PODCAST: TARGETED KILLINGS: STRATEGIC ASSET?
PODCAST: SOVEREIGNTY; IS IT REALLY WORTH IT?
PODCAST: A Conversation With The Former Deputy Commissioner
WHO BY CELLPHONE? WHO BY MISSILE? WHO BY BOMBING? ISRAEL'S TARGETED KILLINGS WILL CONTINUE
By David Hacham
After a five year moratorium, Israel's targeted killings reemerged in November of last year when the IDF conducted a missile strike against the Northern Brigade commander of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Bahaa Abu Al-Ata, in Gaza.
The IDF emphasized that Al-Ata had become a ticking time bomb who refused to respond to prior warnings. The strike led to a 48-hour round of intense escalation.
The use of targeted killings has stirred animated controversies, and has led many, particularly overseas human rights organizations, to criticize Israel's policy. Such organizations perceive it as an illegitimate and immoral policy, describing it as "an execution without trial."
Yet, in the conditions of today, targeted killings remain a vital part of Israel's ongoing strategy, one which will likely be used again in the future in order to maintain our clear-cut advantage in the war against terrorism.
Israel's advanced operational and intelligence capabilities, and determination to implement surgical killings, constitute a source of constant threat to those seeking to harm it's security.
One need only look at the list of those targeted for killing in order to understand the anxiety the practice causes among Israel's enemies.
Hamas founder and leader, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, was killed in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza on March 22, 2004, while his successor, Dr. Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi, was killed weeks later, on April 17, 2004. On April 16, 1988, an elite IDF unit assassinated one of Fatah's key founders in Tunis, Khalil Al-Wazir, also known as Abu Jihad.
Sheikh Yassin played a central role in the founding of Hamas. I knew him - personally - and held many meetings with him, both in my office and in his Gazan home, when I served as head of the Arab Affairs Department in the IDF's Military Administration of Gaza during the years of the First Intifada, from 1987 to 1993.
Despite his total physical disability, Yassin was able to ingeniously seize upon a grave strategic error committed by Israel in 1987, when it approved the founding of the Al-Mujama Al-Islami religious charity association. Throughout the 1980s, Yassin consolidated his position in Gaza through the use of 'Da'wa' - establishing a wide Islamist religious civilian infrastructure, and using it to take over institutions and associations for the purpose of boosting his status as a rival to the nationalist Fatah movement.
Yassin was laying down the building blocks for what would evolve into Hamas. Hamas officially came into being during the early days of the First Intifada, which erupted on December 9, 1987.
Rantisi, a pediatrician by profession, replaced Sheikh Yassin as Hamas leader. Like Yassin, I knew Rantisi well from my military service in Gaza. It was impossible to miss his burning hatred of Israel and Jews. Each time we'd meet, I'd feel his hateful gaze upon me. Rantisi was also a founding member of Hamas, and he was one of the 415 Hamas and Palestinian (PIJ) terrorists deported to Lebanon in December 1992 by the Rabin government in response to the kidnapping and murder of Israeli Border Policeman Nissim Toledano. Rantisi spent a year in a southern Lebanese camp, during which time he stood out as a leader and a speaker, and rose to a senior, unshakeable position within the organization.
Another senior terror figure who was eliminated from the scene through a targeted operation was Fathi Al-Shkaki, a founder and first operational head of PIJ. He was killed in Malta on October 26, 1995, in a Mossad special operation. I knew Shkaki very well. He studied medicine in Egypt, where he was first exposed to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Upon his return to Gaza, he became active in PIJ. He was arrested by Israel in 1986, and expelled to Lebanon in 1988 during the First Intifada. After his expulsion, Shkaki was able to reorganize PIJ into a deadly terror group, and assume the role of its exclusive leader.
An additional prominent figure targeted by Israel for assassination was Yahya Ayash, also known as 'the engineer,' a senior Hamas operative who masterminded many deadly suicide bombings against Israelis in the 1990s. Yahya's killing occurred on January 5, 1996, through a boobytrapped cell phone, in which 50 grams of explosives had been planted. Ayash was in a hideout apartment in Bet Lahiya in northern Gaza when he received the phone from a Shin Bet Palestinian agent. The killing was the product of a complex and sophisticated operation, which included meticulous planning, and outside-of-the-box thinking.
In December 2006, the High Court of Israel ruled that striking those taking a direct part in hostile, violent activities is a legitimate tool, but can only be used in order to prevent future attacks, rather than as retribution, revenge, punishment, or deterrence.
The ruling also said that the harm to noncombatants has to meet standards of proportionality to the military value of the target. Many bitter arguments in Israel arose over targeted killings, most prominently, after the July 2002 air strike that killed Hamas operative Salah Shhada, alongside 14 civilians in a Gazan residential building.
The Israeli government set up a committee to check the IDF's conduct in that incident, and found that no criminal offenses were committed. But it did find that an intelligence failure had occurred causing disproportionate harm to civilians.
Looking back, there can be no dispute that targeted killings form one of the most critical and important methods Israel has in its long-term war against terrorism. The end objective is to minimize the scope of terror attacks by removing those who plot and initiate operations from the scene. Such strikes cause significant harm to operational terror capabilities, morale, and future motivation to implement terror attacks.
Targeted killings stir fear among those terrorists seeking to do harm. Their use pushes terror organizations into defensive positions. They have a paralyzing effect, at least temporarily. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the influence of this tool is ultimately limited and short-term.
After the initial shock, new operatives rise up and fill the ranks, but the very real threat of their removal, as was the case with Rantisi, successor to Sheikh Yassin, looms large; as it is intended to do.
David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.
ISRAEL SHOULD APPLY SOVEREIGNTY AND REJECT THE TRUMP PEACE PROPOSAL
BY Benjamin Anthony & David Benger
Regardless of how far-reaching or limited, immediate or gradual the process may actually be, Israel should apply sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, but it must not do so under the framework of the Trump peace plan. That plan, if implemented, exacerbates all of Israel’s present security concerns and leaves it with no discernible advantages. Israel’s sovereignty over the Jordan Valley must be decoupled from the Trump plan, therefore.
The extension of Israeli sovereignty is a policy consonant with the principled, decades-long held view of Israeli leaders that Israel must retain security control over the Jordan valley.
That bedrock of Israeli national security, combined with the continued growth of Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria, has increased the calls for international recognition of Israeli sovereignty in those areas, the recognition of which would enshrine Israel's national security imperatives in law and resolve the somewhat purgatorial status of Israelis who live there.
Indeed, Israel should have recognized its own sovereignty over Judea and Samaria long ago, just as it did over the Golan Heights in 1981, but it has not yet done so. Instead, it has deferred any decisive legislative action vis-à-vis the Jordan Valley right up to the present day.
Absent an Israeli declaration, the Trump plan is now the voice most openly calling for the recognition of Israeli sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, something that has pleased many observers who value the importance of Israel affixing its eastern border. The unfortunate consequence of this is that the Trump administration seems a more strident supporter of the idea than do many Israeli policy makers.
A thorough analysis of the plan reveals that the concessions requested of the Israelis in exchange for American support of sovereignty extension are far too great for Israel to accept or work from as a basis for negotiation.
Heavily conditioned upon a change in Palestinian behavior though the plan is, it encourages negotiations on issues that Israel has long considered non-negotiable, to a degree that is unpalatable and unacceptable.
First: the question of Jerusalem. The Trump Plan explicitly proposes that the capital of a future Palestinian state is to be situated in East Jerusalem. It states:
“The sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem...and could be named Al Quds..Jerusalem should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Israel. Al Quds…should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Palestine."
If Israel applies sovereignty to the Jordan Valley as part of the Trump plan, it will be doing so while knowingly elevating the partition of Jerusalem to a legitimate subject for negotiation. Jerusalem is the eternal and indivisible capital of the Jewish people. President Trump cannot be allowed to play King Solomon with that city.
Second, the plan explicitly calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria. By applying sovereignty over the Jordan Valley as part of the deal, Israelis themselves will be party to a proposal that anchors a Palestinian state in the heartland of the Jewish people's ancient homeland.
This would expose Israel to a potentially belligerent Palestine perched atop the Judean hills. Such a Palestine would enjoy a topographical advantage over Israel's most densely populated civilian areas and industrial sectors, including Tel Aviv.
This plan defies the ideological and religious principles of many Israelis who support sovereignty.
It wantonly ignores the pyrrhic price Israel could be required to pay, according to the plan itself, promoted as it is by a transactional American president who, beyond November, will be free from reelection considerations, and who will likely be in pursuit of a foreign policy legacy.
Third, this plan dangerously resurrects the widely discredited “land for peace” strategy that harmed Israel’s security interests in the past and continues to do so in the present. It encourages further concessions of Israeli land, specifically in the Negev region, for the stated purpose of expanding the Gaza Strip.
Gaza has been a haven for terrorists since the Israeli withdrawal from the enclave in 2005. There is no evidence to support the idea that an expansion of Gaza’s borders into Israel will improve the situation.
In essence, the plan offers Israeli land adjacent to the Gaza strip, that has been cultivated and inhabited by Israelis for a century – and which is in no way disputed – to an enemy state. It effectively calls for the affixing of Israel’s eastern border with Jordan, with whom Israel has a peace treaty, at the cost of further ensnaring over a million Israelis within a reality of continuing, sustained, indiscriminate rocket barrages from an ever larger launching pad to Israel’s west.
Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, stated that “It is in the Negev where the creativity and pioneering vigor of Israel will be tested.” Ceding Israeli land in that part of the country will destroy that vision.
In addition to the many flaws particular to the Trump plan, it’s high time that Israel disentangles itself from US-brokered peace processes writ large. Historically, peace deals brokered by Americans have not aged well for Israelis. Every concession to the Palestinians simply becomes the starting point for the next round of negotiations, while Israel gains nothing in return; not peace, nor quiet, nor international legitimacy.
No other sovereign nation awaits the permission of the United States of America when deciding its domestic affairs and priorities, as Israel has done. The parameters of the Trump plan prove that it is not in Israel’s interests to continue to do so, despite the long-standing bonds between the two countries.
If the American 'quid' is the recognition of Israeli sovereignty over land Israel already legitimately holds, Israel’s 'quo' must not be the division of its capital, the anchoring of a Palestinian state in its heartland, the ceding of further land, and the placement of its citizens in yet greater danger.
Israel must reject the Trump plan outright. It only endangers Israel further. Instead, Israel should assert full effective civil control over the Jordan Valley, and arrive at the next negotiation from a place of strength.
Benjamin Anthony, Co-Founder & CEO of the MirYam Institute, brings considerable experience and expertise to his position in the areas of substantive, policy driven dialogue and debate about the State of Israel throughout the international community. His portfolio includes the coordination of high level briefings by senior members of the Israel defense establishment - active and retired - to elected officials; including within the US Administration, the US Senate, and the US House of Representatives, on matters relating to the state of Israel and her strategic relationship and positioning in an international context.
David Benger is a 3rd year JD student at Harvard Law School. At Harvard, David is the chapter president of Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under the Law, and the Events Chair of the HLS Alliance for Israel. He is also an editor on the Journal of Law and Public Policy and the HLS National Security Journal.
DEBATE VIDEO: SHOULD ISRAEL APPLY SOVEREIGNTY NOW?
The Latest In The MirYam Institute Debate Series
BLM, Israel and the Dangers of Intersectionality
By Elana Dushey
In the past month, America has transformed from a landscape of empty streets under COVID-19 lockdown to streets crowded with protesters, vocalizing anger and grief over generations of Black suffering due to systemic American racism. Catalyzed by the murder of George Floyd at the hands of police officers, the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement is energized, and the fantasy that racism no longer exists in America is being publicly and collectively debunked. BLM has the soap box and the world is listening.
American racism is not merely a police issue. The fact that racism is rampant in interactions between police officers and Black civilians is telling: it suggests that 21st century American racism is rooted so deeply in the American psyche that the Black body is often unlawfully and immorally viewed as a threat.
But police (and not all police) are not the only Americans guilty of racism; police/civilian racism is symptomatic of the undercurrent of racism in America as a whole. This recognition reveals the imperative for self and collective examination, insisting on a space for quiet reflection, listening, and learning, despite the discomfort that may arise from those findings; at its best, the BLM movement is simultaneously encouraging hyper dynamism and hyper reflection — and, if Americans nurture both equally, we will witness great and constructive change. Like many Americans, I am examining my inner and outer world to determine how I can contribute to an equitable and just America. Because I insist on examining nuance, I concurrently respect lawful law enforcement and support BLM because it is the voice of needed change.
However, for me, as a Zionist, Jewish American, my support of BLM becomes complicated, as BLM’s agenda is repeatedly exploited by the problematic umbrella of intersectionality — an ideology that overlaps categories of identity based on perceived shared experiences of discrimination.
Intersectionality lumps groups of people — despite their historical, cultural, political, and social differences — into an overly simplified binary of oppressed vs. oppressor. Intersectionality may be well-intentioned, despite its intellectual flaws, but when it comes to Israel, intersectionality becomes a veiled and hypocritical discourse to spew antisemitism.
Now to the detriment of Black and Jewish Americans, BLM protests/activism have become locations for intersectionality — and thus platforms to vilify Israel and create inaccurate parallels between racism in America and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Here are some examples:
In an effort to blame Israel for Minnesota police officer Derek Chauvin’s murderous behavior, a pro-Palestinian group began a widely circulated tweet which claimed that the Minneapolis police department was trained by the IDF- an absurdly illogical connection that can only be attributed to antisemitism.
Protestors desecrated synagogues across the nation, including one in LA-by spray painting “F—k Israel” on its facade.
In a protest in my own town, one of the organizers boldly asserted that American racism is akin to Israeli oppression.
Linda Sarsour’s MPower Juneteenth gathering unabashedly advertised that it was “open to all, minus cops and Zionists.” The audaciousness of such a caveat is terrifying considering the protest was at Gracie Mansion — the official residence of the New York mayor.
Anti-Israel rhetoric is antisemitic. But intersectionality constructs an arena where antisemitism can thrive behind the veil of supposed social justice. Because the rhetorical flaws of intersectionality erase social and historical nuance it also feeds the tribalized discourse that America has fallen prey to. Particularly among liberal circles, the Jewish self-determination has been irresponsibly translated into a narrative of Jewish oppression, and colonialism — a gross misrepresentation. But I am not writing to address those inaccurate accusations against Israel.
I’m writing to discuss how I can negotiate the contradiction of supporting the BLM movement, while recognizing how it is often misused to disseminate false information about Israel. In tribalist fashion, do I abandon my support of BLM because its surrounding discourse has perpetuated anti-Zionism (and antisemitism)?
No, I don’t, because I won’t abandon my Black American brothers and sisters in their cause. Nevertheless, in the spirit of honesty and self-examination, that I hope becomes the zeitgeist of our time, I look at the parallels that are drawn between Black Americans and Palestinians, despite their inaccuracies, and try to learn something:
In Israel, is the Palestinian/Israeli dynamic one in which Palestinians experience racism? Do Israelis view the Palestinian individual as a threat? In the Palestinian territories, anti-Jewish/Israeli hatred is academically and systemically indoctrinated. Martyrdom is encouraged and glorified. Palestinians have consistently launched or attempted to launch terror attacks against Israelis, including via rocket fire, suicide/homicide bombings, car rammings and stabbings. As such, Israel must constantly identify and subdue legitimate and violent threats from Palestinians, while still not succumbing to stereotyping and racism. Does Israel always succeed with this balance? I hope so. But I don’t know.
I do know, however, that Israeli/Palestinian conflict was not engendered from Israeli racism and colonialism, as BDS asserts. The situation, including Palestinian suffering, was borne from a complex historical reality too long to describe here. But in addition to Israel’s involvement, the Palestinian leadership has greatly contributed to the challenges both groups face by exploiting its own people and rejecting multiple opportunities for peace and economic betterment.
Still, to eradicate racism, should Jews look inwardly and question if they view Palestinian bodies differently than they view Jewish and Israeli bodies? Yes, absolutely. That type of self-examination is a constructive result of paralleling Black Americans and Palestinians. But that is where the constructive nature of it ends.
Labeling Israel as the “oppressor” is inaccurate and dangerous — not only to Jews, who have been suffering from an exponential rise in hate crimes, and who have historically/continuously advocated for Black American civil liberties — but it is also destructive to Black Americans, who will gain nothing by the vilification of Israel.
Now is the time to give Black Americans their platform to speak, without allowing other groups to exploit that platform with hate. Let’s hear BLM so we can self-examine and learn to create a better America for Black Americans. We need honesty and accuracy now, not grotesque over-simplifications and the lies of intersectionality. Let us empower BLM to be a model of how to combat social injustice with passion, intellectual honesty and nuanced discourse; we should discuss Israel-related issues, but not in context with BLM.
Elana Hornblass Dushey earned her PhD in English Literature from Fordham University in 2015 with a dissertation that focused on Jewish American literature and its approach to Zionism and Israel. For 12 years, she taught literature, composition, and film at St. Johns University and Fordham University, where she was awarded numerous fellowships. Following her degree, she was a Connected Academic Fellow in the Modern Language Association.
Israel Should Extend Sovereignty to the Jordan Valley Now
By Jeremiah Rozman
There is strong consensus among Israel’s defense establishment that Israel must maintain a permanent military presence in the Jordan Valley. Extending sovereignty is the best way to secure that. Sovereignty also facilitates peace talks by removing a non-starter from the discourse. Sovereignty’s benefits outweigh the risks, while continuing the status quo harms growth, does not prevent international scorn and entails long-term risks. Israel should seize the opportunity provided by its historically large government, the Trump administration’s “Peace to Prosperity” vision, and favorable international conditions to extend sovereignty to the Jordan Valley.
The Jordan Valley’s strategic importance
Prime Ministers spanning Israel’s political spectrum, including: Rabin, Barak, Sharon and Netanyahu, all staunchly supported retaining permanent control of the Jordan Valley. Military control allows Israel to enforce the demilitarization of a future Palestinian entity, defend against conventional attack, deter and prevent forces from destabilizing Jordan, and mobilize reservists along interior lines.
Past withdrawals have failed to achieve peace, weakening Israel’s security in the process. Understanding these lessons, no responsible leader should cede control over strategic territory in an unstable region, to an untrustworthy entity. Israel’s evolving defensive capabilities do not minimize the importance of territorial control. Active defense entails taking fire which hurts Israel’s economy and traumatizes its citizens. The less Israel has to rely on it, the better.
Israeli control of the Jordan Valley is key to preventing the “Gazafication” of any future Palestinian sovereign entity. Without it, militants can infiltrate from anywhere in the Middle East, extending Iran’s reach, and that of other militants, to territory bordering the Jerusalem-Ashdod-Haifa triangle, home to 70 percent of Israel’s population and 80 percent of its economic infrastructure. Foreign forces and “trip-wires” cannot prevent this. For example, the United Nations failed to enforce Hezbollah disarmament following the 2006 Lebanon War.
Sovereignty, not status-quo
60% of Israelis with a clear opinion want the government to extend sovereignty to the Jordan Valley. Some experts argue that sovereignty would unnecessarily focus negative attention upon Israel, and they advocate for Israel to simply continue building “facts on the ground.” Such an approach has not shielded Israel from international condemnation in the past.
Continuing the status quo neither moves the peace process forward, nor enhances Israel’s future prospects. It asks Israel to 'play dumb' and assumes that the international community and the Palestinians will play along indefinitely. This risks Israel being pressured into a withdrawal from the Jordan Valley in the next peace process as it was under the 2013 John Kerry led initiative.
Israel has historically failed to maintain a military presence beyond its borders. Extending sovereignty now, under the auspices of a U.S. proposal, would create a powerful political “fact on the ground,” while continued limbo disincentivizes investment in civil infrastructure needed to build a de-facto presence.
The Risks
The Jordan Valley contains only 58,000 Palestinian Arabs who will likely remain under PA sovereignty. The demographic risk is a non-issue. Sovereignty enjoys significant public support and diplomatic risks are overblown.
The Palestinian Authority
Israel’s mutually beneficial cooperation with the PA is unlikely to suffer significantly. Abbas’s oft-repeated threat to cut security ties is hollow. The PA relies on the IDF to keep Hamas from throwing its men off of roofs as they did in Gaza. This is why despite numerous threats, in practice, the PA will likely continue security cooperation.
Jordan
Israel and the U.S. both desire good relations with Jordan. However, Jordan faces severe challenges to its stability, relies heavily on U.S. support, and benefits from the IDF securing its western border. It is therefore unlikely to curtail cooperation over territory that it ceded its claim to in 1988. Senior Jordanian officials have reportedly signaled this position repeatedly to Israel and to other leaders involved in the U.S. led peace initiative.
Regional powers
Increased threat from Iran and decreased importance of Middle Eastern oil lead regional powers to seek stronger ties with the U.S. and Israel. Several Arab countries are quietly backing the U.S. plan allowing Israel to extend sovereignty. Senior Saudi officials reportedly said that for many Arab states, official opposition is for show.
The E.U. and international bodies
The EU has voiced strong opposition to Israel’s sovereignty plans. Hungary and Austria have prevented unanimous condemnation and will likely make it impossible for it to impose sanctions on Israel, while mutually beneficial trade and defense ties are unlikely to suffer much.
The International Criminal Court (ICC) also expressed concern. In the past it has sought to prosecute Israelis for fighting Hamas. If Israel is criticized for defending itself against a terrorist entity which calls for genocide in its charter, there is little reason to believe that it can ever avoid being the target of a double standard by the ICC or other international bodies. The U.S. recently rejected the ICC’s power to charge its troops. Its authority should not be overestimated.
The U.S.
The Trump administration’s approach to Israel has gained rising legitimacy as its political opponents’ predictions of “a regional explosion” over moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem or recognizing Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights failed to materialize. U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo’s most recent statements called extending sovereignty “a decision for the Israeli government.” He noted regional support and expressed disappointment over the PA’s refusal to participate in negotiations. Future administrations from either party are unlikely to pressure Israel to withdraw once sovereignty is an established fact. Nor would they be likely to curtail defense, intelligence, trade or diplomatic relations which enjoy strong congressional and popular support.
Conclusion
There is broad consensus that Israel must maintain military control in the Jordan Valley. Continuing the status quo does Israel no favors, while the risks of extending sovereignty are likely overblown. Sovereignty reduces the likelihood that Israel will be pressured into further withdrawal. It also removes ambiguity, enhancing Israel’s ability to build infrastructure. This will yield economic as well as security dividends. Israel should seize the current opportunity. Long-term ambiguity is not in Israel’s interest despite it consistently being the easier short-term route.
Jeremiah Rozman currently works as the National Security Analyst at a DC-based think tank. From 2006-2009 he served as an infantryman in the IDF. His regional expertise is in the Middle East and Russia. He designed and taught an undergraduate course on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
HOW ISRAEL CAN ANSWER THE CHINA QUESTION
By Efraim Chalamish
Pompeo’s recent visit to Israel during the Covid-19 pandemic and the public controversy surrounding Chinese involvement in Israel’s companies and infrastructure have intensified the discussion about the way Israel balances U.S. and Chinese interests in the region.
There is no doubt that China’s engagement with Israel has been on the rise for a few years now on all levels, including: a 5 times increase of Israeli export to China this past decade, the rising Chinese capital flows into Israel’s tech and innovation ecosystem, and the intense participation of Chinese companies in pubic tenders and key infrastructure projects.
The Israel-China economic renaissance has been driven by a well-designed government-to-government dialogue alongside strategic initiatives among public and private entities in academia, business, and NGOs.
Yet, very little attention has been paid to the need to balance the multiple interests in the region. The Israel-US unique nexus and the Israel-China track have been perceived as parallel, with limited points of intersection. However, this might have to change as the Trump Administration perceives China as a strategic threat and as China’s involvement in Israel expands to include Israeli strategic assets, such as its ports.
The growing calls from Washington and other parts of the international security community to reduce Israel’s dependence on China have been characterized as a zero-sum game.
That said, recent experience shows that Israel can navigate this potential crisis well and should continue the constructive dialogue with both nations concurrently.
First, Israel is not the first nation to chart these waters and should learn from the experiences of others. The EU and its member states are facing similar dilemmas. When Mathias Dopfner, the CEO of influential media conglomerate Axel Springer, called for an economic and tech ‘de-coupling’ from China post-Covid19, many European politicians and business leaders criticized him for picking a side.
On a related note, various countries had to decide if and how to implement Chinese 5G technology, while the U.S. administration has been trying to prevent such adoption.
Most countries found a middle ground by allowing Chinese 5G technology in certain parts of the market that are more secured. The British government, for one, announced at the beginning of 2020 that it would cap Huawei’s market share at 35% and exclude the vendor from sensitive locations.
That decision was criticized by a Chinese PR campaign and is under review by the UK government for security reasons. While Chinese companies are currently excluded from Israel’s 5G technology push, a similar, more balanced approach, may be needed with respect to other aspects of Israel’s tech environment.
Second, the Israeli government adopted a screening mechanism for foreign investments for national security purposes. Unlike the U.S., Canada and other nations, the Israeli mechanism has been kept secret with limited execution. The ramifications are significant. The lack of transparency creates uncertainty in the market, both in Israel and China, and imposes constraints on capital flows. It also gives the impression that Israel doesn’t do enough to consider security interests and US-Israel bilateral relations.
Israel needs to open the process, engage the private sector more closely, and develop a reporting mechanism which would give the process the credibility and legitimacy necessary for its success.
Third, significant parts of the current Israel-US tension surrounding the ‘Chinese Question’ result from Trump’s specific take on trade and investment protectionist measures and the Chinese threat to U.S. allies. It is not unreasonable to think that some of these policies may change during a Biden Administration following the upcoming November 2020 elections. Many of the Israeli projects being criticized by the U.S. government are long-term and it would be prudent to re-assess them following the U.S. election season.
Fourth, several sectors in the Israeli market are lacking major U.S. participation, such as construction. The construction and renewables sectors have been dominated by European and Asian players in recent years. The U.S. government should do more to bring American players to Israel’s infrastructure space.
Fifth, as more military technologies globally are being used for civilian purposes and vice versa, there is a growing connection between ‘dual use’ export-control regime and screening of foreign investment for national security risks. The U.S. is going through a similar transition. Israel has a sophisticated export control mechanism but a very limited review process of foreign investors. Israel should bring these 2 regimes closer to each other. The tech industry has rejected the government’s review of tech investments, while embracing a careful approach to the export of sensitive technologies.
The time for change has come.
Also, any review of Chinese commercial activity should be conducted via intra-disciplinary lenses, including diplomatic, commercial, and civic factors. Israel’s National Security Council (NSC), currently responsible to execute Israel-China strategy on this matter, has been historically lacking the resources and the capabilities to support such a review.
Incidents like the military action against the Turkish flotilla in 2010 that reshaped Israel-Turkey relations emphasize the risk of over-reliance on security concerns. Empowering and strengthening the Israeli NSC should be part of the new Israel-US-China balancing act.
Finally, international trade has been shifting directions. Asian international trade, mostly from China, is now more than twice as big as America’s international trade. Israel cannot ignore the changing economic reality, and ‘de-coupling’ is less attractive in the Israeli unique economic context.
Yet, Chinese bidders have lost major tenders in Israel lately, such as the world’s largest desalination plant and Ramat Hovav’s power plant. It reflects both Israel’s policy preferences as well as new commercial and financial constraints in China. But while Israel tends to think about the here and now, China has a very long-term view on global and local markets.
Israel should show China that it knows how to address real security concerns while keeping the critical flow of inbound capital.
Balancing US and Chinese interests in the region is not an impossible task and the benefits are compelling.
Dr. Efraim Chalamish is an international economic law professor, advisor, and media commentator. He has been involved in international legal practice in New York, Paris and Israel, along with research in, and analysis of, cutting edge areas in public and private international economic law. Dr. Chalamish teaches at NYU Law School.
Annexation Would Undermine 70 Years of Israeli Foreign Policy
By Zachary Shapiro
As the July 1 annexation deadline looms, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces a fateful opportunity to write his foreign policy legacy. Should he decide to annex even part of the West Bank, he will jeopardize his own foreign policy strategy—as well as over seven decades of the Israeli doctrine.
Despite the many variations in policy between successive prime ministers, Israeli foreign policy has consistently revolved around five overarching goals: normalization; pursuing or maintaining regional stability through cold peace with Jordan; improving Israel’s standing at the United Nations; sustaining strong alliances with Western powers; and finally, cultivating a strong and bipartisan strategic partnership with the United States. A decision to annex would undermine each of these objectives and do lasting damage to Israel overseas.
Israeli leaders have long sought normalized ties with various countries. Netanyahu has made marked progress in Israel’s quest for normalization in the Middle East. He has carefully cultivated ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Sultanate of Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. Annexation in July would render Israel politically radioactive in the eyes of these new partners, halting and likely reversing Netanyahu and his predecessors’progress on this front. In a recent op-ed in Yedioth Aharonoth, Yousef Al-Otaiba, Emirati Ambassador to the United States,warned that “Israeli plans for annexation and talk of normalization are a contradiction.” He added that “Annexation will certainly and immediately upend Israeli aspirations for improved security, economic and cultural ties with the Arab world and with the UAE.” Crown Prince Mohamed Bin Zayed tweeted a pointed rejection of annexation, calling it an “illegal move.”
Applying sovereignty in the West Bank would similarly imperil the stability of Israel’s cold peace with Jordan. Israel sought a détente with Jordan for decades and has enjoyed the comforts of cold peace since 1994. Despite some challenging moments, Israel has maintained its relationship with the Hashemite Kingdom. Yet King Abdullah recently stated that “If Israel really annexed the West Bank in July, it would lead to a massive conflict” with Jordan.
All the while, annexation would set back Israel’s hard work at the United Nations by decades. In recent years, Israel’s emissaries to the UN have labored to narrow the margins of defeat on anti-Israel measures while cultivating quiet ties with unexpected partners. Outgoing Ambassador Danny Danon is proud of this recent trend in voting patterns and has touted it as one of his accomplishments. Applying sovereignty would all-but guarantee a rapid reversal of that shift, along with a litany of measures against Israel in various committees.
Annexation would sabotage Israel’s longstanding interest in maintaining solid alliances with Western powers. Israeli ties with Germany and France in particular have been useful; both countries have sold crucial military equipment to Israel and been important trade partners.
But the specter of annexation means Jerusalem can no longer count on Berlin or Paris. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas released a joint statement with Palestinian Authority Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh opposing Netanyahu’s possible plan. Adding insult to injury, a statement from the French Foreign Ministry cautioned that “This could not be without consequences for the European Union’s relations with Israel.”
Finally, a decision to apply sovereignty in the West Bank would create unprecedented instability with Israel’s most important partner, the United States. That relationship has withstood tumultuous moments under Democratic and Republican presidents alike. However, the bipartisan foundations of the relationship have shown cracks in recent years.
Since the Obama administration’s pursuit of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, the relationship has become increasingly partisan. And the Trump administration has politicized its ties with Israel like no prior presidency. Coupled with anti-Israel trends within the Democratic Party, annexation could accelerate and strengthen these political forces. Multiple Democratic presidential candidates floated the possibility of conditioning aid to Israel—a paradigm shift away from decades of liberal policy.
Prime Minister Netanyahu is a polarizing figure, but he clearly is a shrewd strategist. He has embraced all five of these strategic goals in his career. He has touted progress towards each as major achievements and has even used them in campaigns. He is clearly aware of the many drawbacks of annexation.
Critics argue that annexation will unfold like U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Many pundits predicted major political consequences that never came to fruition. But annexation is more than a de jure recognition of a de facto reality. It is a statement about the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Ultimately, threatening any one of the five tenets of Israeli foreign policy on its own could be seen as a reasonable, calculated risk—even for a prime minister who is extremely risk-averse. Taken together, they amount to an overwhelming case against annexation.
At its core, Netanyahu’s talk of annexation is political gamesmanship. That is a dangerous game for Israel to play, one that may jeopardize 72 years of Israeli strategy and tireless efforts by its diplomats.
Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
VIDEO: SIX DAYS AND D-DAY - Roundtable With Senior Israeli, US And British Commanders
THE SIX DAY WAR: A PARADIGM FROM A PREVIOUS CENTURY
By Gershon Hacohen
Following the publication of the Trump peace plan, scores of retired senior members of Israel’s defense establishment campaigned in opposition to the application of Israeli sovereignty over areas that are vital to Israel's security in Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley.
They assert that Israel will retain its ability to defend itself even if it withdraws from most of the territories conquered during the Six Day War, believing that the IDF can replicate its 1967 achievements, on demand.
Such perspectives reflect a blindness and obliviousness to the changes that have taken place over the course of several decades in the area of warfare - both in Israel, and generally.
They overestimate the IDF's power and grossly underestimate the capabilities of Israel's enemies.
The storied successes of the Six Day War resulted from unique military phenomena that nobody should reasonably expect to be repeated.
On both the Israeli Right and Left, Israel’s success continues to stir an expectation of a future ‘victory’ to which the IDF is unrealistically held.
Those former generals and commanders who took part in the 1967 conflict who still expect the IDF to achieve a victory similar to the one it did then fail to realize how fundamental the changes are between the 1967 battlefield and the theatre of today.
The Six Day War was the last military clash that occurred along the patterns of the Second World War.
The IDF operated against conventional, regular militaries that fought on the basis of British or Soviet doctrines, with full symmetry. That enabled Israel to achieve tactical and operational supremacy at every encounter.
Mechanized combat in desert surroundings, or in the open settings of the Golan Heights, enabled the IDF to identify a clear advantage over its adversaries - despite the odds it faced.
The lightning attack against the Jordanian Legion in Judea and Samaria followed similar patterns. Using a moderate number of armored and mechanized brigades, made up of conscripted and reserve forces and backed by outstanding air power, the State of Israel maximized the potency of a powerful military force, suited to the arenas in which it fought, drawn from a society of some two million citizens.
The IDF's armored formations channeled the swift offensive tactic of the German blitzkrieg of the Second World War. In the open areas of Sinai and the Golan Heights, the IDF overcame its adversaries by using modern, mechanized combat.
Since that time, Arab militaries have metamorphosized, something first demonstrated during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, under the direction of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Just a few years after The Six Day War, Arab militaries had adapted to a military process better suited to them.
Anti-tank missiles were widely distributed among infantry units - and a dense air defense system based on surface-to-air missiles, combined to create a significant obstacle that blocked and impeded a swift IDF offensive; by air, or on land.
These challenges and adaptations, designed to blunt the momentum of Israeli maneuvers, have only mutated and intensified since then.
In the modern era, and particularly after the IDF's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah has played an important role in the overall conceptual upgrade undertaken by Israel's enemies. The creativity used by Hezbollah to design its operations, out of a cognizance of where it is inferior to the IDF, is a strong example of organizational adaptation, both at the tactical and the operational levels.
Hezbollah's unique system of organization was demonstrated in its force build-up and actions; something particularly visible in the realm of widespread, unprecedented rocket fire, and its use of dense defensive systems that are dug into bunkers.
These rockets and bunkers were placed in villages, both above and below ground, and in mountainous terrain. Such diversity demonstrates their ability to exploit the environment in which it seeks to achieve its objectives, while reducing and even overcoming the IDF's areas of supremacy.
Such thinking, adapted for the environment at play, has also been applied in the Gaza Strip since 2006.
In the past three rounds of conflict between the IDF and Hamas, two core components - rocket fire and defensive strongholds - challenged the IDF and drew it into broad, multi-domain conflicts.
Israel's adversaries have traded open terrain for urban battlefields. A tank brigade is now forced to adapt itself to warfare in built-up areas and to function as a combined force with the infantry and engineering units. But unlike in the open, an infantry battalion consisting of over 400 soldiers can be swallowed whole by a single street as it tries to cleanse it of combatants. That reality has dulled the IDF’s abilities.
Additionally, as radical Islamic forces grow in numbers, so too does the fierce belief of Islamist fighters, who demonstrate a willingness and readiness to die for their cause; a reality with which we must contend in the modern battlefield.
None of these factors was at play during the Six Day War.
Each of these developments lead directly back to the heart of Israel’s domestic division over the application of sovereignty to the vital areas obtained during the Six Day War.
Those who support the traditional two-state solution do so based upon a totally false assumption; namely that Israel will be able to defend itself, by itself despite a withdrawal to pre-1967 armistice lines, something they recommend albeit with minor adaptations, and despite the surrender of any strategic depth.
Supporters of the two state solution evoke the victory of the Six Day War in order to support their position, while ignoring the massive changes that have occurred since then.
Expecting a victory similar to one Israel won in 1967 is akin to expecting a second parting of the Red Sea.
The Six Day War configuration cannot be replicated, nor can the advantageous conditions enjoyed by the IDF in 1967.
Those circumstances, and the crushing victories that resulted, belong in the previous century - as does the two state solution, for which too many commanders of the past continue to call!
Major General Gershon Hacohen served as Commander of the Northern Corps of the IDF. He previously held various positions, including Commander of the IDF Colleges, Head of Training & Doctrine Division in the General Staff, Reserve Division Commander of the Northern Command and Commander of the 7th Brigade of the IDF Armor Division.
THE SIX DAY WAR: INFLECTION POINT FOR NATIONAL AND REGIONAL TRENDS
By Yair Golan
The Six Day War of 1967 was undoubtedly a great military victory. Israel's maneuvers were mostly successful, and while no war is perfect, most battles were well-fought and won; on the northern, eastern, and southern fronts.
Tactically, at the command level – from the platoon and company level, to the division level, and beyond - were exemplary, as was Southern Command's handling of the Egyptian front. The war represented the height of the IDF's tactical success.
Those tactical victories combined to form a strategic vector, marked by significant short and long-term ramifications for the State of Israel.
In the short-term, the war led to the rise of a dangerous arrogance among the Israeli defense establishment, and a complacency that enabled Egypt and Syria to surprise Israel during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
The Six Day war led to the idea, among the military establishment and wider society, that Israel was invincible and to the trivialization of our adversaries. In the run-up to the 1973 war, Israeli leaders stated that there was no chance of another war breaking out.
Israel paid a very heavy price for that complacency.
In the longer-term, the Six Day War represented a watershed moment for Israeli society. It went on to shape the entire political map; from that day to this.
ISRAEL IN THE TERRITORIES
Our presence in the territories, which was originally intended to be short-term, and to serve as a strong bargaining chip, turned into a long-term occupation. In 1968, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol talked about returning the territories, once negotiations with Arab states ripened, but that day never came.
Instead, in Israel, a messianic movement arose. It viewed the Six Day War as the continuation of a messianic process, one which began in the 1948 War of Independence.
For religious Zionists, this chain of seminal events represented an inevitable process of divine redemption. That led to large-scale settlement construction, beginning in Gush Etzion and Hebron, and spreading out from there.
The Gush Emunim movement fueled this process further, and rightwing governments accelerated the construction.
Our presence in these territories constitutes Israel’s greatest strategic challenge; above Iran, Hezbollah or Hamas. What is at stake is Israel's identity, and the ability of different components of our society to live together.
Today, the political system is aligned along a deep fault line, created in 1967, between the pro-annexation camp and the camp that favors a separation from the Palestinians.
The long-term impact of the Six Day War continues to confound Israeli opinion. On both sides of the fault line, whether one listens to those coming from the messianic bloc or the Israeli bloc that opposes annexation, one notes that both trace their roots and rationale back to the outcome of the war, pinning their logic upon the lessons they each draw from the same events. In simple terms, the Six Day War has directly shaped our contemporary, political reality.
PALESTINIANS & PAN-ARABISM
For the Palestinians, the war demolished the hope that Arab states would come to the assistance of the Palestinian-Arabs, invade Israel, and turn back the clock.
The war represents a breaking point in the Palestinian experience. It ended their trust in Arab states, birthing a new ethos of self-reliance.
Prior to the Six Day War, Fatah was a small clique with limited resources, mostly relying upon Syrian support. After the Six Day War, it became the central Palestinian movement, and launched a series of terror attacks against Israel throughout the 1970s and 80s.
The two intifadas that occurred in recent decades directly result from the Palestinian shift, toward a mindset of handling the conflict with Israel independently; one shocked into existence after the Six Day War.
In the Arab world, the war destroyed the Pan-Arab movement, which peaked under the leadership of Egyptian President Gammal Abdel Nasser. After the resounding defeat of 1967, and the death of Nasser in 1970, Pan-Arabism lost its influence in the Middle East.
IMPACT ON THE IDF
Prior to 1967, the IDF enjoyed a healthy equilibrium among its air, land, and sea branches, and well-organized reconnaissance, artillery, and intelligence units.
As a result, it fought well.
That was undone after 1967. Based on the flawed conclusion that the tank is the most important element in the arsenal of victory, other sections of the ground forces – the infantry, artillery, and engineering – were allowed to erode.
As the IDF faced an entirely new kind of conflict – the War of Attrition launched by Arab states, with new forms of violent clashes, decision makers struggled to form clear objectives or to define what victory meant under the circumstances of attrition.
Prior to the conflict, the IDF was almost constantly training. A mere eight companies was all it dedicated to continuous security missions.
But following the conflict, the number of companies engaged in ongoing security and counter-insurgency missions grew to 66 by the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
Constant training was a thing of the past.
The burden continuous security missions place upon the IDF is a negative consequence of the war. Lacking warfare training, the IDF's combat readiness has been eroded.
While continuous security missions do instill some operational capabilities, they are no replacement for training for actual war.
The situation following the Six Day War enabled Israel's enemies to support Palestinian terrorism and insurgency, rather than seeking to tackle Israel directly; a new phenomenon that took the IDF many years to internalize and adapt to.
Despite two Palestinian uprisings and waves of terror attacks, the area of counter-insurgency still remains underdeveloped as a professional military field in the IDF.
Given the likelihood that Israel’s future generations will also have to engage in counter-insurgency missions, our military must increase its professional knowledge of this area.
The legacy of the Six Day War and the military victory that it was, looms large today. Whether we categorize those as an asset or a liability in terms of Israel’s long term future, depends on how we affix policy in the territories today.
Yair Golan is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute, a serving Member of Knesset and the immediate past Deputy Chief Of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces.
THE SIX DAY WAR: ISRAEL'S AIR FORCE SEIZES THE ADVANTAGE
By Avishai Levi
The Six Day War presents an exceptional case study of the Israeli Air Force’s ethos of military planning and preparation - something that resulted from the clear understanding that the country’s very existence rested - in no small part - upon the shoulders of its pilots, air crew and ground crews.
On land, tens of thousands of graves had been dug to be filled by the anticipated casualties of war. Our young nation felt like it was on the edge of the abyss, with powerful enemies rounding upon it in the form of several Arab militaries.
The sense throughout the defense establishment was that if Israel was to avoid what it perceived to be a looming second Holocaust, it must capitalize upon the first opportunity to push back the threats massing against it to the north and, much more forebodingly, to the south. Primary among those threats was the mighty Egyptian Air Force.
A failure to preempt those dangers would have left us imperiled.
It would rely upon intelligence gathering, doctrinal contrarianism, logistical daring, the exploitation of the mundane and communications discipline.
INTELLIGENCE
Israel acquired and deciphered detailed intelligence as it studied its enemies. As they built up their military forces and declared their intention to eliminate the Jewish state, Israel observed.
In 1967, Arab militaries based much of their strategy and battle doctrine on Soviet concepts; a doctrine Israel closely studied. Combined with the ongoing intelligence effort, Israel came to receive rivers of information on the military capabilities of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan - both in the air and on land.
As a result, we deduced the tactical and strategic calculations of enemy commanders, turning that information to our advantage.
This was particularly true in the case of Nasser's Egypt; the leader of the Arab world.
Compared to the air forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, the IAF had to concede that it suffered from a massive shortage of planes.
Because our forces were so scant, a strict prioritization of targets was required and priority number one was hitting the Egyptian Air Force - before it left the runway - in a daring mission known as Operation Moked.
DOCTRINAL CONTRARIANISM
Calibrated to a precision of seconds and meters, the strike required the dispatch of the maximum number of planes possible for a wave of attacks against the Egyptian Air Force; the first wave of which had to massively impede the Egyptian takeoff capabilities.
If that first wave failed, Israel would have been exposed to painful aerial attacks at home. Israel’s need to incapacitate enemy aircraft meant very few planes were reserved for defense; far fewer than is endorsed by any known military defense doctrine. Israel went all in.
Every individual, from the mechanic to the pilot, knew their role - precisely. In most combat sorties, pilots typically learn of their destination just prior to take off. Every pilot in Operation Moked knew their precise location in the attack formation, and where they would be flying to, well in advance.
LOGISTICAL DARING
The distance between Israel’s airfields and the more distant Egyptian Air Force bases made fuel efficiency a priority. Israel’s pilots had to practically drain their supplies in order to target Egypt’s Soviet supplied strategic bombers, which had the ability to reach Tel Aviv.
Attack planes would need rapid turn around as well.
They had to land, rearm, refuel, and be airborne for the next wave, without delay, to avoid retaliatory air raids.
The ground crew’s ability to rearm and repair aircraft had to be as rapid and efficient as possible.
Because Israel needed the maximum number of planes possible for the purposes of the bombings, while planning the mission, it logged the precise details of when enemy air forces conducted routine defense air patrols, and when those patrols changed over. It did so not with a view to downing those patrols, but to avoiding them and preventing dog fights, freeing up Israeli aircraft to concentrate on bombing stationery targets on the ground. After many months of surveillance, the IAF had a clear idea of the optimal time to strike.
EXPLOITING THE MUNDANE: RUSH-HOUR IN CAIRO
Even rush hour traffic in Cairo was exploited to Israel’s advantage. The first strike took place at the point when the Egyptian Chief of Staff and Air Force command officers left their homes bound for their offices. Israel thus maximized the length of time they would be in transition, without direct contact with their forces.
Egyptian decision-making was effectively paralyzed, allowing additional time for the bombing waves to take place.
COMMUNICATIONS DISCIPLINE
On the morning of the attack, the IAF's flight school conducted training flights, creating a veil of normality for the watching Egyptians.
To lull Egypt’s defense systems into a further sense of security, Israel’s June 5th air force radio transmissions were pre-recorded and transmitted over the airwaves as decoy communications for the consumption of Egyptian surveillance.
Radio silence was so strictly adhered to that Israeli air crews maintained absolute radio silence even as they conducted the initial bombing run.
In case of mid air malfunction, Israeli crews were instructed to leave their formations in silence, fly back to base at low altitude, and, if necessary, to eject.
The attack squadrons flew toward Egypt at a sufficiently low altitude so as to evade Egyptian radar.
Incredibly, every formation reached its target without a word being uttered over the radio.
Israel’s planning, daring and clear understanding of the threats it faced resulted in the successful bombing raids it needed against Egypt, and set the stage for the remainder of the war and the lightning fast Israeli victory that ensued, one studied by militaries throughout the globe to this day.
With Egypt firmly on the back foot, the IAF crippled the Syrian Air Force, and destroyed targets in Iraq after the Iraqis entered the fray.
Those same attitudes and principles remain essential for victory in the modern era and will play a crucial role in combating enemies that threaten Israel today.
Brigadier General Avishai Levi served for 30 years in the Israeli Air Force (IAF), a career that culminated as the Head of Intelligence and Reconnaissance for the IAF from 2007-2010. It was during his tenure that the Israeli Air Force successfully detonated the Syrian nuclear reactor.
ISRAEL MUST PRIORITIZE AMERICA OVER CHINA
By Oded Gour-Lavie
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo recently made an unusual visit to Israel to warn against extending economic cooperation with China. Israel should not require such pressure in order to formulate an independent policy that is cautious of China, while at the same time, safely engages Beijing.
The decision by the Israeli government to allow a Chinese state-owned company to build and operate a privately owned port in Haifa, constitutes a significant security issue.
It represents a narrow, economics-based form of decision making, which conceded a strategic asset.
A U.S. built port in Haifa, would have been far more preferable.
It has also angered Israel's principal and most powerful ally, the United States, which will remain Israel's top ally, at least for the coming decades. Unlike China, the U.S.'s values closely match and mirror those of Israel.
Long-term strategic thinking should have been what did and what will inform the core considerations and decisions surrounding the granting of such contracts. Such considerations should trump economic incentives.
Israeli governments have a duty to consider every such contract first and foremost through the lens of geo-strategic considerations. Awaiting American pressure in order to do so is a mistake.
Mike Pompeo's visit, alongside public statements by Chinese and American leaders, has caused some observers to wonder whether the U.S. and China are on a path to economic decoupling and a new escalation in their rivalry.
In the current global order, with its complex economic systems and interdependency, a full decoupling is not an inevitability. Even prior to the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic, China and the U.S. were engaged in a global struggle over their economic interests and their international influence. The U.S.'s strategy includes regaining its lost manufacturing power, and getting China to pay for that shift to the extent that it can do so.
The current conditions will very likely intensify this preexisting struggle.
China has been steadily using its economic, regional development and diplomatic capabilities, to buy and take over industries in multiple locations; an approach that very much strengthens China's international trade infrastructure, economy, manufacturing, and ability to boost its GNP.
Taking advantage of the Trump Administration's 'America First' approach, which has reduced American participation abroad and assistance to other countries, China has moved into vacuums and open spaces in order to increase its influence.
That maneuver is natural and practical for a massive state that requires a growing quantity of supplies and capabilities.
The U.S. may now seek to recruit countries to its struggle against China, a struggle which, until now, it was waging unilaterally. Israel's own role in this epic struggle is small. It must prioritize and protect the strategic anchor that is the alliance with Washington which is the highest strategic order for Jerusalem.
China, with its technology and economic prowess, has been keen to invest in infrastructure projects in Israel, and to gain access to Israeli technology. Israel must always keep its finger on the pulse of such investments, keeping investment beating, but never garroting its vital strategic interests in the process.
Allowing China to take control of Israel's 5G cellular network, for example, would mean ceding control of the information being relayed on the network to someone else.
While it's true that networks can be hacked regardless of who built them, it is easier for a global power to control and bring down a network it built on its own.
Similarly, a highly strategic seaport should not be in the hands of a power that can quickly change its views on Israeli interests, and which lacks common values with Israel.
Again, a U.S. built port in Haifa, would have been far more preferable.
Ultimately, the time has come for Israel to minimize Chinese involvement in strategic infrastructure projects, as quickly as possible, and to decrease the amount of time that Israel is committed to pre-existing projects.
Several papers produced by the Haifa Maritime Policy and Strategy center (HMS) have laid out the argument for such an approach.
The matter at hand is one to be played out delicately.
On the one hand. Foreign investment on sensitive projects should be the preserve of the strongest of allies. When Israel purchases submarines from Germany, for example, it does so knowing that it can rely on the German government for parts in the hour of need.
On the other hand, Significant caution must be applied to any suggested breaking of ties with China. Beijing is a highly significant power, with many advantages for those who engage with it. Those include production and manufacturing abilities, efficient implementation, economic investment opportunities, and a desire to work with Israel.
Those assets are not to be casually discarded.
Diplomatically, Israel must also take care not to be dragged into anti-Chinese sentiments or statements. It need not take up a frontline position in the campaign against China, and it is not in a position that justifies or requires it taking on such a role.
The struggle against China is not an Israeli one, but in the coming months, Israel must monitor the global U.S. – Chinese struggle while making its own decisions in accordance with its own strategic imperatives; something that inherently mandates China’s subjugation to America in the mindset of Israeli policy makers.
A clear line on where and when to engage with China - or not - should be drawn at vulnerable, strategic sites. Vulnerability and strategy should serve as the guiding lighthouses for Israel’s future engagement with China, and Israel's relationship with America must remain the clearcut priority.
Rear Admiral Oded Gour-Lavie (Ret.) is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute. He concluded his career in 2014 as the Head of the IDF’s Legal & Strategic Policy Team. Prior to that, he served as Head of Naval Operations and was Commander of a submarine flotilla.
SIX DAYS & THE FOREVER WAR
By Frank Sobchak
This June marks the 53rd anniversary of Israel’s lightning victory in the 1967 Six Day War when the Israel Defense Forces defeated the combined militaries of several of its neighbors.
Israel’s decisive military victory is often studied by the armed forces of other nations and many have applied its lessons in other conflicts.
This year also marks eighteenth year of constant conflict for the U.S. in what was originally named the global war on terrorism. The juxtaposition of these two conflicts brings pause to military strategists and begs the question if Israel’s success in 1967 could ever be repeated, there or elsewhere.
In the U.S., children who were not born at the time of the 9/11attacks are now old enough to fight in the seemingly never ending conflict, an all too common situation amongst members of the military whose offspring are statistically more likely to follow in their parent’s footsteps.
It is a situation that Israel is also familiar with, having seen the success of 1967 dissipate into a protracted conflict against amorphous terrorist groups, guerrillas, and extremist organizations after the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Pundits of all political persuasions in both countries have bemoaned this parallel development, arguing that such a perpetual “Forever War” threatens the fabric of democratic governments, erodes societal civil military relations, creates too many casualties to bear, and generates costs that destroy opportunities for future generations. Yet is this seemingly everlasting struggle as bad as they make out?
It is important to note that I am not advocating that war is a good thing. I have lost friends, classmates, subordinates, and students to the unforgiving scythe of battle and wish that we all could live out the rest of our days in peace. But I also recognize their sacrifices have tamped down war’s natural tendencies to escalate and expand and that these seemingly endless conflicts have prevented much larger and much bloodier wars from developing.
This is also not to say that both countries have always fought their conflicts intelligently. The Iraq War will probably go down in U.S. history as one of the worst foreign policy blunders in the history of the Republic.
Yet although the prolonged fighting has been devastating at the individual and family level, we should recognize two facts. First, that the conflict both nations are engaged in is a war of ideas against nebulous transnational actors, a struggle that is not likely to be won decisively.
Second, that the current era of conflict, by comparison to other time periods in history and other wars, is far less destructive than almost all the wars of the past.
One of the main reasons why we should not be deceived into assuming that either country could safely walk away from conflict without it boomeranging back is because we are in a war of ideas against a loosely aligned set of violent extremist organizations.
The U.S. has fought ideologies before and won great victories: against slavery and white supremacy in the U.S. Civil War, Nazism and Fascism World War II, and Communism during the Cold War.
Israel has had to fight the very notion that it should not be allowed to exist.
Yet even in those conflicts, the core ideology of each group sadly persists today and we still have to fight neo-Nazis, white supremacists, anti-Semites, and other villainy. Destroying an ideology is nearly impossible, even after defeating it on the field of battle and discrediting its supporters.
Furthermore, because we are fighting a networked non-state actor spread across the globe that hides amongst the population, rooting out their poisonous creed is much more difficult.
In this struggle, there will be no surrender by our enemies under the guns of the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. Hamas, Hezballah, Al Qai’da, and ISIS will not be giving up anytime soon. To force those organizations to capitulate would require such horrors that we should thank providence that we are in a forever war rather than a traditional conflict.
In World War II, the allies had to resort to firebombing cities and dropping atomic bombs to convince Germany and Japan to surrender, even though rationally there was no pathway to victory for either of those nations after mid-1944 (at the latest). Unfortunately, human beings will continue to fight, suffer, and die far past the point when they should logically give up.
This point brings out a larger fact- that as horrible as the post 9/11 wars have been, they have been much less devastating than conventional wars. This is a truism of wars which have been called “low intensity conflicts” because casualties are often a fraction of what they are in larger struggles.
American losses in more traditional forms of warfare include 405,000 killed in World War II, 58,000 in Vietnam, and 36,000 in Korea. Israel lost nearly 3,000 soldiers during the Yom Kippur War, and 1,000 during the Six Day War. By contrast, the two decade long “Global War on Terrorism” has claimed roughly 7,000 American combatants.
By comparison, the U.S. lost roughly the same number of soldiers in one month during the battle of Iwo Jima, as it did during the Forever War.
As painful as the losses were, Israel’s casualties amounted to under 100 soldiers killed during the 2014 invasion of Gaza and approximately 200 in all the conflicts with Lebanon and Hizbollah since the year 2000.
Those losses occurred in the prevention of amorphous groups from coalescing into powerful nation states against which any campaign would be much bloodier.
Warfare has changed, as noted by military theorists and scholars such as Rupert Smith, Martin Van Creveld, and Sean McFate.
In this new paradigm, conflict is timeless, almost unending and the venue of fighting has shifted from a traditional battlefield to one where parties operate amongst civilian populations.
Rather than deny that these changes have occurred, we should recognize and accept them for what they are. We must live in the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. And in that world, the best option might just be the military equivalent of “mowing the lawn” every few years.
When fighting a virulent ideology, an outcome of a protracted conflict where we endure a never-ending drip of a handful of losses a year is still better than the alternative of facing off against a well-armed, industrialized, and tech-savvy nation state.
In such a context, the Forever War is likely the best that we can hope for. While it is hard to stomach, such a truism reinforces the ancient wisdom: Only the dead have seen the end of war.
Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. Read full bio here.
Women Must Play an Equal Role in Israeli and Global Policymaking
By Sharon Roffe Ofir
For Israel and other countries to improve their response to national challenges, an increased presence of women in leadership positions is required.
Many of Israel's political leaders are former generals, and while the Israel Defense Forces has recently realized the importance of integrating women, its effort to do so remains incomplete, despite the positive changes that have been made in a number of combat units.
While they understandably attract the attention and faith of many voters, former generals are not necessarily the leaders that we need today in order to deal with the multitude of acute public-civilian problems that stand before us. In our political system, women constitute an unacceptably small percentage of Knesset Members.
In March 2020, at the time of the national elections for the 23rd Knesset, a mere 5.5% of elected MK’s were women. The senior echelons of Israeli leadership are almost exclusively composed of men. The National Security Council, which is the official advisory body guiding the government's responses to the Coronavirus pandemic, does not include a single woman.
The same was true of the experts committee established by the National Security Council, which at first included two female research assistants but no female experts. Only after a series of protest letters was sent by organizations and women, and a petition was submitted to the High Court of Israel, did the committee include a small number of female experts.
A century ago, the Women's International Zionist Organization (WIZO) was established in Britain because the Zionist Congress had not incorporated women. Despite that effort, a look back over the last 100 years shows that little has changed. That realization should serve as a red flag and a call to action. Israel is filled with inspirational women, just as it has many inspirational men. The question remains as to why, time and again, we return to the default position of women being excluded.
One of the answers lies in the socialization of society. Since our founding, Israel has been dominated by a militaristic worldview, necessarily so; but that has resulted in a near automatic tendency to push women to the sidelines. Despite the fact that Israel had a female prime minister relatively soon after its establishment, Golda Meir’s rise is reflective of an anomaly, not a trend.
As in many countries, exclusion is based on the false notion that only men can manage matters of state effectively. When I ran in the last round of elections in the Women's Voice party, I received criticism from the left, center, and right. All of them repeatedly asked why I was taking votes away from their cause. The notion that women's equality was a cause worthy of a voting constituency was one they automatically dismissed. The time has come to change that. That change must begin with women themselves.
Women must first believe in their own abilities and capacity to contribute. We must operate with the understanding that achieving true equality is to the benefit everyone; men, women, society, the economy, the private sector, and many other sectors. Any field that has gender equality will be all the enriched by way of it.
Israel’s National Women's Council For Civil Security, We Power, founded by Dr. Mazal Shaul, an organization of which I am proud to be a part, was established in response to the absence of female experts on the National Security Council. Its 150 members have created a unique strategic model for alternative ways of tackling challenges.
The government's efforts to bring civilian life back to a functioning routine in the wake of COVID-19 has revealed many societal sub-stratas, including families that lack the computers needed to enable children to participate in remote learning. Decision makers overlooked that sub-strata. They correctly identified remote learning at the macro level but failed to cater to the need to find solutions for those who lack the resources at home.The education system is comprised mostly of women, who skillfully juggle their home and career demands. Their perspective and expertise are of the kind that could combine macro and micro aspects of remote learning participation when formulating government responses.
Female leaders in the education system have found many creative solutions to enable children to return to schools and kindergartens. Combining a macro and micro approach, something embodied within women's perspectives, would have been of real assistance to the communications campaigns of the government as they sought to reach out to various strands of society during the pandemic response.
The Haredi community, for example, which is not online and does not watch television, did not always receive guidelines with sufficient time remaining for implementation. As a result, the government had to reconfigure the way in which it reached out to them, something that resulted in actual discord between the government and the ultra orthodox community and a perception of an even greater discord than was the reality among Israeli society, generally.
The same is true for the Israel’s Arab population, which struggled to buy food for Ramadan when stores were required to close early. These groups required a detail-oriented response, something at which women excel. Had more of us been at the heart of legislating, these scenarios would have been better managed.
The United Nations has called for women to make up 50 percent of international leadership by the year 2030. This is a welcome call, but alongside it, I would add my call for the establishment of an international women's leadership council. This body could address many crises around the world, offering much needed, new perspectives as they do so.
Examples of successful female leadership are growing, but it’s only a beginning and must be built upon. They include the prime minister of New Zealand and Denmark and the former president of South Korea, but there is more to be done.A passing glance at Israel’s new governing coalition, less than a quarter of which are women, is sufficient proof of the fact that the path toward adequate female representation remains long, and that legislative initiatives and committees focused upon gender equality do not play a significant role in the complex coalition agreements.
The establishment of an international council would go some way to promoting this change, and Israel would have many wonderful women that it could contribute to such an organization.
Sharon Roffe Ofir is deputy Mayor of Kiriyat Tivon, in the Haifa region. She is in charge of government relations and gender equality and is a member of WCCS (Women's Council for Civil Security) strategy group.
APPLYING SOVEREIGNTY IS IN ISRAEL'S SECURITY INTEREST
By Amir Avivi
When assessing Israel’s core national security interests, applying Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley fits squarely within the list of Israeli needs.
Our nation, with its ancient past, must take an equally long view of it’s future, particularly given the many security challenges that likely await us in the near and more distant term.
Israel must act to solidify its key needs in the fields of security, economy, and development and must not hesitate when doing so.
In just fifty years from now our population is projected to exceed 20 million people. In order to thrive, not just survive, we must have a minimally defensible eastern border, located in the Jordan Valley, and it must retain control of the eastern mountain ridge.
Yitzhak Rabin, architect of the Oslo Accords, in the eponymous ‘Rabin parameters’ included full Israeli security control over Jewish cities in Judea and Samaria/the West Bank, and full freedom of maneuver for Israelis along the main roads of the area, within those parameters. He did so based on the need to protect the large Israeli communities of Judea and Samaria known today as the ‘Settlement blocs.’
But Israel's civilian presence in Judea and Samaria extends far beyond those blocs, and retaining control over those additional areas in perpetuity is a puzzle we finally have an opportunity to solve.
The Trump peace plan, with its endorsement of the application of Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, accurately reflects the Rabin parameters. It also calls for a two-state solution, and a demilitarized Palestinian state, with Israeli security control over the entire area between the Jordan river and the Mediterranean sea, along with a permanent presence in the Jordan Valley.
The surprising alignment between these two plans begets a moment in time not to be missed by Israel. The reasons to proceed with sovereignty go beyond the commonality of Rabin’s and Trump’s visions, however; in ways that ought to temper the panic and pessimism disseminated by those who portray Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley as a portent for catastrophe.
The Trump peace plan was coordinated with Sunni states, Israel and the US Administration.
That coordination is the result of the Sunni view that an alliance with Israel is an existential imperative in their fight against Iran, something that is of far greater significance to them than the Palestinian-Arab cause.
Economically, the dependence of these states upon economic aid and ties to the U.S. render any frantic statements of what awaits following the application of sovereignty just that - statements.
In particular, Jordan, despite its rhetoric, is unlikely to cancel its peace treaty with Israel. It is Israel and the U.S. that stabilize Jordan, not the other way around. There is no Jordanian interest in having a Palestinian military presence on their western border.
The primary, essential distinction between the Trump plan and the Rabin parameters is one that ought to be welcomed; the demand for the Palestinians to meet their responsibilities, come to the negotiating table and fashion a way forward.
Some, particularly on the Israeli Left, who are concerned about the potential for a deterioration in our security situation if sovereignty is applied, endorse ideas that are counter-strategic. They advocate for short-term arrangements for an Israeli presence on the Jordan Valley and in Judea and Samaria, to be assessed and reassessed in increments of ten to fifteen years.
But the question of what happens beyond that timeframe will have to be revisited, regularly and often. If we wait, the opportunity to apply sovereignty may no longer enjoy the backing of the world’s only superpower.
Neither a spike in Palestinian violence, nor rocket fire from Hamas, nor a rupture in Israel’s relationship with Jordan – nor a combination of all three; all of which are held up as reasons not to apply sovereignty, should deter us from advancing our vital interests.
A cursory glance at our history helps to outline the importance of pursuing such interests.
In 1948, Israel concluded the War of Independence with extended control over territory that expanded beyond the areas given to it by the UN partition plan, including approximately half of the Sinai Peninsula.
Significant pressure, emanating from the U.S. and Russia, was applied to Israel to withdraw. David Ben Gurion, Israel’s Prime Minister at the time and a master strategist, was prepared to return the land captured in the Sinai, but was unwilling to do so with regard to any other area of land.
Ben Gurion, leader of what was then a small, young and relatively weak country, stood firm in the face of pressure from the world's superpowers, prioritizing strategy over tactics as he did so.
Today’s Israel is incomparably more powerful than it was during those founding years.
The scare tactics employed to decry the virtue of applying sovereignty ought to be recognized as the hollow cat-calls that they are. Such pessimistic tales of woe were employed in advance of the U.S. recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights and Washington’s relocation of its embassy to Jerusalem. Those predictions failed to materialize, however.
The region did not catch fire. Those who thought it would, or who fear that it will if Israel applies sovereignty, fail to realize that the region has changed beyond recognition.
The Palestinian public in Judea and Samaria, for its part, has demonstrated that it is primarily interested in its economic wellbeing. Not only has the Palestinian-Arab street shown little appetite to return to the days of the Second Intifada, if it did, Israel's security control renders it almost impossible for a full-scale uprising to erupt.
Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan valley should be applied, swiftly - the stars are finally aligned for Israel to not only affix its eastern border, but to cement a secure future for itself.
Brigadier General Amir Avivi concluded his service as the Head of the Auditing and Consulting Department of the Israeli Defense Establishment, (including the Israel Defense Force, the Ministry of Defense and Israeli Military Industries).
NATIONAL GUARD DEPLOYMENT IS A DELICATE MISSION
By Benjamin Anthony, Richard Kemp, & Cade Spivey
Following the brutal killing of George Floyd, demonstrations and peaceful protests have taken place throughout the United States in a legitimate expression of deep grievances and suffering felt by members of Black America and those who stand in solidarity with their cause.
Separate to those, gangs of violent, thuggish, rioting looters and agitators are now engaged in a rash of dangerous, criminal behavior spreading throughout America.
As a result, the security role of the National Guard, originally confined during the COVID-19 era to "support for warehouse and commodity management and distribution," "conducting logistics missions in support of the state response at warehouse locations," and "advising and assisting, logistics, transportation, traffic control…" is now very likely to become vital, central, and extremely complex, deployed as they will be to not only disperse those gangs, but also to protect the business owners and homeowners threatened by these violent mobs.
As veterans of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the United States Navy (USN) and the British Army, respectively, we are well aware of the complexities regarding the implementation of the use of force for the sake of crowd control, across a range of missions; from dispersal, to anti-terror measures.
We understand the complexities of a military deploying and operating among and alongside a host nation's citizenry against threats emanating from non-citizens. While conducting those operations, we found that the greatest asset to hand was a population of willing supporters – people that saw us not as occupiers or tyrants, but as colleagues, partners, and even family.
Those operations were not nearly as complex or as fraught an undertaking as the deployment of what is essentially a military, to restrain its own citizenry. The British Army conducted such operations in Northern Ireland beginning in the late 1960s and their actions are still being fought out in the courts half a century later.
Yet that very task could soon become the priority of the Guard.
Mission: Delicate!
Boundaries between residential areas and districts are non-existent. If the looting and violence continues, these riots are liable to spread to municipalities, towns and villages upstream from where they are currently taking place. Absent territorial enforcement, there is little reason to expect a slowing of the geographical spread of these events.
In a polarized America, uniformed law enforcement has often proven to be an incendiary presence; the very touch paper needed to ignite a storm of civil unrest, even as it comes in service of the citizenry. In the wake of the horrific videos of a uniformed officer denying the circulation of blood and oxygen to the brain of a detained, handcuffed, black American, members of that community will be further incensed by the increased appearance of uniformed personnel; whether that uniform is one worn by the police or a guardsman, in the event that the National Guard is deployed.
If the Guard is charged with restricting the movement of populations between areas, or dispersing those who seek to assemble, both of which are essentially law enforcement roles, the means of enforcement are inherently problematic.
Firstly, the use of non-lethal methods results in unintended lethal outcomes across a long enough timeline. Asphyxiation, a rubber bullet that impacts upon the temple instead of the leg or abdomen, a rushing crowd that tramples an individual to death; all of these realities exist.
Secondly, and of even greater concern, is what can occur if the restricted population senses that those sent as enforcers are unwilling to carry out their task because of concern over the aforementioned outcomes. Examples of such a dynamic are already taking place in Minneapolis, where police recently fled the scene of a riot.
Thirdly, the National Guard’s raison d’être is not policing a domestic populace. Striking the requisite balance of security enforcement and engagement with the citizenry will be a tremendous challenge, undertaken beneath an intensive media glare.
Sustained, district-wide riots and mob violence could serve as the gasoline poured onto the domestic fire currently fueled by the combination of coronavirus pandemic, political division, and socioeconomic inequality.
Upping the ante here is the fact that due to the COVID-19 pandemic, millions of young Americans, particularly men aged 18-35, are currently out of work, unengaged, restless and have little to no commitments preventing them from joining these riots. The added financial insecurity attendant the shelter in place orders that are still in effect, not only serve to further stir the impulse to steal and to loot - which is nonetheless unacceptable - but also increases the availability of bodies for the purpose of protest and, in turn, the number of individuals who can potentially cause, and be the victims of, harm; something that will reignite a cycle of violence and further rioting with each passing incident.
The unrest that could occur in the coming days and weeks may well be met with a police and National Guard presence that most Americans have never seen before. The societal tensions in the U.S. could well be exacerbated by an increased domestic military/law enforcement presence and the headlines that emanate from the scene will make for troubling viewing.
A tear gas canister fired toward a crowd for the sake of dispersal in order to avoid death does not constitute a headline. A child trampled during the course of that dispersal, very much does. Such can be the unintended outcome of massive guard deployment at this time.
And yet, without the safety provided by the Guard the anarchy and violence that could occur in their absence would surely make for even more troubling images, headlines, videos, tweets and posts.
In order to succeed, it is essential that the Guard and the American citizenry receive strong, moral and clear leadership from elected officials and community leaders at the local, state and federal levels throughout their deployment.
As they are sent forward to confront this coming crisis, the National Guard may become the savior America needs, even if not the one she wants. Their task is not a simple one.
Richard Kemp, former Commander of British Forces in Afghanistan, was a member of the UK’s national crisis management committee, COBRA, and commanded British troops in the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, often working alongside US forces. He completed eight tours of duty in Northern Ireland dealing with riot control, counter-terrorism and intelligence.
Benjamin Anthony is an IDF veteran and the co-founder & CEO of The MirYam Institute. He served in the Second Lebanon War, 2006, Operation Pillar of Defense, 2012, Operation Protective Edge, 2014. He has served in Judea and Samaria / The West Bank and along Israel’s northern border.
Cade Spivey is a publishing Adjunct at The MirYam Institute. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy and served three tours in the Navy as a Gunnery/Antiterrorism Officer, Damage Control Assistant, and Counter-Piracy Evaluator. He is currently a student at the Wake Forest University School of Law.