Israel’s coalition is on life support

By Zachary Shapiro

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The Knesset took its first step towards dissolving the government and setting the country on the path to its fourth round of elections in two years. In a 61-54 vote, the opposition, joined by Defense Minister Benny Gantz’s Blue and White Party, moved for new elections. While the bill requires three more readings before it is passed, this development is yet another sign that Israel’s coalition government is on life support.

With Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu facing a February 2021 trial, Gantz facing trouble in his own party and Israel facing a third wave of COVID-19, another election is the last thing that Israel needs. An election is estimated to cost Israeli taxpayers NIS 3 billion (about $925,000)—all while the government is overstretched and overburdened by the coronavirus pandemic. To make things worse, Netanyahu and his cabinet still have not passed a budget for 2020. For months, they have been operating on a pro-rated re-authorization of the 2019 budget. Gantz has long insisted on the need to pass a new budget, while Netanyahu has stalled the approval process.

Amid all this political uncertainty, I interviewed  Nachman Shai, former Knesset member and Israel Defense Forces’ spokesperson, and Danielle Roth Avneri, political correspondent and editor at Israel Hayom, to discuss the fate of Israel’s fraying coalition. They explored the legal and political challenges ahead for Netanyahu and Gantz’s precarious position. Shai and Roth Avneri also assessed Yamina Party chief Naftali Bennett’s rapid ascent in the polls and the future of Yesh Atid and the Israeli left. Four key takeaways emerged from our discussion:

Netanyahu may be up against the wall, but he remains in the driver’s seat. Without doubt, the embattled prime minister’s upcoming trial in February is his primary concern. As well it should be, given the gravity of the Attorney General’s corruption charges and the number of former Netanyahu advisors who have turned states’ witnesses. Just this week, one of Netanyahu’s archrivals, Gideon Sa’ar, announced a bid to bring him down. From the outside, Netanyahu’s situation may look bleak. But the reality is that the prime minister is still a cunning political operator in his prime.

Over the last two years, he has survived three close elections while courting a dismayed Israeli electorate. He has outfoxed the most potent challengers he has ever faced, recruiting Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi into his government, and relegating Lapid and Yesh Atid to the opposition. He has mustered many polarizing and unparalleled foreign-policy achievements, extracting unprecedented political concessions from U.S. President Donald Trump while advancing Israel’s normalization campaign to new heights. And in a stunning development, Netanyahu may well engineer a historic political realignment after reports emerged of a newfound partnership with Joint List Knesset member Mansour Abbas.

Nobody puts Gantz in a corner; he put himself there. Gantz’s political predicament is largely one of his own making. He ran a tough campaign by assembling a broad anti-Netanyahu coalition that agreed on little else. After making many emphatic campaign promises, Gantz joined his sworn enemy in an ill-fated rotation agreement. In doing so, he made a new enemy in a perceived betrayal of Lapid. Only a few months later, Gantz is losing control of his own party while facing elections that are likely to weaken him significantly. Altogether, he has placed himself in a difficult and unsustainable political position. Sooner or later, something has to give.

Don’t believe the hype about Gadi Eizenkot. The former IDF chief of staff may become the latest general to throw his hat in the ring. Reports indicate that he is considering a bid to unseat Netanyahu. But Gantz’s struggles remind us that military credentials do not a politician make, especially when running against a man of Netanyahu’s political talents.

Furthermore, Eizenkot faces an uphill battle if he does decide to run. It’s unclear which party he would join, but Yesh Atid, Blue and White, and Knesset member Moshe Ya’alon’s Telem Party are all in the running. In any event, Eizenkot would be competing in a crowded field of former generals and staunch opponents of the prime minister—all of whom thought their military backgrounds could be a gamechanger, and all of whom failed to defeat Netanyahu. The prime minister, after all, has outmaneuvered the generals of Blue and White, and presided over the left’s deep decline.

A new chapter may be in store for the Arab List. While the new partnership between Mansour Abbas and Netanyahu may be an alliance of convenience, it’s still a major departure from the Arab factions’ policy of noncooperation with sitting coalitions. For the time being, it is in Netanyahu’s interest to court Abbas, as it helps him divide the Joint List and blunt its power. And working with Netanyahu serves Abbas’s political goals. An alliance with the prime minister could help Abbas bring crucial funding, support and infrastructure to the Israeli Arab community. This, in turn, may bolster his standing with constituents. As long as these mutually beneficial interests hold, more cooperation may well be on the horizon.

What did not come up in our conversation was Sa’ar’s dramatic decision to leave Likud and form his own party in his latest effort to defeat Netanyahu. No doubt this is an intriguing development. Sa’ar’s defection is a wildcard, but not a game-changer. He may pull votes from Likud, but the odds are not in his favor. His past attempts to take on Netanyahu have failed spectacularly. In December 2019, Sa’ar challenged the prime minister in a Likud leadership primary and lost by a whopping margin of 72-27 percent. As payback, Netanyahu did not offer Sa’ar a ministerial post during the last round of coalition negotiations in May. And this was after Netanyahu had forced his rival into political exile for a few years before the primary.

Sa’ar may take a page out of Gantz’s playbook and vow not to join a Netanyahu government. Still, Netanyahu has a knack for wearing down his enemies by enticing them to defect. He could tempt his eager rival to break his promises with the right cabinet post—just as he did with Gantz.

As usual, Israel’s political future remains uncertain. Ultimately, the measure to dissolve the coalition must survive three plenum votes before new elections are official—leaving Netanyahu and Gantz time to break the stalemate. Reports indicate that the two are negotiating a secret deal to avoid elections. Deal or no deal, Israel is in for a challenging few months, yet more political deadlock and a riveting trial.

Zachary Shapiro is a foreign policy analyst and master's candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He was previously a research associate for Middle Eastern studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Hezbollah: A systematic violator of international law: Pt 2

By Eli Bar-On

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The laws of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law, are the manifestation of the various norms the international community has adopted as the legal framework for conducting war in modern times.

This corpus of law was put in place to ensure that the unimaginable suffering to which humanity was exposed during the two world wars in the 20th century would not repeat itself. Accordingly, these laws strike a balance between militaries’ need to win the wars they engage in, and their obligation to do so while minimizing harm to civilians. A clear indication of how these laws value human life can be found in the principle of distinction, one of the key principles of the laws of war.

This principle obligates all belligerents to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and between military objectives and civilian objects, and to carry out attacks only against combatants and military objectives. Additionally, this principle states that combatants must distinguish themselves from the civilians around them (both enemy civilians and their own civilians), and they are forbidden from using the presence of civilians in their vicinity to render themselves immune from attack.

In defiance of this basic principle of the law, Hezbollah makes no effort to hide its intention to kill and maim Israeli civilians. One way it plans to do this is through cross-border ground raids in the next war with Israel. Hezbollah has repeatedly declared its intention of sending its elite Radwan Force death squads into the Galilee region, with the mission of attacking civilians.

The IDF’s uncovering of six large Hezbollah cross-border tunnels in 2018 exposed just how Hezbollah planned to carry out such an attack.

In order to terrorize citizens across the border, Hezbollah publications have shown the group’s terrorists holding signs saying that combat in Syria is merely a “practice run” for their planned cross-border killing raids into Israel.

Hezbollah’s intentions regarding its massive projectile arsenal are no different. The arsenal, replenished by Iran since the 2006 Second Lebanon War, has grown to 170,000 rockets and missiles, according to some estimates.

It includes unguided short-range projectiles, long-range rockets, and missiles with ranges of more than 300 km., as well as hundreds of attack drones. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has repeatedly threatened to use his long-range missiles to strike Israel’s nuclear power reactor in Dimona.

In what has become the top-priority conventional threat to Israel, Iran and Hezbollah are also engaged in an effort to build precision-guided munitions (PGMs). Iran has attempted to smuggle precision-guidance kits into Lebanon to ensure that Hezbollah’s projectiles reach their targets and the organization’s ammunition is not wasted.

Israeli military experts suggest that Hezbollah and Iran have succeeded in their efforts, at least to some extent, and Hezbollah is now in possession of a few dozen precision-guided missiles. Such a capability will allow Hezbollah to conduct pinpoint strikes in any future conflict with Israel and target the country’s top strategic assets.

Hezbollah can fire up to 4,000 projectiles a day, compared to a total of fewer than 4,000 rockets fired throughout the entirety of the 34-day conflict in 2006. Its surface-to-surface firepower capability is greater than that of 95% of the world’s militaries.

In 2006, with a significantly inferior arsenal, Hezbollah’s rockets hit Israeli schools, hospitals, and other civilian sites. Some 300,000 Israelis became internally displaced during the war. Forty-three civilians and 12 soldiers were killed inside Israel, thousands were injured, and major property damage was sustained.

In 2016, Nasrallah declared that he has his own version of an “atomic bomb,” in the form of a missile strike on Haifa’s ammonium storage site – which has since been emptied – that would result in the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians.

Consequently, in any future war, the IDF will have no choice but to operate deep in Lebanon – both through airstrikes and a ground campaign – to neutralize Hezbollah’s capabilities. Unfortunately, in light of Hezbollah’s modus operandi, and the multiple ways in which it disregards the laws of armed conflict to shield itself with Lebanese civilians, and to deliberately target Israeli civilians, it is inevitable that the Lebanese population will pay a price.

The question is whether the international community will recognize the flagrant violations by Hezbollah and its role in all but guaranteeing the suffering of the Lebanese population.

Eli Bar-On concluded his career in the Israel Defense Forces holding the position of instructor at the IDF National Defense College (the INDC). Prior to that position, Bar-on served as the Deputy Military Advocate General of the IDF (2012 to 2015), where he was in command of approximately 1,000 lawyers and legal experts, including prior to, during and following Operation Pillar of Defense & Operation Protective Edge. He also served as the Chief Legal Advisor for the IDF in the West Bank from 2009 to 2012.

Amid pandemic, Israel Police must balance between enforcement, support

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By Alon Levavi

As a result of the government's vacillation between reopening some parts of our country while limiting others, the Israeli National Police now faces extreme challenges during the pandemic era. 

While in the first wave that struck Israel, the public's top concern was the disease itself, in the second wave, its fears have turned to its economic well being. Meanwhile, the pandemic has provided a stage for political and social crises. Political paralysis and instability preceded the pandemic, and have been intensified by it. 

This has caused state systems to suffer a significant shake-up, and ultimately, the police finds itself in the role of the responsible adult, forced to act as a mediator in Israeli society - between Right and Left, the desire of ultra-Orthodox to enter synagogues, and the desire of protesters to crowd together in demonstrations and manifest their democratic rights. 

This trend is accelerated by the fact that vast sections of the public are facing personal financial hardships and the failure of their businesses. 

When a crisis hits, it is the police that must bear the brunt. Currently, it finds itself having to handle the pandemic's extraordinary after-shocks, while at the same time continuing to combat crime, deal with traffic accidents, and fight the war on drugs. As it conducts these missions, the police now must also enforce mask wearing, social distancing, and engage in situations where otherwise law-abiding citizens gradually enter into a state of civil disobedience. 

As it does so, Israel's police cannot decrease its anti-crime, counter-terrorism, or traffic operations. 

The scope of this challenge is only growing. 

The fact that the police entered this situation with an acting commissioner, not an appointed commissioner, does not make things easier. A commissioner must be appointed as soon as possible, and the government’s procrastination in getting this done is causing real damage to the police's ability to act in an organized and effective manner. 

At the same time, it is worth noting that the acting commissioner, Motti Cohen, is executing his role in a very professional manner, and is taking correct operational decisions during one of the police's most difficult hours. 

With time, the police are slowly learning how to enforce the new public health laws, but those are changing and being updated frequently, leaving the force to adjust each time, something that makes enforcement even more difficult. 

In terms of the relations between police and the ultra-Orthodox population, it is vital to point out that this sector is not monolithic, and is made up of various streams. Most ultra-Orthodox citizens have a full understanding of the dangers posed by the pandemic and have abided by the law. There are, however, a number of elements in this sector that explicitly ignore regulations and present an enormous challenge to the state's efforts to break the chain of infection. 

The police have, despite the myriad challenges, been able to build strong relations with the ultra-Orthodox sector. It employs community policing techniques, has drafted women investigators from the ultra-Orthodox world, and managed to build bridges to the community. The police have ultra-Orthodox volunteers, and work closely with ultra-Orthodox paramedics and with the Zaka emergency response teams. 

Despite these positive attributes, there are extreme streams that disregard national laws, and these provocations end up at the police's door.

The police are also learning to deal with the risk of its own officers becoming infected with the virus when policing mass demonstrations and events. Hundreds of police officers have been infected so far, and thousands have had to go into self-isolation. When the number of missions it must conduct is examined, it becomes clear that police have too few personnel and too many missions. 

And yet, the Israeli Police is managing to conduct enforcement that is smart and appropriate. 

Israel in general is lacking when it comes to communicating with the public on enforcement and public health rules that are designed to prevent infection. This creates an additional layer of challenges that officers on the ground must deal with.   

Still, with time, the world will exit the pandemic crisis, either by learning to live with it or by defeating the virus. The police must therefore think about the day after the public crisis of confidence in the state and its authorities and consider how to rehabilitate the collateral damage to trust it has suffered.

The Israel Police has an enormous role in our national resilience. While it must conduct determined enforcement against disturbances or blatant public health violations, law enforcement must also see things from the perspective of a civilian. A civilian who has lost their job, or perhaps lost a loved one to disease, is fearful and often faces extreme pressures. The police must know how to contain that, and to be sympathetic to such civilians. 

Ultimately, in such an unusual, challenging time, the police will not be able to bridge all gaps. Extreme times bring about extreme actions. These are not normal times; it is critical for police to be smart, and to avoid incidents in which officers have to activate force against young children in synagogues or schools, for example. 

The police must enforce public health laws with economic sanctions, and receive assistance from other sectors of the state, since provocations against the law are ultimately directed at the state itself, not only at police. 

Ultimately, for the police, successfully navigating these challenging times requires striking the balance between determined enforcement and supporting the population they are here to serve. 

Major General Alon Levavi served as a combat helicopter pilot in the Israel Air Force and later served for 34 years in the Israeli National police (INP).

How to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge in a changing Middle East

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By Yair Ramati

The United States’ long-standing commitment to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge, or QME, forms a central pillar of Israel’s security strategy.

The U.S. commitment reflects the bipartisan support for Israel that has been expressed by all recent U.S. administrations and Capitol Hill. It encompasses multiyear military financial assistance made available to Israel for procuring weapons systems, as part of the U.S.-Israel Memorandum of Understanding; the joint development and production of missile defense systems; the sharing of intelligence information and missile alerts; and the holding of joint military exercises. American support also takes the form of pre-positioning U.S. military equipment on Israeli territory.

In order to ensure that this cooperation remains sturdy into the foreseeable future, both Israel and the U.S. will need to address several emerging challenges. Chief among them is Iran, whose hegemonic ambition in the Middle East is sparking a broader arms race between the Iranian-led Shiite axis and Arab Sunni states. This arms race jeopardizes Israel’s QME.

An additional challenge is the sheer volume of defense deals undertaken in the Middle East since the beginning of the 21st century, totaling hundreds of billions of dollars.

A third factor in considering threats to Israel’s QME is the fact that while the U.S. remains the main supplier of weapons systems in the region, European, Russian and even Chinese defense industries are becoming more prominent suppliers to Middle Eastern states.

The systems sold by these counties range from items that the U.S. has refused to sell (sometimes due to Israeli objections), such as armed drones, ballistic missiles, main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, air defense batteries and more.

In light of the above, there are Middle Eastern states — the Gulf petrodollar nations — with deep pockets that could easily afford to buy significant maritime and/or airborne fleets that are out of Israel’s economic reach. The higher the cost of platforms, the more the trend is pronounced.

At the same time, the Middle East is undergoing rapid changes, with three Arab countries — two of them Gulf states — signing historic normalization treaties with Israel, creating a different environment when compared to just a decade ago.

Israel’s core strategy of enhancing, strengthening and deepening its ties with Gulf states relies on a common mutual interest based on a view of Iran as a strategic enemy. With both Israel and the Gulf states facing a similar threat from Iran and its proxies, it remains unclear how wise a policy it is to object to Gulf countries procuring modern weapons systems from the U.S.

Blocking such procurements could push the United Arab Emirates to purchase Russia’s Su-57 stealth fighter jet instead of the U.S. F-35 aircraft, and it is not clear how such a scenario would better serve the mutual interests of the U.S. and Israel. The question of whether such an attitude would cause harm to the newly tightened Israeli-Gulf strategic relationship remains relevant.

No policy is free from built-in risks, and it is necessary for Israel to identify these in the pursuit of its QME in the new geopolitical environment, and to manage them appropriately.

Two of the most disturbing risks are long-term regime instability and the slippery slope potential of other countries achieving advanced defense technology.

In terms of regional instability, regional political history has witnessed multiple regime changes in recent years, and governments that are pragmatic today could become hostile tomorrow. Well-known examples include the Muslim Brotherhood’s takeover of Egypt, or the conversion of Turkey from an ally of Israel to a bitter opponent. Iran itself underwent the most drastic of changes, going from a close partner to the U.S. and Israel until 1979, when it became a sworn adversary after the Islamic Revolution.

The slippery slope risk means if the U.S. were to sell, with Israel’s approval, state-of-the-art technologies to country A, preventing country B from acquiring the same technology or platform would become highly complex and difficult.

In order to navigate these risks with minimum negative impacts to Israel’s qualitative military edge, establishing win-win strategies is an advisable path. This can include technological differentiation, which is based on the idea that not all platforms are the same and that the U.S. can keep some of its naval and airborne platform software packages to itself. Opening new technological routes for upgrading Israeli-American mutual cooperation, and increasing the volume and diversity of American pre-positioning of military equipment in Israel, would also further such strategies, as would deepening cooperation in missile defense; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and cooperation in space.

With Israel’s resources limited in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, an additional route to promoting its QME is through a U.S. government commercial loan, guaranteed against the funds provided by the 10-year Memorandum of Understanding.

At the same time, since Israel is also a defense technology and weapons supplier in its own right, bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Israel on arms sales to the region could pave the way forward to a trilateral and more healthy relationship: the U.S., the Gulf and Israel.

Ultimately, American and Israeli policies for maintaining Israel’s QME, in place since the 1960s, are due for an update. Tectonic changes in the region require fresh policies from both Washington and Jerusalem. An updated and balanced bilateral policy can enable Israel’s new peace partners to benefit from the diplomatic process they have entered, while minimizing erosion of Israel’s QME.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel.

The Coalition Band Aid That Turned Into A National Wound

By Danielle Roth-Avneri

The relationship between Blue and White and Likud is dysfunctional. Blue and White party leader Benny Gantz announced on Tuesday that he will support a vote of no confidence in the government, though he also left open a narrow window for a potential attempt to avoid elections.

When the unity government was formed in April, as an emergency step to deal with the COVID-19 pandemic, Gantz took the bold step of parting company with his political allies in order to join forces with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

But since that time, the pandemic has raged and the government founded as a response to it has floundered.

The government has grown ultra-polarized, with Blue and White turning into an 'in-house opposition' within the very government it is a part of. The term 'unity' in the government has been emptied of meaningful content, and none of the government's ministers are hiding this fact. While in April there was a semblance of cooperation, today neither Gantz nor Netanyahu make any pretence that the government is working.

Blue and White point to the failure of Likud and Netanyahu to pass a state budget as a major transgression, and their claim has merit. The coalition agreement stipulates a deadline for budgets, and Blue and White’s expectations for the agreement to be kept have been left unmet.

Yet Blue and White is in a trap. As soon as the party entered the government, all power passed to Netanyahu, and this was a calculated risk that Gantz agreed to take. Netanyahu has repeatedly demonstrated how little he values Gantz and Blue and White's ministers, as his decision to avoid updating them on his reported visit to Saudi Arabia demonstrates. Netanyahu continues to play a skillful, calculated political game, while Gantz, who remains a political novice, is dragged along.

Blue and White would be unlikely to go to elections if the budget delay lasted just a few weeks.

Yet the party is in a pressure cooker, one which is creating real fissures in Blue and White, undermining Gantz's leadership as it does so. While Netanyahu has been able to keep the Likud party under control, despite the occasional complaints within the party, the same is not the case for Blue and White. Serious internal rivalries are emerging. One camp, led by Justice Minister Avi Nissenkorn, favors an uncompromising approach to Netanyahu even if another round of elections is the price to be paid.

On the other side of the internal rift, Gantz prefers to avoid elections, despite public statements in which he says he does not fear a return to the ballot box, and despite the looming no confidence vote.

Ultimately, Gantz has struggled to settle a central paradox. While he certainly wants to become prime minister in November 2021, as the coalition agreement stipulates, he does not wish to be perceived as someone who will simply acquiesce in order to reach that objective.

Gantz has already proven that, as his party's last election slogan stated, for him, Israel is the consideration above all others. When he left his political allies to join the Netanyahu government, he demonstrated how seriously he took his party's slogan.

But he also knows there is a limit to how many more times he can compromise with Netanyahu.

Gantz's decision to form a Defense Ministry commission of inquiry into the purchase of German-made submarines – an affair that Netanyahu's opponents claim involves improper conduct by the prime minister – is intended to demonstrate that he is not under the full control of Netanyahu.

That strategic step could end up causing Netanyahu to break up the government and proceed toward elections. It is a step that could bury Gantz's remaining chances of becoming prime minister, therefore.

It is also an effort by Gantz to salvage what remains of his credibility.

If Netanyahu ends up triggering elections, Gantz can save face by pointing to his current warnings, and claim that he was willing to go to elections the entire time.

Beneath the radar, however, and despite repeated calls for elections, Blue and White is formulating a compromise offer for Netanyahu as a final test of his willingness to work with them.

And yet, Blue and White is not expected to fare well in any future elections. The latest polls show it barely crossing the two-digit threshold, and for a party that in the last elections gained 33 seats [before its break up with Yesh Atid], this presents a bleak political horizon for the party.

While senior party members speak of not fearing new elections, those who rank lower down the party list know their political survival is unlikely.

In the near future, the Blue and White party is expected to hold primaries. Senior members of the party no longer wish to defer to Gantz. They want greater involvement in the decision making. Some see themselves as future replacements for Gantz. The primaries will revolve around the central dilemma hovering over the party: Should it fold and remain in the coalition, or should it face the prospect of vanishing in the next elections?

Opposition Chairman Yair Lapid – Gantz’s former partner in Blue and White – is, for his part, satisfied with all of these developments. His position in the polls is excellent, and it is clear that he wants elections as soon as possible. Lapid imagines linking up with other political forces, such as Naftali Bennet's Yamina party, and foresees a new path to the premiership. Yet Lapid seems more interested in his political future than in the national interest of avoiding elections at this time.

The political system has not yet passed the final point of no return leading to a fourth round of elections since April 2019. While chances of new elections are certainly high, the Israeli political system, true to form, remains unpredictable.

Danielle Roth-Avneri is a journalist and reporter on political matters, as well as an editor for the Israel Hayom/Israel Todaynewspaper, the most widely circulated publication in Israel.

“The Jury Is Still Out:” Uncertainty Concerning Whether A Future Biden-Harris Administration Will Improve The US-Israel Relationship

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By Micah Jones

In the days leading up to the 2020 presidential election, the MirYam Institute hosted a debate titled: “Which Presidential Ticket Is Best for the US-Israel Relationship?” At the debate’s conclusion, the Biden-Harris ticket was declared the winner. Perhaps this was prescient, as Biden and Harris went on to win the November 3 election. 

The future Biden administration will usher in a new era of American governance and politics. Although this proposed agenda seems popular amongst one-half of the American public, I, nevertheless, remain skeptical as to whether the Biden administration will be the best for the US-Israel relationship. My skepticism stems from the Biden campaign’s recent actions and the embrace by some in the Democratic Party of ideologies that view Israel as an “oppressor” state. 

Over the summer, some in the Biden campaign reportedly privately apologized to former Women’s March leader Linda Sarsour following public condemnation of her anti-Israel rhetoric. At the beginning of November 2020, it was reported that the Palestinian Authority established direct lines of communication with the Biden campaign -- though this has never been confirmed. Most troubling, Kamala Harris’ chief of staff, Karine Jean-Pierre, stated this summer that Democratic candidates had “made the right call” in boycotting the annual AIPAC conference.Jean-Pierre declared that AIPAC’s values “[were] not progressive.” Although none of these actions by the campaign are determinative of the future Biden-Harris administration’s policies, they indicate that the US-Israel relationship may become much less amicable than in previous administrations.   

Biden has called for unity and renewed cooperation with historic American allies. But the skeptic in me does not believe that such rhetoric or policy will apply to the State of Israel. The far-left of the Democratic Party has embraced the collective ideologies of “Critical Race Theory,” “intersectionality,” identity politics, and “wokeness.” Although each of these ideologies warrants its own unique discussion, there is significant overlap in their respective world view. In short, these ideologies divide the world into “oppressors” and “oppressed,” predominantly along the distinctions of race and class. These ideologies believe that “white people” occupy the positions of oppressors within the United States and the West. “Black, brown, and indigenous peoples” are viewed as being oppressed victims at the mercy of the oppressor class. And, as it turns out, Jews do not fit neatly into this bifurcated framework.

At first glance, it should appear that Jews would clearly fall within the victim category. After all, Jews have been oppressed for millennia. But in the world view of the radical left, Jews are not victims, but rather members of the oppressor class. Their perceived economic success within the United States, and the presumed but wrong belief that all Jews are of Ashkenazi heritage, places Jews at the apex of the oppressor hierarchy. 

With no knowledge of, or exposure to, Mizrahi, Ethiopian, or Sephardic Jews, the charge of “all Jews are white” allows Jews to be collectively grouped into the previously-stated oppressor class. These assertions are then further supported by the Palestinians being portrayed as victims within the mainstream media narrative. 

Although Biden may not personally believe in these ideologies, there is a substantial portion of the progressive-wing of the Democratic Party that does. A Biden-Harris administration may claim to be able to control or stymie the most radical voices in the party, but I remain doubtful.  

These ideologies are powerful, ascendant, and demanding to be heard. And coupled with the Biden campaign's recent interaction with various anti-Israel groups, they resonate that much more clearly. At the present moment, however, the potential Biden-Harris administration seems intent on maintaining bipartisan support for Israel. Whether that view is able to hold remains uncertain. 

Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division.



MAHMOUD ABBAS IS WAITING FOR A BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

By David Hacham

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The historic Abraham Accords have exposed the profoundly weakened position in which the Palestinian Authority now finds itself. 

Mahmoud Abbas is almost certainly hoping for the return of a U.S. Democratic Administration, one he believes will turn back the clock on several recent US policies regarding the Israel-Palestinian conflict.

Barely any ties remain between Mahmoud Abbas and the Trump Administration. Relations are at their lowest point since the start of the Oslo peace process. 

Spawning that deterioration is a series of US decisions that constitute a major departure from long held American positions toward the Palestinians. 

Attempting to convey the PA’s ability to implement unified, decisive positions in the face of U.S. treatment it views as unfair; Abbas has abandoned any pretense of cordial relations with America and he has ramped up his condemnation of what he views as Trump's unbalanced positions and bias. His audiences are the Palestinian street, the Arab world, and to the international community. 

It’s worth recalling what led to this breakdown. 

Following his election, the American president delayed his response to Abbas’s request for a congratulatory phone call. That conversation, which took place some ten days after the request was made, was interpreted as a clear attempt by Trump to downgrade Abbas's status. 

The appointment of David Friedman as the U.S. Ambassador to Israel, in May 2017, was seen as a provocative and offensive maneuver. Friedman, who was on record as holding explicitly right-wing positions, including enthusiastic support for Israeli development in the West Bank, was viewed as highly problematic by the P.A.  

Later, in December of the same year, the Americans recognized Jerusalem as Israel's capital; a declaration swiftly followed by the deed of officially opening a U.S. embassy there.

Also in 2017, the Trump Administration closed the PLO office in Washington D.C. in an attempt to force the Palestinians back to the negotiating table, and to punish them for - and to deter them from - submitting complaints against Israel at the Hague. 

The immediate Palestinian response was to submit a new complaint to the Hague, opposing Israel's decision to clear the village of Khan Al-Ahmar in the West Bank.

The January 2020 'Deal of the Century' was dismissed by Abbas as an unfair and hostile blueprint.  

The passage of the Taylor Force Act of March 2018, which halts funding to the PA while it continues to pay monthly stipends to convicted terrorists and the families of killed terrorists, further angered Abbas. In 2018 alone, the PA paid 360 million dollars to terrorists or their families – 7% of the P.A.’s budget. 

The US, which was the principal funder of UNRWA, paying $ 1.1 billion annually (a third of UNRWA’s yearly budget), also withdrew funding to the organization in 2018.  

These measures have ruptured both diplomatic relations between the U.S. and the Palestinians and the security-intelligence cooperation between the P.A., the U.S. and Israel. 

In October 2018, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. General Consulate would merge with the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem, and that the U.S. would manage relations with the Palestinians through a Special Palestinian Affairs Unit. The P.A.’s policy has been to avoid any cooperation with the new unit.

That cooperation, led by the PA’s head of the General Intelligence Services, Maj. Gen. Majed Faraj, on the Palestinian side, was suspended by the PA in May 2020, in protest of Israeli plans to apply sovereignty in the Jordan Valley. 

Even the official contacts between the PA and the CIA, which had managed to weather the crisis, were suspended a number of weeks ago. 

Ultimately, the P.A.’s decision to cut off ties with a superpower like the U.S. was counterproductive. It only served to weaken the P.A.’s status in America’s eyes. 

The Palestinians have thus adopted a waiting position ahead of the US presidential elections this coming November. Their hope is that a Biden Administration will bring an end what the PA views as four nightmarish years for the Palestinian cause.

But when viewed for what they are; the withholding of funding for terrorist stipends, including terrorists who have murdered U.S. citizens, the opening of a U.S. embassy to Israel in the Israeli capital and the defunding of UNRWA; any future U.S. administration will be hard pressed to reverse course. Gambling that they will do so may prove to be a mistake. The P.A. would be better served by coming out of its defensive crouch and starting to progress toward reconciliation with Israel and America. 

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.

QUESTIONING ABRAHAM

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By Frank Sobchak

This week Sudan agreed to the normalization of relations with Israel in exchange for its removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism; joining Bahrain, UAE, and a growing chorus of nations that have seemingly put an end to decades of Arab-Israeli conflict. The Trump and Netanyahu administrations have heralded these achievements as byproducts of their diplomatic efforts, and President Trump has been personally nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Despite these claims, such an assessment would be a poor interpretation of events. Although the Abraham Accords are encouraging and historically significant developments, they are more a byproduct of tectonic changes that have transformed the region over decades than the result of diplomatic work of the parties involved. Most responsible for the accords is the restructuring of the Middle East regional balance of power as well as massive domestic transformations across the Arab world. 

For three decades, the two Iraq wars and their aftershocks have restructured the power dynamic of the Middle East, producing what scholars term the phenomenon of balancing - when countries shift alliances to collectively meet the challenges of a rising power. States that have little in common and few incentives to form partnerships band together against what they perceive to be a common and larger foe. Here, the decline of Iraq and the rise of Iran have led countries across the region to reassess their regional and international partnerships. Such a change in circumstance did not occur overnight. America’s two wars with Iraq, Desert Storm in 1991 and Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, militarily emasculated Iraq, which had long been considered Iran's regional counterbalance. Iraq’s armed forces, which in 1990 was the fifth largest in the world now cannot even provide domestic security. 

The deterioration of Iraqi military strength increased Iran’s relative power and emboldened their behavior. Iranian surrogates operate in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq; all part of an aggressive regional strategy known as the axis of resistance. Iranian forces or their proxies have launched attacks on tankers in the Persian Gulf and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, exacerbating the traditional Sunni-Shi’a schism and terrifying many of Iran’s neighbors whose militaries are dwarfed by the new regional hegemon. Iran’s active military is roughly three times Saudi Arabia’s and six times the size of UAE’s. Worse, the U.S., which has often played the role of regional policeman, has seemingly retreated into an era of limited overseas commitments and can’t be counted on to intervene against Iran- a policy consistent across the Obama and Trump administrations. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, viewed by many in the U.S. and Europe as a way to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, is perceived very differently by most Sunni Arab states. They see it as poorly designed and enforced; a destabilizing factor that could result in a nightmarish scenario. These factors have frightened Iran's neighbors into novel alliances with Israel which demonstrate the classical balancing verdict that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.  

Shifts in the regional balance of power, when added to the diminishing importance of the Palestinian cause among Arab populations, has resulted in new opportunities for Israel-Arab relations.  Twenty years ago, when Arabs were polled about their most important personal issue it was almost always "liberation" for the Palestinians. In Arabic, the word “Jerusalem” was seemingly inseparable from “occupied,” reflecting that the plight of the Palestinians mattered in daily life. Polls today do not reflect these concerns. A Palestinian state has dropped to the second most important foreign policy issue (behind Iran) for many Arab states and has often fallen behind economic issues and education in personal concerns. Majorities in many states now see normalization of relations with Israel as a positive development.

Fatigue with the Palestinian conflict, alongside a greater recognition of their own domestic problems makes many Arabs less inclined to follow the traditional Arab narrative on the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The fracturing of the Palestinian position into two diametrically different camps in the West Bank and Gaza further accelerated this process. Frustration from the Arab Spring’s lack of progress towards political change refocused many domestic audiences towards their own problems rather than those of the Palestinians. And the brutality of the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars put the notion of suffering into painful context.  

Access to non state-run media sources have enabled Arabs across the region to bear witness to these problems like never before. Old orthodoxies are thus questioned. Tired narratives lack the support they once did. 

Some Syrians and Lebanese have posted videos stating they would rather be Arabs in Israel than in their own countries, and others have denounced Hezbollah as “worse than Israel.”  Even Saudi Arabia, once a stalwart defender of the Palestinians, has begun to criticize Palestinian positions. Put together, these changes have begotten opportunities for advances in relations and normalization; most tellingly manifested in the form of the Abraham accords.

Given the impacts of the shifts in the Middle East balance of power and Arab domestic political changes, it is more likely than not that subsequent normalizations between Israel and other Arab states will occur in the near future. 

But more important than the simple tally of new alliances is the question of how long lasting and deep rooted those new friendships prove themselves to be. Allegiances that have shifted can shift back. That reality raises questions.

If the interests that led to normalization abruptly change, how heightened will concerns over the controversial sale of advanced F-35s stealth fighters to UAE become? Those concerns remain, despite Israel's recent condoning of the sale. Will Sudan’s removal from the list of state sponsors result in a real change of behavior and policy? Time will tell, but before we celebrate in earnest, these questions are certainly worthy of answers.

Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. Read full bio here.

Hezbollah: A systematic violator of international law

By Eli Bar-On

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As Prime Minister Netanyahu outlined during his presentation to the UN General Assembly, Hezbollah is a terrorist organization, one which draws its influence through systemic violations of international law. 

In early August, a powerful blast caused by the detonation of an enormous quantity of ammonium nitrate stored at the Beirut port, shook the entire Lebanese capital, killing at least 190 deaths, thousands of injuries and causing devastating damage to property.

While an investigative report into the explosion has yet to be published, many Lebanese protesters have been pointing fingers at Hezbollah as the prime culprit for the explosion. Circumstantial suspicion of Hezbollah's responsibility for this tragedy is predicated upon the organization's well-known control of the port, and its pattern of storing ammonium nitrate for terror purposes in various locations around the world; including Germany, Cyprus, the UK, and Thailand. This tragic incident reminds the world of Hezbollah's malign activities and violations of the law in general, and international law in particular, in Lebanon, the Middle East and throughout the world.

Hezbollah was established in 1982 as an Iranian-backed terror organization. Since then, it has gained growing political power in Lebanon. By the elections of 2018, Hezbollah and its political allies had won the majority of seats in the Lebanese parliament. At the same time, Hezbollah's military wing has morphed into a fully-equipped and well-trained modern army. In many ways, Hezbollah is operating as 'a state within a state' in Lebanon.

As was explicitly admitted by the organization's Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, the lion's share of Hezbollah's budget, some 700 million dollars a year (a decrease from past years), comes directly from Iran. An estimated 200 million more dollars comes from illegal international Hezbollah activities, such as the trafficking of narcotics and money laundering.  

In recent years, the organization has been struggling to deal with international sanctions that were imposed on its funding, mainly by the U.S..

Hezbollah in its entirety has been designated as a terror organization by a growing number of countries, which recognize that there is no distinction whatsoever between its political and military wings. Prominent countries that have banned Hezbollah in its entirety include the U.S., the UK, Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Lithuania, Israel and several Latin American countries. The Arab League has also declared it a terror entity, as has the Gulf Cooperation Council. Unfortunately, the European Union, which has only designated the military wing of the organization as a terror group, has yet to follow suit, creating an obstacle in the effort to disrupt Hezbollah's overseas activities. 

Hezbollah's footprint in global terrorism has been enormous ever since its inception. While many of its terror plots have been foiled, examples of its deadly attacks include the 1983 Marine Corps barracks attack in Beirut, the 2012 Burgas bus bombing, and mass casualty bombings of Jewish and Israeli targets in Argentina in the 1990s. Hezbollah terror cells are active around the world. 

In Lebanon itself, Hezbollah is a non-state actor that has gradually come to take control of Lebanese state institutions. After the Hezbollah-led bloc took control of the cabinet and parliament in 2019, and following the organization's growing penetration of state budgets and ministries, it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between Hezbollah and Lebanon. 

Lebanon is either unwilling or unable to take control of this rogue organization, and both Lebanon's and Hezbollah's systematic violations of UN Security Council resolutions go unchallenged.  

Resolution 1559, passed in 2004, called for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Resolution 1701, passed during the 2006 Lebanon War, calls for full respect of the Blue Line (the border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel, declared by the UN in 2000), and the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon. It also stipulates that the area south of the Litani River must be free from armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of UNIFIL (the UN's observer force in the area) and the Lebanese Military. These resolutions have been violated continuously in various ways, both by Lebanon and Hezbollah. 

Hezbollah continues to store weapons across southern Lebanon – whether received from Iran and Syria or produced internally. It continues to develop its program to produce precision guided missiles. In the whole of Lebanon, Hezbollah, replenished by Iran since the 2006 war, has an arsenal estimated to be as high as 170,000 projectiles. 

Armed Hezbollah operatives maintain a presence on the Blue Line itself. In April 2017, in a tour that was organized by Hezbollah, foreign and Lebanese media documented armed Hezbollah operatives on the border with Israel. UNIFIL later said it did not see them.

The Green Without Borders organization is a Hezbollah front group that purportedly advances an environmental agenda, but which is linked to the terror organization, and maintains at least 16 known posts along the Israeli border that are manned by armed Hezbollah operatives. 

Following the September 2019 missile attack on an IDF vehicle near Avivim, northern Israel, a UNIFIL investigation found that the attack was launched from a location next to a Green Without Borders post, an area UNIFIL says it has no access to. 

Hezbollah will sometimes organize "protests" by civilians that it rallies to the border, who occasionally cross into Israeli territory and carry out operational missions. It also uses goat herders for reconnaissance gathering missions. Moreover, it attacks and harasses UNIFIL observers and prevents them from gaining full access to any point along the Blue Line on a regular basis. 

In December 2018, the IDF exposed six Hezbollah cross-border tunnels, which were intended to enable thousands of elite terror operatives to cross into Israel and massacre civilians. The tunnels represent another blatant violation of Resolution 1701. 

While the Lebanese Forces and the Lebanese government were supposed to disarm Hezbollah according to UN Security Council resolutions, the opposite is happening. Hezbollah is infiltrating the Lebanese army, and increasingly using its assets, as well as those of the Lebanese government. During a 2016 Hezbollah parade in Syria, armored personnel carriers taken from the Lebanese army were put on display. 

The Prime Minister was correct. The growing menace of Hezbollah must be tackled, not merely for the sake of Lebanon's neighbors, including Israel, but for the sake of the Lebanese themselves. They have borne the brunt of Hezbollah's flagrant violation of international law once already this year. Let that be no recurrence of such suffering. 

Eli Bar-On concluded his career in the Israel Defense Forces holding the position of instructor at the IDF National Defense College (the INDC). Prior to that position, Bar-on served as the Deputy Military Advocate General of the IDF (2012 to 2015), where he was in command of approximately 1,000 lawyers and legal experts, including prior to, during and following Operation Pillar of Defense & Operation Protective Edge. He also served as the Chief Legal Advisor for the IDF in the West Bank from 2009 to 2012.