What would be the security & strategic dimensions of an Israel-Saudi deal?

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

As the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia gets ever-closer, it is reasonable to assume that Israel’s defense establishment is conducting a thorough analysis of the potential security ramifications of such a maneuver.

Normalization would be a part of a trilateral agreement between Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel, and has the potential to redefine regional alignments.

In due time, the Israeli government will be equipped with recommendations from the defense establishment to help it navigate this strategic junction. The proposed normalization of relations is predicated on Saudi Arabia's requests to purchase American F-35 fighter jets, cutting-edge air defense systems, and a civilian nuclear reactor that is outfitted with a uranium enrichment fuel cycle.

Saudi Arabia wishes to receive American security commitments and to build long-term stability to enable it to become an economic powerhouse. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s vision is to turn the desert kingdom into a regional powerhouse that attracts business and investment and is not reliant on oil for its economic prosperity.

In assessing these requests from an Israeli perspective, it is impossible to examine them in isolation. Beyond the undeniable fact that they would improve Riyadh's capacity to defend itself against Iranian aggression, the Saudi ‘asks’ should also be seen in the wider context of the ongoing arms race between Israel and Iran. In recent years, Iran has disturbingly closed the gap on Israel’s military edge over it and its axis of proxies. Equipping Saudi Arabia with new capabilities that would be pointed at Tehran would, therefore, boost Israel’s strategic interests, while also carrying implicit risks.

But first, an examination of recent developments in Iran’s capability force build-up is in order.

The ban on Iran possessing ballistic missiles imposed by the United Nations will be lifted in October, and this could be a significant event for the world and the region, due to the blossoming cooperation between Iran and Russia.

Europe may soon see Iranian ballistic missiles fired by Russia at Ukraine. Given the robust nature of Iran's military industry, which is capable of the mass production of missiles, drones, and a wide variety of other types of weaponry, Russia has become dependent on Iranian firepower.

 As a result of Iran's assistance to Russia in its conflict with Ukraine, Moscow owes Iran a debt; as repayment, Iran may receive Russian Sukhoi jets. Russia could also help Iran with spy satellites and with the development of a more sophisticated missile arsenal.

Even if Iran occasionally cuts corners in terms of quality, the rapidity with which it manufactures its arms and then distributes them to regional proxies via air, land, and sea channels is cause for concern. Iran is expanding its influence all over the region, including Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, in addition to Yemen and the West Bank and Gaza.

Israel's goals in the region are clear: it wants to build an anti-Iran bloc of states that includes itself and other pragmatic Arab Sunni nations. In this context, the Abraham Accords, signed with the UAE and Bahrain in the year 2020, were a groundbreaking initiative. The normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia, the largest country in the Arab world, however, holds the promise of being the real game-changer.

A shift of this magnitude is monumental, and it gives rise to optimism for a more positive and stable future. Amid these seismic shifts, Israel's overarching goal continues to be to maximize strategic gains while managing the risks associated with these gains.

To craft a new Middle East, certain gambles are required; as a result, the potential arming of Saudi Arabia needs to be viewed within the context of this grand strategy.

Iran continues to arm and fund its proxies, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen, creating a clear joint Saudi-Israeli interest to contain these threats.

Israel's expanding influence in the region, on the other hand, has caused trepidation in Tehran. This may have been the trigger for the Iranian government to launch a charm offensive and to normalize ties with Saudi Arabia in March.

The Abraham Accords and their expansion should therefore be seen as Israel’s response to Iran’s strategy of encircling it with missile bases and well-armed enemies.

Throughout history, the attitude of many Arab nations toward normalization with Israel was cautious and their strategy was to wait for the Palestinian conflict to be resolved. This all began to change from 2020 onwards, when the acknowledgment of Israel's growing economic and military power, and its close ties with the United States—reshaped diplomatic priorities for Arab Sunni states.

These states identify Iran as the primary security threat to them.

All these processes have enabled Israel's integration into the Middle Eastern map in an unprecedented manner.

This shift is exemplified by the growing ties between the IDF and not only long-standing partners such as the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt, but also rumored military-strategic relations that are kept secret for the time being.

In addition, the transfer of the IDF from the US European Command to the Central Command, which is responsible for the Middle East, following the signing of the Abraham Accords, has greatly enhanced Israel’s integration in the region.

Even though it does not signify the formation of a Middle Eastern NATO, it does encourage information sharing, deterrence, and defense cooperation among nations. These kinds of collaborations have the potential to be formidable obstacles in the way of Iran's goals.

As such, normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel is not merely another diplomatic effort. It is a possible harbinger of a new order in the Middle East, one in which Israel and Saudi Arabia, two Middle Eastern powerhouses, can combine their military, economic, and political power to push back against Iran in new ways.

These are the larger considerations that should guide the discussion on Saudi Arabia’s requests from the U.S. in exchange for normalization. 

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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Cyber is the new oil in Middle East diplomacy

By RENE-PIERRE AZRIA

Fifty years ago, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia dared confront the then-most powerful man on earth, US President Richard Nixon. The king wielded an unexpected but fearsome weapon: oil embargoes.

King Faisal, angry at Nixon’s massive rescue of Israel during the Yom Kippur War, overnight cut all deliveries of oil to the United States, Japan, the Netherlands, and several other European countries, plunging the West into an unprecedented panic.

The vengeful king also ordered a massive increase in the price of oil, which jumped from about $3 a barrel in early October 1973 to about $12 a barrel in April 1974. Within months, the US, Japan, and Europe were suffering from runaway inflation and a series of deep recessions.

By 1979, prompted by the revolution in Iran, the oil price had tripled again, to about $36 a barrel. US inflation followed, and the fed funds rate moved over 20% in 1980, crushing the Jimmy Carter administration and ushering in the Ronald Reagan era.

Revenues of oil producers, particularly those in the Middle East, skyrocketed, creating unprecedented financial power for Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, and the UAE. The most influential man in the world briefly became Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, then oil minister of Saudi Arabia, who had inspired the creation of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and negotiated the takeover, by the Kingdom, of Aramco, the old Arabian American Oil Company.

For decades after the 1973 “oil shock,” the price of oil and the production quotas decided by OPEC and OAPEC conditioned the foreign policies of the West vs. the Arab world, thus vs Israel. It was openly admitted that applying pressure on Israel to compromise with its Arab foes was the required path to appease Arab oil producers.

Two views dominated the oil-producing cartel: that oil should be viewed in the economic context of supply and demand, and that oil should be viewed and used essentially as a political pressure tool. Sheikh Yamani was on the side of moderation, warning his colleagues that raising oil too high, too fast would prompt a market reaction. Oil, however, was being used by Middle East powers as a weapon, but as such it turned out to have unpredictable impacts. During the Iraq-Iran war, Saudi Arabia kept lowering the price of oil to deprive Iran of money, a strategy which indeed hurt Iran but equally weakened all the oil producers and profoundly divided OPEC.

Sheikh Yamani was essentially correct. The high price of oil made exploration and invention worthwhile. The West found numerous new oil fields (North Sea, West Africa, Russia, and more recently North American shale oil), developed massive new energies (nuclear, LPG, and more recently renewables), and started conserving energy. The US today is self-sufficient, and Israel has become a gas exporter. Oil may still sustain the finances of large oil producers, but it does not rule Middle East politics any longer.

An alternative to oil

If not the oil, what then gave Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, one of King Faisal’s grandsons, the power to ignore and confront US President Joe Biden in 2023? 

Cyber power.

Cyber power is this writer’s shortcut for the revolutions of the last 20 years: the Internet, mobile phones, smartphones, social media, artificial intelligence (AI), and the global propaganda techniques derived from this new toolbox. The battlefield has moved from Western chanceries to billions of little screens, and world public opinion gets manipulated by the Arab world, quite cheaply, through deafening propaganda and targeted character assassination.

This is not to say that the Middle East is now devoid of oil plots and old-world battling. At no time since the Yom Kippur War has terrorism abated, nor has guerrilla warfare, intelligence work, lawfare, or cyber attacks on civilian infrastructures. 

The world public opinion, however, pays little attention to the feuds between Iran and Sunni powers, to the civil war in Syria, to the division of Libya, to Turkey’s ambitions in Iraq, to the Kurdish drama. The Arab world has successfully managed to protect these gruesome Muslim-to-Muslim conflicts from international interference, while constantly keeping Israel in the international penalty box.

The convicted murderer and politician, Marwan Barghouti, once announced in a Financial Times editorial the launch of the “Boycott, Divest, Sanction” movement against Israel. He specified that the movement would first target the BBC and the Financial Times, because they dominated English language media, and had the farthest reach into opinion leaders across the world. Since then, anti-Israel crusades have left the realm of the print and been amplified billions of times by social media and the internet in general. Hammering works.

Israel discovered a fantastic antidote against this electronic poison: the concept of the Start-up Nation. The Start-up Nation is the 21st-century equivalent of the kibbutz dream: a brilliant shortcut for success, scientific progress, peace, and universal contribution. Young Westerners identify with its message of hope and sharing, and so do youths in emerging countries.

The Start-up Nation opened the way for the Abraham Accords, for the opening of diplomatic relations in Africa, and for the investment flows from India, China, Japan, and Korea. The Start-up Nation reversed decades of negative tropes on Israel.

Yet, news from Israel today seems to revolve exclusively around a potential constitutional crisis perpetrated by the incendiary policies of a handful of far-right ministers. Will the damage to Israel’s standing among nations be so deep and so lengthy as to wipe out the goodwill created by the start-up nation concept?

Israel used to win skeptics’ hearts by bringing opinion leaders to Israel, showing them its geopolitical realities, and letting them judge by themselves. Four billion people today are less than 30 years old; they are tomorrow’s leaders. What can they know of Israel’s history, of the Jewish people’s struggles? What will shape their view of whether Israel may survive? The Internet.

Isn’t it time for Israel to go back to inventing, creating, and getting Nobel prizes? The power is in the Web. Harness it.

Rene-Pierre Azria, is a publishing contributor at The MirYam Institute. He began his career in service of the French Treasury, and is a recipient of the French Legion of Honor for his services to philanthropy and international finance. Read full bio here.

MirYam Exclusive: Yoav Gallant's Delicate Balancing Act.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant has been in a very difficult position for several months, faced with the need to navigate between Israel's domestic judicial reform crisis and the interlinked crisis of unprecedented cracks in the cohesion of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

Time and again, Gallant finds himself at a crossroads. Israel's national security and the cohesiveness of its defense establishment are in jeopardy as a result of the toxic interaction between politics, military preparedness, and the conflict between the government and the judicial branch.

For the time being, the IDF is equipped with the capabilities necessary to successfully carry out its activities. On the other hand, the ongoing pattern (at the time of this writing) of reservists not turning up for their scheduled active service, especially in essential units within the air force and intelligence, might have disastrous consequences if left unchecked.

If this pattern persists and becomes more widespread, it may compromise Israel's capacity to react to broader security challenges. There is no specific estimate of when this may happen, but the military establishment is on high alert in an effort to assuage the worries of the reserves and make the political echelons aware of the seriousness of the issue.

The fact that the IDF is now facing its greatest difficulty in maintaining unity since its founding in 1948 highlights the urgency of the problem, and this issue is eating up Gallant’s time, preventing him and IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and the General Staff from spending the time they’d like to pour over readiness for war scenarios and Iran.

In order to prevent a schism from developing among the ranks of the armed forces, Gallant has been trying to apply his influence in government to bring the domestic upheaval under control and free the military from its current political impasse. In Gallant's view, the way to achieve this is to achieve a broad consensus over judicial reform and to move on as a nation as quickly as possible to a set of priorities that will serve rather than wreck Israeli interests.

His messages to the public and the ruling coalition, of which he is a part, have reflected this.

"The citizens of Israel and the IDF need unity. Now is the time to put aside our differences and to find what we have in common and what unites us," Gallant urged on September 5.

"I call on my friends in the Knesset to reach consensus and to do so quickly—for the sake of our country and the security of the State of Israel," he added.

Five days later, on September 10, during an address to the World Summit on Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Gallant issued one of his most detailed calls for the political system and civil society to rearrange their national priorities, following a description of Israel’s severe plethora of security threats.

"In the face of all these stands the State of Israel. Our military, intelligence, economic, and technological power allow our existence," he stated. In a hostile environment saturated with challenges, Israel has been able to defend itself due to the high-quality commanders and soldiers that it has, advanced weapons, breakthrough technology, and a deep understanding of enemy goals and modus operandi.

And yet, he warned, protecting the State of Israel is conditioned on the Israeli people being able to act in union and close rank.

This ability has been challenged disturbingly by a growing fissure in Israeli society over the feud regarding the balance of power between state authorities, he said.

"The price may be heavy—too heavy in national security contexts —and so major changes are made by broad consensus," he stressed.

"As the head of the security system, I declare here: The continuation of the internal struggle among different currents within the State of Israel seeps into the IDF and other security organizations and exacts a price that the IDF and the security system cannot bear," said Gallant in one of his sternest warnings to date.

"I'm not dealing with the question of who started or who is right. I say: The continuation of the internal struggle endangers national resilience, the Israel Defense Forces, and our ability to ensure security for the State of Israel and protect its citizens."

"How far are we willing to deepen the rift? When do we decide that it is our duty to return to the priorities suitable for the State of Israel?" he asked.

During his speech, Gallant laid out what he said was the correct national priority list, and it began with forming a broad national consensus on the major issues of the day.

"This is a prerequisite for ensuring the national security and continued prosperity of the State of Israel," he stressed.

He then listed the other priorities as preserving Israel's ability to defend itself against its enemies, chiefly against the Iranian nuclear threat and the terror arms sent towards Israel from its borders, followed by normalization with Saudi Arabia and through it with most of the Arab and Muslim world — an objective Gallant said could be missed by Israel if the internal rift continues.

In addition, he said, Israel’s security and political power are based on its economic capability and continued economic growth, which are themselves predicated on innovation and technology.

"It's important to remember that the condition for continued foreign investment, manufacturing, and innovation is stability. Social division and ongoing disputes also harm the vital economic effort for our future and existence," he stated.

Finally, he listed law and order and stopping serious crime in Israel's cities in general and in the Arab sector in particular as the final priorities to defend the social fabric of the country and Israel’s ability to function.

"Given the great challenges ahead, especially the security threats, which might become existential threats, we have to clearly tell ourselves—we have a duty to get back to the main issues. Security, normalization with our neighbors, a thriving economy, and the rule of law and order — all of these precede any other national effort and are more important than it," said Gallant.

"This is the priority; this is the precedence, and everything else can wait for the appropriate time and manner."

In July, indicators of the fissure in the military began to appear as 1,142 reservists, including many from the Israeli Air Force, conveyed an alarming message. They announced their intention to withdraw their participation in active service if an amendment to the Basic Law: The Judiciary, annulling the Reasonability Standard, which limits the Supreme Court's ability to oversee decisions made by the government, was approved. The amendment passed and Gallant has been dealing with the fallout ever since.

In fact, Gallant has been in crisis mode over this issue since at least March. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sought to fire Gallant on March 26, 2018, due to his issuing a public warning over the threat posed by the judicial reform issue to unity in the ranks.

There was an outpouring of public outrage that enveloped the whole country in response to the decision, which Netanyahu later overturned.

Ultimately, the unique composition of the IDF, which is comprised of both conscripts and reserve forces, means that no military technology or equipment can substitute a basic level of cohesion for the military to function properly, and this is what Gallant has been seeking to rescue from the fire of Israel’s domestic crisis.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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monthly brief: Three Key Strategic Events That Shaped Israel.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

The month of September brings with it three key anniversaries of pivotal strategic events that have indelibly shaped Israel and the region.

The Gaza Disengagement

On September 22, 2005, Israel completed its unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and North Samaria. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) withdrew from Gaza, and Israel evacuated every civilian and community from the Strip, uprooting over 9,000 Israeli settlers from 25 settlements.

Proposed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, this maneuver aimed to bolster Israel’s security, initiate a separation from the Palestinians, and boost the country’s international stature.

Yet, just two years later, in 2007, Hamas ousted Fatah in Gaza, transforming the Strip into an Iranian-backed rocket launchpad.

Since then, Israel has grappled with four major armed conflicts with Gazan terror factions and several smaller rounds of hostilities, involving Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The skies over Israeli cities routinely blaze with rockets from Gazan terror factions.

Israel's pioneering Iron Dome air defense system, operational since 2011, has played a pivotal role in shielding its citizens and enabling the Israeli Air Force to lead campaigns against the terror groups by reducing pressure on Israeli governments to launch ground offensives. Meanwhile, Hamas’s ambitions extend beyond Gaza, as it eyes the West Bank with intent.

The Oslo Accords: Legacy of a Stalemate

Rewind to September 13, 1993. On the  White House lawn, President Bill Clinton, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and PLO chief Yasser Arafat inscribed their signatures on the Oslo Accords. Three decades later, hopes of a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace appear to be buried. Yet, the Accords still profoundly influence the matrix of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the West Bank.

Today, the Palestinian Authority (PA) governs Area A of the West Bank and, despite numerous challenges, persists in its security collaboration with Israel. Notably, no Israeli government has abolished the Oslo agreements or disbanded Palestinian autonomy in major West Bank cities. The accords may have reached an impasse long ago, but the underlying arrangements continue to serve the mutual interests of both parties.

Echoes from 1973

This month, the Israel State Archive unveiled its most extensive dossier on the 1973 Yom Kippur War, shedding fresh light on the catastrophic intelligence lapses preceding Egypt and Syria's coordinated assault on Israel. The scars of the war, marked by Israel's unpreparedness and consequent heavy casualties, remain etched deep into its national consciousness.

Yet, the saga of the IDF rebounding from initial setbacks, summoning reserves, and launching counteroffensives that neared Cairo and Damascus is an enduring testament to Israeli resilience.

Today, the threats encircling Israel have metamorphosed. The specter of enemy infantry and tank brigades storming its borders has receded. In their place, terror armies, equipped with rocket and missile arsenals, lurk. Iran-backed terror armies such as Hezbollah, armed with an estimated 200,000 warheads and embedded within civilian enclaves, epitomize this threat.

While discerning enemy motives remains intricate in 2023, Israel’s extensive, technologically advanced intelligence infrastructure renders it far less vulnerable to strategic surprises than on the eve of the 1973 war.

Drawing lessons from the Yom Kippur debacle, Israel has spearheaded an intelligence renaissance. Today's IDF is backed by a cutting-edge sensor grid stretching across land, sea, air, and space, and fueled by artificial intelligence that processes vast quantities of intelligence.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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A battle for Israel’s future

By SHARON ROFFE OFIR

There are times in the life of a nation that we will forever remember as turning points. One of these was the 1973 Yom Kippur War; this September as we mark 50 years since that war, we will find ourselves facing a perhaps equally critical turning point. This battle will be waged not in the deserts of the Sinai Peninsula or on the volcanic terrain of the Golan Heights, but in the Supreme Court, sitting as the High Court of Justice.

Just a month before she retires, Supreme Court President Esther Hayut will conduct the battle of her life, and the decision she presides over will shape the life of the entire nation.

The announcement of the government's narrowing of the Reasonableness Standard – which restricts the court’s ability to strike down laws on the grounds that they are unreasonable – was received by Hayut in Germany, where she was visiting along with a group of Supreme Court justices. They cut short the visit and returned to Israel.

The judges understood that as important as the visit to Germany may be, they could not remain abroad while Israel is on fire. Petitions to repeal the amendment that annulled the Reasonableness Standard – a law passed by a large majority in the Knesset – were quickly stacking up

A week later, the decision was made. Hayut announced that the petitions would be heard on September 12 – for the first time by an extended lineup of 15 judges. The Reasonableness Standard is not the only issue facing the Supreme Court – the court’s judges face a heavy workload. They will also address petitions filed against the government's failure to convene the Judicial Selection Committee, and appeals against an amendment to Basic Law: The Government that limits the ability of the Knesset to declare a prime minister “incapacitated”  and which the petitioners claim was designed to personally serve Prime Minister Netanyahu – the amendment prevents Netanyahu,  who is on criminal trial for three separate cases, from being declared incapacitated if he is found to have breached a conflict of interest agreement by engaging with the judicial reform program.

In other words, the difficult crisis facing the State of Israel is coming to the Supreme Court, and the decisions that will be made may decide the fate of Israeli democracy. It is difficult to bet on how the court will rule; Until now, the Supreme Court has never stricken off a Knesset Basic Law. However, previous Supreme Court rulings that dealt with the constitutional status of the Basic Laws (such as the Supreme Court discussion in the context of the Nation-State Law), and discussions on whether such laws are immune to judicial review, give some indications.

These suggest the decision will be made in line with the degree of constitutional legality that the judges will assign to the amendment that annulled the Reasonableness Standard. Other factors include the judges' views of the extent of the alleged misuse of the Knesset's authority and purpose and their assessment of the degree of harm caused by the amendment. The Supreme Court will also assess its authority to disqualify the amendment.

These major questions surface against the background of signals by coalition members, the prime minister and his ministers regarding the possibility that they will not respect the Supreme Court's ruling. Such calls make it clear to the panel of judges, liberals and conservatives alike, that their decision will be a turning point in the life of the State of Israel. The situation post-September will be very different from what came before. This forms a decisive test for the question of checks and balances, and the identity of the driver holding the steering wheel.

Hints of the worldview of Chief Justice Hayut can be found in the dramatic speech she made after Justice Minister Yariv Levine introduced his comprehensive judicial reform. Addressing the Reasonableness Standard, she stated, among other things: "If there is no room for a judge's value decision regarding the reasonableness of a government decision, the next step – according to the same logic – may be that the judge also has no professional advantage in determining what forms reasonable doubt for the acquittal of a criminal defendant.” In other words, if a judge cannot exercise judicial review of government, administrative and constitutional decisions, we can shut down the court entirely.

"From here, the road is short to the deletion of extensive chapters in the various Israeli legal sectors, all of which are subject to value standards that the judge must examine and decide upon," Hayut warned.

Those who support annulment of the Reasonableness Standard and denying the Supreme Court authority to review the laws laid down by the Knesset, and those who demand that Justice Hayut does not sit on the panel, are in fact expressing what opponents of the judicial overhaul fear – a state that will not allow substantive judicial review is a state on the threshold of dictatorship.

 Appointing judges on behalf of the delusional reform laws (225 laws in total – for those interested) will turn us into a fully-fledged dictatorship.

How will Israeli society emerge post-September? This is a question that should concern every one of us. Unlike September 1973, the battle to hold the line this time will be waged by the Supreme Court and the many citizens who come out week after week to protest for the future of the country.

Any government that wants to act on behalf of its citizens should not fear a Reasonableness Standard, and that which may seem reasonable today could develop into something deeply unreasonable tomorrow. When that happens, there might not be anyone around to stop it.

Sharon Roffe-Ofir served as Knesset Member in the 24th Knesset. She has served as a deputy local council head at Kiryat Tivon, and has worked as a journalist and as a senior lecturer in academic institutions for 24 years. Read full bio here.

Israel-Saudi normalization is Biden's diplomatic 'Hail Mary'

By Chuck Freilich

The Biden administration appears to be pursuing two separate but complementary tracks in the Middle East: continued efforts to reach a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear standoff with Iran and Saudi-Israeli normalization. Both tracks are designed to stabilize the region and potentially even lead to a strategic transformation. 

With the hopes for a new nuclear deal stymied by Iran, the administration is now attempting to reach “informal understandings.” Iran would halt uranium enrichment at the 60% level – dangerous, but not yet sufficient for a bomb – and refrain from attacking US targets in the Gulf. The United States, in exchange, would unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian assets, to be used for purchases of food and medical products; and allow Iraq $4 billion to pay for the electric power it buys from Iran.

The Saudi-Israel track is the one with the potential for far-reaching regional change. In reality, it is a multilateral package that would impose major demands on all sides but also provide major benefits. It is the diplomatic version of football’s “Hail Mary” play. 

What do the Saudis want in order to normalize ties with Israel?

The Saudis, in exchange for normalization, are demanding that Israel make significant, although as yet unspecified, concessions on the Palestinian issue. 

Saudi demands of the US are more specific: a defense treaty; access to essentially unlimited American weapons; and US approval of a civilian Saudi nuclear program. 

Given King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud’s hard-line positions on the Palestinian issue, the Saudis may be considering only partial normalization at this point, pending Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s ascent to the throne. If true, this would undoubtedly limit American and Israeli willingness to accede to the Saudis’ far-reaching demands. 

Israel’s concessions to the Palestinians would be significant and encompass the avoidance of measures that would jeopardize a two-state solution. Israel would have to indefinitely postpone West Bank annexation, as well as the establishment of new settlements and the legalization of illegal outposts. It would also transfer some of the territory from Area C in the West Bank now under Israeli control to the Palestinians. 

The Biden administration would seek Israel’s acceptance of the Saudi demands, especially on the nuclear issue, and even Israel and AIPAC’s active lobbying in Congress, as a means of gaining approval for what will be a difficult sell.

The Palestinians were expected, at least in the initial American thinking, to once again remain on the sidelines, as they did during the negotiations leading to the Abraham Accords. In exchange for refraining from active interference – their usual modus operandi – the Palestinians were to gain extensive Saudi aid and benefit from the Israeli concessions. To the administration’s surprise, however, the Palestinians may be adopting a different approach this time, seeking to be involved in the process. 

The US wishes to put the Iranian nuclear issue to bed, at least until after the 2024 elections, and thereby minimize the dangers that a crisis with Iran would deflect international attention from the war in Ukraine and global competition with China. In addition to full normalization with Israel, the US will likely seek a Saudi commitment to end to the war in Yemen, provide the Palestinians with truly generous aid, and impose significant constraints on the kingdom’s rapidly expanding ties with Beijing. 

President Joe Biden is a true friend of Israel – the only president to define himself as a Zionist and to take his children to visit the concentration camps. 

Critical American strategic interests notwithstanding, the primary impetus for the recent momentum appears to be Biden’s growing concern that Israel is incapable of extracting itself from two imminent inflection points. These are the demise of the two-state solution with the consequent ramifications for its Jewish and democratic character and the judicial overhaul process, begun by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s ultra-right-wing government which threatens Israel’s democratic character. 

The practicability of the above package has justifiably met with considerable skepticism. All sides would have to make major concessions and even a watered-down version would likely lead to the collapse of Israel’s coalition and either to the formation of a new and more moderate one or to early elections that would constitute a de facto referendum on the package.

Either outcome would be welcome for an administration that seeks to confront the sides, especially Israel, with the need to make historic decisions. It is unclear, however, how a breakthrough would help Netanyahu achieve his one overriding objective – of forcing an end to the corruption trial that may land him in jail – or whether he has any residual ability to place the needs of the state above his own.

The US, for its part, has not signed a defense treaty with any country since Japan in 1960. To do so with Saudi Arabia, a country that is reviled today by much of the Democratic Party, is a very tall order. 

The administration must also take into account that acceding to the Saudi demand will likely lead to demands for similar treaties by Israel and a number of Arab allies, as well as other states around the world. On the upside, a series of bilateral treaties with countries in the Middle East could constitute the basis for the regional security architecture that the US has long sought to establish. 

A second critical decision is whether to acquiesce to the demand that Saudi Arabia be allowed a domestic uranium enrichment capability – a critical component of a potential military program in the future. Acquiescing would raise the awkward question of why Iran should be barred from such an enrichment capability if Saudi Arabia is not, and set a dangerous precedent for future proliferators. 

Conceivably, a compromise might be found whereby US willingness to grant the Saudis a defense treaty would be contingent on their willingness to forgo enrichment. Should a trade-off such as this prove elusive and the overall package ultimately depends on it, a sufficiently intrusive inspections regime would provide a reasonable compromise that Israel, too, could live with. 

Thirdly, US willingness to grant the Saudis access to the most advanced American weapons – such as F-35 aircraft – would make it very difficult to live up to the congressionally-mandated commitment to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME). However, based on past experience, a solution could probably be found by selling the Saudis weapons that are one generation behind those provided to Israel, missing some specific capability, or whose geographic deployment in Saudi Arabia is limited.  

Faced with a reinvigorated American-led military alignment, Iran would be the big loser in this scenario. While it is most likely to respond to this strategic setback by exercising greater restraint, a manufactured crisis designed to reset the table by increasing enrichment to the 90% level, cannot be ruled out. 

Normalization with Saudi Arabia would constitute a historic transformation in Israel’s strategic circumstances, essentially ending the conflict with the Arab states and at least somewhat containing the remaining belligerents – Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. It would also open up much of the Muslim world to Israel, possibly enabling normalization with Indonesia, Malaysia, and even Pakistan. 

An opening with the Palestinians, even if limited, is better than the current stasis, which is leading inexorably to a one-state binational solution. Anything that forces an end to the judicial overhaul (read “wrecking ball”), is more than welcome. The “informal understandings” with Iran on enrichment are far from ideal, but the best of the bad alternatives, and assuming an effective inspection regime can be found for Saudi enrichment, the benefits for Israel could not be clearer.

At this point, all of the above is still very tentative and it is unclear whether Biden is willing to put his full weight and authority behind it. However, senior American officials who recently met with their Saudi counterparts apparently came away sufficiently encouraged to proceed to the next step, an upcoming meeting with Netanyahu’s Strategic Affairs Minister and close confidant, Ron Dermer. 

It is still decidedly a long shot, but as David Ben-Gurion famously stated, “Anyone in Israel who doesn’t believe in miracles is not a realist.” 

Professor Chuck Freilich, serves as Adjunct Associate Professor of Political Science, Dept of Political Science at Columbia University. He is a former deputy national security adviser in Israel and long-time senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center, has taught political science at Harvard, Columbia, NYU and Tel Aviv University. Read full bio here.

monthly brief: Constitutional Crisis Brewing? Israel Saudi Normalization & Israel-German Defense.

By YAAKOV LAPPIN

Israel's key institutions are finding themselves having to answer the question of how they would act in the event of a constitutional crisis.

Such a crisis could arise in a scenario in which the Israeli government refuses to adhere to a potential Supreme Court ruling striking down the government's amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary that narrows the 'Reasonableness Standard ' and thus takes away the court's ability to cancel government decisions or legislation on the grounds of their lack of reasonability. 

The head of Israel's national trade union, the Histadrut Labor Federation, Arnon Bar David, warned on August 16 that if the government precipitated such a crisis, his organization would act to shut down the Israeli economy with mass strikes. 

"A refusal to adhere to Supreme Court decisions would be a violation of the status quo. We will not allow it to happen," he warned. 

It is believed that the IDF, the Israel Police, the intelligence community, the diplomatic corps, and the civil service would side with the court in such a scenario. However, on Thursday, August 17, the candidate favored by National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir to become the next Israel Police Commissioner, Cmdr. Yoram Sofer, refused to answer a media question on the issue, calling the question "irrelevant."

Government ministers and Members of Knesset have recently refused to answer questions on how they would act in the event of a Supreme Court ruling to strike down the reasonableness standard. 

Saudi Arabia covers its 'Palestinian bases' ahead of possible normalization with Israel

On August 14, Saudi Arabia announced that it had appointed its ambassador to Jordan, Nayef bin Bandar Al-Sudairi, as “non-resident ambassador to the State of Palestine and Consul General in Jerusalem.”

The Saudi move seeks to protect the Kingdom’s legitimacy both domestically and in the Arab world. It sends a message that it has not forgotten about the Palestinian issue as it moves forward with a process aimed at normalizing ties with Israel and gaining security guarantees, advanced weapons, and a civil nuclear program from the United States. 

The Saudi appointment can be seen as a signal to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, telling him that any normalization agreement will require significant concessions from Israel regarding the Palestinians, such as a commitment not to annex Area C of the West Bank, a halt to the construction of settlements deep within Area C, and possibly transferring parts of Area C to Palestinian Authority, as well as other steps designed to stabilize the PA's rule. 

It is unclear what kind of impact such steps would have on the stability of Israel's ruling coalition, which includes nationalist-religious elements ideologically opposed to the division of the Land of Israel. 

The Palestinian Authority welcomed the Saudi appointment, saying that the “timing of the decision reflects the interest of the brotherly Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Palestinian cause,” the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates said in a statement Sunday.

Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen told Tel Aviv’s 103 FM radio station Sunday that Israel was aware of Saudi Arabia’s planned appointment, but that the kingdom did not coordinate with Israel on the matter.

US authorizes sale of Israel’s Arrow 3 air defense system to Germany

The Israeli Ministry of Defense, German Federal Ministry of Defense, and Israel Aerospace Industries confirmed on August 17 that they will sign a record-breaking $3.5 billion defense agreement – Israel’s largest-ever defense deal – for the supply of the Arrow 3 Israeli air-defense system to Germany.

The system will achieve initial operational capacity by 2025 and full capacity by 2030.

Germany’s investment in the Arrow 3 system, which intercepts ballistic missiles in space at exceptionally long ranges and high altitudes, comes against the backdrop of the threat posed by Russia and its missile arsenal.

IAI CEO Boaz Levy, whose mother was a Holocaust survivor, noted the powerful historical significance of the Jewish state providing a defense system for the German people 78 years after the Second World War.

Arrow 3 is the leading missile defense system of its kind for the interception of exo-atmospheric ballistic missiles, according to the Israeli Defense Ministry.

After receiving approval from the U.S. government, senior officials from the Israeli and German Ministries of Defense will partake in a ceremony to sign a Letter of Commitment (LOC), that marks the commencement of the agreement. The allocated commitment of $600 million will facilitate the immediate initiation of work on the project, said the Ministry.

As part of the deal, IAI and the Israeli Air Force will provide training to the German Air Force.

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

 

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MirYam In The Media: Israel ‘one of the world’s top cyber powers’

Yaakov Lappin IN CONVERSATION WITH: PROF. CHUCK FREILICH

Israel’s position as a cyber superpower places it in an exclusive club of world powers, despite having a population a little larger than New York City, according to former Israeli defense official Chuck Freilich.

Freilich, a senior research fellow at the MirYam Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies and a former deputy national security adviser in Israel, recently published a book on the subject, titled, “Israel and Cyber Threat: How the Startup Nation Became a Global Cyber Power.”

A former senior fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School who teaches at Columbia and at Tel Aviv University, Freilich said Israel’s cyber capabilities are prominent at both the civilian and military levels. The number of cyber start-ups in Israel equals the total number of cyber start-ups in the world, excluding the United States, he noted.

“This is a stunning statistic. It’s the result of a really unique contribution to the Israeli hi-tech scene in general, and the cyber realm especially, by the defense establishment and intelligence agencies,” said Freilich.

Graduates of the Israel Defense Forces cyber units, mainly Unit 8200 and Unit 81, as well as intelligence agencies, enter the private sector and become a primary source of commercial start-ups, he explained.

This in turn acts as a driving force behind cyber innovation. The fact that the Israeli defense establishment funds incubators and technological innovation programs also contributes to this prosperity of the local cyber scene, according to Freilich.

The military units “find and train Israel’s cyber personnel, and most importantly, the really top-level personnel. In the cyber world, a few geniuses make all the difference,” he added.

Between 2011 and 2020, some 100 veterans of Unit 81, who served in the years between 2003 and 2010, went on to found 50 start-ups, with an accumulated evaluation of over $10 billion, Freilich noted. “That’s 100 veterans alone,” he said.

“Another mind blowing statistic is that the NSA [the U.S. National Security Agency] has about 40,000 personnel, while Unit 8200 [its Israeli equivalent] reportedly has a quarter of that, 10,000 people. Most of what Unit 8200 does is cyber based. Here you have little Israel on the scale of a global superpower. Each year, between a few hundred and a thousand cyber personnel are discharged in Israel. China’s 2022 graduating cyber school count was 1,300. So we have a cyber force on the scale of global superpowers,” he stated.

Pointing to compulsory military service as the core secret sauce behind this success, Freilich argues that this enables the IDF to track down the best and the brightest, with the military scouting high school databases and beginning to locate suitable youths by the 10th grade.

“One percent of the best high school graduates go to Atuda [a program that enables them to study and delay military service] and Talpiyot [a program that sends students to complete BAs in mathematics and natural sciences as part of their service]. Talpiyot looks at the top 2%, and then begins an intensive testing process. Only 10% of that 2% pass and are then further winnowed down through a grueling aptitude testing process,” said Freilich, describing the rigorous screening process.

With regard to Unit 81, while 10,000 candidates passed initial annual screening, only a few hundred went on to be selected.

“All told, the IDF trains 10,000 people a year in cyber programs. This is a huge training program, not only giving people computer skills, but also reaching the real geniuses,” he said.

Freilich added that a third of graduates of a Unit 8200 high school program that teaches university-level cyber come from peripheral areas.

He also drew attention to Israel’s national style, which he described in his book as “hutzpah gone viral.”

“Israeli society has a never-ending propensity to challenge authority and reject accepted norms, refusing to take no for an answer, and thirsting for new ways of achieving things,” said Freilich.

“Our strategic circumstances means we have a greater willingness to take risks, and we are non-hierarchical and informal,” he added. “That’s the same culture you find in R&D firms around the world. So cyber fits Israel like a glove.”

On Aug. 8, the Mayanei HaYeshua Medical Center in Bnei Brak announced that it had been struck by a cyber-attack, forcing personnel to switch to pen and paper before recovering computer networks.

Despite Israel’s cyber achievements, problems still exist in protecting the civil sector, Freilich admitted.

“There is reason to be concerned about that and critical national infrastructure, like water and communications—the type of sites that the Israel National Cyber Directorate defends the most. They get specially tailored defense packages, but there is still reason for concern,” said Freilich.

Iran, for its part, woke up to the cyber realm after sustaining the devastating 2009 Stuxnet attack, which international media reports attributed to Israel and the United States.

“Be wary of the law of unintended consequences,” said Freilich. “Until 2010, Iran wasn’t doing much in this area. By 2012, it was launching offensive attacks around the world.”

Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

A U.S.-Saudi deal could bring down Israel’s government

By eitan dangot

A possible agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia that would involve Saudi- Israeli normalization, is above all a maneuver that is designed to strengthen Washington’s global strategic policy. Israel plays a minor consideration in this potential arrangement, but its results could nevertheless challenge the current Israeli government to the point of bringing about its dissolution.

The U.S.’s primary considerations are the Chinese and Russian challenges to its already degraded status in the Middle East. In this context and on the eve of an American election year, the Biden administration understands that it needs a regional agreement with the Saudis to stabilize the Middle East and give Biden a boost ahead of his bid to retain the presidency.

Moreover, Washington, as it observes the Chinese infiltration of its alliance with Saudi Arabia, does not want to be drawn into instability in the region.

Under the proposed agreement, Saudi Arabia will be formally recognized as a new and primary member of the Abraham Accords bloc, which is designed to create a check against Iran. An agreement would also create a status quo against Russian penetration, which often goes hand in hand with Chinese infiltration. As far as the U.S. is concerned, this is the ultimate goal of the agreement, and hence Israel itself is not the most important element. But as part of a deal, normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia can also boost American policy in the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Israel is in the second circle of Washington’s considerations.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is looking on with obvious displeasure at the deterioration of relations between the Israeli leadership and Washington that is taking place against the background of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decisions, as head of the ‘all right-wing’ government.

For Saudi Arabia, the agreement is designed to boost its regional and global status. This follows a Saudi policy of continued dependence on the United States, while at the same time opening channels in the opposite direction, reflecting the lack of Saudi confidence in the U.S.

Riyadh wants a deal to affirm its place as a prestigious and valuable U.S. ally, in a reversal of the current American attitude to it. The Saudis also want a deal to include a U.S. commitment to a strategic defense alliance, similar to the U.S. commitment to NATO.

As Saudi Arabia looks a decade or two ahead at a changing world, against the backdrop of Iran's provocations, it also sees in the deal an opportunity to gain early nuclear technological know-how. And this signifies a challenge for the future Middle East.

Saudi Arabia would also receive advanced military technology platforms and capabilities that put it in the first class of powers, and through sales of F-35 and air defense systems, give it capabilities against the Iranian axis. This will also give the Saudis confidence in facing the Houthis in Yemen.

Israel will have to deal with the risk of losing regional aerial superiority due to Saudi Arabia acquiring F-35s, and Riyadh’s planned nuclear program, will also see a major erosion of Israel’s qualitative military qualitative edge.

Perhaps, as a compromise solution, the U.S. will agree to the first civilian nuclear steps over a longer timeline, with other steps put on hold. We cannot ignore the risk of an unconventional arms race developing, with additional countries following the Saudis, like Egypt and Turkey. And this dilemma is something the US and Israel will have to seriously discuss.

Yet for Riyadh, all of this will give the Kingdom the security to continue with its economic plans to become a global superpower with the confidence to navigate threats.

Israel, therefore, does not form the premise of the three-way Saudi – American – Israeli deal. It is more like a distinguished passenger who is invited to the business train car and is able to take advantage of what is on offer.

Israel’s involvement will make it easier for Biden to get the deal approved in Congress, where both Democrats and Republicans have raised objections to Saudi Arabia over human rights and extremism, issues that have prevented better U.S. ties with Riyadh.

Regionally speaking, Saudi-Israeli normalization will create a high wall and underground barrier to fortify the Abraham Accords in the coming years, creating a new bloc in the Middle East in the face of the Iranian threat.

Implications for Israeli politics

Neither Saudi Arabia nor the U.S. are happy about the political situation in Israel or about the risk of policies that could lead to a multi-arena escalation event. The common interest of the US and Saudi Arabia is regional quiet.

Saudi Arabia will demand significant changes from Israel. As the leading Muslim state, it will not be able to afford to give up the Palestinian issue. Normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia will not be served without Israeli concessions, including an Israeli commitment to a concept that falls within the space of the two-state idea.

In practice, Israel will be required to take steps such as the cessation of annexation of territories for several years in the West Bank, to make land available to the Palestinian Authority in Area C and to promote Palestinian economic projects. Saudi Arabia may demand a renewed and approved mechanism to keep the Al Aqsa Mosque quiet as well.

Israel will be required to transfer funds to the Palestinian Authority. It may also be time for Israel to request Saudi financial involvement in the development of infrastructure in the West Bank.

The Saudis can also provide jobs outside of the West Bank to Palestinian tech personnel and academics, some of whom were employed in the Gulf in the past but have returned to unemployment in the West Bank.

Therefore, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have to take critical decisions ahead of his meeting with President Biden in September. Does he want to return to being a legitimate leader on the international stage? If he accepts the terms of normalization, this could speed up the departure of the Ben Gvir-Smotrich alliance from his coalition and the demise of the full right-wing government, leading to the formation of a new government that could deal with these issues in a matter-of-fact manner.

Major-General Eitan Dangot concluded his extensive career as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.) in 2014. Prior to that post he served as the Military Secretary to three Ministers of Defense; Shaul Mofaz, Amir Peretz and Ehud Barak. Read full bio here.

 

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Hamas and Israel’s domestic crisis

By grisha yakubovich

When it comes to the domestic political crisis raging within Israel's borders, Hamas is currently on the fence about how to react. Hamas’s leadership in Gaza has not been taken in by the Iranian-Shi’ite axises confident pronouncements that Israel is weak and that its end is nigh. Unlike Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (which are completely dependent on Iran both ideologically and economically), Hamas is aware that democracy is one of Israel's primary strengths.

We know that Hamas recognizes this strength because, in over 30 weeks of mass political demonstrations held in Israel, Hamas has not launched a single terror attack targeting these rallies. That appears to be a deliberate choice. It is based on the calculation that assaulting the protesters will backfire, and that this would be a foolish move for Hamas. This conclusion was likely reached after Hamas completed a strategic and operational examination of its options. The review concluded with a decision, for now at least, to stay on the sidelines and “let the Jews tear themselves apart.”

 At the same time, Hamas takes advantage of the Israeli divide to advance its goal of making its narrative the dominant narrative in the Palestinian arena. Confident that the actions of the Israeli Right, which are creating increased friction with the Palestinians, will assist its efforts to position itself as the leading faction in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), Hamas has doubled down on its efforts to carry out and support terrorism in the territories. The August 4 incident in Burqa, in the West Bank, in which a Palestinian man was shot dead by an Israeli settler during clashes, is just the kind of incident that Hamas is banking on to boost its status.

As the lead Palestinian organization behind terrorist attacks, Hamas can present its rival, the Palestinian Authority/Fatah, as a collaborator of Israel, and depict the PA’s security operations in Jenin, following the IDF’s operation there, as part of that collaboration.

Hamas very much hopes that far-right Israeli figures, such as National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, will continue to stir up trouble in the West Bank.

Meanwhile, Hamas is also pressing Israel, Egypt, and others to increase the quantity of money entering Gaza, as a form of extortion racket, and this pressure likely led to Israel’s agreement to increase Qatari funding of Gaza’s power station by an additional three million dollars a month.

Hamas-backed launches of primitive rockets in Jenin, meanwhile, are another signal to Israel that the multi-arena threat that Hamas is building – the ability to fire rockets at Israel from Gaza, Lebanon and Syria – is now being joined by the West Bank.

Hamas has a firm understanding of the Israeli psyche, with its top leaders, like Yahya Sinwar, having spent many years in Israeli prisons. That’s why in early August, Hamas released an image of the firearm it seized from IDF soldier Hadar Goldin, who was killed in action and whose body is held by the organization as a bargaining chip for a future prisoner swap.

Hamas sees that Israel is refraining from a forceful response against Hezbollah’s stepped-up provocations from Lebanon and is responding with a campaign of threats of its own.

Looking ahead, all of this places Hamas in a better position ahead of the departure of PA President Mahmoud Abbas from the scene. While Hamas is aware that Israel would not permit it to establish a regime in the West Bank as it has in Gaza, it is planning a different kind of maneuver, based on replicating the democratic claim to legitimacy that it sees in Israel.

Hamas will claim, not without justification, that most West Bank Palestinian voters want it in power. It is therefore likely to hold mass rallies and attempted takeovers of PA power centers, based on the democratic claim.

It is still unclear whether Hamas plans to plant one of its people as future president of the PA, or as a future secretary-general of the PLO, but what is highly likely is that it will choose a legal–democratic channel to try and seize power. Hamas may also try to re-establish a majority in the Palestinian parliament, much like Hezbollah has done in Lebanon. This is Hamas’s next significant objective – and it is searching for ways to exploit Israel’s moment of crisis to help advance it.

Should it succeed, the Oslo Accords would likely be scrapped, and Israel would probably go back to a military-combat posture regarding the West Bank.

As such, when Hamas views the mass protests in Israel and claims by both sides within the Israeli divide of representing a democratic majority, it sees the blueprints for its takeover plan of the West Bank. This scenario, if it plays out, places Israel in a more precarious position than an attempted Hamas armed coup would in the West Bank. It reduces Israel’s room for political maneuvering.

Ultimately, Israel’s working assumption when preparing for Hamas’s next steps should be that Hamas’s leadership knows Israelis better than we know ourselves.

When Hamas looks around the region and views the rise in power of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis and the perceived weakening of the U.S. alliance system, it draws encouragement. When it sees Israel fighting itself, it draws even greater encouragement, and this will guide Hamas as it enters the post-Abbas succession battle. 

Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.). Read full bio here.

 

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Israel's Defense Must Not Be Held Hostage

By jeremiah rozman

Over the past few months, hundreds of thousands of Israelis have turned out to protest judicial reform. The discourse on this issue is fraught with doomsday hyperbole. As a result, there is the potential for serious economic damage and a rift with the United States.

However, this pales in comparison to the danger represented by a movement—championed by some prominent leaders and politicians—that calls on reservists to refuse their obligation to serve: In essence, a call for mutiny.

This is not within the realm of legal protest. It cynically seeks to hold Israel’s security hostage if unelected elements do not get their way, and does so in the name of defending democracy.

Contrary to hyperbole about judicial reform being the “end of democracy,” it would, in fact, make Israel’s Supreme Court more accountable to the Knesset, Israel’s elected branch of government. Clearly, this is not the end of democracy.

The dispute over reforms is a policy dispute. In fact, it is a rather mundane one, considering that, absurdly, it remains possible for Israel’s judiciary to rule against the reforms.

Gullible people might believe that judicial reform poses an existential threat to Israel’s democracy. The cynical people driving the movement know this is false. They claim it is such a threat because only extreme danger can justify extreme actions such as soliciting mutiny.

This attempt to coerce political change by threatening to degrade Israel’s security is akin to a toxic partner threatening self-harm if they do not get their way. Supporters of the refusal movement explicitly say so.

For example, a member of the Brothers in Arms organization stated outright, “If the overhaul bills are passed, we and tens of thousands more who are with us will stop volunteering for reserve duty. … The army is disintegrating before your eyes.” Addressing Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, he stated, “We expect you to stand up and say that you will not vote for the laws.”

In a democracy, policy differences are addressed through voting. There is nothing wrong with opposing judicial reform. Peaceful protest is protected. But mutiny is criminal.

As IDF Chief of Staff Herzl Halevi said, “Hezbollah and Hamas have one goal, and that is to destroy Israel; they do not care what kind of judiciary it has.”

Some 10,000 IDF reservists, including 1,000 Air Force reservists, have stated their refusal to serve in protest of judicial reform. Israel has a small active military. Mandatory reserves allow Israel to field a military capable of deterring and, if need be, defeating regional threats despite its small population.

Many reservists fill critical roles, especially pilots and elite soldiers like the Yahalom unit’s combat engineers. 160 such reservists recently refused to serve. These soldiers are expensive to train, meet difficult standards and conduct critical missions.

The refusal movement also threatens the active service. Defense analyst Amos Harel noted, “In brigades, they’re talking about ‘our’ units and ‘their’ units as solidarity erodes during the judicial overhaul.”

Ministers Miki Zohar and Itamar Ben Gvir stressed this point, sharing a staged video showing ground forces asking for aerial support and pilots asking them their position on judicial reform. A dying soldier then says, “My brothers, from right and left, don’t put politics in the army.” This political theater makes a valid point.

Israel won its independence because numerous identity groups worked together. There was a religious-secular divide, a socialist-capitalist divide, a Sephardi-Ashkenazi divide, a Western European-Eastern European divide and so on. But all these factions shared the goal of a secure Jewish homeland.

They almost failed to achieve it. When independence was declared, Israel had to decide whether to permit the existence of a separate military structure loyal to a separate political faction. But despite a bitter rivalry, the Etzel and the Haganah collaborated during the 1948 War of Independence.

Towards the end of the war, however, Diaspora supporters sent the Etzel a shipment of critical arms on a ship called the Altalena. The Haganah was ordered to fire on the ship if it refused to hand over those arms to the new Israel Defense Forces. It did so.

As difficult as this decision was, it is unlikely that Israel would have survived without a unified military that obeyed the lawful orders of the democratically elected government.

Imagine the precedent set by legitimizing refusal to serve on political grounds. Will soldiers serve only under governments they support?

The optimal solution to this crisis is top-down and bottom-up persuasion through an appeal to common sense and unity. 80,000 reservists have signed a petition against refusal and elite units have condemned refusal as well.

Those inclined to refuse must listen to those on their side of the political divide. Protest leaders and politicians should stress the need to protest through means that do not harm security or democracy. National Unity Party head and former IDF chief of staff Benny Gantz has done so, despite opposing Netanyahu and judicial reform.

Finally, only persuasion can retain the high-quality volunteers who serve in the reserves. A suboptimal solution is punishment, including dismissal, fines and the requirement to pay back benefits.

When soldiers refused to serve during the disengagement from Gaza, they faced military justice. Although punishment should be the last resort, it is preferable to capitulation, which legitimizes mutiny as a way to coerce policy changes. It is also better than ignoring the problem, which degrades readiness and divides the military.

In the lead-up to the destruction of the Second Temple, zealots failed to convince the Jewish leadership in Jerusalem to attack the Romans instead of waiting out the siege. They burned Jerusalem’s food and supplies stores to render that option impossible.

The resulting calamity is a warning against drastic unilateral action that harms Israel’s security. It is fine to have policy preferences and to use legal means to promote them. But Israel was established to defend the Jewish people. This defense must not be held hostage.

The views expressed do not reflect the position of the U.S. government or military and are the author's own.

Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Read full bio here.

 

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It’s time to put out Israel’s political fires

By DANIELLE ROTH-AVNERI

At a conservative estimate, around two-and-a-half months should suffice to douse the political flames engulfing Israel, which have left not a single person in Israeli society unaffected, be they on the Right or Left.    

What we have witnessed over the past few months is a quiet civil war, one that is being fought not with arrows or physical blows, but rather on social media networks and within groups of friends and families.

Meanwhile, the Knesset has just begun a two-and-a-half-month-long recess, during which time, anything can happen in Israel’s political reality. August is a time for families to go on vacation, with kids off school. In September, the High Holy Days continue the vacation mode, with an added spiritual, national, and cognitive effect created by the powerful holiday of Yom Kippur.

The Knesset will reconvene in mid-October, and by then we will know whether the recess allowed enough time for heads to cool in the aftermath of the passing of the coalition's amendment to the Basic Law: The Judiciary, also known as the reasonableness standard bill, restricting the power of the Supreme Court to use the reasonableness doctrine to review government decisions.  

Currently, the country is still at boiling point, and the gulf that separates the two sides is vast. One side believes that a very minor law was passed and that it had to be passed to demonstrate to conservative voters that the Right has not capitulated on issues pertaining to judicial reform and that the Left does not run the government.

On the other hand, for this law to pass, there needed to be a complete consensus among all members of the government because of the opposition to it within the military. The uprising within the ranks, which included threats by reservist pilots and elite reserve combat unit members not to show up for service, ended up being the driving force behind the passage of this law.

This is something the government could not have given in to: The refusal card puts the safety of the State of Israel in jeopardy. When it comes to military no-shows, the government correctly felt that if it gave in, the no-show card would be pulled out of the deck in other scenarios in the future.

Two camps have formed within the coalition. One faction within the Likud and other coalition parties believes the legislative process should be carried out in its entirety right now. This group is led by Justice Minister Yariv Levin and his confidants. After getting the law passed, some members of this hawkish and ultra-rightist group took a selfie in the Knesset that was highly insensitive; there was no need for them to rub salt in the opposition’s wound. After winning, they ought to have shown some modesty.

A second group within the Likud believes that now is the time to calm the situation before making any further moves. This group believes that it is necessary to arrive at a broad consensus on the future of judicial reform, most critically on the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. Deciding the future of this committee, which appoints justices to the Supreme Court, is the next major milestone of the judicial reform drama. It is already clear that at this stage in the proceedings whatever happens on this count, the proposal will fall short of the coalition’s original plans.

Meanwhile, the demonstrations on Israeli streets warning of dictatorship spread all manner of libel against Israel. The claims of a dictatorship are simply baseless. Former senior politicians promoted this narrative within the protest movement, but anyone familiar with politics, strategy, and political campaigns is aware that the objective of the protest movement is to remove Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from office.

The protest campaigns began a long time before judicial reform did. Notably, politicians from the opposition are being completely excluded from the movement. This means that the movement itself is a political development in the making, which could result in the formation of a new party.

All in all, the heads of the protest movement are exploiting circumstances to promote their agenda, and many of them have fallen in love with protests for protest’s sake.

Despite their rhetoric, Israel will not transition into a dictatorship. The amendment to the reasonableness standard does not spell the end of democracy.

The State of Israel is not a perfect country, and many things need to be fixed. It is not sustainable to have a situation in which the government will conclude that it is powerless to make changes. On the other hand, with all due respect to Justice Minister Levin, the government needs to realize that there are more pressing things for it to deal with right now.  

We have an education system that is slowly disintegrating, a health system that requires an emergency transfusion, and security challenges on all fronts.

It is time to end the control over the political situation by extreme elements on the Right as well as the Left. This means moderating future government steps and ending anarchy on the streets, where, during a protest, a mother was attacked in her vehicle while children were inside, or where a driver drove into protesters.

How did we stoop to this new low? Many of Israel’s adversaries are clasping their hands with excitement at these scenes.

Regardless, in the end, it is Netanyahu who will decide what the next move is. He is watching the polls carefully and sees that his situation has deteriorated very significantly since the judicial reform began. Given the damage done so far, it is fair to assume that his motivation to continue with judicial reform is extremely low.  

Netanyahu will continue his wait-and-see approach before deciding what to do vis-à-vis the Judicial Selection Committee. He will wait to see what new developments surface before taking his next step.

In late July, Netanyahu was taken to hospital by ambulance. He claimed to be suffering from dehydration. When the most qualified cardiologists in the State of Israel were rushed to his side, everybody understood that there had been some kind of cardiac event, and he later received a pacemaker. The flames burning in Israel affect the entire country, including the heart of the prime minister.

Danielle Roth-Avneri is a political commentator & panelist on Morning World and various current affairs news programs on television. She is a former Knesset reporter, news editor and columnist for the newspaper Israel Hayom. Read full bio here.

 

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