly, Hamas is positioning to succeed Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank.

Hamas’ negotiation strategy is constantly evolving, while Israel’s approach to negotiations has remained stagnant. Israel continues to demand a cessation of rocket attacks, tunnel digging (including sea tunnels), the end of Hamas's naval commando threats to the Israeli coastline, border bombs, and recruiting for its military wing. Israel also demands the release of two civilians held captive by Hamas and the remains of two IDF soldiers who fell in Gaza in 2014. In return, Israel offers to solve some of Gaza's humanitarian challenges, both directly and through the assistance of third parties. 

For example, Israel proposed the construction of a natural gas pipeline into Gaza to power Gaza's electricity station. Though Egypt also has the capacity to build such a pipeline into Gaza, Israeli-Egyptian relations mean Egypt would not do this without coordination with Israel. Hamas understands this, and realizes that it would have to make concessions at the negotiating table for the pipeline to go forward.

So Hamas turns to primitive tools to coax Israel back to negotiations: incendiary and explosive balloons and kites, for example. The use of these simple tools comes after many months of disturbances on the Israel-Gaza border, and the deployment of 'night squads' along the fence that burn tires, release arson balloons, and aim to exhaust local Israeli civilians living in southern Israel. 

These attacks have garnered extensive coverage across Israeli media, and Israeli civilians are desperate for the carnage to end. In short, Hamas’ goal of manipulating Israel back into the negotiating room appears to be working.

Israel has responded with sophisticated air power. When juxtaposed against kites and balloons in the international press, Israeli fighter jets look like Goliath’s bronze spear staring down the Gazan David’s sling.

This past month exemplified this pattern. On August 7, incendiary Gazan balloons began being floated across the border, riding on sea winds that always blow east towards Israel. A week later, on August 15, an Egyptian mediation delegation arrived in Gaza.

To heap further pressure on Israeli negotiators, Hamas announced that its power station would cease operations, making it seem as though Israel was preventing Hamas from producing the energy it needs to power the Strip.  

Three days thereafter, Gaza City's Mayor raised an alarm about the effect of the power cuts on Gaza’s water supply. As a result, Hamas won the PR battle once again, somehow convincing the international community that Israel was responsible for the absence of potable water in Gaza.

Hamas carried out the escalation it had planned all along, step by step, as a military operation. The doctrine of Hamas is to 'keep the enemy busy,' by way of a low level war of attrition, using the most basic tools imaginable, and to reap real dividends during future negotiations. 

Hamas continues to rack up large victories in the PR arena, and small victories at the negotiating table. And so they will continue to push. Hamas will demand new projects, and further Israeli investment into Gaza's economy. It will not agree to demilitarize Gaza. Indeed, further demands will likely include a port, a symbolic airport, and access to the West Bank so that Hamas can participate in future Palestinian elections. 

This is a losing situation for Israel. Multiple deployments of the same Israeli strategy is not an effective way forward. It is no accident that such thinking was apocryphally described by Albert Einstein as “insanity.” Israel needs to reevaluate their negotiating strategy with Hamas. It is time for some creativity - something they could learn from their adversary.


Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.).

Stop Politicizing Jewish Issues

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By Peter Fishkind

With the Democratic and Republican Party conventions now behind us, I took some time to reflect on a concern that has been ailing the American Jewish community. Over the past few years, issues of special importance to Jewish voters have become increasingly politicized. Time and time again, matters like the question of support for the U.S.-Israel relationship and specific concerns that antisemitism is on the rise within our political parties, have not been dealt with on the merits. Instead, they have been thrown into the political fray. Acknowledging my own biases as an active member of the Democratic Party, I’d like to use this space to discuss the problems this approach poses for American Jews. 

The first example that has caused me alarm is the allegation that my party, and the political left in general, has an antisemitism problem. My issue with this charge is not that it is manufacturing a controversy. There are those on the left that are, whether they recognize it themselves or not, antisemites. Take a recent incident that came to light in New York City. Just a few weeks ago it was reported that the NYC Chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America included on their candidate survey to NYC Council Member candidates whether they would “pledge not to travel to Israel if elected to City Council.” The only other foreign policy question asked on the survey was whether they supported the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement that refuses to recognize a Jewish right to statehood in any borders. Any group’s call to reject the Jewish people’s right to statehood and design a survey with a singular focus on the world’s one Jewish state echoes past charges deeming the Jewish people responsible for unique evils in the world and is antisemitic. 

Therefore, to my Republican friends reading this article, please know that I am willing to acknowledge the existence of the problem of anti-Jewish bigotry among those who claim to be progressives. I have done so in the past. The purpose of this point is to advise caution to those who are framing the issue in broad strokes. This presupposes that Republicans and those who claim to be conservatives don’t have their own share of wackos or a President who has crossed the line with his words about the Jewish community on multiple occasions. Moreover, it ignores that anti-Jewish bias is a human problem that has existed for millennia. Suggesting that it subsists within a single political camp is a critical error that risks serving as a shield for those of the alternative ideological persuasion.

For what it is worth, while many Jews believe the President holds anti-Jewish animus, I do not. Instead, I believe his views about the Jewish community track somewhat well with what is described in this article. He seems to believe many of the stereotypes about Jews valuing wealth and our supposed business savvy but, through his own worldview, sees them as virtues to be complimented. Due to his reckless comments about Jews as well as a slew of other reasons, I remain unsupportive of the President. 

However, I will readily acknowledge that President Trump has put in place a number of policies of special concern to the Jewish community that I have supported. The President was right to join Israel in recognizing Jerusalem as its own capital, a privilege that, as far as I understand, we grant to every other state whose sovereignty our government recognizes. I also supported his decision to sign an executive order extending protections to Jewish college students facing discrimination in line with a policy previously championed by former Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada. In fact, the Jewish community as a whole seems to hold a similar outlook on these questions. A recent survey found that disapproval for the President among American Jews hovered at around 70 percent. At the same time, there was net approval of 20 percentage points for the move of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and 13 points for the signing of the executive order. It also found that Jewish voters disapproved of his handling of antisemitism/white nationalism by a margin of 71 to 22. Should his purported failure on this latter point be taken to mean the Republicans have an antisemitism problem? My answer would be no, and that such framing again does a disservice. Instead, I see this as a specific failure of the President and not one that would occur under a President Romney or McCain.

Moreover, there is recent evidence that suggests GOP voters may not prioritize support for Israel to the extent that many believe. Specifically, one can look to the statements the President made during his successful primary campaign where he promised to remain “neutral” on questions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and did not suffer a political cost. None of this is to suggest such a change will necessarily happen. It is to suggest that it certainly could happen and, therefore, those seeking to promote the long-term interests of Jewish voters should refrain from making their criticisms in terms of partisan broadsides. 

At the end of the day, there aren’t many American Jews. Making up only about 2 percent of the total U.S. population, we don’t have enough voters in our ranks to sway elections for any political party. Rather, we are largely reliant on our capacity to advocate for our interests and for our allies of good will in both parties to address our concerns. Statements that put forth charges of guilt by association or tar those who share a party with those who have ignored our concerns will only chip away at our community’s capacity to advocate for our interests. Instead, we should move forward with an individualized focus on condemning those actors or the specific statements of our detractors. Recognizing antisemitism and other Jewish concerns on their own merits, without partisan blinders, is undoubtedly the best way to maintain our credibility and raise alarm effectively when lines are crossed.


Peter Fishkind is currently an associate in the Litigation Department at Proskauer Rose LLP in New York. He lives in Great Neck, New York and is a Member of the Nassau County Democratic Party Committee.

The UK Must Support Sanctions on Iran

By Lord Leslie Turnberg

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The recent refusal by the UN to accept an American request to renew sanctions against Iran is an unsurprising, but grave error.

The so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was supposed to have placed an embargo on Iran’s proliferation of conventional and nuclear arms in exchange for sanction limitations against Iran. It failed.

Iran’s continued conventional arms production — and more — will only gather pace absent snapback sanctions.

Iran seeks to improve its missile capability, including with new Land Attack Cruise Missiles, improved anti-ship ballistic missiles, mines, and more sophisticated submarines. China and Russia seem ready to help with these goals, including by way of advanced air surveillance systems and fighter aircraft.

And Iran is keen to lift the restraint on its nuclear program.

Iran is not a friend-in-waiting, ready to be brought in from the cold in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. Believing that is true defies all credibility. Look at its recent actions under the terms of the JCPOA, and you realize how illogical such a presumption is.

In the Middle East, Iran’s support for the Houthis in Yemen has brought terrorism into Saudi Arabia and increased threats to the Gulf States. The Saudi airport has been struck, and the damage to the Abqaiq oil processing facility resulted in oil price increases that were felt throughout the world.

Iran’s involvement in Iraq has made that country almost ungovernable, and its support for the designated terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon has made life almost impossible for Lebanese civilians, even before the recent disastrous explosions in Beirut.

Iran makes no secret of its intention to wipe Israel off the map and enlists its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, in its efforts to do so. It has also played a central role in the collapse of civilization in Syria — a reality that has been manifested in the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands.

Its malign influence also spreads beyond the region. Mines were detonated on Japanese and Norwegian ships in the Gulf of Oman; an unmanned American aircraft was shot down over international borders; the Iranian navy seized a UK-flagged, Swedish-owned oil tanker in the Straits of Hormuz; and Iranian efforts to work with the regime in Venezuela give little confidence that a slackening of sanctions at this stage will be anything other than disastrous. Burning American and British flags and imprisoning British citizens on little pretext are not the actions of a regime that is moderating.

Iran is suffering badly from economic failure and COVID-19. Its citizens, who belong to a once proud nation with a long history of intellectual and social development, are being brought to their knees, literally, by a rigid theocracy that sees women as second class citizens and homosexuals as targets for hanging.

Constantly and brutally suppressed, the Iranian population has seen hundreds of dissidents hanged and thousands of demonstrators killed, including a reported 1,500 in last November’s demonstrations alone.

Every signal from Iran points to them being poised to take advantage of any easing of sanctions, and the case for extending the sanctions beyond the October deadline seems unanswerable.

Yet the EU, Britain, and the UN have rebuffed the US.

It is an extremely regrettable error that the UN has now turned down the bid by the US to press for more sanctions. But I strongly believe that Britain should play a more active role as it leaves the EU and seeks to demonstrate that it remains a significant player on the world stage. Its rejection of the US bid to reinstate sanctions on Iran, however, makes it very doubtful that the UK is willing to take on such a role.

In a world where political wisdom and moral leadership is sadly in short supply, it is vital that we find a path to de-escalation in what has become a Middle East armed quagmire.

The UK should be working with its allies and pressing them not to blink in the face of Iranian false promises. Appeasement has never worked in the past and is unlikely to do so now. We are facing many perils in the world. Iran is inflaming rather than stabilizing them.

The people of Iran deserve better, the Middle East and Israel need relief from existential threats, and the rest of us are eagerly seeking a safer world.

The UK must act firmly on the issue of Iran, demonstrating to friends and adversaries alike that it is prepared to do as should be done. A failure to do so, however, will be remembered and recalled.


Lord Leslie Turnberg is a life Peer in the British House of Lords and the author of several books, including “Beyond the Balfour Declaration - The 100 year Quest For Israeli Palestinian Peace.”

TEN TAKEAWAYS FROM THE UAE - ISRAEL ANNOUNCEMENT

By Benjamin Anthony

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The normalization of ties between the UAE and Israel is an historic moment, worthy of celebration and optimism. 

In no particular order, here are ten take away points to keep in mind. 

1) By taking the issue of sovereignty off the table, the Israeli right has been spared from entering into the Trump peace plan as a basis for negotiations. That plan endorsed Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley, but it also supported the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea & Samaria, it’s capital in east Jerusalem and the ceding of more Israeli land, this time adjacent to the Gaza strip (see Trump peace initiative conceptual map below). If sovereignty is ever to be applied it should occur in total separation from the Trump plan. The Israeli right should breathe a sigh of relief - and demonstrate some introspection. Several settler movement leaders applauded the Trump peace plan at the White house ceremony, without reading its contents. Next time, they should study such a document in advance of rendering judgment - particularly when that document pertains to the fate of their own homes.  

 
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2) Prime Minister Netanyahu says sovereignty is not off the table. The Americans and the Emirates say otherwise. To find out who's right, wait to see the written details of the deal. Beware though. While the issue will probably be addressed contractually, if past treaties are prologue, the wording relating to sovereignty will be agreed upon but what that wording actually means will be hotly contested - possibly for generations to come – by both sides. 

3) If Israel applies sovereignty in the future, it is unlikely that such a step would destroy an Israel – UAE deal. Mutual interests between the two countries will become inextricably tied by the time such a decision is taken by any future Israeli government. 

4) America, whose commitment to the Middle East has been understandably questioned recently, could very well be back in the region - and that is a good thing. Russia, China and the EU are pale imitations of American leadership.

5) Benjamin Netanyahu’s massive presence astride the international stage and his myriad domestic achievements have not yielded him a seminal legacy issue. He has managed, rather than resolved, the matters he designates most in need of resolution, including the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear program.

The normalization of ties with the UAE undoubtedly gives him that legacy achievement. Whenever he departs the political stage, this deal is one to which he can always gesture. It's also quite possible that the inking of the agreement will enable him to add another notch to his legacy belt; finally tackling Iran. 

6) Normalization turns the tables on the Iranians. For years, Iran has tormented Israel by stationing Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, hard along Israel's border. Now Iran must contend with the open fact that Israeli capabilities and know-how will be established in the UAE, likely in greater order than has been the case to this point, in a position as proximate as possible to the Ayatollahs. It's a tit-for-tat move by Israel and the UAE. Geography still matters.

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7) Netanyahu has hinted that his potential successors include Mossad Chief, Yossi Cohen. That Cohen effectively conducted the diplomacy undergirding this deal may indicate more than the traditional Mossad role of coordinating with countries with which Israel does not enjoy diplomatic ties. Cohen's role speaks to this being an interests based agreement between the UAE and Israel, at the lead of which is Iran. But it also demonstrates Netanyahu's faith in the Mossad Chief and bolsters his credentials if ever a political 'succession' does take place. 

8) Benjamin Netanyahu is the world's most strident voice against the Iranian nuclear program. The UAE wants that program ended. They are more likely to reach that goal with Netanyahu as Premier. At this moment, Benny Gantz is set to soon rotate into that position. On Iran, Gantz is a far less strident force than Netanyahu, and the UAE knows it. Israeli politics are such that anything could change. Gantz may never become PM. But if you were the UAE, why would you wait to find out?

9) The August 25th deadline for Israel’s government to pass a budget is looming and the coalition is at an impasse. A bill to defer that deadline recently passed its first preliminary reading. The bill could still be scuttled though, the deadline missed and this government dissolved, ushering in a fourth round of elections in Israel. The US presidential elections will take place on November 3rd. Netanyahu frequently stakes his election campaigns on his international gravitas and Trump is seeking a bump in the polls. Any signing ceremony will be timed to take place at a time that buoys the electoral chances of both leaders. If Netanyahu wants to form a coalition of new partners, a well timed peace summit would do wonders for his prospects - and he is absolutely canny enough to have timed the announcement of normalization for when he did, for that very reason. 

10) Watch Foreign Minister Gaby Ashkenazi closely. If the coalition holds, the signing ceremony could be his moment to shine - to the detriment of Benny Gantz. Gantz is the leader of the party, but he's thus far failed to make a political impression. Ashkenazi could use this opportunity to step out from behind him, if Netanyahu allows him to do so.  

Bonus Point 11) The BDS movement was just delivered an absolute hammer blow. This deal is a massive economic opportunity for both countries. Those who’ve thrown in their lot with the BDS movement should understand that they are backing a racist, bigoted, Jew-hating movement that's on the wrong side of truth, history, principle and progress. While that movement lurched between student governments seeking divestment, Israel and the UAE were identifying ways to generate massive mutual investment. Better to follow their example and join a winning team. 


Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. His portfolio includes the coordination of high level briefings by senior members of the Israel defense establishment - active and retired - to elected officials; including within the US Administration, the US Senate, and the US House of Representatives, on matters relating to the state of Israel and her strategic relationship and positioning in an international context.

NORMALIZATION WITH THE UAE. DENORMALIZATION FOR ISRAEL.

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By Alexander J. Apfel

The “normalization” of ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an historic step about which Israelis can rejoice. Jerusalem is forging relations with countries that not long ago vowed to never recognize the Jewish state. The benefits accompanying this “Normalization” should be celebrated by all peace-loving people. It is Israel’s hope that one by one, other Arab countries will follow this courageous, albeit overdue, path of peace.

However, in the process of pursuing Normalization with the UAE, Prime Minister Netanyahu all but formally relinquished Israel’s sovereignty to the United States. Hailing the historic breakthrough, Netanyahu assured his base in a press conference on Thursday that he remained committed to applying sovereignty, as he had repeatedly pledged during his last three election campaigns.

Many Israelis believed Netanyahu's election promise and that he had just the man in the White House to give the green light. Yet, after Jordan protested and threatened diplomatic consequences and with Netanyahu’s characteristic flip-flopping, the July 1st date for commencing the process came and went, without progress or event. 

Fast Forward a month, and here we are once again, with Netanyahu bowing to the demands of the UAE and the US that we surrender our right to extend sovereignty to areas he has stated belong to the Jewish state. In a press conference immediately following the announcement of the UAE deal, Netanyahu outlined the benefits of such Normalization. These mutual benefits - particularly that Israel has now enlisted a strategic, overt ally against Iran -  justify the “temporary” delay on sovereignty, he said.

But rather than accepting the demand to halt sovereignty as a precondition for signing this pact, Netanyahu should have turned the tables and insisted that Israel will sign the pact on condition that the UAE recognizes Israel’s application of sovereignty over certain territories; or, failing that, that the UAE does not openly oppose the Israeli step? Why must Israel, whose cooperation is so highly coveted by the UAE in the fight against Iran and in many other areas, repeatedly yield to demands from others, particularly as those demands pertain to Israeli land?

Such a predisposition is not tenable for a sovereign state. It plays into a decades-old fiction that Israel does not have the right to determine its own destiny unless “we, the world” say it does. This has essentially been the case since 1947 and it appears to be a symptom of the Galut (Jewish diaspora) mentality that has bled into the modern Israeli psyche.

In our pursuit of acceptance among the nations, we submit to their dictates. It's time for Israel to fully shed its Galut skin.

Netanyahu’s deference to Washington on almost all military and territorial matter of strategic, historic and biblical import, constitutes a near total abandonment of the principles upon which this country was founded - that no longer would the Jewish people be bound by the whims of any nation, that they alone would be the architects of their own destiny.

Before blindly embracing this Normalization pact with the UAE, therefore, Israel must ask itself some fundamental questions: Are we a sovereign state or are we a client state of the United States? Is our capital in Washington or Jerusalem? Do we follow the decisions of the democratically elected Knesset or do we obey those sent from Capitol Hill? Are we really an “Am Hofshi (free people)” or are we simply an “Am Americai - An American people”? And what are the implications of those questions in a rapidly changing America?

Israelis must ask themselves the very question that Netanyahu himself asked during a 2012 speech about neutralizing the Iranian threat: “The world tells Israel, ‘wait. There’s still time.’ And I say, wait for what? Wait until when?”?

As a sovereign Jewish state, we should have applied sovereignty. If doing so had resulted in the scuttling of a deal with the UAE, so be it. A country that is unable to determine its own borders without foreign consent is no country at all. It is little more than a colony.

An ever-closer relationship between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump is no reason for Israelis to feel any less of the bitter disappointment they carry as a result of Netanyahu’s repeated, broken promises. Netanyahu surely has not forgotten that the end of the Trump era is approaching and a sea of new challenges under an unknown administration awaits - whether in November, 2020 or four years hence.

Delaying the application of sovereignty has rendered us an autonomous enclave in the Middle East, rather than a sovereign power. Put simply, Normalization with arab countries must never be conditioned upon the perennial denormalization of our own identity and territorial integrity.

On sovereignty, Netanyahu has failed to seize the opportunity he was afforded by history.

He would do well to reflect on what was arguably his finest hour.

Sitting in the Oval Office, in the face of inordinate pressure from an American president, the Israeli Prime Minister invoked history. As he pushed back against the policies of Barack Obama on Judea and Samaria, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed that if we were to misstep, “history will not give the Jewish people another chance."

On sovereignty, that same Israeli Prime Minister has misstepped. History is unlikely to bestow another chance upon the Jewish people. 


Alexander J. Apfel earned a BA and MA in Modern History. He is the former managing editor of Ynetnews and served in the Armoured Corps of the IDF, where he continues to serve as a reservist.

Israel Must Seize Its Moment in Abu Dhabi

By Zachary Shapiro

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Last week, the Trump administration announced that Israel and the United Arab Emirates reached a landmark diplomatic agreement to normalize relations. President Donald Trump hinted that the deal could be the first of many accords with other Arab states. 

Of course, Israel should celebrate this historic achievement. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government should resist the temptation to sit back and rest on their laurels. Instead, they should seize upon this breakthrough by prioritizing non-military cooperation, choosing a fitting ambassador to Abu Dhabi, investing in public diplomacy, and moderating Israeli policy towards the West Bank. Taking these steps would help solidify the agreement while advancing Israel’s broader normalization campaign in the Middle East and beyond—a cornerstone of Israeli doctrine.

Israel has long tempted unlikely partners with access to its defense and technology sectors. According to the White House’s statement, security ties will be a pillar of this normalization deal, along with environmental, medical, and technological trade, and more. No doubt Israel’s security cooperation with its Emirati counterparts is crucial to countering Iran. However, Netanyahu and his diplomats should work tirelessly to advance relations in non-military sectors first and foremost. Ultimately, the long-term success of this treaty hinges on broad and deep economic cooperation. By focusing on non-military commerce, Israel can diversify and deepen a critical partnership for years to come.

Second, the Israeli government should choose its first envoy to Abu Dhabi carefully and strategically. And Netanyahu should vet candidates more cautiously than he has in the past. In 2016, he nominated former settler leader Dani Dayan as ambassador to Brazil. Israel suffered an embarrassing setback when Brazilian officials rejected Dayan’s credentials, citing his past in the settler community. Ultimately, Dayan became Consul General in New York, where he made impressive headway with critics of the Israeli government. On other occasions, Netanyahu has used diplomatic appointments to exile potential political foes like Danny Danon, Israel’s outgoing ambassador to the United Nations. 

This time, Netanyahu should resist the urge to politicize the appointment. Instead, he should select an ambassador who can speak to the Emirati people articulately: an Arab-Israeli official. Two in particular would make strong choices. George Deek, Israel’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, has been called “Israel’s best diplomat.” Ishmael Khaldi, who in July became Israel’s ambassador to Eritrea, is Israel’s first Bedouin diplomat. He, too, would make a fine nominee.

After selecting a qualified ambassador, Netanyahu and the Foreign Ministry should invest heavily in exchange and cultural diplomacy programs in the United Arab Emirates. If handled properly, Abu Dhabi could be a steppingstone to Manama, Muscat, and beyond. Accordingly, normalization with the UAE is a golden opportunity for Israel to break down barriers and to change long-hostile Arab attitudes. A robust public diplomacy strategy could help Israeli diplomats reach Emirati audiences and lay the groundwork for long-term change. The Foreign Ministry excels at this sort of diplomacy, so it should make these programs a strategic priority as soon as the Embassy opens its doors. 

Finally, Netanyahu should moderate Israeli policy toward the West Bank. Emirati leaders have already faced blowback across the Arab world. Beyond keeping its word to avoid annexing the West Bank for the foreseeable future, the Israeli government should refrain from further settlement activity for at least the near term. In the wake of the normalization deal, each new settlement is effectively a threat to Israel’s relationship with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed. 

Furthermore, settlement construction, especially in more controversial areas understood to comprise a future Palestinian state, could preclude the possibility of more official relationships with other Arab countries. Much like the possibility of annexation, building in these areas could jeopardize this potential realignment—a focal point of Israeli foreign policy and its strategy to counter Iran. Though the Israeli right has condemned Netanyahu’s concession on annexation, this historic victory gives him sufficient political cover to continue pursuing other pragmatic policy objectives while pivoting towards the Israeli center—and away from wayward settlers on his right.

Overall, the Israel-UAE agreement marks a watershed moment for Israeli foreign policy and for Netanyahu. A string of accords with other Arab states may well be on the horizon, and Israel’s longtime goal of greater normalization may finally be within reach. Netanyahu should be pleased and proud, but he should also lean forward. He must capitalize on this opportunity to secure Israel’s place in the region and among the nations.


Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

The Geopolitics of the Israel-UAE Peace Agreement

By Jeremiah Rozman

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With strong U.S. backing, on August 13, 2020, Israel and the UAE agreed to normalize relations. The UAE is the third Arab country to do so since Israel’s founding. 

In exchange for full normalization, Israel agreed to suspend extending sovereignty to disputed areas. As a supporter of sovereignty, especially in the strategically critical Jordan Valley, I view this agreement with tempered optimism. It supports the strategic interests of the U.S., U.S. partners in the Middle East and Israel. It does not harm Israel’s de-facto defensive position and should encourage the Palestinians to negotiate. Following an extensive election campaign, which heavily featured the promise to extend sovereignty, this deal has mixed results for Israel’s domestic politics. 

Great Power Competition

The Israel-UAE peace agreement was at least as much about U.S. strategic interests as it was about Israel and the UAE. Washington’s strategic priority is great power competition. Its top adversaries are Russia and China. Its main advantage is its alliance network. By solidifying the start of a coherent alignment between itself, Israel, and regional partners, the U.S. can lead a united front against Iran while preempting Russian and Chinese encroachment on its traditional allies. Furthermore, European partners often clash with the U.S. over Israel. This agreement has been warmly welcomed by the Europeans, helping to smooth over some of these differences.

Regional Security and Prosperity

The main benefit of this agreement is not ending violence, as was the case with Egypt. Rather, it is the setting of a diplomatic precedent intended to open a new regional realignment and an era of cooperation. 

Forward thinking Arab leaders realize that oil does not hold the promise for prolonged prosperity that it did fifty years ago. Their countries need access to state of the art technology and expertise in order to build economies and militaries primed for success in the information age. The U.S. and Israel can offer much needed investment, expertise, and defense support. Normalization with Israel opens the door for multilateral cooperation to modernize regional economies and enhance collective defense with an eye focused towards restraining Iran. 

Presidential candidate Joe Biden’s campaign credited the Israel-UAE breakthrough as the culmination of “efforts of multiple administrations.” Perhaps this assertion alludes to President Obama’s Iran deal, which caused regional powers to seek cooperation with Israel out of fear of Iran. This agreement, as a starting point for regional cooperation, will greatly boost Israel’s ability to target Iran should the need arise. 

Israel and the Gulf countries fear that if Joe Biden were to win the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, and follow through on his platform’s pledge to reenter the JCPOA, ending the maximum pressure strategy against Iran, the need to kinetically target Iran’s nuclear program could very well arise. For Israel to carry out a successful attack, it needs good relations with partners, the use of airspace, staging grounds, refueling capabilities, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support. By simply boosting the credibility of the threat to strike Iran, the peace deal enhances deterrence against Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

By forestalling sovereignty and securing increased visitation to the al Aqsa Mosque, this agreement gives the UAE a concrete policy win for the Palestinian cause. This boosts its leadership clout and contrasts the advantages of diplomacy with the Hezbollah/Lebanon confrontational model which has secured nothing for the Palestinians and brought ruin to Lebanon. 

For Israel, the main strategic drawback of the agreement is postponing de jure sovereignty, which is the optimal way to ensure Israeli control over the Jordan Valley for posterity. In the near term, this changes nothing, though. Israel has maintained security control over the Jordan Valley for over five decades and can continue, now with the tacit support of Arab powers, until an adequate deal is presented. This would require concrete border commitments from the Palestinian Authority (PA). Due to their ideological opposition, this is unlikely to be obtained.  

Over the coming years, the UAE will inevitably see substantial economic and defense benefits from normalization with Israel, making the treaty ever more difficult to abrogate. If the PA remains unwilling to negotiate peace, it is unlikely that the UAE will withdraw from the agreement if Israel extends sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. At that point, Israel could extend sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and other areas in the disputed territories without substantively harming relations with its Arab partners. Both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Jared Kushner have signaled that this is on the table. Whether it is implemented depends mostly upon the actions of the PA. 

Israel’s Domestic Politics

For Israel’s domestic politics, the peace agreement will have mixed results. It will exacerbate trust issues between the electorate and the Likud. Netanyahu campaigned on the promise of sovereignty, which was strongly supported by his voters. Some might credit him with masterful “door in the face” negotiating, waiving the credible threat of sovereignty in order to secure a diplomatic win by then conceding on it. Others will see this as a bait and switch. Either way, it exemplifies foreign policy from on high, keeping the masses in the dark so that the “experts” can play geopolitical chess. While this may or may not be desirable, it is likely to erode faith in electoral promises. 

Conclusion

The much heralded Israel-UAE peace agreement has disappointed many proponents of sovereignty. Others see normalized ties without requiring a change to the status quo as a betrayal of the Palestinians. In reality, this is a pragmatic move aimed primarily at boosting the U.S. geostrategic position with an eye towards great power competition. Secondarily, it opens the door for regional alignment between Israel and Gulf countries for economic and military cooperation. It does not harm Israel’s security in the short-term. It does not definitively end sovereignty. It does however, boost Israel’s position vis-à-vis its only existential threat, a nuclear armed Iran. For these reasons, the deal should be viewed with tentative optimism, as a win for Israel, moderate Arab regimes and the democratic global order. 


Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

You Won't Get Peace Now By Weaponizing Falsehoods

By Cade Spivey

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On a long drive from my native Indiana to Virginia, I listened to a podcast wherein the interview subject began with a fairly benign truism: "Words matter." The program, produced by Americans For Peace Now, began by stating that not every murder is a genocide, and that not all discrimination is apartheid. The interview then continued for another thirty minutes laying out a “legal” framework of apartheid in order to shoehorn Israel into that definition, vis-à-vis Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank.  

I agree that words matter. The words we use to describe an issue directly influence the substance of a debate. I further contend that facts matter, and that merely using legal terms to describe a legal framework does not establish facts independently. Law was not meant to be argued in the abstract. The arguments made to establish Israel as an "apartheid state" were irresponsible and unwarranted and promoted key assertions which have become commonplace in the misinformed effort to establish Israel as an apartheid state. 

Apartheid Defined

The UN defines apartheid as "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them." The term was derived from the system of racial segregation imposed in South Africa from the late 1940s until 1994. Separation of the races was strictly enforced in public accommodation, trade, education, marriage, and even sexual acts. The purpose was to cement the power structures which existed at the end of the British colonialization of the region. While the UN's legal framework does not establish South African-style apartheid as a benchmark for action, there have been no sanctions for acts by any government (including South Africa) since the passage of the Rome Statute by the International Criminal Court in 1997

Regardless, the cynical invocation of the term harkens back to that brutal scheme of governance in hope of eliciting a sympathetic response to the alleged victims - in this case, the Palestinian Arabs. When the term is used to describe Israel, it is as inappropriate an analogy as a comparison apples to hand grenades. 

Occupied Territory

Firstly, the speaker described the West Bank as "occupied territory" under international law. This is simply not true. The area traditionally referred to as the West Bank is not "occupied." The West Bank is “disputed" territory. While the distinction may seem purely semantic, words matter.

Occupied territories are captured in war from another sovereign; in this case, a Palestinian sovereign did not exist in 1967, prior to the Six Day War, when the alleged “occupation” began. Disputed territories, however, are lands subject to ongoing negotiations regarding conflicting claims of sovereignty. Referring to the West Bank as occupied may play well into the argument of Israeli apartheid, but doing so mischaracterizes the legal and political frameworks under which both sides of the debate are attempting to establish agreements. Furthermore, this mischaracterization does not produce a positive result - nor does it seek to do so. It seeks only to entrench and divide both sides through alienation while failing to meaningfully address the needs of either.

Racial Subjugation

The speaker told of an Israel where Arabs are second-class citizens; denied the right to vote, run for office, or attain citizenship. I would wager there are many Israeli-Arabs who would beg to differ. For example, Abdel Rahman ZuabiSalim Joubran, or George Karra, former members of Israel's Supreme Court; the 17 Israeli-Arab members currently serving in the Knesset; or perhaps the Israeli-Arabs serving in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), would likely see things differently. 

Even in the West Bank, Palestinians are afforded voting rights and even their own civil management under the Palestinian Authority (PA). While the PA certainly coordinates with Israel in some areas - such as sharing security functions with the IDF - it  still has autonomy status. The Palestinian-Arabs who live under the control of the Authority are not denied a voice, it’s just that the authority to which they speak seems unwilling to listen. The people who live in the West Bank are subject to security controls and movement is, at times, limited. But the realities that lead to such policies are independent of their race. They are based on real-world safety and security concerns. The Palestinian-Arabs are not subjugated, and they are not second-class citizens. They are also not citizens of Israel.

To be clear, matters of Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty are not beyond debate. There are political, religious, and human rights issues that should be debated and considered very deliberately. 

Reducing one side or the other to terms that are the very embodiment of evil through ad hominem labels or inappropriately applied legal definitions is not helpful, and does not produce meaningful outcomes for people living these truths daily.


Cade Spivey is a publishing Adjunct at The MirYam Institute. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and served three tours in the Navy as a Gunnery/Antiterrorism Officer, Damage Control Assistant, and Counter-Piracy Evaluator. He is currently a student at the Wake Forest University School of Law.

THE BEIRUT BLAST HAS ROCKED LEBANON AND THE REGION

By Yaakov Lappin

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The tragic August 4 explosion that tore through Beirut, killing over 150 people, injuring thousands, and causing massive property damage, represents the latest tragic phase in Lebanon's destabilization and transition into failed-state status. 

As the fallout from the deadly explosion continues to reverberate, and the government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab resigned in the face of popular outrage, many Lebanese demonstrators have taken to the streets. In addition to their calls for an overhaul of the corrupt political system, which has left them poor, with little electricity, and a breakdown in basic services, the demonstrators have begun challenging Hezbollah's unrivaled status as the military and political hegemon in Lebanon. 

A domino effect of instability could see Hezbollah's position challenged in new ways, and the Iranian-backed proxy could respond with violence to protect its status.  

Yet the destabilization of the Lebanese state began long before the Beirut explosion. Lebanon has been facing a series of crises, joining a Middle Eastern club of states unable to provide basic services or an economic future for its citizens, a growing number of whom find themselves homeless, jobless, and hopeless. 

Lebanon has shown an inability to find a solution for its people, for whom the economy is the most important and pressing issue. That reality has given rise to a growing current of anti-leadership protests in Lebanon, and the protests are not sectarian in nature. Like in Iraq, the Shi'ite sector in Lebanon has seen a young generation challenging its own Shi'ite leaders. 

The involvement of the international community has also been sub-par. Inherent instability is thus the norm in Lebanon, and, like in other Middle Eastern states, Iran is a big part of the story. 

Lebanon now faces the twin crisis of economic collapse and political paralysis. 

While anger toward the government and Hezbollah was growing prior to the blast, Hezbollah still maintains a large loyalist southern Lebanese Shi'ite heartland (though some people there have joined Shi'ite voices critical of Hezbollah's actions). 

Lebanese citizens, from a variety of sectarian backgrounds, have become frustrated by the obstacles that the Iranian-backed terror-army has placed in the way of outside help. Sunni Gulf states, alarmed by the political ascendency of their arch-adversary - the Iranian-Shi'ite axis in Lebanon - stopped channeling large funds into Lebanon's banking services sector. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE, which must contend with the radical Shi'ite axis in their own backyards, have any interest in rescuing a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanese government from bankruptcy. 

In distress, Lebanon turned to the International Monetary Fund for a 10 billion dollar bailout loan. But the IMF would require changes to Lebanon's economic structure, including more transparency, and assurances that Hezbollah, which faces American sanctions, will not take charge of the funds. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has described the IMF conditions as terms "that would make the country explode" – a statement that reflects the degree to which Hezbollah holds the country hostage. 

Hezbollah, meanwhile, still maintains thousands of combatants in Syria, where they fight alongside Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias on behalf of the genocidal Assad regime.

The blast itself raises a number of questions, so far unanswered, about Hezbollah's potential linkage. The questions were well summarized by Dr. Ely Karmon, a senior research scholar at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, who examined the official version of events describing how a Moldovan-flagged cargo ship docked at Beirut port in 2013, reportedly after suffering technical problems while sailing from Georgia to Mozambique, carrying 2750 tons of ammonium nitrate. After a series of disputes and inspections, the ship was abandoned by its owners in Beirut, and its cargo was transferred to the Port's Warehouse No. 12, where it remained for several years, despite repeated requests by port authorities to dispose or resell the explosive substance contained. 

According to Karmon, questions linger over how the ship got permission to dock in Beirut in the first place, as well as why nobody contacted the company in Mozambique that allegedly ordered the explosives and paid a million dollars to the ship's owners for it. Questions over who decided to store the explosives at the port for six years, and keep it in poor conditions, have not received satisfactory answers. 

In addition, it remains unclear whether Hezbollah weapons were stored near the enormous ammonium nitrate storehouse. 

Whether or not Hezbollah is connected to the blast, what is beyond dispute is that Hezbollah terror cells, under orders to attack Israeli and Jewish targets around the world, were found in possession of tons of ammonium nitrate, including in London, Thailand, Cyprus, and Peru. The organization appears to have trafficked the substance to its sleeper cells. The Thai National Police chief found similar explosives in shipping crates, apparently for export to other destinations. 

It must also be noted that Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor intended to set up a missile production line inside Lebanon, an initiative that resulted from Israel’s alleged,  effective, ongoing interdiction of Iranian smuggling attempts into Lebanon.  

Hezbollah now wants to convert many of its rockets into precision guided missiles in order to threaten Israeli strategic sites, a development that would cause even greater regional volatility. 

Whether or not Hezbollah negligence was linked to the Beirut blast, the tragic event underlines the obvious risk posed by the storage of explosives and weapons in the heart of crowded, built-up civilian areas – a modus operandi that Hezbollah has pioneered, and continues to implement. 


Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.