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Hamas: Masters Of Negotiations
BY Grisha Yakubovich
Earlier this week, Hamas and Israel declared a long-term cease fire agreement.
Some view Hamas as a simple terrorist organization that limits its activities to digging tunnels, firing rockets, and preparing suicide bombings. In reality, Hamas has evolved into an organization with clear long-term goals, and a strategy to achieve them.
Others believe Hamas is a democratically elected political party that acts on the will of its people. In truth, it censors domestic criticism. Gazans opposed to Hamas’ authority face merciless retribution.
So, what is Hamas, and how have they become such sophisticated, formidable negotiators, able to force Israel to the negotiating table? Hamas rose to power in the Gaza Strip in June 2007, ousting the Palestinian Authority in a violent coup. Since then, it has fought three conflicts with Israel, and the socio-economic situation in Gaza has inched ever closer to collapse. Yet, Hamas’s rule is strengthening, and it governs the Strip with a firm hand, wielding unchallenged power.
Furthermore, after every major armed conflict with Israel, Hamas emerged seemingly victorious from post-ceasefire negotiations.
Their playbook is simple. First, they escalate hostilities. Second, they agree to a ceasefire on the condition that post-violence negotiations are mediated by Egypt. Third, they anchor their negotiating positions with unreasonably high demands. Last, they extract concessions from Israel to which Israelis would not have conceded during peacetime.
Hamas has studied the Israelis. Their demands yield increasing effectiveness. Hamas has learned Israel’s priorities, red-lines, and non-negotiables.
Hamas acts first to improve Gaza's humanitarian situation. Second, they seek to lift Israeli security restrictions on Gaza, which it describes as a blockade. Third, Hamas wants to dominate the international narrative.
Lastly, Hamas is positioning to succeed Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank.
Hamas’ negotiation strategy is constantly evolving, while Israel’s approach to negotiations has remained stagnant. Israel continues to demand a cessation of rocket attacks, tunnel digging (including sea tunnels), the end of Hamas's naval commando threats to the Israeli coastline, border bombs, and recruiting for its military wing. Israel also demands the release of two civilians held captive by Hamas and the remains of two IDF soldiers who fell in Gaza in 2014. In return, Israel offers to solve some of Gaza's humanitarian challenges, both directly and through the assistance of third parties.
For example, Israel proposed the construction of a natural gas pipeline into Gaza to power Gaza's electricity station. Though Egypt also has the capacity to build such a pipeline into Gaza, Israeli-Egyptian relations mean Egypt would not do this without coordination with Israel. Hamas understands this, and realizes that it would have to make concessions at the negotiating table for the pipeline to go forward.
So Hamas turns to primitive tools to coax Israel back to negotiations: incendiary and explosive balloons and kites, for example. The use of these simple tools comes after many months of disturbances on the Israel-Gaza border, and the deployment of 'night squads' along the fence that burn tires, release arson balloons, and aim to exhaust local Israeli civilians living in southern Israel.
These attacks have garnered extensive coverage across Israeli media, and Israeli civilians are desperate for the carnage to end. In short, Hamas’ goal of manipulating Israel back into the negotiating room appears to be working.
Israel has responded with sophisticated air power. When juxtaposed against kites and balloons in the international press, Israeli fighter jets look like Goliath’s bronze spear staring down the Gazan David’s sling.
This past month exemplified this pattern. On August 7, incendiary Gazan balloons began being floated across the border, riding on sea winds that always blow east towards Israel. A week later, on August 15, an Egyptian mediation delegation arrived in Gaza.
To heap further pressure on Israeli negotiators, Hamas announced that its power station would cease operations, making it seem as though Israel was preventing Hamas from producing the energy it needs to power the Strip.
Three days thereafter, Gaza City's Mayor raised an alarm about the effect of the power cuts on Gaza’s water supply. As a result, Hamas won the PR battle once again, somehow convincing the international community that Israel was responsible for the absence of potable water in Gaza.
Hamas carried out the escalation it had planned all along, step by step, as a military operation. The doctrine of Hamas is to 'keep the enemy busy,' by way of a low level war of attrition, using the most basic tools imaginable, and to reap real dividends during future negotiations.
Hamas continues to rack up large victories in the PR arena, and small victories at the negotiating table. And so they will continue to push. Hamas will demand new projects, and further Israeli investment into Gaza's economy. It will not agree to demilitarize Gaza. Indeed, further demands will likely include a port, a symbolic airport, and access to the West Bank so that Hamas can participate in future Palestinian elections.
This is a losing situation for Israel. Multiple deployments of the same Israeli strategy is not an effective way forward. It is no accident that such thinking was apocryphally described by Albert Einstein as “insanity.” Israel needs to reevaluate their negotiating strategy with Hamas. It is time for some creativity - something they could learn from their adversary.
Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.).
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Senior Legal Advisor To The INP, BG Gordon
Stop Politicizing Jewish Issues
By Peter Fishkind
With the Democratic and Republican Party conventions now behind us, I took some time to reflect on a concern that has been ailing the American Jewish community. Over the past few years, issues of special importance to Jewish voters have become increasingly politicized. Time and time again, matters like the question of support for the U.S.-Israel relationship and specific concerns that antisemitism is on the rise within our political parties, have not been dealt with on the merits. Instead, they have been thrown into the political fray. Acknowledging my own biases as an active member of the Democratic Party, I’d like to use this space to discuss the problems this approach poses for American Jews.
The first example that has caused me alarm is the allegation that my party, and the political left in general, has an antisemitism problem. My issue with this charge is not that it is manufacturing a controversy. There are those on the left that are, whether they recognize it themselves or not, antisemites. Take a recent incident that came to light in New York City. Just a few weeks ago it was reported that the NYC Chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America included on their candidate survey to NYC Council Member candidates whether they would “pledge not to travel to Israel if elected to City Council.” The only other foreign policy question asked on the survey was whether they supported the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement that refuses to recognize a Jewish right to statehood in any borders. Any group’s call to reject the Jewish people’s right to statehood and design a survey with a singular focus on the world’s one Jewish state echoes past charges deeming the Jewish people responsible for unique evils in the world and is antisemitic.
Therefore, to my Republican friends reading this article, please know that I am willing to acknowledge the existence of the problem of anti-Jewish bigotry among those who claim to be progressives. I have done so in the past. The purpose of this point is to advise caution to those who are framing the issue in broad strokes. This presupposes that Republicans and those who claim to be conservatives don’t have their own share of wackos or a President who has crossed the line with his words about the Jewish community on multiple occasions. Moreover, it ignores that anti-Jewish bias is a human problem that has existed for millennia. Suggesting that it subsists within a single political camp is a critical error that risks serving as a shield for those of the alternative ideological persuasion.
For what it is worth, while many Jews believe the President holds anti-Jewish animus, I do not. Instead, I believe his views about the Jewish community track somewhat well with what is described in this article. He seems to believe many of the stereotypes about Jews valuing wealth and our supposed business savvy but, through his own worldview, sees them as virtues to be complimented. Due to his reckless comments about Jews as well as a slew of other reasons, I remain unsupportive of the President.
However, I will readily acknowledge that President Trump has put in place a number of policies of special concern to the Jewish community that I have supported. The President was right to join Israel in recognizing Jerusalem as its own capital, a privilege that, as far as I understand, we grant to every other state whose sovereignty our government recognizes. I also supported his decision to sign an executive order extending protections to Jewish college students facing discrimination in line with a policy previously championed by former Democratic Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid of Nevada. In fact, the Jewish community as a whole seems to hold a similar outlook on these questions. A recent survey found that disapproval for the President among American Jews hovered at around 70 percent. At the same time, there was net approval of 20 percentage points for the move of the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and 13 points for the signing of the executive order. It also found that Jewish voters disapproved of his handling of antisemitism/white nationalism by a margin of 71 to 22. Should his purported failure on this latter point be taken to mean the Republicans have an antisemitism problem? My answer would be no, and that such framing again does a disservice. Instead, I see this as a specific failure of the President and not one that would occur under a President Romney or McCain.
Moreover, there is recent evidence that suggests GOP voters may not prioritize support for Israel to the extent that many believe. Specifically, one can look to the statements the President made during his successful primary campaign where he promised to remain “neutral” on questions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and did not suffer a political cost. None of this is to suggest such a change will necessarily happen. It is to suggest that it certainly could happen and, therefore, those seeking to promote the long-term interests of Jewish voters should refrain from making their criticisms in terms of partisan broadsides.
At the end of the day, there aren’t many American Jews. Making up only about 2 percent of the total U.S. population, we don’t have enough voters in our ranks to sway elections for any political party. Rather, we are largely reliant on our capacity to advocate for our interests and for our allies of good will in both parties to address our concerns. Statements that put forth charges of guilt by association or tar those who share a party with those who have ignored our concerns will only chip away at our community’s capacity to advocate for our interests. Instead, we should move forward with an individualized focus on condemning those actors or the specific statements of our detractors. Recognizing antisemitism and other Jewish concerns on their own merits, without partisan blinders, is undoubtedly the best way to maintain our credibility and raise alarm effectively when lines are crossed.
Peter Fishkind is currently an associate in the Litigation Department at Proskauer Rose LLP in New York. He lives in Great Neck, New York and is a Member of the Nassau County Democratic Party Committee.
The UK Must Support Sanctions on Iran
By Lord Leslie Turnberg
The recent refusal by the UN to accept an American request to renew sanctions against Iran is an unsurprising, but grave error.
The so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was supposed to have placed an embargo on Iran’s proliferation of conventional and nuclear arms in exchange for sanction limitations against Iran. It failed.
Iran’s continued conventional arms production — and more — will only gather pace absent snapback sanctions.
Iran seeks to improve its missile capability, including with new Land Attack Cruise Missiles, improved anti-ship ballistic missiles, mines, and more sophisticated submarines. China and Russia seem ready to help with these goals, including by way of advanced air surveillance systems and fighter aircraft.
And Iran is keen to lift the restraint on its nuclear program.
Iran is not a friend-in-waiting, ready to be brought in from the cold in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. Believing that is true defies all credibility. Look at its recent actions under the terms of the JCPOA, and you realize how illogical such a presumption is.
In the Middle East, Iran’s support for the Houthis in Yemen has brought terrorism into Saudi Arabia and increased threats to the Gulf States. The Saudi airport has been struck, and the damage to the Abqaiq oil processing facility resulted in oil price increases that were felt throughout the world.
Iran’s involvement in Iraq has made that country almost ungovernable, and its support for the designated terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon has made life almost impossible for Lebanese civilians, even before the recent disastrous explosions in Beirut.
Iran makes no secret of its intention to wipe Israel off the map and enlists its proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, in its efforts to do so. It has also played a central role in the collapse of civilization in Syria — a reality that has been manifested in the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands.
Its malign influence also spreads beyond the region. Mines were detonated on Japanese and Norwegian ships in the Gulf of Oman; an unmanned American aircraft was shot down over international borders; the Iranian navy seized a UK-flagged, Swedish-owned oil tanker in the Straits of Hormuz; and Iranian efforts to work with the regime in Venezuela give little confidence that a slackening of sanctions at this stage will be anything other than disastrous. Burning American and British flags and imprisoning British citizens on little pretext are not the actions of a regime that is moderating.
Iran is suffering badly from economic failure and COVID-19. Its citizens, who belong to a once proud nation with a long history of intellectual and social development, are being brought to their knees, literally, by a rigid theocracy that sees women as second class citizens and homosexuals as targets for hanging.
Constantly and brutally suppressed, the Iranian population has seen hundreds of dissidents hanged and thousands of demonstrators killed, including a reported 1,500 in last November’s demonstrations alone.
Every signal from Iran points to them being poised to take advantage of any easing of sanctions, and the case for extending the sanctions beyond the October deadline seems unanswerable.
Yet the EU, Britain, and the UN have rebuffed the US.
It is an extremely regrettable error that the UN has now turned down the bid by the US to press for more sanctions. But I strongly believe that Britain should play a more active role as it leaves the EU and seeks to demonstrate that it remains a significant player on the world stage. Its rejection of the US bid to reinstate sanctions on Iran, however, makes it very doubtful that the UK is willing to take on such a role.
In a world where political wisdom and moral leadership is sadly in short supply, it is vital that we find a path to de-escalation in what has become a Middle East armed quagmire.
The UK should be working with its allies and pressing them not to blink in the face of Iranian false promises. Appeasement has never worked in the past and is unlikely to do so now. We are facing many perils in the world. Iran is inflaming rather than stabilizing them.
The people of Iran deserve better, the Middle East and Israel need relief from existential threats, and the rest of us are eagerly seeking a safer world.
The UK must act firmly on the issue of Iran, demonstrating to friends and adversaries alike that it is prepared to do as should be done. A failure to do so, however, will be remembered and recalled.
Lord Leslie Turnberg is a life Peer in the British House of Lords and the author of several books, including “Beyond the Balfour Declaration - The 100 year Quest For Israeli Palestinian Peace.”
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UAE - Israel Normalization: An Analysis
TEN TAKEAWAYS FROM THE UAE - ISRAEL ANNOUNCEMENT
By Benjamin Anthony
The normalization of ties between the UAE and Israel is an historic moment, worthy of celebration and optimism.
In no particular order, here are ten take away points to keep in mind.
1) By taking the issue of sovereignty off the table, the Israeli right has been spared from entering into the Trump peace plan as a basis for negotiations. That plan endorsed Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley, but it also supported the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea & Samaria, it’s capital in east Jerusalem and the ceding of more Israeli land, this time adjacent to the Gaza strip (see Trump peace initiative conceptual map below). If sovereignty is ever to be applied it should occur in total separation from the Trump plan. The Israeli right should breathe a sigh of relief - and demonstrate some introspection. Several settler movement leaders applauded the Trump peace plan at the White house ceremony, without reading its contents. Next time, they should study such a document in advance of rendering judgment - particularly when that document pertains to the fate of their own homes.
2) Prime Minister Netanyahu says sovereignty is not off the table. The Americans and the Emirates say otherwise. To find out who's right, wait to see the written details of the deal. Beware though. While the issue will probably be addressed contractually, if past treaties are prologue, the wording relating to sovereignty will be agreed upon but what that wording actually means will be hotly contested - possibly for generations to come – by both sides.
3) If Israel applies sovereignty in the future, it is unlikely that such a step would destroy an Israel – UAE deal. Mutual interests between the two countries will become inextricably tied by the time such a decision is taken by any future Israeli government.
4) America, whose commitment to the Middle East has been understandably questioned recently, could very well be back in the region - and that is a good thing. Russia, China and the EU are pale imitations of American leadership.
5) Benjamin Netanyahu’s massive presence astride the international stage and his myriad domestic achievements have not yielded him a seminal legacy issue. He has managed, rather than resolved, the matters he designates most in need of resolution, including the Israel-Palestinian conflict and the Iranian nuclear program.
The normalization of ties with the UAE undoubtedly gives him that legacy achievement. Whenever he departs the political stage, this deal is one to which he can always gesture. It's also quite possible that the inking of the agreement will enable him to add another notch to his legacy belt; finally tackling Iran.
6) Normalization turns the tables on the Iranians. For years, Iran has tormented Israel by stationing Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, hard along Israel's border. Now Iran must contend with the open fact that Israeli capabilities and know-how will be established in the UAE, likely in greater order than has been the case to this point, in a position as proximate as possible to the Ayatollahs. It's a tit-for-tat move by Israel and the UAE. Geography still matters.
7) Netanyahu has hinted that his potential successors include Mossad Chief, Yossi Cohen. That Cohen effectively conducted the diplomacy undergirding this deal may indicate more than the traditional Mossad role of coordinating with countries with which Israel does not enjoy diplomatic ties. Cohen's role speaks to this being an interests based agreement between the UAE and Israel, at the lead of which is Iran. But it also demonstrates Netanyahu's faith in the Mossad Chief and bolsters his credentials if ever a political 'succession' does take place.
8) Benjamin Netanyahu is the world's most strident voice against the Iranian nuclear program. The UAE wants that program ended. They are more likely to reach that goal with Netanyahu as Premier. At this moment, Benny Gantz is set to soon rotate into that position. On Iran, Gantz is a far less strident force than Netanyahu, and the UAE knows it. Israeli politics are such that anything could change. Gantz may never become PM. But if you were the UAE, why would you wait to find out?
9) The August 25th deadline for Israel’s government to pass a budget is looming and the coalition is at an impasse. A bill to defer that deadline recently passed its first preliminary reading. The bill could still be scuttled though, the deadline missed and this government dissolved, ushering in a fourth round of elections in Israel. The US presidential elections will take place on November 3rd. Netanyahu frequently stakes his election campaigns on his international gravitas and Trump is seeking a bump in the polls. Any signing ceremony will be timed to take place at a time that buoys the electoral chances of both leaders. If Netanyahu wants to form a coalition of new partners, a well timed peace summit would do wonders for his prospects - and he is absolutely canny enough to have timed the announcement of normalization for when he did, for that very reason.
10) Watch Foreign Minister Gaby Ashkenazi closely. If the coalition holds, the signing ceremony could be his moment to shine - to the detriment of Benny Gantz. Gantz is the leader of the party, but he's thus far failed to make a political impression. Ashkenazi could use this opportunity to step out from behind him, if Netanyahu allows him to do so.
Bonus Point 11) The BDS movement was just delivered an absolute hammer blow. This deal is a massive economic opportunity for both countries. Those who’ve thrown in their lot with the BDS movement should understand that they are backing a racist, bigoted, Jew-hating movement that's on the wrong side of truth, history, principle and progress. While that movement lurched between student governments seeking divestment, Israel and the UAE were identifying ways to generate massive mutual investment. Better to follow their example and join a winning team.
Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. His portfolio includes the coordination of high level briefings by senior members of the Israel defense establishment - active and retired - to elected officials; including within the US Administration, the US Senate, and the US House of Representatives, on matters relating to the state of Israel and her strategic relationship and positioning in an international context.
NORMALIZATION WITH THE UAE. DENORMALIZATION FOR ISRAEL.
By Alexander J. Apfel
The “normalization” of ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is an historic step about which Israelis can rejoice. Jerusalem is forging relations with countries that not long ago vowed to never recognize the Jewish state. The benefits accompanying this “Normalization” should be celebrated by all peace-loving people. It is Israel’s hope that one by one, other Arab countries will follow this courageous, albeit overdue, path of peace.
However, in the process of pursuing Normalization with the UAE, Prime Minister Netanyahu all but formally relinquished Israel’s sovereignty to the United States. Hailing the historic breakthrough, Netanyahu assured his base in a press conference on Thursday that he remained committed to applying sovereignty, as he had repeatedly pledged during his last three election campaigns.
Many Israelis believed Netanyahu's election promise and that he had just the man in the White House to give the green light. Yet, after Jordan protested and threatened diplomatic consequences and with Netanyahu’s characteristic flip-flopping, the July 1st date for commencing the process came and went, without progress or event.
Fast Forward a month, and here we are once again, with Netanyahu bowing to the demands of the UAE and the US that we surrender our right to extend sovereignty to areas he has stated belong to the Jewish state. In a press conference immediately following the announcement of the UAE deal, Netanyahu outlined the benefits of such Normalization. These mutual benefits - particularly that Israel has now enlisted a strategic, overt ally against Iran - justify the “temporary” delay on sovereignty, he said.
But rather than accepting the demand to halt sovereignty as a precondition for signing this pact, Netanyahu should have turned the tables and insisted that Israel will sign the pact on condition that the UAE recognizes Israel’s application of sovereignty over certain territories; or, failing that, that the UAE does not openly oppose the Israeli step? Why must Israel, whose cooperation is so highly coveted by the UAE in the fight against Iran and in many other areas, repeatedly yield to demands from others, particularly as those demands pertain to Israeli land?
Such a predisposition is not tenable for a sovereign state. It plays into a decades-old fiction that Israel does not have the right to determine its own destiny unless “we, the world” say it does. This has essentially been the case since 1947 and it appears to be a symptom of the Galut (Jewish diaspora) mentality that has bled into the modern Israeli psyche.
In our pursuit of acceptance among the nations, we submit to their dictates. It's time for Israel to fully shed its Galut skin.
Netanyahu’s deference to Washington on almost all military and territorial matter of strategic, historic and biblical import, constitutes a near total abandonment of the principles upon which this country was founded - that no longer would the Jewish people be bound by the whims of any nation, that they alone would be the architects of their own destiny.
Before blindly embracing this Normalization pact with the UAE, therefore, Israel must ask itself some fundamental questions: Are we a sovereign state or are we a client state of the United States? Is our capital in Washington or Jerusalem? Do we follow the decisions of the democratically elected Knesset or do we obey those sent from Capitol Hill? Are we really an “Am Hofshi (free people)” or are we simply an “Am Americai - An American people”? And what are the implications of those questions in a rapidly changing America?
Israelis must ask themselves the very question that Netanyahu himself asked during a 2012 speech about neutralizing the Iranian threat: “The world tells Israel, ‘wait. There’s still time.’ And I say, wait for what? Wait until when?”?
As a sovereign Jewish state, we should have applied sovereignty. If doing so had resulted in the scuttling of a deal with the UAE, so be it. A country that is unable to determine its own borders without foreign consent is no country at all. It is little more than a colony.
An ever-closer relationship between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump is no reason for Israelis to feel any less of the bitter disappointment they carry as a result of Netanyahu’s repeated, broken promises. Netanyahu surely has not forgotten that the end of the Trump era is approaching and a sea of new challenges under an unknown administration awaits - whether in November, 2020 or four years hence.
Delaying the application of sovereignty has rendered us an autonomous enclave in the Middle East, rather than a sovereign power. Put simply, Normalization with arab countries must never be conditioned upon the perennial denormalization of our own identity and territorial integrity.
On sovereignty, Netanyahu has failed to seize the opportunity he was afforded by history.
He would do well to reflect on what was arguably his finest hour.
Sitting in the Oval Office, in the face of inordinate pressure from an American president, the Israeli Prime Minister invoked history. As he pushed back against the policies of Barack Obama on Judea and Samaria, Prime Minister Netanyahu expressed that if we were to misstep, “history will not give the Jewish people another chance."
On sovereignty, that same Israeli Prime Minister has misstepped. History is unlikely to bestow another chance upon the Jewish people.
Alexander J. Apfel earned a BA and MA in Modern History. He is the former managing editor of Ynetnews and served in the Armoured Corps of the IDF, where he continues to serve as a reservist.
Israel Must Seize Its Moment in Abu Dhabi
By Zachary Shapiro
Last week, the Trump administration announced that Israel and the United Arab Emirates reached a landmark diplomatic agreement to normalize relations. President Donald Trump hinted that the deal could be the first of many accords with other Arab states.
Of course, Israel should celebrate this historic achievement. But Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government should resist the temptation to sit back and rest on their laurels. Instead, they should seize upon this breakthrough by prioritizing non-military cooperation, choosing a fitting ambassador to Abu Dhabi, investing in public diplomacy, and moderating Israeli policy towards the West Bank. Taking these steps would help solidify the agreement while advancing Israel’s broader normalization campaign in the Middle East and beyond—a cornerstone of Israeli doctrine.
Israel has long tempted unlikely partners with access to its defense and technology sectors. According to the White House’s statement, security ties will be a pillar of this normalization deal, along with environmental, medical, and technological trade, and more. No doubt Israel’s security cooperation with its Emirati counterparts is crucial to countering Iran. However, Netanyahu and his diplomats should work tirelessly to advance relations in non-military sectors first and foremost. Ultimately, the long-term success of this treaty hinges on broad and deep economic cooperation. By focusing on non-military commerce, Israel can diversify and deepen a critical partnership for years to come.
Second, the Israeli government should choose its first envoy to Abu Dhabi carefully and strategically. And Netanyahu should vet candidates more cautiously than he has in the past. In 2016, he nominated former settler leader Dani Dayan as ambassador to Brazil. Israel suffered an embarrassing setback when Brazilian officials rejected Dayan’s credentials, citing his past in the settler community. Ultimately, Dayan became Consul General in New York, where he made impressive headway with critics of the Israeli government. On other occasions, Netanyahu has used diplomatic appointments to exile potential political foes like Danny Danon, Israel’s outgoing ambassador to the United Nations.
This time, Netanyahu should resist the urge to politicize the appointment. Instead, he should select an ambassador who can speak to the Emirati people articulately: an Arab-Israeli official. Two in particular would make strong choices. George Deek, Israel’s ambassador to Azerbaijan, has been called “Israel’s best diplomat.” Ishmael Khaldi, who in July became Israel’s ambassador to Eritrea, is Israel’s first Bedouin diplomat. He, too, would make a fine nominee.
After selecting a qualified ambassador, Netanyahu and the Foreign Ministry should invest heavily in exchange and cultural diplomacy programs in the United Arab Emirates. If handled properly, Abu Dhabi could be a steppingstone to Manama, Muscat, and beyond. Accordingly, normalization with the UAE is a golden opportunity for Israel to break down barriers and to change long-hostile Arab attitudes. A robust public diplomacy strategy could help Israeli diplomats reach Emirati audiences and lay the groundwork for long-term change. The Foreign Ministry excels at this sort of diplomacy, so it should make these programs a strategic priority as soon as the Embassy opens its doors.
Finally, Netanyahu should moderate Israeli policy toward the West Bank. Emirati leaders have already faced blowback across the Arab world. Beyond keeping its word to avoid annexing the West Bank for the foreseeable future, the Israeli government should refrain from further settlement activity for at least the near term. In the wake of the normalization deal, each new settlement is effectively a threat to Israel’s relationship with Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Zayed.
Furthermore, settlement construction, especially in more controversial areas understood to comprise a future Palestinian state, could preclude the possibility of more official relationships with other Arab countries. Much like the possibility of annexation, building in these areas could jeopardize this potential realignment—a focal point of Israeli foreign policy and its strategy to counter Iran. Though the Israeli right has condemned Netanyahu’s concession on annexation, this historic victory gives him sufficient political cover to continue pursuing other pragmatic policy objectives while pivoting towards the Israeli center—and away from wayward settlers on his right.
Overall, the Israel-UAE agreement marks a watershed moment for Israeli foreign policy and for Netanyahu. A string of accords with other Arab states may well be on the horizon, and Israel’s longtime goal of greater normalization may finally be within reach. Netanyahu should be pleased and proud, but he should also lean forward. He must capitalize on this opportunity to secure Israel’s place in the region and among the nations.
Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
The Geopolitics of the Israel-UAE Peace Agreement
By Jeremiah Rozman
With strong U.S. backing, on August 13, 2020, Israel and the UAE agreed to normalize relations. The UAE is the third Arab country to do so since Israel’s founding.
In exchange for full normalization, Israel agreed to suspend extending sovereignty to disputed areas. As a supporter of sovereignty, especially in the strategically critical Jordan Valley, I view this agreement with tempered optimism. It supports the strategic interests of the U.S., U.S. partners in the Middle East and Israel. It does not harm Israel’s de-facto defensive position and should encourage the Palestinians to negotiate. Following an extensive election campaign, which heavily featured the promise to extend sovereignty, this deal has mixed results for Israel’s domestic politics.
Great Power Competition
The Israel-UAE peace agreement was at least as much about U.S. strategic interests as it was about Israel and the UAE. Washington’s strategic priority is great power competition. Its top adversaries are Russia and China. Its main advantage is its alliance network. By solidifying the start of a coherent alignment between itself, Israel, and regional partners, the U.S. can lead a united front against Iran while preempting Russian and Chinese encroachment on its traditional allies. Furthermore, European partners often clash with the U.S. over Israel. This agreement has been warmly welcomed by the Europeans, helping to smooth over some of these differences.
Regional Security and Prosperity
The main benefit of this agreement is not ending violence, as was the case with Egypt. Rather, it is the setting of a diplomatic precedent intended to open a new regional realignment and an era of cooperation.
Forward thinking Arab leaders realize that oil does not hold the promise for prolonged prosperity that it did fifty years ago. Their countries need access to state of the art technology and expertise in order to build economies and militaries primed for success in the information age. The U.S. and Israel can offer much needed investment, expertise, and defense support. Normalization with Israel opens the door for multilateral cooperation to modernize regional economies and enhance collective defense with an eye focused towards restraining Iran.
Presidential candidate Joe Biden’s campaign credited the Israel-UAE breakthrough as the culmination of “efforts of multiple administrations.” Perhaps this assertion alludes to President Obama’s Iran deal, which caused regional powers to seek cooperation with Israel out of fear of Iran. This agreement, as a starting point for regional cooperation, will greatly boost Israel’s ability to target Iran should the need arise.
Israel and the Gulf countries fear that if Joe Biden were to win the upcoming U.S. presidential elections, and follow through on his platform’s pledge to reenter the JCPOA, ending the maximum pressure strategy against Iran, the need to kinetically target Iran’s nuclear program could very well arise. For Israel to carry out a successful attack, it needs good relations with partners, the use of airspace, staging grounds, refueling capabilities, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support. By simply boosting the credibility of the threat to strike Iran, the peace deal enhances deterrence against Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
By forestalling sovereignty and securing increased visitation to the al Aqsa Mosque, this agreement gives the UAE a concrete policy win for the Palestinian cause. This boosts its leadership clout and contrasts the advantages of diplomacy with the Hezbollah/Lebanon confrontational model which has secured nothing for the Palestinians and brought ruin to Lebanon.
For Israel, the main strategic drawback of the agreement is postponing de jure sovereignty, which is the optimal way to ensure Israeli control over the Jordan Valley for posterity. In the near term, this changes nothing, though. Israel has maintained security control over the Jordan Valley for over five decades and can continue, now with the tacit support of Arab powers, until an adequate deal is presented. This would require concrete border commitments from the Palestinian Authority (PA). Due to their ideological opposition, this is unlikely to be obtained.
Over the coming years, the UAE will inevitably see substantial economic and defense benefits from normalization with Israel, making the treaty ever more difficult to abrogate. If the PA remains unwilling to negotiate peace, it is unlikely that the UAE will withdraw from the agreement if Israel extends sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. At that point, Israel could extend sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and other areas in the disputed territories without substantively harming relations with its Arab partners. Both Prime Minister Netanyahu and Jared Kushner have signaled that this is on the table. Whether it is implemented depends mostly upon the actions of the PA.
Israel’s Domestic Politics
For Israel’s domestic politics, the peace agreement will have mixed results. It will exacerbate trust issues between the electorate and the Likud. Netanyahu campaigned on the promise of sovereignty, which was strongly supported by his voters. Some might credit him with masterful “door in the face” negotiating, waiving the credible threat of sovereignty in order to secure a diplomatic win by then conceding on it. Others will see this as a bait and switch. Either way, it exemplifies foreign policy from on high, keeping the masses in the dark so that the “experts” can play geopolitical chess. While this may or may not be desirable, it is likely to erode faith in electoral promises.
Conclusion
The much heralded Israel-UAE peace agreement has disappointed many proponents of sovereignty. Others see normalized ties without requiring a change to the status quo as a betrayal of the Palestinians. In reality, this is a pragmatic move aimed primarily at boosting the U.S. geostrategic position with an eye towards great power competition. Secondarily, it opens the door for regional alignment between Israel and Gulf countries for economic and military cooperation. It does not harm Israel’s security in the short-term. It does not definitively end sovereignty. It does however, boost Israel’s position vis-à-vis its only existential threat, a nuclear armed Iran. For these reasons, the deal should be viewed with tentative optimism, as a win for Israel, moderate Arab regimes and the democratic global order.
Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
You Won't Get Peace Now By Weaponizing Falsehoods
By Cade Spivey
On a long drive from my native Indiana to Virginia, I listened to a podcast wherein the interview subject began with a fairly benign truism: "Words matter." The program, produced by Americans For Peace Now, began by stating that not every murder is a genocide, and that not all discrimination is apartheid. The interview then continued for another thirty minutes laying out a “legal” framework of apartheid in order to shoehorn Israel into that definition, vis-à-vis Palestinian Arabs living in the West Bank.
I agree that words matter. The words we use to describe an issue directly influence the substance of a debate. I further contend that facts matter, and that merely using legal terms to describe a legal framework does not establish facts independently. Law was not meant to be argued in the abstract. The arguments made to establish Israel as an "apartheid state" were irresponsible and unwarranted and promoted key assertions which have become commonplace in the misinformed effort to establish Israel as an apartheid state.
Apartheid Defined
The UN defines apartheid as "inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them." The term was derived from the system of racial segregation imposed in South Africa from the late 1940s until 1994. Separation of the races was strictly enforced in public accommodation, trade, education, marriage, and even sexual acts. The purpose was to cement the power structures which existed at the end of the British colonialization of the region. While the UN's legal framework does not establish South African-style apartheid as a benchmark for action, there have been no sanctions for acts by any government (including South Africa) since the passage of the Rome Statute by the International Criminal Court in 1997.
Regardless, the cynical invocation of the term harkens back to that brutal scheme of governance in hope of eliciting a sympathetic response to the alleged victims - in this case, the Palestinian Arabs. When the term is used to describe Israel, it is as inappropriate an analogy as a comparison apples to hand grenades.
Occupied Territory
Firstly, the speaker described the West Bank as "occupied territory" under international law. This is simply not true. The area traditionally referred to as the West Bank is not "occupied." The West Bank is “disputed" territory. While the distinction may seem purely semantic, words matter.
Occupied territories are captured in war from another sovereign; in this case, a Palestinian sovereign did not exist in 1967, prior to the Six Day War, when the alleged “occupation” began. Disputed territories, however, are lands subject to ongoing negotiations regarding conflicting claims of sovereignty. Referring to the West Bank as occupied may play well into the argument of Israeli apartheid, but doing so mischaracterizes the legal and political frameworks under which both sides of the debate are attempting to establish agreements. Furthermore, this mischaracterization does not produce a positive result - nor does it seek to do so. It seeks only to entrench and divide both sides through alienation while failing to meaningfully address the needs of either.
Racial Subjugation
The speaker told of an Israel where Arabs are second-class citizens; denied the right to vote, run for office, or attain citizenship. I would wager there are many Israeli-Arabs who would beg to differ. For example, Abdel Rahman Zuabi, Salim Joubran, or George Karra, former members of Israel's Supreme Court; the 17 Israeli-Arab members currently serving in the Knesset; or perhaps the Israeli-Arabs serving in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), would likely see things differently.
Even in the West Bank, Palestinians are afforded voting rights and even their own civil management under the Palestinian Authority (PA). While the PA certainly coordinates with Israel in some areas - such as sharing security functions with the IDF - it still has autonomy status. The Palestinian-Arabs who live under the control of the Authority are not denied a voice, it’s just that the authority to which they speak seems unwilling to listen. The people who live in the West Bank are subject to security controls and movement is, at times, limited. But the realities that lead to such policies are independent of their race. They are based on real-world safety and security concerns. The Palestinian-Arabs are not subjugated, and they are not second-class citizens. They are also not citizens of Israel.
To be clear, matters of Israeli-Palestinian sovereignty are not beyond debate. There are political, religious, and human rights issues that should be debated and considered very deliberately.
Reducing one side or the other to terms that are the very embodiment of evil through ad hominem labels or inappropriately applied legal definitions is not helpful, and does not produce meaningful outcomes for people living these truths daily.
Cade Spivey is a publishing Adjunct at The MirYam Institute. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and served three tours in the Navy as a Gunnery/Antiterrorism Officer, Damage Control Assistant, and Counter-Piracy Evaluator. He is currently a student at the Wake Forest University School of Law.
VIDEO: IS A FOURTH ELECTION IN THE CARDS?
A Conversation With Israel Hayom Correspondent, Danielle Roth-Avneri
THE BEIRUT BLAST HAS ROCKED LEBANON AND THE REGION
By Yaakov Lappin
The tragic August 4 explosion that tore through Beirut, killing over 150 people, injuring thousands, and causing massive property damage, represents the latest tragic phase in Lebanon's destabilization and transition into failed-state status.
As the fallout from the deadly explosion continues to reverberate, and the government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab resigned in the face of popular outrage, many Lebanese demonstrators have taken to the streets. In addition to their calls for an overhaul of the corrupt political system, which has left them poor, with little electricity, and a breakdown in basic services, the demonstrators have begun challenging Hezbollah's unrivaled status as the military and political hegemon in Lebanon.
A domino effect of instability could see Hezbollah's position challenged in new ways, and the Iranian-backed proxy could respond with violence to protect its status.
Yet the destabilization of the Lebanese state began long before the Beirut explosion. Lebanon has been facing a series of crises, joining a Middle Eastern club of states unable to provide basic services or an economic future for its citizens, a growing number of whom find themselves homeless, jobless, and hopeless.
Lebanon has shown an inability to find a solution for its people, for whom the economy is the most important and pressing issue. That reality has given rise to a growing current of anti-leadership protests in Lebanon, and the protests are not sectarian in nature. Like in Iraq, the Shi'ite sector in Lebanon has seen a young generation challenging its own Shi'ite leaders.
The involvement of the international community has also been sub-par. Inherent instability is thus the norm in Lebanon, and, like in other Middle Eastern states, Iran is a big part of the story.
Lebanon now faces the twin crisis of economic collapse and political paralysis.
While anger toward the government and Hezbollah was growing prior to the blast, Hezbollah still maintains a large loyalist southern Lebanese Shi'ite heartland (though some people there have joined Shi'ite voices critical of Hezbollah's actions).
Lebanese citizens, from a variety of sectarian backgrounds, have become frustrated by the obstacles that the Iranian-backed terror-army has placed in the way of outside help. Sunni Gulf states, alarmed by the political ascendency of their arch-adversary - the Iranian-Shi'ite axis in Lebanon - stopped channeling large funds into Lebanon's banking services sector. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the UAE, which must contend with the radical Shi'ite axis in their own backyards, have any interest in rescuing a Hezbollah-dominated Lebanese government from bankruptcy.
In distress, Lebanon turned to the International Monetary Fund for a 10 billion dollar bailout loan. But the IMF would require changes to Lebanon's economic structure, including more transparency, and assurances that Hezbollah, which faces American sanctions, will not take charge of the funds. Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has described the IMF conditions as terms "that would make the country explode" – a statement that reflects the degree to which Hezbollah holds the country hostage.
Hezbollah, meanwhile, still maintains thousands of combatants in Syria, where they fight alongside Iranian-backed Shi'ite militias on behalf of the genocidal Assad regime.
The blast itself raises a number of questions, so far unanswered, about Hezbollah's potential linkage. The questions were well summarized by Dr. Ely Karmon, a senior research scholar at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, who examined the official version of events describing how a Moldovan-flagged cargo ship docked at Beirut port in 2013, reportedly after suffering technical problems while sailing from Georgia to Mozambique, carrying 2750 tons of ammonium nitrate. After a series of disputes and inspections, the ship was abandoned by its owners in Beirut, and its cargo was transferred to the Port's Warehouse No. 12, where it remained for several years, despite repeated requests by port authorities to dispose or resell the explosive substance contained.
According to Karmon, questions linger over how the ship got permission to dock in Beirut in the first place, as well as why nobody contacted the company in Mozambique that allegedly ordered the explosives and paid a million dollars to the ship's owners for it. Questions over who decided to store the explosives at the port for six years, and keep it in poor conditions, have not received satisfactory answers.
In addition, it remains unclear whether Hezbollah weapons were stored near the enormous ammonium nitrate storehouse.
Whether or not Hezbollah is connected to the blast, what is beyond dispute is that Hezbollah terror cells, under orders to attack Israeli and Jewish targets around the world, were found in possession of tons of ammonium nitrate, including in London, Thailand, Cyprus, and Peru. The organization appears to have trafficked the substance to its sleeper cells. The Thai National Police chief found similar explosives in shipping crates, apparently for export to other destinations.
It must also be noted that Hezbollah and its Iranian sponsor intended to set up a missile production line inside Lebanon, an initiative that resulted from Israel’s alleged, effective, ongoing interdiction of Iranian smuggling attempts into Lebanon.
Hezbollah now wants to convert many of its rockets into precision guided missiles in order to threaten Israeli strategic sites, a development that would cause even greater regional volatility.
Whether or not Hezbollah negligence was linked to the Beirut blast, the tragic event underlines the obvious risk posed by the storage of explosives and weapons in the heart of crowded, built-up civilian areas – a modus operandi that Hezbollah has pioneered, and continues to implement.
Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S.
RIGHT OF REPLY: ISRAEL'S ECONOMY IN THE COVID-19 ERA: AN UPDATE
By Itai Ater
I listened with interest to the MirYam Institute Podcast discussion between Pinchas Landau and Allan Marks on July 31st, regarding Israel's Economy in the Covid-19 era. I want to briefly touch upon two points that were raised in the conversation, and then discuss a third point that was mentioned but perhaps did not receive enough attention.
1. Mr. Landau asserts that the current 15-20% unemployment rates are first and foremost NOT a macro-economic problem. He explains that many of the newly unemployed are young, low income and unskilled individuals and that the impact of these unemployed individuals on the Economy is not significant, therefore.
I disagree.
The underlying goals of economic policy is the well-being of all individuals in the Economy. If a non-trivial share of individuals in the economy is unemployed then the Economy is facing a huge economic problem, both at the micro and the macro level. This is true irrespective of the education, age and skills of those unemployed. If anything, having many unskilled individuals unemployed implies that the recovery period from the current crisis may be more protracted given that these individuals will find it increasingly difficult to find jobs elsewhere.
Furthermore, due to the rise in unemployment, income inequality can be expected to increase, yielding further negative ramifications on the Economy.
The unprecedented rise in unemployment is clearly, first and foremost an economic problem, therefore.
2. The conversation discussed in length the Israeli balance of payments, which for various reasons improved in recent months. Macroeconomic indicators (e.g., GDP, balance of payments, inflation) are not important in their own right. They become important when they tell us something about the performance of the Economy overall.
Unfortunately, the balance of payments indicator is probably the only macroeconomic indicator that looks somewhat positive at this time. Other indicators (such as unemployment which was discussed above) provide a different perspective. For instance, the Bank of Israel estimates that GDP in Israel will fall by 6% in 2020. Private consumption, the main driver of economic growth in Israel in recent years, has fallen dramatically (per-capita private consumption dropped by 22.2% in the first quarter of 2020). Finally, the government deficit is expected to be at 13% by the end 2021. That large deficit is driven by increased government spending and a drop in government income due to lower tax collections.
The implications of the current crisis are far-reaching. First, unemployment rates are expected to remain high for the next 4-5 years. Second, the government will need to fund its debt through higher taxes and lower government spending on education, welfare and infrastructure projects. While it’s possible that not all measures will be adopted in the immediate to near term, in the world of economics there's no such thing as a free lunch. Someone (the Israeli public) will end up footing the bill for the vast (probably warranted, given the situation) government spending.
3. Many of the adverse implications of Covid-19 are common to many countries. Yet, unfortunately, the Israeli case is further complicated by a dysfunctional government.
Reflecting this leadership crisis is the current disagreement regarding the government budget, and whether the newly formed coalition will pass a budget before August 25th.
Absent a budget by that August date, elections will be triggered automatically, announced and held this coming November. Despite contrary opinions held by nearly all economists - including the Governor of the Bank of Israel - Prime Minister Netanyahu is advocating for a short-term budget for the coming 3 months. Deputy Prime Minister Gantz is seeking a budget that takes us through 2021.
A failure to resolve the budget impasse could well result in the international credit agencies (Moody's, Fitch and S&P) lowering the credit rating of the Israeli government, leading to higher interest rates having to be paid by the Israeli government.
Perhaps even more troubling than looking at a particular macroeconomic indicator is the notion that - unlike the large economic crises that Israel faced in 1985 and 2001-2002 – in this particular scenario, the politicians running the Israeli government, and specifically the current Prime Minister, are distracted by other political considerations - considerations that prevent them from fully focusing on the very real challenge at and helping the economy exit its current state of crisis, bringing it to recovery and - hopefully - prosperity.
Itai Ater is a Professor of Business Economics and Strategy at the Coller School of Management at Tel Aviv University. Itai, born and raised in southern Israel, served as an officer in the IDF's 8200 unit.