Israel’s Shift to CENTCOM: Big Things Come in Little Packages

By Iris SOBCHAK & FRANK Sobchak

In the waning hours of his presidency, President Trump ordered the U.S. military to change its Unified Command Plan by moving Israel from European Command (EUCOM) to Central Command (CENTCOM).  

Seemingly a small and semantic change, in reality the shift is nothing short of tectonic and momentous. While the decision did not receive much coverage because of the attack on the Capitol and surrounding events, it is an important issue with many considerable ramifications. Specifically, it will have immediate practical implications and will create new opportunities for engagement that could trigger another wave of diplomatic developments and normalizations.

European Command was established in 1952 to provide unified command and authority over US forces in Europe focused on the danger of a Soviet invasion during the Cold War. By contrast, Central Command was established by Ronald Reagan in 1983, taking over from the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to address Middle East crises. Israel, Lebanon, and Syria were chosen to remain in EUCOM, at least in part because Egypt was the only country in CENTCOM that recognized Israel. Also informing the decision was the thought that the animosity towards Israel from many Arab nations would complicate coalition negotiations and operational planning.  

At the time, simply having an Israeli entry stamp in one’s passport prohibited American military planners from entering most Arab states, and the ridiculous posturing of officials maintaining two passports became a necessity. General Norman Schwarzkopf believed that not having Israel in CENTCOM made his job as coalition commander during the 1991 Gulf War easier and noted, “I’d have difficulty impressing the Arabs with Central Command’s grasp of geo-political nuance if one of the stops on my itinerary had been Tel Aviv.”  

But the decision had negative consequences on U.S. interagency planning. In the Department of Defense, Israel was under EUCOM while in the State Department it was organized under the Near Eastern Bureau with its Arab neighbors. This caused difficulties in the areas of defense and diplomacy, including when negotiating treaties or coordinating operations. But the geo-strategic tides shifted and in 1994 Jordan joined Egypt in recognizing Israel. 

Fast forward to more recent months and we note that as part of the recent Abraham Accords, Bahrain, UAE, Morocco, and Sudan have also normalized relations. 

Moving Israel to CENTCOM is a significant step towards correctly aligning the State and Defense Department regional bureaus and commands. The logical realignment of Israel in CENTCOM is good for governance and will allow the U.S. to manage the national bureaucracy and communications between these governmental organizations and with our allies in the region.  

Additionally, the two most pressing regional (and potentially geo-strategic) dangers of our time, a rearming and resurgent Iran and the threat of militant Islamic fundamentalists groups such as Al Qa’ida and ISIS, are issues that require the involvement, coordination, and assistance of countries throughout the region.   

The U.S. has long sought to build a regional defense arrangement to counter Iranian expansion and prevent Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons. By including Israel in the appropriate plans and operations, CENTCOM will have greater success in achieving these goals, whether they be through missile defense, non-proliferation, countering terrorist financing, or simply killing or capturing senior terrorist leadership. Israel and her neighbors will also benefit greatly as the change aligns with their own security objectives. 

Switching Israel to CENTCOM also creates new opportunities. Such a realignment will compel other Arab states that have not yet recognized Israel to engage more with her more readily. The alignments also has the potential to lead to warmed relations or even a new wave of recognitions or normalizations. 

At the CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, there exists an “engagement village” where all countries included in the region send liaisons to coordinate and make connections. Having Israel as  part of this engagement village will open an additional back door of communications that will enable further cooperation on a multitude of issues. Even countries that do not yet formally have established relations with Israel would have to collaborate with Israel in such an environment and it is not inconceivable that such efforts could lead to the quiet prospering of informal relations with Iran’s principal Gulf rival, Saudi Arabia.

Another possible outcome could be that Israel’s shift results in a larger American military unified command plan reassessment. Such a review could spur the movement of the countries in northern Africa that are more culturally and geographically similar to those in the Middle East to be realigned with CENTCOM as well. Making this move would line up CENTCOM with the way that the State Department has structured their Near East Affairs Bureau. It makes logical sense to have Morocco, Libya, Algeria and Tunisia in the same regional headquarters, as they are facing similar issues as the Arabian Peninsula and Egypt.  

The decision to shift Israel to CENTCOM is one that will have significant, immediate, practical benefits for the United States, Israel, and the Arab nations of the region. The only possible downside to this decision is that should Israel come into conflict with any of the other countries within CENTCOM, decision making and operational planning would become more complicated. More likely however, is that such a realignment would help deter this kind of conflict and create a greater peace between Israel and the other countries of the region.  

Engagement leads to personal connections and the dispelling of biases and prejudices.  As the American author Mark Twain wrote, “Broad, wholesome, charitable views of men and things cannot be acquired by vegetating in one little corner of the earth all one's lifetime.” Let us all hope that this move helps inspire such views.

---

Frank Sobchak is a PhD candidate in international relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and The Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He holds a BS in Military History from West Point and a MA in Arab Studies from Georgetown University. Read full bio here.

Iris Sobchak (Lieutenant Colonel, Retired Army) has had a diverse 29 year career in the military, academia, financial services and in women’s leadership consulting. She taught History at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and she holds a BS in international/Strategic History from West Point and a MA in Latin American History at Penn State.

TURKISH OVERTURES TO ISRAEL. TREAT WITH SUSPICION

By Arthur Koll

In recent weeks, Turkey has made diplomatic overtures toward Israel, signaling a desire to repair damaged relations between the two countries. But Ankara will need to go significantly further than sending feelers to Jerusalem if it is serious about rebuilding ties. 

In the past, close relations between Israel and Turkey formed an important anchor in Israeli foreign policy, spanning diplomatic, political, and military-intelligence cooperation. The ties also included large-scale trade, and hundreds of thousands of Israeli tourists visited Turkey annually. 

These ties developed gradually, when Turkey was still under the control of a secular government, led by the ideology of its secular founder, Ataturk, and backed by the military, which had a special status. 

When Recep Tayyip Erdogan was first elected Prime Minister in 2003 and came to power with his Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), security and intelligence cooperation with Israel were not immediately harmed, and neither were trade or tourism, which continued to break records year after year. 

Yet with time, the Turkish military’s secular chiefs and civil service were replaced with Islamists, and the relationship with Israel began to deteriorate as Erdogan and the AKP tightened their grip on power. 

The 2010 Mavi Marmara incident marked the start of a deep crisis, when Turkish citizens who sought to break Israel’s security restrictions on Gaza sailed to the Strip with Erdogan’s approval, violently clashing with the IDF, resulting in the deaths of Turkish extremists.  

Erdogan’s language towards Israel became more extreme, as he attempted, unsuccessfully, to act against Israel through international legal maneuvers. Rounds of conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza saw Erdogan position himself openly and vocally on the side of Hamas, and employ language that bordered on anti-Semitic. 

In 2018, Turkey ejected Israel’s ambassador after deadly clashes on the Gaza border, sparked by Hamas’s ‘return marches.’ Since then, the chargé d'affaires at the Israeli embassy in Ankara has managed what is left of the bilateral relationship. 

But Ankara seems to have gained little, if anything, by its hostility toward Israel. Jerusalem has found strategic alternatives to Turkey, in the form of important new Mediterranean alliances with Greece and Cyprus, where special relations, joint military training, and shared economic interests, including cooperation on offshore gas reserves, are creating powerful partnerships. 

Israel has also nurtured open, strategic cooperation with a number of key Sunni Arab states in the Gulf and North Africa. 

Yet Ankara and Jerusalem still find themselves, sometimes, on the same side, with similar strategic interests. The latest example of this could be found in the recent war between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Media reports suggested that Turkey and Israel were principal backers of Baku, creating a clear merger of interests. 

Still, Israel has been badly burned by Turkey in recent years. Past attempts by Jerusalem to reconcile were only met with hostility, as exemplified by Turkey’s reaction to a decision by Prime Minister Netanyahu to compensate the families of the Mavi Marmara casualties and to express regret over the incident – a decision that did nothing to ameliorate relations. 

To make matters worse, Turkey spent years providing asylum for senior Hamas members on its territory, from where they coordinate operations against Israel. 

Erdogan ultimately views himself as the leader of the Islamic world, resulting in his decision to create an alliance with Hamas, which is a designated terror organization in many Western states. He has also been attempting to gain a foothold in the Temple Mount compound in Jerusalem. 

As a result, it has been surprising to see statements by a senior Erdogan advisor on foreign relations about a new desire to restore relations with Israel, including renewed defense cooperation. 

It is possible that Turkey came to the conclusion that fixing the damaged ties is in its interest for both geopolitical as well as economic reasons. In this context, Ankara is seeking a way to connect and gain from the large gas reserves found in the eastern Mediterranean, from which it has been left out. 

Unlike in the past, so far Jerusalem seems to be reserved in response to Turkey’s overtures. Israel has simply been ‘burned’ too many times by Erdogan’s hostility. Clear confidence building measures are now needed to restore trust.

If Ankara’s intentions are genuine, it would have to shut down Hamas’s activity on its territory to prove it. This would serve as an important confidence building act. At the same time, it is unrealistic to expect that Israel will abandon its new Mediterranean allies for a possible improvement in relations with Ankara. 

---

Ambassador Arthur Koll is the former Deputy Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he concluded his service as the head of the Media and Public Affairs Division. He is a former Ambassador of Israel to the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro and served as instructor of the National Defense College. Mr. Koll also served as Consul of the Israeli Consulate in Atlanta, USA and as Director of Projects for the Central Europe & Eurasia Division.

IS A LONG-TERM ARRANGMENT WITH GAZA POSSIBLE?

BY Grisha Yakubovich

Voices in Israel have been calling recently for an effort to reach a long-term truce with Hamas in the Gaza Strip, but while Israel may be willing to take steps to reach that objective, it remains an open question whether Hamas is willing and able to do the same.

It is imperative to first realize that Israel and Hamas likely have very different definitions of the term 'long-term truce.'

In Israel and the Western world this could translate into many years of absolute quiet, accompanied by economic development in Gaza, trade, and a major step towards peace.

But in Hamas's world, such an arrangement would be interpreted as an agreement that serves Hamas's immediate, medium, and long-term interests, and the arrangement is unlikely to lead to a broader end to hostilities, so long as Hamas only controls Gaza and not the West Bank – unless that is the organization changes its goals. 

According to Hamas's perspective, a truce arrangement with Israel on the Gazan front does not mean an end to terror attacks by Hamas cells based in the West Bank, Lebanon, or even overseas.

Moreover, while in Israel there are calls for Hamas to demilitarize Gaza as part of such a truce, this would ironically undermine the chances of any arrangement holding up as Hamas needs its terror military assets to reign in other armed factions in Gaza, particularly Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Salafi-jihadi groups, who could try to challenge the détente. 

For Israel, a long-term arrangement would enable the defense establishment to focus its resources and attention on its main threat, the Iranian axis. For Hamas, a deal would be about securing its role as a Palestinian governing entity with tangible achievements to present to the Palestinian people.

To understand Hamas's dilemma in weighing up a long-term arrangement, it is worth noting that such an agreement could see Iran cut off funding to the organization to show its displeasure. Iran expects its proxies and sponsored organizations to confront Israel and be responsive to its desires. Entering a long-term arrangement with Israel would violate that understanding. This could also create new tensions between Hamas and Iran's more intimate Gaza proxy, Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

On the other hand, Hamas is extremely keen to solve the pressing issues it is currently facing – the Strip's failing economy, stretched medical system, disintegrating basic services and infrastructure, and lack of any tangible achievements as a sovereign entity that it can display domestically. The coronavirus is another urgent problem troubling the Hamas regime.

Still, Hamas would face serious challenges if it presented a future arrangement with Israel as being motivated only by the desire to merely secure stable electricity and water, alleviate unemployment, and gain additional economic benefits.

It needs to show more significant gains to Gazans and to the other factions, and this means securing a sea port, and the opening up of Gaza's borders to freer movement. In addition, it would need to secure the release of Palestinian security prisoners – as a separate deal.

The ability to market any arrangement as a major Hamas achievement will therefore be crucial if Hamas leaders in Gaza and outside are to agree to it.

Hamas Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar is worried by the fact that after 13 years of Hamas rule, the organization has little to nothing to present Gazans with, other than wars, poverty, and a disconnect from the West Bank. This is not what Hamas wants to enshrine as its primary legacy.

 Hamas's distress found expression in a recent joint military drill it held with other Gazan factions. The message behind the drill to Israel is that Hamas has power, and is not to be trivialized. It also served as a creative way of urging Israel to enter into mediated negotiations.

The dramatic regional changes that led to normalization agreements between Israel and Sunni Arab states could create new momentum in the push to reach an arrangement. Qatar, a key financial sponsor of Hamas, is moving toward the Saudi-led Sunni axis, and this axis has every interest in pulling Hamas out of Iran's orbit. 

One major obstacle to reaching such an arrangement is the unresolved issue of Hamas's holding of two Israeli hostages and the bodies of two IDF soldiers killed in the 2014 Gaza war.

Hamas is holding the hostages and bodies as bargaining chips for the release of Palestinian prisoners – a major strategic gain if Hamas can secure it. Israel has no current intentions of releasing large numbers of prisoners and is unwilling to proceed with broader arrangements until the release is secured. For Hamas the prisoners and a long-term arrangement are two separate issues.  

Perhaps an even bigger question though is how far is Hamas willing to budge on larger issues.

Not only can Hamas not afford to demilitarize itself, it would also need a declarative acknowledgment from Israel, the Palestinian Authority, and the region that it is the legitimate ruling entity in Gaza

Only such a declarative achievement would enable Hamas to descend some steps from its ideological militant tree, while still being able to enforce its authority over other Gazan armed factions.

This would mean that Gaza would remain militarized in any realistic arrangement and that a great deal of money would need to be poured into the Strip to 'solve the problem' of militant Islamist ideology.

Adding further complications to the mix is the danger that Hamas wins elections in the West Bank, an outcome that would not serve Israel’s interests, as long as Hamas remains a terrorist organization.

It is important to keep in mind that Hamas is a strategic organization with long-term calculations. This means that any potential arrangement would have to go a long way to meeting the organization's immediate and future needs.

This fact creates a far trickier challenge than first meets the eye. Only a delicate recipe, prepared by the right chef, could make such an arrangement potentially 'palatable' for all of the involved parties, near and far.

---

Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.).

WHEN VALUES GO GLOBAL-A COUNTRY AND PEOPLE REDEFINED

By Efraim Chalamish

This past week brought us the unique opportunity to observe two very different events and occasions that happened to take place on the same day — Tu Bishvat and International Holocaust Remembrance Day. One is nature’s New Year in Judaism and the other commemorates the unprecedented events of the Holocaust and their role in the international community. While these two very distinct events have very little in common, this coincidence of time and place projects important developments in Israel’s rapid growth as a sovereign nation and its role on the global stage. And the lessons should be applied to other Israeli and Jewish events moving forward.

Tu Bishvat is originally a Jewish holiday that celebrates the birth of the trees. Israeli kids historically are heading to nature on that day, planting their first seeds. The holiday not only symbolizes the renewal of nature, but also the unique role of trees and the environment in the Jewish tradition and its culture. Jewish patriarchs, matriarchs, and thought leaders used trees to dream and grow for generations.

Yet, the nature of Tu Bishvat has changed over the years. It was the first birthday of the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, which became a symbol of modern democracy, despite its weaknesses and challenges. It also introduced the concept of environmental preservation and ‘climate change’ to new audiences in Israel and the Jewish community around the world. Most importantly, though, it took particular Jewish events and turned them into a universal message, presenting the meaning of the day to the wider global community.

Holocaust Remembrance Day (Yom HaShoah) has been mainly an internal Israeli event. Commemorated in Israel and Jewish communities around the world in April every year, it became an international event in 2006 when the United Nations announced the new International Holocaust Remembrance Day to be marked on January 27, the date of the liberation of Auschwitz by the Red Army.

Following advocacy efforts by various organizations, which I had the opportunity to be part of, the leadership of the United Nations and the international community concluded that it is the right moment in history to turn the memorial day into an international day, educate next generations in every country and religion, and project the importance and relevance of the horrific events to today’s world. While for years the Holocaust has been perceived in some circles as an internal Jewish element, now the universal message has been delivered loud and clear.

The transition of Tu Bishvat and Holocaust Remembrance Day should have a special meaning to us. They represent a dramatic change in the way Israel defines itself and projects its role in and to the world.

The story of Israel as a startup-nation resonates with broader audiences globally since it shows how you can take internal challenges and convert them to innovation and technological solutions that change positively the world completely, one app at a time. It also brought Israel to the forefront of impact investing, social investments, and Tikkun Olam.

Yet, it is not only Israel’s technology that can take a national narrative to the universal stage in order to re-define Israel’s role in the world. The Jewish and Israeli calendars are comprised of many dates, events, and themes that can be shared with the world to give them current meanings and modern applications.

The benefits are many. While some groups question the importance of these holidays and events even within the Jewish community itself, a universal messaging helps them understand their broader context. Moreover, it provides more opportunities for Israel as a sovereign nation to contribute to the most cutting-edge discussions in the world today, from health policy to security. Also, similarly to the U.N. example, it can create additional forums where leaders from around the world can connect on these key issues, where Israeli diplomacy plays a meaningful constructive role.

The Abraham Accords and consequent agreements between Israel and Arab nations, including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco, also reflect this change. Listening carefully to the region’s leaders and reading the relevant texts, the agreements reflect not only a new regional strategic order, but also a deep understanding between religions that can be used to surface key issues in inter-religious dialogues, and can be relevant to other religions and crises around the world.

The world of trees met the world of European and World history in a week that reminded all of us of the power of universal relevance and messaging of Jewish and Israeli events and values. We should all continue and explore ways to bring this unique voice to the world. I have no doubt it will be heard. The world is listening.

---

Dr. Efraim Chalamish is an international economic law professor, advisor, and media commentator. He has been involved in international legal practice in New York, Paris and Israel, along with research in, and analysis of, cutting edge areas in public and private international economic law. Dr. Chalamish teaches at NYU Law School.

PODCAST: Jonny Gould's Jewish State - Israel's world-leading Covid vaccine rollout

Jonny Gould's Jewish State · 52: Israel's world-leading Covid vaccine rollout

IN THE COMING ELECTIONS, IT'S TIME FOR GENDER EQUALITY TO TAKE CENTER STAGE

By Sharon Roffe Ofir

The coming elections for Israel’s 24th Knesset represent a vital opportunity to place the values of gender equality – and with them, those of liberal Zionism - at the forefront of Israeli national development. 

The good news is that the issue of gender equality is already at the heart of public dialogue. All political parties have recognized the centrality of the issue, and are highlighting the women in their ranks. Almost every party has its own women’s committee, even the ultra-Orthodox Shas party. 

But ultimately, such steps are at the level of ‘nice to have.’ After all, it is one thing to raise the banner of gender equality across all parts of society, it is another to take these calls forward and translate them into tangible action. 

Unfortunately, the ultra-Orthodox parties, including Shas, have no women at all among their elected officials – yet they still receive state funding for election campaigns. As long as this remains the case, full gender equality will be out of reach. 

Any coalition that involves the two ultra-Orthodox parties will be incapable of promoting gender equality. This is not to say that there are not voices within ultra-Orthodox society seeking to create important change. There are indeed Ultra-Orthodox women activists who are fighting back. 

Knesset legislation must be introduced conditioning state funding on parties having at least 30% representation by women. 

 According to a report by the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Israel is ranked 83rd out of 189 countries when it comes to global parliamentary gender equality, and is ranked 27th out of 35 OECD countries. These figures are highly unflattering. 

Measured in the absence of Shas and UTJ, most Knesset parties have female  representation ranging from 26 to 45% – not a trivial percentage, and in line with the Western average. 

Greater commitment to gender equality education is required, from kindergarten to twelfth grade. This is currently not compulsory in Israel, and making such gender education part of the curriculum would be a revolutionary act that could happen in the 24th Knesset. 

Similarly, it is time to open IDF roles to men and women, and while the military has made progress in this direction, ensuring that only suitable candidates reach such positions irrespective of gender should be enshrined in legislation. 

 For any of these things to happen, the ultra-Orthodox parties must be forced into opposition. The choice is clear: Israel can have either ultra-Orthodox parties in the ruling coalition, or it can promote women’s rights. It cannot have both. 

If an enabling coalition is formed, a broad range of issues can be tackled. 

Reform is also overdue in the private sector. Among publicly traded companies on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, only three have women as CEOs. To help address this issue, a ‘traffic light index’ was introduced in the last knesset by MK Oded Forer, who chaired the Status of Women committee at that time, to measure the integration of women in the workforce and in senior management in companies on the Tel Aviv 125 Index.

This was based on research conducted abroad, where gender equality indexes are published for investors, since companies with a higher percentage of women have been found to be more profitable, creating investor pressure for the publication of the indexes. 

Israel is still trailing many other countries on this front. The new index will publish figures twice a year, and highlight green companies, which have over 40% women in senior management, yellow companies, with 20 to 40%, and red companies, which have under 20%.

 The coronavirus pandemic has been especially harmful to women, with some 70% of unemployed in this current, third closure being women. There has been a sharp rise of hundreds of percent in the numbers of women falling prey to domestic abuse. And yet, just seven out of 37 people on the government’s committee of experts to exit the crisis are women. 

 Out of the expert guests who appear on the media to discuss these issues, a mere 15% are women. 

Only one woman has served as a Knesset chairperson since the parliament’s founding, and important Knesset committees such as Finance, Defense and Foreign Affairs, and Law and Justice have never been chaired by a woman. ,. 

Meanwhile, twenty-five women were murdered in domestic violence attacks in the past year.

Despite the challenges that remain, today’s young generation is demanding gender equality, and such values are familiar territory for it. Yet it is vital to take the next necessary steps — for gender equality will make it more likely that that we all live in a stable, prosperous society, and in a liberal-Zionist country

---

Sharon Roffe Ofir is deputy Mayor of Kiriyat Tivon, in the Haifa region. She is in charge of government relations and gender equality and is a member of WCCS (Women's Council for Civil Security) strategy group. Sharon is the Chairperson of the Women's Rights Committee in the Yisrael-Beiteinu party. Read full bio here.

HEBREW PODCAST: השגריר בדימוס ארתור קול , ישראל: עבר,הווה ועתיד

השגריר בדימוס ארתור קול, חיי והשירות שלי למען המדינה

HEZBOLLAH STILL EYES REVENGE

BY Noam Tibon

In recent months, Hezbollah has made repeated attempts to avenge the death of one of its operatives in a reported Israeli air strike in Syria in July. While the Lebanese terror organization hasn't given up on its stated goal of killing an Israeli soldier in response, the organization currently faces multiple challenges that are significantly more pressing. 

The restraining factors acting against Hezbollah at this time are likely dissuading it from taking action that could lead to war with Israel, though the risk of an unintended conflict certainly remains. 

The Lebanese state, which hosts Hezbollah, faces several crises, each of which has an impact on the organization: The coronavirus pandemic, and a severe economic meltdown are two of the most impactful of the current challenges. 

In addition, the massive blast in the Beirut port in August killed more than 200 people in 2020 and left widespread devastation in the Lebanese capital. 

Iran, Hezbollah's state sponsor, faces its own grave economic crisis, and the spiraling coronavirus outbreak in the Islamic Republic is fomenting widespread anger against the Ayatollahs.

Meanwhile, for the first time in years, extraordinary negotiations took place between the Israeli and Lebanese governments over maritime borders. These talks, though stalled, occurred in spite of Hezbollah, and have been driven by Lebanon's dire economic straits, which led Beirut to seek natural gas revenue in the Mediterranean. Lebanon's willingness to negotiate represents a change to the status quo. 

Iran, meanwhile, remains on high alert as the Biden administration settles into Washington DC. Though free from the concern that President Trump might have taken drastic action against it before he left office, the Biden Administration's policy toward Iran remains unclear. It is as yet unknown when the new president will return to the nuclear agreement, and under which conditions. As a result of these uncertainties, Iran must avoid any unforced errors, and the same holds true for its proxy, Hezbollah. 

Nevertheless, it is important to recall that Hezbollah is continuing with many of its dangerous activities. First among these is its accumulation of firepower. Israel is engaged in a daily battle with Hezbollah, which seeks to turn a significant portion of its massive arsenal of rockets and missiles into accurate projectiles that pose a far greater threat.

Israel's campaign of attacks in Syria is designed to prevent precision guided missiles from reaching Hezbollah. It is also designed to prevent Iranian-backed militias from entrenching themselves in Syria, and building a second front against Israel in the Syrian Golan Heights. 

Last November’s IDF discovery of explosive devices placed on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights border was clear evidence of the same effort by the Iranian axis to create a second anti-Israel northern front in Syria. Hezbollah is certainly involved in that attempt, even if its involvement takes a low profile. 

With so many factors at play, Hezbollah's "revenge" against Israel in response to the July incident appears likely to be very minor, and pursuit of this objective is not at the top of the organization's priority list. 

There have been three attempts since the summer to exact a price from Israel - at Mount Dov, on the Golan Heights, and on the Lebanese border. All three have failed, but Hezbollah continues to search for an IDF weak point, albeit as a low priority. 

The targeted killing of the Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in a U.S. drone strike dealt a further blow to Hezbollah's effectiveness. 

Despite all of the above, it is also important not to underplay the risk of unintended war. In 2006, when it launched a cross-border kidnapping raid, Hezbollah did not intend to launch the Second Lebanon War, and the organization's secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah would later state as much. 

The high tension level on the Israeli - Lebanese border means that localized incidents have the potential to rapidly snowball into major events. 

Israel therefore must remain on high alert, and closely monitor developments on the ground. While Hezbollah remains under multiple restraints, it could still seek to act, and it may choose a location that is far from local in order to do so, as it has done in the past. 

The 2012 Burgas bus bombing, which killed five Israeli tourists and their Bulgarian driver, is one such example. 

The Israeli defense establishment will be closely monitoring the situation, and can be expected to continue to gather intelligence while remaining on the highest alert. A full blown conflict would be costly to Hezbollah and very costly to Lebanon. 

---

Major General Noam Tibon spent his military career specializing in counter terrorism and homeland security. His command positions include service as Commander of the 202nd Battalion of the Paratroopers Brigade, Deputy Commander of the Paratroopers Brigade, Commander of the Etzion Regional Brigade, Commander of the Judea Regional Brigade, Commander of the “Nahal” Brigade, Head of the Personnel Division of the IDF Ground Forces, Chief of the Infantry and Paratroopers Corps, Commander of the Judea and Samaria Division and Commander of the Command and Staff College, IDF.

MIRYAM'S SUMMARY: DR. MICHAEL OREN ON THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

By Peter Fishkind

On Tuesday, January 12th the MirYam Institute hosted Israel’s former Ambassador to the United States, Michael Oren, for a discussion, available on MirYam’s podcast channel focused on what Joe Biden’s election will mean for Israel. The first half of the program was a Q & A with Benjamin Anthony and the remainder was filled with questions from members of the MirYam Institute community of adjuncts. The conversation with the Ambassador also focused on recent news events including the riot at the U.S. Capitol.

In discussing Joe Biden, Ambassador Oren described him as a friend of Israel, spoke fondly of his character, and noted that he took specific stances during the Democratic Presidential Primary on issues like U.S. financial aid to Israel to positively distinguish himself from certain other competitors in the race. However, he expressed concern over the administration’s expected Iran policy. In particular, despite speaking highly of the capacity of a number of Biden’s announced foreign policy team and their support of Israel, he noted that the bulk of them played significant roles in crafting the JCPOA. Despite those concerns, the Ambassador stated his hope that the administration will be guided by facts and analysis rather than preconceived ideological goals, that the administration will seek to utilize leverage afforded to it by the sanctions currently in place, and that the administration will avoid showing daylight with Israel whenever possible. 

Certain recent developments, including the testimony of Joe Biden’s nominee for Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, have reinforced the conclusions of the Ambassador. Blinken was generally received warmly by the Committee, testifying that the U.S. Embassy would remain in Jerusalem, complementing the successes of the Trump Administration in facilitating the development of Israeli-Arab relations via the Abraham Accords while pledging to work to increase such efforts. However, as expected, Blinken stated that it would be the Biden administration’s intention to re-enter the JCPOA if Iran was to come into compliance with its terms. As the Ambassador noted, and I agree, the Agreement contains fatal flaws such that a re-entry will cause significant friction in the U.S.-Israel relationship. However, Blinken noted that any such step is a “long way” off and also addressed a critical concern of Oren’s, promising that Israel and other regional allies as well as Congress would be consulted before any U.S. action. If such steps are taken and sound advice is heeded, it will only improve the odds that a policy is best designed to achieve the joint aim of the U.S. and Israel, to prevent Iran from developing the capacity to build a deliverable nuclear weapon. 

Additionally, the Ambassador stated that he does not expect Israeli-Palestinian negotiations to be a particular priority of the Biden administration. Such a stance accords with the U.S. interest, where U.S. meddling has often backfired in its aim of improving Israeli-Palestinian relations. Rather, the Ambassador predicted that a greater focus will be placed on building on the successes of the Abraham Accords, noting Biden’s praise of the agreements during the campaign. As noted, this was reiterated as an intention of Biden’s in the Blinken testimony. 

In discussing the riot at the Capitol, the Ambassador contextualized the events specific to that day within a longer framework of America’s withdrawal from the world. The Ambassador noted that dating back to his time of service as Israel’s Ambassador during President Obama’s tenure through President Trump’s term in office that political leaders in both parties as well as American voters were far more focused on domestic concerns than ones abroad. In the Ambassador's view, the riot was indicative of these troubles and would demand that the U.S. continue its focus on policing itself and strengthening its own democracy rather than foreign affairs. In no uncertain terms, the Ambassador stated that this development will be bad for Israel and the free world, as an American withdrawal will create vacuums to be filled with bad actors. 

This analysis is likely correct as both America’s political divisions and the massive costs imposed by the pandemic will require the Biden administration to focus on domestic issues. However, there is certainly a contrarian view to take here. One could suggest that Americans may respond to the pandemic with an increased focus on global affairs. In fact, its need is apparent, as the virus was birthed in China and spread, in part, because no external actor was on the ground to assess the threat posed by the virus. Similarly, there may be an opportunity to build a political consensus on how the U.S. can most effectively compete with China’s growing economic power and influence abroad.

Unfortunately, while the factors to make such a reinvigoration of America’s broader strategy of engagement with the world are present, it is most likely that other domestic challenges will require too great a focus for any administration to meet them fully in the near term. As a consequence, as the Ambassador noted, Israel will need to continue to diversify its relationships rather than rely on its alliance with the U.S. alone.

---

Peter Fishkind is currently an associate in the Litigation Department at Proskauer Rose LLP in New York. He lives in Great Neck, New York and is a Member of the Nassau County Democratic Party Committee.

PALESTINIAN ELECTION TRAIN ROLLS OUT, BUT WILL ABBAS LET IT REACH ITS DESTINATION?

By David Hacham

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has fired the opening shot marking the start of the race to Palestinian elections, some 15 years after the last time a ballot was held,  but multiple obstacles remain, as well as considerable risks for Fatah.

In mid-January, Abbas signed a presidential decree announcing elections in three stages to the Palestinian Legislative Council, the Palestinian presidency, and the PLO parliament.

The last time elections were held, Hamas won a majority of 76 of the Legislative Council’s 132 seats (Abbas won the presidential elections the year before).

There are many good reasons to remain doubtful that the current elections train will reach its final destination.

Hamas rushed to embrace Abbas's decree, claiming that it would prepare the ground for free and fair elections to reflect the genuine will of the voters, though it remains far from clear whether this indeed would be the case in Gaza.

Major gaps remain between the two groups, driven by their opposing strategic objectives, and these differences could still thwart elections entirely.

A sign of Fatah's true feelings about elections could be found in Abbas's insistence that they be held in stages, in contrast to Hamas's desire to hold all three elections (legislative, presidential, and the PLO) in one swoop.  

For Fatah, each stage represents a possible exit ramp, which could abort the process in the event of a Hamas victory. Yet Hamas agreed to Fatah's conditions, due to its ongoing distress in Gaza, where the regime is facing deep economic and health crises, accompanied by regional isolation that is only growing following normalization agreements between Sunni countries and Israel. 

Hamas is seeking rapid economic relief for Gaza, and acknowledgement from the international community that it is a legitimate actor. It views elections as a path to those goals, as well as a stepping stone to expanding its power in the West Bank and taking over Palestinian government institutions.

For Israel, merely allowing Hamas - a hostile enemy entity, it designates as a terror organization - to take part in elections in East Jerusalem presents enormous problems .

Yet it is not just Israel that faces serious dilemmas.

Fatah itself senses some level of discomfort. Within the organization, Abbas's real intentions in moving forward on the elections are unclear, and the question of whether he is prepared to pay the price of a Hamas victory remains open.  

Behind closed doors, claims have emerged that Abbas received a promise from Hamas that it will not run a candidate for the presidential elections, and may even support him, or at least not interfere. If true, this could help explain Abbas's consent for holding elections. Under such a deal, Abbas would give Hamas a chance to be present in the PA's parliament, and Hamas would enable him to continue as PA president.

A far more popular candidate is the imprisoned senior Fatah member Marwan Bargouthi, who is serving five life sentences plus 40 years for a string of deadly terror attacks on Israelis. Bargouthi has hinted at his intention to run in the elections. An additional dilemma facing Abbas is whether to allow rival Mohammed Dahlan to run. Dahlan was ejected from Fatah’s ranks in 2011 due to his rivalry with Abbas, and currently enjoys the support of refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza, as well as of the UAE and Egypt.

Abbas's renewed interests in elections are primarily timed to coincide with the arrival of the Biden administration in Washington.

He is clearly seeking to signal the PA's democratic credentials, and to consolidate it as a legal, legitimate, and elected entity, after years without elections.

Abbas is undoubtedly aware of the risks he is taking enabling Hamas to participate in the democratic game. Hamas could take over the PA and the PLO from the inside. This would be tantamount to allowing a wolf into a sheep's pen, and hoping that things pass peacefully.

In light of the above, the multiple exit ramps that Abbas has built into the process are critical, and it should surprise no one if in the near future, divisions arise between Fatah and Hamas that derail the elections.

 One possibility is that talks between the factions in Cairo will end with failure, while an escalation of the coronavirus outbreak could also lead to cancellation of the process.  On the other hand, the possibility of the elections dynamic gaining its own momentum also exists, and both sides could find themselves unable to pull the brakes on the process. 

---

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.

PODCAST: SPACE: A Paradigm Shift in Modern Warfare

PODCAST: U.S. Army Base, Fort Gordon, Hosts MirYam's Webinar on Modern Warfare

HEBREW PODCAST: תת ניצב בדימוס שאול גורדון, השתקפות על חיי בשירותי בצה״ל ובמשטרת ישראל, למען מדינת ישראל

דיאלוג על חשיבות החוק למען אזרחי מדינת ישראל

PODCAST: Ambassador Michael Oren On What A Biden Administration Means For Israel

RAMALLAH PLACES ITS HOPES IN BIDEN

By David Hacham

The incoming Biden Administration has relegated all talk of 'reconciliation' between Fatah and Hamas to the realm of fantasy. 

Now, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority (PA), must remove itself from that process - which was little more than an attempted provocation of Israel and the Arab states in response to normalization, and the Trump peace plan - and aggressively steer itself toward the goal of seizing on Biden's victory in order to make diplomatic progress vis-à-vis Israel. 

Biden's election victory has been greeted with a sigh of relief within the PA, after what for it were four nightmarish years of President Trump, whose policies categorically sided with Israel. 

Yet the PA does not suffer from delusions when it comes to what it can expect to achieve under the new administration. 

The PA does not expect the Biden administration to immediately steer toward a position that would favor the Palestinians. In the PA’s sober assessment, building overly grand expectations would be a serious mistake, at least in the short-term. 

The new American administration will likely repudiate Trump's Deal of the Century and reject all steps that challenge the traditional two-state formula as it seeks to realign with the international community and with positions that receive legitimacy from that community – a source of encouragement as far as the PA is concerned. 

Yet it will likely be many months, perhaps more than a year, before Washington even turns its attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It will be busy dealing with the coronavirus crisis and with taking steps to put the severely damaged U.S. economy back on track to growth. 

Still, the arrival of Biden has provided the PA with an opportunity to climb down from the ladder it ascended when it decided to cancel security and civilian coordination with Israel as a protest against Israel's earlier intention to apply sovereignty in parts of Judea and Samaria and the Jordan Valley. 

In President Biden, the PA has found the justification it needed to immediately and unconditionally resume coordination with Israel, in a manner that was smoothly accepted by the Palestinian street. 

In terms of what the PA can realistically expect from Washington, steps such as withdrawing the American embassy from Jerusalem back to Tel Aviv, or cancelling American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, are nonstarters. Ramallah understands that reality. 

But the PA can reasonably expect the Biden administration to renew its funding of the PA and of UNRWA, reopen the PLO's embassy in Washington, and reopen the US consulate in East Jerusalem, while expressing a renewed commitment to restarting the diplomatic process. 

Despite the likelihood that any renewed negotiations will take time to translate into policy, the PA does expect Washington to abandon Trump's Deal of the Century as a basis for future talks. It will also seek to gain diplomatic leverage to freeze Israeli settlement construction, remove annexation from the table as a viable option for Israel, and stymie Israeli aspirations in Judea and Samaria. 

The PA is also seeking increased coordination with Egypt and Jordan ahead of the arrival of the new administration, as recent visits by PA President Mahmoud Abbas to both countries demonstrate. Abbas is keen to present the image of a PA that enjoys the support and backing of moderate Arab states.   

Yet even the successful cultivation of that image cannot mask the fact that the PA has lost its veto power over other Arab states and that the PA can no longer torpedo the desire of those states to promote normalization with Israel. 

The latest agreements between Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco under U.S. sponsorship make it abundantly clear that the Palestinian agenda, which holds that Arab normalization with Israel is wholly contingent upon major progress in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, has been discarded by much of the Arab world. 

The Sunni Arab states are preoccupied with a new strategic concern. They fear Iran's nuclear-military program, and are also concerned about Iran's ongoing attempts to entrench itself throughout the Middle East, and its support for radical Islamist elements including Hezbollah in Lebanon; an ever increasing presence. 

Ramallah has little choice but to adapt and to reestablish itself as a major concern despite those shifting priorities, while cautiously raising its hopes that a new American administration can undo some of the setbacks it experienced under the Trump years.  

---

David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense.

THE CAPITOL INSURECTION WILL DAMAGE AMERICAN SOFT POWER AND HARM THE US-ISRAEL RELATIONSHIP

By Micah Jones

During my year-long tour in Kabul, Afghanistan, I served as the military aide to the U.S. Army Brigadier General in charge of NATO’s Rule of Law Mission. I joined the general in every high-level meeting with Afghan, U.S., and International VIPs as we tried to establish a viable rule of law system in a country that had none. Although we failed in our overall mission, we did make incremental progress, much of which was due to our ability to cite our own democratic institutions and the consistent, peaceful, transfers of power following our elections.

Deployed to a country that, for centuries, had relied on tribal affiliations and warlords, the ability to contrast the Afghan system with the American one gave our mission clout.

In watching the riotous mob of Trump-supporters and far-right extremists storm the United States Capitol on Wednesday, January 6, 2021, I thought of how impossible that same Rule of Law mission now seemed. Yes, we could cite how the House and Senate reconvened to certify the electoral votes, or how order was restored within a matter of hours, but the glaring stain on American democratic institutions and values would be hard to conceal.

The moral authority that U.S. foreign policy could leverage in a place like Afghanistan had become far more difficult now that warlords and tyrants the world over could point to the Banana Republic-like images of the U.S. Capitol being overrun. 

Beyond the irrevocable damage to American soft power, the mob’s actions may also harm the relationship between the United States and Israel. In the wake of the Capitol Insurrection, there will be significant momentum to overturn everything affiliated with the Trump Administration. Anything that might bolster President Trump’s legacy will face a reckoning. And this retribution will likely be done with a sledgehammer rather than a scalpel. Unfortunately, this purge may do away with some of the historic achievements that the Trump Administration facilitated in the Middle East.

From recognizing the Golan Heights to defending Israeli settlements to presiding over the Abraham Accords, President Trump was incredibly pro-Israel. Trump’s support for Israel, however, may prove to be a curse as the US-Israel relationship may be viewed as a relic from a time that the new Biden-Harris administration must reconstruct. 

Because the vast majority of American Jews are members of the Democratic party, and Israel still has majority bi-partnership support in Congress, this damage to the US-Israel relationship may not be immediate. That said, support for Israel in the US is rapidly becoming a divisive and partisan issue. Israel is anathema to the values of the progressive Left, made amply clear by the most vocal members of the Democratic party who have not been censured despite spouting anti-Semitic and anti-Israel tropes. Coupled with the rise of Critical Social Justice ideologies within academic and governmental institutions, the false notion that Israel is a racist, oppressive, settler-colonial State is only gaining more transaction amongst younger Americans and American Jews.

Following the Capitol Insurrection, my fear is that the mainstream media’s unfair, but likely, equating of all conservatives and Trump supporters as equivalent to the thugs who ransacked the Capitol will lead to less bi-partisan support for Israel. Based on the mob’s actions, many Americans who did not have an opinion about the U.S.-Israel relationship may now view support for Israel as affiliation with a “toxic” Trump Administration. 

With full control of the Executive and Legislative branches and significant momentum to purge the Trump Administration’s policies and executive orders, robust U.S. support for Israel may dwindle. The Biden Administration has already signaled interest to rejoin the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” colloquially known as the “Iran Deal.” Furthermore, with the progressive Left emboldened and ascendant, and the Republican party in disarray, there will be no check on the most radical voices of the Democratic party when it comes to challenging continued US support for Israel. Withholding of foreign aid, sanctions on Israeli-settlements, and the lack of support in international bodies like the UN may become the prelude to the new American-Israeli relationship. 

The fall-out from the Capitol Insurrection will not be fully known in the immediate future. But what transpired on January 6, 2021 will have ramifications for years, if not decades to come for American soft power and the U.S.-Israel relationship.

---

Micah Quinney Jones is an attorney, a US Army veteran, and a pro-Israel advocate. He is a recipient of the Bronze Star Medal for Meritorious Service. Before attending law school, Micah served for over five years as a Military Intelligence branch detail Infantry officer in the United States Army. He was honorably discharged as a Captain in 2016. The majority of his military service was spent in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division.

BRIEFING BY FORMER HEAD OF MOSSAD: MIRYAM ADJUNCT REFLECTIONS

BY David Benger

On Monday, December 21st, the former Director of Mossad, Tamir Pardo, became the inaugural speaker of The MirYam Institute “Exclusive Speaker Series.” Pardo spoke eloquently, thoughtfully, and candidly about many leading issues of the day, and chiefly on three major topics. First, he discussed the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action – commonly known as the Iran Deal). Next, he offered some thoughts on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And lastly, in response to questions from the audience, Director Pardo spoke about the challenges and opportunities the rise of China poses to Israel.

Before delving into these three key issues, however, Director Pardo began with an even more pressing question: What does Israel need to do to regain bipartisan support in the United States? It was a stellar question that I wish Director Pardo had tried to answer. He did not really address this issue in any depth. He noted that Israel is a sovereign nation, and it should not intervene in domestic politics. Moreover, he said, Israel must not be beholden to American interests or overly deferential to American requests.

When it came to the Iran challenge, Pardo’s expertise was in full gear. He presented three theoretical options for dealing with the approaching deadline for a nuclear-armed Iran.

Option one, he said, was a full ground invasion and destruction of weapons-making facilities, akin to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Pardo immediately dismissed Option 1 as absurd, but ever the intelligence professional, he felt it needed to be voiced nonetheless.

Option 2 is to sit back and wait for the growth of pro-democratic revolutionary forces in Iran, and to support that revolution when it inevitably comes. Pardo was clear that he was speaking only of providing material assistance to a homegrown revolution in full stride, and never of fomenting revolution from the outside. History has shown that outside forces artificially stoking the flames of rebellion (especially in the Middle East) inevitably ends in catastrophe. But offering support to an ongoing revolution might just be ok. The problem with Option 2 is that you are at the mercy of Iranian domestic groups, and if Iranian nuclear scientists complete their work before grassroots activists’ revolt, Israel will have compromised the security of millions of her residents.

That leaves us with Option 3, which, according to Pardo is to negotiate with Iran, to dialogue with the Iranian leadership, and to convince them to change their opinion toward Israel, and reconsider their genocidal intent. Option 3, according to Pardo, is “the only option.”

Pardo claimed the greatest mistake made by President Obama’s negotiating team was to not open the agreement with full diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States. Paragraph 1 of Section 1 of the agreement, said Pardo, should have been a hearty declaration of mutual recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations, followed by immediate openings of reciprocal embassies in Tehran and Washington as well as multiple consulates in both countries.

The conversation retreated from the horizon problem of Iran to the existential problems Israel faces with regard to daily rocket fire from Hamas in Gaza, and various other terror cells in the West Bank, as well as the looming threat from Hezbollah on Israel’s northern tip in Lebanon. Here, Pardo made it clear that though the Abraham Accords are a positive development, they have nearly no impact on the Israeli-Palestinian status quo. Annexation of neighborhoods in Judea and Samaria was never a serious consideration by Prime Minister Netanyahu, according to Pardo. It was merely a feint meant to inspire negotiating partners in the UAE, Bahrain, and other nations to come to the table. And so, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no closer to being solved. Pardo was adamant that a one-state solution was untenable. Demographic trends alone would mean that in only a few decades, one state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea would be a majority Muslim Palestinian state.

At this point, moderator Benjamin Anthony opened the floor to audience questions. Pardo was asked, in particular, to characterize the growth of China from Israel’s perspective: Is China foremost a prospective trading partner? A military rival? Is China’s growth an opportunity or a threat from Israel’s perspective? Pardo answered succinctly, but clearly: “From my perspective, Israel’s priority is the United States. Israel should be careful not to cross the rules that the United States has set, because Israel could end up losing more than it gains.” Pardo indicated that Israel should be taking its lead from the Americans with regard to China, because the special relationship with the U.S. is Israel’s most important strategic asset.

It was not only a special treat to hear from a man of Tamir Pardo’s stature, but indeed a singular honor. The man has done far more than most to ensure that Jewish blood is no longer cheap. Pardo, in my esteem, was thoughtful, self effacing, analytical, and clever in his calculations of the geopolitical costs and benefits.

---

David Benger is a research fellow at Harvard University. He is a recent graduate of Harvard Law School, where he served as the chapter president of Louis D. Brandeis Center for Human Rights Under the Law, and the Events Chair of the HLS Alliance for Israel, as well as an editor on the Journal of Law and Public Policy and the HLS National Security Journal.