Israel's core curriculum failure

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

The comprehensive investigative report by the New York Times into the issue of the teaching of core curriculum in New York State ultra-Orthodox schools did not cause anyone in Israel to fall off their chair.

In little Israel, there is no need for an investigative piece to understand the reality of ultra-Orthodox school systems. If the New York Times had just called, we would have been happy to tell them.

According to the report, ultra-Orthodox schools in New York receive billions from state budgets, and yet, even though they are supposed to teach basic core subjects to give pupils tools to deal with the modern world, these institutions function as if they were an autonomy.

In New York, that’s a legal offense, but here in Israel, there is no equivalent law. Despite oceans separating the two places, there are, however, certain parallels, such as the intervention of wheelers and dealers in politics, and the harm that this causes to the economy. In both places, children are left behind and coerced into ignorance.

Why is it that important to learn core subjects?

The answer lies in the symbolic date of 9/11 when the American newspaper chose to publish its piece. The ultra-Orthodox community claims that the publication date symbolizes a kind of terror attack against them in New York, though the newspaper apparently chose this date to underline the view that children who do not acquire basic tools grow up ignorant and live in poverty, leading to social disaster if not stopped.

The day that this reality knocks on our door isn’t far away. In Israel, the percentage of ultra-Orthodox men in employment is around 50%, while among secular men, the employment rate stands at over 80%.

If the ultra-Orthodox male employment rate ever matches the secular one, the Israeli economy would, every year, receive another 29 billion shekels. In effect,  billions of shekels would enter the collective fund of Israeli citizens, through which the state finances its defense budget, police, education, health infrastructure, and more.

If a change does not occur, the State of Israel will not be able to continue to fund these vital systems, and the burden will fall on the shoulders of working people, who will have to pay higher taxes: National bankruptcy won’t be far behind.

And what about Torah studies, some will surely ask? There is no contradiction between religious studies and teaching core curriculum. The only ones exploiting the situation are politicians who hold an entire public hostage. In Israel, like in the state of New York, a community that does not support itself, and lives in poverty, is a community that needs economic assistance and support, and it is easier to manage such a community. The stipend comes with a voting ballot.

To grasp the full picture, let’s zoom out of the present day, and go back in time by a  year to 2021 when Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman issued a call to ensure core curriculum by conditioning budgets to ultra-Orthodox institutions that taught it. This was done to strengthen the Israeli economy and increase the cycle of employment among ultra-Orthodox men (a similar push is needed regarding Arab Israeli women).

It did not take long for positive momentum to build. The Belz Hassidic community took the initiative, and in a bold move, the community’s rebbe announced that he would insert core curriculum into the education system in the coming year. The firestorm quickly appeared too, with critics claiming that such a move would harm religious studies. Ultra-Orthodox Members of Knesset demanded to know why the government thought it had the right to intervene in children’s curriculum.

The investigative report published overseas encountered an Israeli political reality that has been hit by storms over exactly the same issue. Opposition Chairman Benjamin Netanyahu understood that he had to prevent a split between the Degel HaTorah and Agudat Yisrael parties (who jointly form the United Torah Judaism list) since this could damage his chances of returning to power. So he promised to match the funding for institutions that do not teach core curriculum subjects to the budgets of the state education system.

The promise worked, and the political parties again merged into a single list. It is clear to all that if ultra-Orthodox politicians Aryeh Deri and Moshe Gafni are partners in the next government, Liberman’s historical achievement will begin to fade.

Meanwhile, New York State decided that in December 2023, budgets will be denied to educational institutions that fail to teach core curriculum. In Israel, if a government headed by Netanyahu is formed, not only will the situation be the opposite of that in New York, but rather, educational institutions will receive a special bonus for failing to teach basic subjects.

This would be the case even if the current Defense Minister Benny Gantz or Prime Minister Yair Lapid join a coalition including ultra-Orthodox parties.  In such a scenario, core curriculum subjects would also be thrown under the bus, and this would constitute a disaster for the Zionist vision and the Israeli economy.

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

Democratic norms and the rule of law at stake in Israel’s elections

 

By Dan Meridor

The upcoming November 1 Israeli national elections, the fifth in three years, are not merely another electoral contest, or just the latest effort to break out of political deadlock.

Rather, they represent a key junction for Israeli society, which will have to make fateful decisions about the kind of ethical and legal systems that will govern the State of Israel in the near and distant future.

Two factors are converging to threaten Israel’s democratic norms and rule of law. The first is the likely attempt by Opposition Leader Benjamin Netanyahu to disrupt the trials underway against him, and the second is the rise of authoritarian political forces that wish to undermine the system of checks and balances and make the Knesset the all-powerful branch of state. These two elements are joining forces.

Until now, the rule of law in Israel has been based on a critical moral foundation of ethical values, which have underpinned Israel’s democratic – Jewish nature. These values are what enable the balance that Israeli democracy has successfully maintained between the Jewish national cause and adhering to liberal democratic norms.

Such norms include equality of all citizens, freedom of expression, and ensuring individual citizen rights. Israelis have relied on state mechanisms like legislation, the police, state prosecutors, attorney generals, and the High Court to ensure these values.

Now, unfortunately, this system is in jeopardy.

Since Israel’s inception in 1948, there have always been substantial disputes between political camps, and in that context, between Herut (the pre-Likud party) and Mapai (the pre-Labor democratic socialist party) over multiple issues. These ranged from whether or not to accept German Holocaust reparation offers in 1952, or decades of dispute over the land-for-peace formula, as well as bitter arguments over whether a free-market economy or deep government-involved socialism should govern the Israeli social-economic sphere.

Over the years, the electorate made its decisions, and Israel continued as a functioning state and society despite these serious divisions. What enabled this to happen was a national consensus on the need for a fundamental ethical framework, which was universally accepted. Institutions made their decisions and society accepted these decisions whether people agreed with them or not.

Until now.

For the first time in Israel, the High Court’s authority, or respect for legal institutions and legal rulings, are under attack. This flies in the face of the national–liberal tradition of the Herut party, which was always committed to upholding the rule of law.

The late prime minister Menachem Begin consistently argued that the High Court should have the authority to overturn Knesset legislation if it violates human rights. I am proud to have been the Justice Minister for the Likud when we initiated legislation to guard basic human rights (known as the constitutional revolution).

In 1953, the High Court told Ben Gurion that he could not decide the balance between freedom of speech and security, and overturned his decision to close the Kol Ha’am newspaper – not very long after the 1948 War of Independence.

The legal system has not changed. The same judges, now accused of being “leftists” by the pro-Netanyahu camp, ruled against Ben Gurion. In 1977, Aharon Barak, the Attorney General at the time, was about to indict former Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, prompting his resignation. He then indicted a number of senior members of the Labor camp.  

This is what the separation of powers looks like, and this is how the judicial branch applies checks and balances on the government and the Knesset – just as it was designed to do – to prevent unchecked power or tyrannical rule.

Liberal democracy has never advocated for unchecked majority rule, and while the majority certainly can select the identity of the government and influence critical policies, it cannot decide who is guilty or innocent. A court has the legitimate and legal powers to also cancel rules that violate democratic norms.

In 1988, we in the Likud led the unusual initiative to ban the racist Kach party from running in the elections. We gathered public information about its activities and delivered it to the National Elections Committee. That is because racism has no place in a Jewish democratic state, whether one is on the Right or Left, Jewish or Arab -- according to the Basic Law, which was changed in 1985 by the national unity Likud – Labor government. The change we introduced banned racist parties.

Today, Itamar Ben-Gvir, a student of the late racist Meir Kahane -- the founder of the Kach party -- who until recently had a photograph of Jewish terrorist Baruch Goldstein in his living room, and who was convicted in the past of support for a terror organization, has gained, to our dismay, legitimacy in the political system. Netanyahu brought Ben-Gvir into the political sphere in order to reach a parliamentary majority.

This is the clearest demonstration of how values once taken for granted are now being questioned. Israel is a Jewish state because it has a Jewish majority, not because it discriminates individually against Arab citizens. The value of equality is now under assault.

The pro-Netanyahu bloc seeks to actively weaken the judicial system because it has identified it as the gatekeeper. The courts, the state comptroller (who has the power to expose corruption and who was weakened), and the police chief have all been targeted by rhetoric designed to delegitimize these institutions and to personally attack those who head them. This includes anyone who does not fall in line with the pro-Netanyahu agenda, such as the former settler police commissioner, Ronnie Alsheikh, the former religious attorney general, Avichai Mandelblit, and the former chief prosecutor and yeshiva graduate, Shai Nitzan. None have been spared from the wrath of the Netanyahu camp or dodged charges of being “leftist” conspirators seeking to dislodge Netanyahu from power in a nefarious plot.

Such unprecedented attacks are, essentially, attacks on the state as we know it. A state cannot exist without agreed-upon methods for resolving disputes.

Now that the trials have already begun, Netanyahu, who has already accused the judges of being ‘leftists,’ is probably examining options to stop them. The past four elections held in Israel since 2019 were about one issue: The likely effort by Netanyahu to gain legal immunity and prevent criminal trials against him from starting.

A weakened court system, which could then be passed to cancel the trial using a step like the ‘French Law,’ is one such scenario that Netanyahu may hope to achieve.

While Netanyahu has the right to be assumed innocent until proven otherwise, a failure to complete his legal process would constitute a significant blow to the concept of equality in the face of the law.

Zionism is a just cause. Justice is critical to it.  Today, those that espouse values like democracy, human rights, and rule of law, are tagged as ‘leftwing,’ although these are the precise values that were espoused by Begin, Herut, and the older version of the Likud party.

Ultimately, all of these developments project onto the core of the Zionist movement. Zionism holds that after 2,000 years of not employing sovereignty or force – with disastrous consequences – the time for the Jewish people to return to statehood has arrived. However, the right to use force comes with the responsibility to preserve righteousness, and that, in turn, is based on the preservation of democratic rights and values.

It is this mix of national and liberal values that the old Herut party once championed, and which the current pro-Netanyahu bloc is threatening to weaken and largely disable.

Dan Meridor is a publishing expert with The MirYam Institute. He was Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Intelligence in the Israeli Government from 2009-2013. Read full bio here.

Israel's political merry go round must stop

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

In Israel, elections have become a new Olympic sport. One round of elections after another has cost the country roughly NIS 12 billion over the past five years, not to mention the economic losses caused by the absence of a national budget for government ministries, the direct damage to our personal finances, and the persistent turmoil that has damaged every national institution.

The political merry-go-round makes it harder to govern and run the state effectively. In the absence of a clear planning agenda, combating the rising cost of living, addressing the housing supply shortage, building a stable national health system, combating crime, reducing road deaths, and implementing comprehensive infrastructure plans become a challenge, to say the least.

What could have been accomplished with NIS 2.4 billion (the cost of each round of elections)? Numerous institutions in Israel would benefit substantially from a fraction of that sum.

Political instability in Israel is nothing new: Calls for a change in Israel’s electoral and governing systems have been around since the days of Mapai. Few Israeli governments have completed their full term, but the past four years have seen Israel’s political instability hit new lows.

Opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu has mastered the game of rewriting the rules of the political system. From his perspective, securing his future, evading justice, and paving the path for his return to the Prime Minister’s Office are the most crucial objectives to pursue.

As far as Netanyahu is concerned, governmental stability should only occur after he accomplishes these objectives. In the meantime, Netanyahu has violated unwritten political norms, among them his refusal to resign after being indicted on corruption charges – a far cry from his insistence that former prime minister Ehud Olmert step down when he was indicted.

The current state of affairs endangers the State of Israel and generates a crisis of confidence between the people and their elected officials that worsens with each election cycle.

Finance Minister Avigdor Liberman recently noted that politicians are dragging the Israeli people through a fifth round of elections, and that, looking ahead, it is therefore essential to secure governmental stability in the simplest and most straightforward way possible.

Liberman proposed passing new legislation to boost governmental stability. According to his proposal, the new legislation would adopt the model of the existing Knesset Chairperson Law. According to Liberman’s proposal, instead of the current setup, in which 61 votes are needed to both swear in a Knesset and disperse it, 90 votes would be required to disperse a future Knesset, after the Knesset passes a two-year budget. This legislation would adopt an existing formula and apply it in the Knesset to boost governmental stability. By linking the legislation to the passing of a two-year budget, this maneuver would introduce at least two years of government stability.

This is now the story of these elections. The time has come to stop the merry-go-round.

Sharon Roffe Ofir is a former Knesset Member on behalf of the Yisrael Beiteinu party and served as the deputy head of the Kiryat Tivon Regional Council. She is a former journalist . Read full bio here.

17 Years Later: Did Israel’s Gaza Withdrawal Aid Peace?

By Chuck Freilich

 

Seventeen years ago this week, Israel withdrew from Gaza and dismantled the seventeen settlements that existed there. To demonstrate that it was prepared to go ahead on the West Bank as well, Israel dismantled four settlements there, too. Israel’s preconditions for further progress were straightforward: a demonstration of the Palestinians’ ability to govern responsibly and end terrorism.

The Palestinian response was similarly straightforward. Hamas seized control in Gaza from the Palestinian Authority (PA), established a radical theocracy, and together with Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), fired tens of thousands of rockets at Israel’s civilian population, over 1,100 in the recent round alone. The PA, in the West Bank, became a corrupt, if feckless, dictatorship.

No criticism of Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians can excuse, or explain away, the intentional and indiscriminate targeting of civilians: that is terrorism and murder. The fact that some Palestinian civilians are unavoidably killed when Israel responds is heartbreaking, but there is no moral equivalence. Israel’s right to defend its citizens is inviolate.

There is no purely military solution to the problem that Gaza proposes. Tragically, there may not be a political one either.

Despite decades of efforts, Israel’s ability to prevent and suppress rocket fire is still limited. Fortunately, Israel’s Iron Dome defensive system has proven extraordinarily effective and its casualties, since the system was first deployed in 2012, have been comparatively small. Had it not been for Iron Dome, Israel’s casualties would have been severe, and it would have been forced to launch a major ground operation. As it is, disruption to the economy and national life is significant.

The only way to truly cut Hamas and PIJ’s large rocket arsenals down to size, and Hezbollah’s mammoth one, is through a ground operation. Israel would have to occupy all of Gaza, or Lebanon, and go house-to-house for months in a bloody battle to root out the rockets. Once Israel withdrew, however, Iran would rapidly replenish the arsenal and the period of calm gained—at the price of hundreds of Israeli casualties (and far more Gazans or Lebanese)—would likely be short-lived. Some suggest that Israel topple Hamas or Hezbollah, but they would probably just rapidly reconstitute or be replaced by something even worse, e.g., ISIS.

For these reasons, every Israeli government in recent decades, regardless of political complexion, has refrained from doing so. Israel may ultimately have no choice, but at least for now, the remedy exceeds the threat.

Unsurprisingly, the repeated rounds of conflict in Gaza, following the withdrawl, have convinced many in Israel that it is a proven failure. If so judged, this would certainly cast a pall over recommendations that Israel undertake a far riskier withdrawal from the West Bank; indeed, over the entire concept of a two-state solution. The West Bank literally abuts central Israel, where it is just 8.7 miles wide, and is in easy rocket and artillery range from Tel Aviv and Beersheba, even small-arms range from Jerusalem.

On the one hand, Israel was unable to prevent Hamas from firing thousands of rockets even before the withdrawal, when it was in complete control of Gaza. In that sense, the withdrawal has not fundamentally changed the situation, even if the repeated rounds have exacerbated it. On a more positive note, Israel no longer occupies 2 million people. Moreover, had Israel not withdrawn, more than half of the population under its control today would not have been Jewish. As such, the withdrawal was a critical step towards full separation from the Palestinians and a future two-state solution.

Conversely, detractors correctly assert that Israel’s post-withdrawal experience has greatly dampened prospects for this. Israel simply cannot allow the West Bank to become another rocket launching pad, and widespread public recognition of this has greatly undermined support for further progress with the Palestinians. Whether truly effective security arrangements can be devised is debatable—and without them, no one in Israel, Left or Right, will withdraw.

If Israel cannot ignore withdrawal’s disappointing consequences, it also cannot allow them to dictate future policy. For all of the greater near-term certainty in the current situation, it, too, poses grave risks. The absence of a political horizon feeds into Palestinian despair, increases the likelihood of a further armed uprising in the West Bank—or at least a surge in terrorism—and ultimately endangers Israel’s national character.

For decades, various overly optimistic analysts have predicted Hamas’s eventual moderation and pursuit of a more diplomatic course, as some terrorist organizations have done in the past. In practice, Hamas’ fundamental enmity toward Israel remains unchanged. However, this fact does not preclude Israeli from pursuing peace negotiations with the PA or taking measures to improve the quality of life in Gaza. Hamas, however, has proven to be an only partial partner even for such limited measures, repeatedly launching rockets at Israel just as it was opening the border. This seemingly self-defeating behavior only appears inexplicable if one refuses to accept Hamas for what it is, a jihadi organization bent on Israel’s destruction.

The situation in Gaza deteriorated so severely in recent years, however, that even Hamas was forced to support some economic reconstruction and growth measures. As the de facto government, Hamas seeks to ensure that the public does not become so disaffected that it rises up against it, but also not so satisfied with the new status quo that it ceases to support ongoing operations against Israel. In practice, the periods of calm between the rounds have grown shorter, not longer, despite Israel’s repeated attempts to promote economic growth.

Palestinian rejectionism has, unfortunately, not been limited to Hamas. PA presidents, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, both rejected dramatic proposals for peace, which would have given the Palestinians a state on essentially 100 percent of the territory, a capital in East Jerusalem, and a limited return of refugees, years ago. One cannot ignore the truly wrenching question, whether the Palestinians are prepared to accept any deal that requires that they live in peace alongside Israel.

Israel heads to the polls again in November and a new centrist government is not unimaginable. The battle to succeed Abbas is also underway and, though less likely, a more moderate Palestinian leadership, too, may emerge. Such are the faint glimmers of hope in the Mideast.

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

Israel must beware of dangerous delusions after Gaza conflict

By Yaakov Lappin

The ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad appears to be holding stable, creating an opportunity to review the key takeaways from the three-day round of fighting from August 5 to August 7.

The Israeli defense establishment conducted a highly successful and effective short, sharp shock to the Iranian-backed PIJ terror faction. Yet it is the weakest of Israel’s adversaries, and the Israeli public needs to manage its expectations accordingly.

Acting on intelligence of an imminent guided missile attack from Gaza on Israeli targets, the Israeli Air Force, the Shin Bet, the Military Intelligence Directorate, Southern Command, and the IDF Armored Corps integrated their firepower efforts in a coordinated opening strike, which eliminated PIJ’s senior military leadership in northern Gaza, PIJ field attack squads, and PIJ observation towers used to coordinate enemy activity -- all at the same time.

The Israeli operational momentum continued throughout the operation, with precision strikes displaying a marriage of accurate firepower and real-time intelligence superiority.

Meanwhile, on the defensive side, Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system broke its previous records and achieved a 97% successful interception rate of rockets heading for built-up areas. Standing guard over Israeli cities, towns, and villages, the Iron Dome intercepted 380 projectiles.

The conflict was fought entirely as an exchange of standoff firepower, with both sides sending firepower strikes at one another. PIJ directed 1,100 rockets indiscriminately at Israeli targets, while the IAF took the utmost care to reduce harm to noncombatants to the extent possible, including aborting strikes when civilians were spotted in the designated strike zone.

According to IDF figures, 15 Palestinians were killed by failed PIJ rockets, meaning that more Palestinian civilians were killed by PIJ than by Israel in this conflict.

The IDF attacked a total of 170 PIJ targets during the three days of fighting, also going on to eliminate the organization’s southern commander.

It is easy to become deluded by the effective defense of the Israeli home front during this conflict, and easy to forget that should Hamas get involved, with its significantly larger arsenal of rockets, or Hezbollah, which has a monstrous arsenal of 150,000 projectiles – larger than that of most NATO armies --  air defenses will be flooded and will only be partially effective in preventing impacts in Israel.

More importantly, it is important to view Gaza as Iran sees it: One more arena in a multi-arena choke hold that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps is trying to wrap around Israel’s neck.

By financing and providing knowhow to Gaza’s terror factions to build rocket arsenals and adding their firepower to that of Hezbollah, together with its entrenchment in Syria where it has ballistic and cruise missile bases, as well as its deployment of missiles and UAVs to Iraq and missile launch sites in Iran itself, the Islamic Republic is building a region-wide multi-front firepower assault staging ground against Israel.

This is the true context in which Gaza should be viewed. The three-day clash with the second largest Gazan terror faction is therefore no indication of the real security challenges faced by Israel.

It is precisely because of this force build-up by the Iranian-led axis, and the alarming progress of Iran’s nuclear program, that Israel’s defense establishment views Gaza as a third-tier priority, and one which must not act as a distraction or drain on Israeli military resources through a large-scale conflict.

Ultimately, however, although it is a mistake to view Gaza in isolation from the wider strategic picture, Israel is still overdue for a more in-depth discussion on its available options regarding the Gaza Strip conundrum.

Israel has two main strategic options when it comes to the Hamas-ruled Islamist enclave: Rounds of fighting designed to create periods of calm and quiet, or re-occupation of the Gaza Strip and a years-long military operation to root out the terrorists that would result in large numbers of casualties and a military regime imposed on 2.2 million Palestinians.

There are no other visible options at this time, and the Israeli defense establishment has repeatedly concluded that limited campaigns to top up Israeli deterrence are the lesser of the two evils.

This is a legitimate and critical debate for Israelis to engage in and those who advocate for toppling the Hamas regime must answer the question of who they think can replace it.

The idea of getting the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority to ‘ride into Gaza on Israeli tanks’ appears to be lacking in credibility, both because of the legitimacy crash that this would cause Fatah, and because of the severe doubts that exist over Fatah’s ability to hold Gaza, after losing the enclave to Hamas in a violent coup in 2007.

If Israel does continue to choose to allow Hamas to rule the Strip, meaning an acceptance of a cycle of enemy force build-up and habitual rounds of fighting, it must also think about ways of strengthening the status of the shaky Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, to avoid giving Palestinians the impression that Hamas’s way of armed conflict and radical Islamism will promote Palestinian interests and national prestige more than the PA’s modus operandi.

The PA’s ‘hybrid’ model of pursuing quiet security coordination with Israel against the common foe of Hamas and PIJ, together with diplomatic assaults on Israel and nods to martyrdom culture and incitement, will be insufficient to compete with Hamas if the PA does not soon begin delivering some political achievements for the Palestinians living under its rule. Those achievements can then act as a lever for Israeli demands for the PA to tone down its incitement.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

ISRAEL'S TECH INVESTMENTS ARE GOOD FOR NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

By Doron Tamir

As technological developments race ahead across the board, governments must take the initiative and create incentives for the private sector to develop those that serve the national interest -- or face being left behind.

The State of Israel’s initiatives to promote eco-systems of development in the cyber sphere are an example of what government-guided development can do for both national security and the national economy.

Societies that are not interested in leaving their wellbeing up to market forces alone need governments that clearly define national technological requirements, and chart ways to reach those objectives.

While governments cannot force companies to research and develop anything, they can certainly encourage them to do so through tax breaks and investments, as Israel’s Office of the Chief Scientist has been doing for over a decade.

Often, technological development comes in recognition of a requirement, and many of these requirements have their origins in wars. For example, mass train transport took on a new dimension after trains became key to moving troops in World War One.

During the Cold War, many defense-related technological developments, like satellite communications and global positioning systems, later revolutionized the civilian world as spinoff technologies emerged.

The emergence in the 20th century of nuclear power from the science behind the atomic bomb solved severe energy issues for many advanced countries, particularly among states lacking oil.

It took around forty years to develop advanced unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver battlefield intelligence in real-time, a process in which Israel played a pioneering role. Today, however, quadcopters deliver packages and monitor traffic.

Yet, despite the plethora of development, many countries are also seeing the appearance of technologies that have no obvious good use.

This deluge of technology without any guiding hand means that governments face dilemmas when they plan for times of crisis – times where falling back on national technological development can make the difference between getting through a crisis successfully or not.

This was the thinking that guided Israel’s establishment of its National Cyber Directorate in 2012 after the government completed a process of defining just what kind of technological objectives it wished to achieve.

Unfortunately, this is not a frequent or common pattern in state-level decision-making, particularly in the West. While states excel in forming institutions and academic infrastructure, they have not fared as well in providing a deliberate guiding hand to technological development.

Israel, a relatively new country, which was barely functional 70 years ago, is a technological hub that competes with major powers, specifically because it has encouraged industries like cyber-security.

The same is true of Israel’s domestic defense industries, which truly began to flourish after the French arms embargo against Israel in 1968; until that time Israel had relied on French weapons systems.

Israel’s lead in agricultural technological development is another case in point – and with the prospect of food insecurity being a larger threat globally than war, countries must urgently begin developing such technologies.

Impending climate change and disruption to food supplies created by events like Russia’s war on Ukraine risk the death of millions of people. Famine is not the only threat faced by vulnerable countries-- droughts are another peril, which is why developing national desalination infrastructure provides states with a shield (albeit an expensive one) against such dangers, as Israel has learned through its pioneering desalination technology.

These maneuvers require governments to take a strategic view of present and future requirements, and to position themselves in ways that enable technological developments to serve as a defense against major threats, be they the result of natural phenomena or be they manmade.

Such a guiding government hand also yields significant economic dividends. When Israel established the National Cyber Directorate a decade ago, at the time it exported just hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cyber security solutions. Today, those exports surpass ten billion dollars a year – not including billions in investment by international companies in the local cyber industry. Today, that pace of growth is slowing down, but its economic and national achievements remain prominent.

Looking ahead, artificial intelligence will be a major sector for deliberate government-fueled development, for any country that wishes to be influential and relevant in the 21st century.  A failure to set such objectives will result in huge resources being poured into the research and development of projects that may yield negligible tangible results on the national level.

Brigadier General Doron Tamir General Doron Tamir had a distinguished military career spanning over 2 decades in the Intelligence Corps and Special forces - as the Chief Intelligence Officer in the Israeli military, where he commanded numerous military units in all aspects of the intelligence field, from signal, visual, and human intelligence, through technology and cyber, to combat and special operations. Read full bio here.

IRAN'S PROXY PIJ, BEHIND ESCALATION HAMAS STAYING OUT, FOR NOW

By David Hacham

Iran’s puppet in the Palestinian arena, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), is a purely military-terrorist organization with a clear pro-Iranian orientation.

With some 10,000 armed members, it is the second largest armed faction in Gaza behind the ruling faction, Hamas, which, while expressing support for PIJ so far, has not rushed to join in the combat – and for good reason, though this could change.

Designated as a terror organization by the United States, Britain, the European Union, Canada, Australia, and Japan, the PIJ was founded by Gazan radical Islamists, who fused fanatical Islamic ideology with nationalism as a tool to promote the goal of destroying Israel and replacing it with an Islamic state. PIJ was the first organization to position itself as an alternative to the secular Fatah party.  

The Sunni PIJ is hugely dependent on external supporters, first and foremost, the Shi’ite Islamic Republic of Iran. It is no coincidence that PIJ’s leader, Ziyad Al-Nakhalah, has spent recent days in Tehran with his backers, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

PIJ is also dependent on support from the Assad regime in Syria, which permits Nakhalah to run a PIJ headquarters from Damascus, as well as from Beirut.

While the PIJ makes local operational decisions, they are in tune with the overall expectations and instructions that Iran transmits to its Palestinian proxy. Iran is actively behind the current escalation and is far from being a passive onlooker.  

Tehran finances almost the whole of the PIJ’s annual budget, and while it directly armed PIJ in past years, today PIJ produces rockets in Gazan factories, based on Iranian know-how.

The central question at the time of this writing is whether Hamas will join the fighting. At this stage, the impression is that Hamas is in no rush to get involved, and this is due to the fact that Hamas absorbed a painful blow from Israel during its own May 2021 conflict with Israel. Since then, Hamas has been licking its wounds, recovering militarily, rebuilding its rocket stockpiles, and encouraging civilian-economic-humanitarian rehabilitation efforts in Gaza as well.

Hamas thus has no immediate and real interest to join the fighting against Israel. It fears that doing so would set it back considerably in terms of military, civilian, and economic damages.

It is fair to assume that Israel’s combat objectives are designed to avoid encouraging Hamas from jumping into the fray. Israel has been focusing its military activity on pinpoint strikes on targets designed to avoid drawing Hamas into the fight.

Still, none of this guarantees that Hamas will remain uninvolved. In the event of an IDF operation resulting in the unintentional killing of large numbers of Palestinian civilians, not only would large-scale international pressure come down on Israel to end its campaign, but also, Hamas would be far more likely to join hostilities. As long as the operation continues, the risk of operational errors grows.

Precisely for this reason, Israel has an interest in limiting the extent of fighting to the extent that it can. On the other hand, PIJ has an opposite interest – in dragging out hostilities in the hope that the IDF makes a mistake, resulting in Hamas joining forces with PIJ on the battlefield.

Either way, even if a ceasefire is implemented in Gaza, observers should have no illusions. An escalation could erupt anew at any time. The conflict between Israel and Hamas/Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a story that has no end.

Still, Israel does not want to get dragged into the Gazan mud in the form of a large-scale ground operation, which would result in Israeli casualties and damage national morale.

In addition, Israel has a clear set of priorities in terms of its security challenges, and Gaza is not at the top of the list. Iran and its nuclear program are very much at the top of the priority list, followed by Iranian entrenchment efforts in Syria, and Tehran’s military assistance to Hezbollah.

Hence, Israel cannot invest all of its energy in Gaza, when it has other threats to prioritize.

Israel took the initiative, launching Operation Breaking Dawn on August 5 and assassinating PIJ northern commander Taysar Jabari in a surprise aerial strike, along with additional strikes on PIJ attack cells approaching the Israeli border.

This was a similar opening to move to that employed in Operation Black Belt in November 2019, which began with the assassination of Baha Abu al-Atta, Jabari’s predecessor. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi presided over both targeted killing operations.

In both 2019 and now, the IDF worked to attack PIJ targets exclusively and tried to avoid an escalation with Hamas.

Jabari, 50, had previously served as deputy to his late predecessor, Abu al-Atta, as head of PIJ operations, and as a coordinator of PIJ activities with Hamas. Jabari coordinated hundreds of rocket launches at Israel during the May 2021 conflict. After surviving past assassination attempts, he met his end on Friday.

During the current operation, the head of PIJ’s southern division, Khaled Mansour, who was involved in rocket fire against Israel during the May 2021 conflict, was also killed by the IDF in a targeted strike.

After the May 2021 conflict, southern Israel experienced almost total quiet, something not seen in Gaza for years. Hamas and PIJ exploited this to rebuild their military capabilities, including replenishing their rocket stockpiles.  

Hamas reaped the benefits of international efforts aimed at rebuilding Gaza’s civilian infrastructure, led by Egypt, and ongoing Qatari financial support for needy Gazan families, as well as fuel for Gaza’s power plant. Israel also encouraged this process by providing permits for 15,000 Gazan workers to enter Israel for employment.  

This escalation could torpedo the process of Israeli civilian gestures toward the Gazan population.  

In the end, civilians on both sides are, once again, paying the cost for the uncompromising radical ideology of Gaza’s terror organizations, which are willing to sacrifice the lives of Palestinians for their own extremist goals. This operation is one more station in what Gaza’s Islamic terrorist groups see as a never-ending journey of conflict.  

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

The PIJ – Israel conflict places Hamas in a trap

BY Grisha Yakubovich

The latest round of conflict between Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Israel has produced a key conclusion: Hamas is the only ‘resistance’ element in the Palestinian arena that can impose an equation of its making on Israel.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad has been seeking to copy Hamas: It tried to mimic Hamas’s strategy of linking the West Bank to the Gazan arena and responding to events in the former by threatening and activating force from the latter.

PIJ has failed in this task. On the one hand, this failure strengthens Hamas, because it provides proof that the ruling faction in Gaza and it alone has the ability to challenge Israel through its terrorist army in the Strip.

There is, however, a flip side to this coin. Hamas is under pressure to join the fighting and prove its credentials as a ‘resistance’ movement. Hamas is in a bind.

Operationally, there is no doubt that the Israeli action against PIJ in Gaza has been beneficial for Hamas. Israel has been targeting PIJ, a competitor to Hamas that is seeking to position itself as the ‘resistance’ entity and steal some of Hamas’s prestige.

PIJ has been able to take a lead position in the northern West Bank, particularly in Jenin, and it is seeking to bolster its position in Gaza too. This troubles Hamas.

Hamas, though it will never admit it publicly, could not ask for a better result than the battering PIJ has received from Israel. The end result, Hamas can hope, will be a message to the Palestinian arena: All smaller armed groups should follow its lead. If they try to wage war on Israel by themselves they are doomed to failure.

This strengthens Hamas significantly. But PIJ has been trying to obtain a different result by prolonging the conflict (although at the time of writing reports of ceasefire negotiations are surfacing) in the hope that Hamas will be entrapped into joining the hostilities.

Israel has understood this sensitive situation very well, and this understanding has been reflected in its precise, cautious targeting of PIJ targets in the Gaza Strip.

It wouldn’t have taken much for Hamas’s calculation to change, and to alter its position to remain out of the fighting.

Still, Hamas is keenly aware that such a result runs contrary to its core interests. At its core, Hamas represents an ideological concept based on the idea of rejecting diplomacy with Israel, rejecting the path of the Palestinian Authority, and continuing with armed conflict.

Both Hamas and PIJ represent the thinking of Palestinian Muslims who reject the path chosen by their secular brethren, who have opted for understanding that they have to live with Israel.

Now, with PIJ weakened by Israel, Hamas can not only rest assured that it has an exclusive lead position in Gaza, it can also begin to fill a void in the northern West Bank, where Israel has arrested large numbers of PIJ operatives.

All of this can significantly help Hamas position itself in the race for the Palestinian leadership when the 87-year-old Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas finally steps down. Hamas becomes the most relevant movement, outshining Fatah, and certainly outshining PIJ, as the only one that can force Israel to change its policies towards Gaza.

Still, these interests do not guarantee that Hamas would not get involved, if not in this round of fighting, then potentially in a future one under similar circumstances. If Hamas did feel compelled to act, it can be expected to do so with massive action, in a surprising manner, hitting Israel as hard as it can with rockets, armed drones, sea attacks, and cyber-attacks.

If that does not happen, however, in the near term future, then PIJ will be on record as failing to replicate Hamas’s impressive achievements at the cognitive-national level. 

The May 2021 conflict that Hamas fought with Israel stands as proof, as far as Hamas is concerned, that it is on the right path, leading as it did to increasing international and Israeli investment in Gaza’s economy, and a boost to Hamas’s status as ‘guardian of Jerusalem,’ the banner under which it sparked that confrontation last year.

PIJ’s pale imitation of this achievement saw the group fire rockets at Jerusalem on Sunday, at a time when Jews mounted the Temple Mount in the Old City to mark the holy Jewish day of Tisha B’Av. But unlike Hamas, that attack, like the remainder of PIJ’s attacks, are a shadow of Hamas’s capabilities.

Ultimately, PIJ’s attempt to be ‘the next Hamas’ failed, and the results of that failure will continue to be felt by Hamas, the PA, and Israel long after the next truce comes into effect.

At the same time, reality on the ground has demonstrated more than once that failure can form the basis for future success. Time will reveal if this will be the case.

Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

Russia-Ukraine war: A driver for Israeli defense exports to Europe?

 

By YAIR RAMATI & Yaakov Lappin

As European states reassess their security situation amid the fallout of Russia’s war against Ukraine, signs are growing that acquisitions of Israeli defense products by European clients – and not only European clients – could substantially increase.

In 2021, according to Defense Ministry figures, Europe was the highest importer of Israeli defense technology. Overall exports hit a new record of $11.3 billion that year, with Europe accounting for 41% of that figure.

However, for this to increase further, European defense budgets will need to rise too, and the extent to which this will happen depends greatly on whether European states develop comprehensive defense strategies.

Such strategies go much further than decisions on defense budget increases.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was one of the biggest opponents of former US President Donald Trump’s insistence that NATO states allocate 2% of their GDP to defense. Now, Scholz how pledged to create a 100 billion Euro defense fund, and exceed the 2% threshold. But will this commitment last into the long-term? It is too soon to answer that question and meanwhile, the annual defense budget that Scholz is proposing is based on a gradual increase, not an immediate jump.

The second key question pertaining to Israeli defense exports to Europe relates to Israeli portfolio adaptability. Are the lessons now emerging from the Russian – Ukraine war relevant to Israeli defense company specialty areas, in a manner that favors distinct products from Israel?

The answer to this is more complex than meets the eye. The United States, for example, can easily supply Ukraine with anti-tank Javelin missiles, or Stinger man-portable air defense systems, by taking them out of US Military storage sites, or from storage facilities allocated for allies. Israel is not in the same situation.

While Rafael has been able to mass produce spike missiles for European clients (Euro Spike), Israeli UAV makers must produce systems from scratch, as is the case with most Israeli defense exports.

The repertoire of Israeli defense companies is generally strongest when it comes to suites for intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance requirements, but not the platforms themselves.

Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance elements such as radars, on the other hand, are easier for Israeli companies to supply in significant numbers.

Additionally, some of the battlefield lessons emerging from Ukraine have changed since Russia launched its offensive in February. At the start of the war, songs of praise were written for Turkey’s Bayraktar TB-2 armed UAVs from the medium altitude long endurance category. Yet limited release of video footage of Bayraktar strikes is testimony of the limited and sporadic use made of this system (unlike the Azeri use of the Bayraktar against Armenian forces in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war).

In the skies, Russia effectively controls the medium to high altitudes, while neutralizing the armed UAVs. It is reasonable to assume that Israeli-made lightweight UAVs or loitering munitions will perform in this environment.

Both Russia and Ukraine have abandoned the low-altitude arena. For Russia, this means precision strike and ground support fire capabilities were largely lost, and Russia reverted to artillery strikes and high-altitude air strikes, conducted by powerful assault helicopters and fighter jets.

These trends reveal three things to Israel’s defense industry. The first is the growing need for standoff weapons, enabling warfighters to avoid getting too close to the ranges of enemy firepower.

Additionally, there is a growing need for advanced soft and hard kill active defense suites for various platforms such as tanks, helicopters, etc.  

Thirdly, air defense requirements are diverse. The Ukrainians are armed with a multitude of shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, and not all warfighters are covered under medium-long range air defense umbrella.

Thus, it is unsurprising that Germany and others are showing interest in Israeli missile defense systems, like the Arrow program, and airborne balloon-carrying radar systems, which can detect cruise missiles and UAVs better than ground-based radars.

Meanwhile, the role of precision surface-to-surface rockets is increasing in the war, as the US and UK supply the Ukrainians with such systems, for example, GMLRS. Even though their numbers are small so far, their influence is highly significant.

In the cyber sphere, Russia failed to achieve its objectives, causing limited damage to Ukraine. Still, Ukraine’s communications networks, water, and electricity, transportation, keep working – and this underlines the central importance of cyber defense systems.

Electronic warfare is undoubtedly growing more influential as the war progresses.

These are the essential lessons that Israel’s defense industry can take away thus far from the war raging in Europe.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Yaakov Lappin provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including JNS.org and a leading global military affairs magazine Jane's Defense Weekly. He is the author of Virtual Caliphate -
Exposing the Islamist state on the Internet. Read full bio here.