The Shadow War Against Hezbollah's Missiles

By Yaakov Lappin

The ongoing attempt by Hezbollah and its patron Iran to build an arsenal of precision guided missiles (PGMs) in Lebanon and in Syria represents the most challenging conventional military threat to Israel’s security.

With an accuracy of within 10 meters, PGMs give Hezbollah the ability to strike strategically sensitive targets such as power plants, government buildings, military targets, commercial centers, and other potential targets. In essence, this firepower capability gives anyone who possesses it, including a non-state terror army like Hezbollah, its own version of an air force with precise bombing abilities.

In any future full-scale conflict with Hezbollah, Israeli multi-tier air defenses would, despite their high-end capabilities, be unable to provide complete protection. The combination of physical damage to life and property in a sensitive site and the boost this would give to future Hezbollah ‘victory’ narratives represents a top priority challenge to Israeli national security.

Iranian-Hezbollah efforts to set up a PGM arsenal go back several years. According to the Israel Defense Forces, in 2013, under the cover of the Syrian civil war, Iran attempted to smuggle fully assembled precision missiles from Iran to Syria. The missiles were intended for the use of Hezbollah. A series of airstrikes, attributed by the international media to Israel, thwarted those efforts.

This shadow campaign, dubbed the ‘campaign between wars’ by the Israeli defense establishment, continued in high gear in 2014 and 2015, as Hezbollah entrenched itself more deeply in Syria.

In 2016, after the campaign between wars apparently thwarted Iranian-Hezbollah efforts, Tehran adopted a new approach, based on the idea of producing PGMs on Lebanese soil, as well as converting unguided rockets already located in Lebanon into PGMs.

In order to achieve this goal, the Islamic Republic began transferring to Lebanon precision components from Iran, and rockets from the Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center (known by its French acronym, CERS), an Assad regime agency that develops weapons together with Iran and Hezbollah.

Hezbollah’s job was to assemble the ‘puzzle pieces’ together into PGMs, and to this end, it began setting up PGM conversion centers across Lebanon, including in Beirut.

The IDF says  the entire program is being managed by senior officers in the Iranian overseas Quds Force. The program is ‘nourished’ through three lines of trafficking, which were planned out by the late Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani: Via cargo flights from Iran, truck convoys, and ships.

Due to what the IDF described in a video as “various efforts,” Iran and Hezbollah struggled to manufacture PGMs or convert ‘dumb missiles’ into guided ones.

In 2019, Iran and Hezbollah again attempted to intensify these efforts, leading Israel to issue multiple warnings to Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah over the grave potential consequences of his actions.

While Nasrallah is theoretically able to convince the Iranians to ‘turn the volume down’ on the PGM project if he were to feel this was necessary, it still remains unclear to what extent Nasrallah has internalized these warnings. This, despite the fact that Hezbollah is extremely busy dealing with - and trying to exploit - Lebanon’s snowballing economic, political, and humanitarian crises.

The crumbling Lebanese state is incapable of stopping these efforts despite the enormous threat they pose to its own security.

Israel continued to expose PGM sites in Lebanon in 2020. In September of that year, for example, it listed several PGM conversion sites in the heart of Beirut, leading Nasrallah to deny the information. He then invited reporters on a dubious tour of the sites in question.

In July this year, the IDF’s Northern Command assessed that Hezbollah possesses between 130,000 to 150,000 rockets and missiles at various ranges. Hebrew media reports noted that Israel is more disturbed by the PGM project than the size of Hezbollah’s arsenal.

It is also worth noting that Hezbollah possesses a number of guided anti-ship cruise missiles, which should also be considered as PGMs. These same cruise missiles could be used to hit targets on the Israeli coastline, such as naval bases.

“The assessment in the defense establishment is that there is no need to conduct a preventative or early strike at this time, since Hezbollah does not pose an existential threat,” Kan reported on July 16. According to the assessments, Hezbollah is not interested in initiating a war in the near future against Israel.

But Hezbollah and Iran are interested in building up the PGM arsenal in Lebanon, and this creates ongoing dilemmas for Israel. From 2013 until now, Israel has apparently decided to respond to the challenge by relying on the campaign between wars.

A reported Israeli airstrike in the area of Al-Safira, southeast of Aleppo, Syria, as well as on civilian and military airports in the area, on July 19 of this year,  appeared to be the latest Israeli preventative move against the PGM program.

According to the Israeli Alma Research and Education Center, which maps out threats on the northern front, Al-Safria has a branch of the CERS agency. 

“We also know that under Iranian auspices, among other things, the precision missile project is involved there,” Alma observed following the reported airstrike. The center assessed that the strikes on Al-Safira were “intended to disrupt and harm attempts to advance the missile accuracy project,” marking what appears to be the latest development in the high stakes shadow war to prevent the radical Shi’ite axis from building Hezbollah’s ‘air force.’

It seems therefore that Israel is continuing to prioritize its activities against the PGM program, but limiting its activities to Syria, based on the common understanding that any Israeli preventative strike in Lebanon would lead to a rapid escalation with Hezbollah.

In addition, it is impossible to view Hezbollah’s PGM program in isolation from the Iranian nuclear program. Iran’s objective to become a nuclear-armed state, or a threshold nuclear state that is on the cusp of nuclear breakout, is designed to provide a nuclear umbrella over its proxies in the Middle East (in addition to creating immunity for the Iranian regime).

Under that scenario, Hezbollah would be able to threaten sensitive targets using PGMs, and enjoy the backing of a nuclear-armed ‘mothership’ state. This combination of threats would surely boost the confidence of the Iranian-Shi’ite axis, and could embolden it to launch future attacks and provocations against Israel as part of a gamble that Israeli decision makers would be deterred from responding with the appropriate level of force.

This scenario contains within it intolerable future costs, meaning that Israel must prevent it from materializing today.

If the campaign between the wars is sufficiently effective at prevention, then this is welcome news, but if it proves to be insufficient, taking preventative action that could incur a high cost today is preferable to sitting on the fence and watching the PGM threat overshadow Israel’s future.

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Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a number of media outlets, including Jane's Defense Weekly, a leading global military affairs magazine, and JNS.org, a news agency with wide distribution among Jewish communities in the U.S. Read full bio here.

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Ben & Jerry’s unjust desserts

By Mark Goldfeder

Monday, Ben & Jerry’s announced that it would terminate its business relationship with its Israeli distributor because the distributor has refused to go along with Ben and Jerry’s decision to end the sale of its ice cream in the “occupied Palestinian territory.”

The decision came after months of online campaigning by those who were indignant that Israel dared defend itself against attacks from the terrorist group Hamas in ways that regrettably cost some innocent Palestinian lives.

For an American company like Ben & Jerry’s, the decision to align with the anti-Semitic Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, a movement that has been denounced by both major U.S. political parties as well as the majority of states as just another in the long history of boycotts against Jews, is not only shameful; it is possibly illegal.

Since Israel is the world’s only Jewish state, singling it out for boycotts and other punitive economic actions involves blatant discrimination on the basis of nationality and ethnicity. If you are curious as to what this looks like, consider Ben & Jerry’s announcement that it will work to “find a different arrangement” to “stay in Israel” that cuts their long-term Israeli licensee out of sales to the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza. The company refused to comment when asked if their products would still be sold in Palestinian-owned stores in those areas (and it is unclear how they intend to continue sales in Israel while boycotting Judea and Samaria, which is illegal under Israeli law), but the strong implication is that if a Palestinian licensee wanted to sell in those regions, Ben and Jerry’s would allow it.

Such discriminatory business practices are contrary to public policy. That is why there has been consistent bipartisan condemnation of the BDS movement by U.S. lawmakers. American anti-boycott regulations under the 1977 Export Administration Act, the Ribicoff Amendment to the 1976 Tax Reform Act and The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act all express opposition to such boycotts. Acquiescence to a BDS pressure campaign could therefore expose a company like Ben & Jerry’s to expensive legal challenges.

Second, boycotting Israelis in a discriminatory fashion violates the fiduciary duties of both loyalty and care that officers and directors owe a corporation and its shareholders. The duty of loyalty requires decision-makers to put the welfare and best interests of the company before their own personal interests (including the desire to virtue signal), while the duty of care requires them to reasonably consider the impact of their decisions on the company’s economic prospects. BDS is bad for business: Thirty-five states already have anti-BDS legislation in place which might block those states from doing business with companies that proudly announce they will henceforth engage in BDS. That means that in many of these states, cafeterias at government offices, universities and so forth will not be allowed to stock their ice cream — and perhaps the much larger number of products made by its parent company, consumer products giant Unilever.

Losing that much market share by politicizing ice cream, all in the service of a controversial and arguably bigoted ideological stance, cannot be justified as good corporate governance.

Finally, Unilever is a publicly owned company. As such, they are required to file documents with the Securities and Exchange Commission and send disclosures to investors about risks that may affect the company. Presumably, after having agreed to divest based on a years-long anti-Semitic blacklist campaign, their next disclosure report will need to include a paragraph like this: “Investment may involve serious risks, because we are currently engaging in a discriminatory boycott, in violation of applicable laws, and for no discernable corporate or business objectives. We may also incur significant liability and cost in defending the company against litigation and enforcement actions responding to our violations, and will likely incur loss of business from jurisdictions that have anti-boycott provisions in place.” In fact, with reports that Ben & Jerry’s has been sitting on this decision for months, they may already be liable for their failure to disclose.

Unilever has tried to distance themselves from the decision, noting in a separate statement that Ben & Jerry’s Board made this decision entirely on their own. That does not absolve them of legal responsibility for the company they own. If Unilever has made agreements with Ben & Jerry’s that prevent them from controlling such actions, they may find themselves in a position of having to choose between selling off the damaged brand or facing regulatory and legal responsibility for its actions.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Israel Needs A Clear Policy On The Palestinians & Israeli Arabs

By Yair Golan

In 2021, some 20% of the Israeli Arab public – 1.9 million people – have come to view themselves as a part of Israeli society. This has found expression in the ever-growing role played by Arab parties in the Knesset, the role that Arab parties play in determining the stability of ruling coalitions, and the engagement of the Arab public by Jewish politicians in ways not seen before.

Alongside the integration process, there are deep frustrations and feelings of discrimination by Arab Israelis, along economic and social lines. But it would be wrong to ignore the fact that a section of the Arab Israeli public expresses fervent Palestinian nationalist sentiments.

In responding to this picture, successive Israeli governments have not come up with one clear policy. There are elements of cooperation and partnership with the Arab public, but there has been no systematic government policy to integrate it. One prominent example of this is the situation of Bedouin in Southern Israel – almost 300,000 people, around a third of whom live in unrecognized communities, in conditions that are not suitable for a modern state.

Meanwhile, skyrocketing violence in the Arab sector has mostly been met with indifference. There have been many complaints about illegal Arab land takeovers and construction, yet nothing tangible has been done to promote a solution to enable legal construction. The issue of building rights is complex, but the State of Israel does not want to deal with it.

According to Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, an Arab child gets a smaller education budget compared to his counterpart in Jewish state schools. This gap clearly does not serve the Israeli national interest in any way.

Hence, what has been happening is a failure by the state to embrace the Arab Israeli public and to create among it identification with the State of Israel. Such an affiliation could be created if the Arab minority were to feel that it has a stake in the country, enjoys equality, and can make progress. Instead, Arab youths who receive a poorer education and struggle to get into Israeli universities, often end up studying in universities in the West Bank and Jordan, run by elements hostile to the Jewish state. 

The eruption of violence in the Arab sector is inexcusable. Those who are guilty of violence need to be dealt with an iron fist, and to be imprisoned for their actions. Every single person, Arab or Jew, who uses violence must be held accountable.

But we must ask ourselves how to repair this situation. The answer lies in initiating a serous, systematic national project to integrate Arab Israelis.

The same lack of clear policy has plagued Israel’s dealings with Gaza. In 2008-9, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead against the Hamas terrorist organization in Gaza; at the time,  I served as head of the IDF Home Front Command.

The operation, which began with a surprise air raid on Hamas’s bases and a Hamas police ceremony, went on to achieve significant military gains, even as Israeli civilians were exposed to terrorist rocket fire without the Iron Dome missile defense system which was not yet operational.

And yet, Israel did not follow up on this achievement or try to leverage it for political gain. Israel could have explored the option of a long-term, stable arrangement with Hamas. The same mistake happened after the 51-day Operation Protective Edge in 2014, when Israel suffered 73 casualties. Nothing was done afterward to achieve political gains to stabilize the situation.

Former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu was not interested in paying the price for a long-term arrangement with Hamas.

Had he been willing to, we could by now have had the answer to the question of whether such an arrangement is possible. Had the answer turned out to be negative, Israel would have been able to know that the time may have truly arrived to dismantle Hamas’s military wing and treat it as a hostile army that needs to be smashed.

Yet Israel failed to choose either option –not an arrangement and not the destruction of Hamas’s military wing. Instead, it opted for the in-between grey zone, thus abandoning the citizens of the South to the brutal hands of Hamas.

The idea of restoring Israeli deterrence through firepower alone has been largely discredited. Hamas is prepared to pay a heavy price, and it is not really deterred for a long time. Hence, a clear decision must be made on this front too.

The same indecision has meant that Israel has not been able to deal correctly with the Palestinian Authority. There is no sense pretending that the PA is composed of Israel-lovers. The entity is obviously made up of Palestinians who are deeply hostile to Israel, yet they are able to cooperate with it at the practical level, leading to success on the ground.

For the past 12 years, the Netanyahu governments described the PA President as a terrorist supporter, and put the spotlight on his payments to the families of terrorists. But this focuses on the marginal issues, for it is clear that the PA’s competitor is Hamas, and that it is in Israel’s interest to make the PA looks more successful than Hamas.

Making the PA look like it is working well for its civilians, while Hamas is damaging them, is a core Israeli interest. Yet the opposite occurred. Instead of pointing out to Palestinians that the PA has superior economic development when compared to the Hamas regime, we have spent all of our time talking about how bad the PA is.

Despite the PA’s many and troubling problems, it is preferrable to Hamas, and in the real world, we must choose between bad and worse.

In summary, Israeli indecision has meant that developments have occurred that run contrary to our critical interests. This has enabled Arab Israelis to identify with Hamas and with West Bank Palestinians – in direct contradiction of Israel’s interests. And it has enabled Hamas to extort Israel and grow stronger on our southern border, but without any long-term stable arrangement.

The time for clear strategic decision making, which actually serves the national interest, is now – and the most prominent Israeli interest is to prevent annexation of millions of Palestinians while continuing to explore the possibility of living beside them peacefully.

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Yair Golan is a publishing Expert at The MirYam Institute, a serving Member of Knesset and the immediate past Deputy Chief Of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces. Read full bio here.

The final countdown to Abbas’s rule is gaining pace

By David Hacham

Recent events in the Palestinian Authority indicate that the countdown to the rule of Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is gaining momentum. This does not mean that the PA is about to collapse as an organized institution of government, but it does raise serious questions about the viability of the Abbas administration.

The recent apparent torture and killing of Palestinian dissident Nizar Banat – now widely called the ‘Palestinian Khashoggi’ by the Palestinian public – seems to signal the approach of a new era in the PA, and it is not at all clear that Abbas and his inner loyalist circle will be able to continue to govern.

In the West Bank, the PA has responded to protests that erupted in the aftermath of Banat’s death with force and with frequent violence.

Abbas might still be able to repel the waves of criticisms and protests he is facing, safeguard the PA’s status, stabilize its rule, and continue to function as a central authority. But that scenario is being cast into doubt by senior Fatah operatives in Ramallah, who assume that Abbas is likely moving toward the final station of his long career.

Demonstrations held to protest Banat’s death saw protesters shout slogans such as “Abbas, leave!”

Added to this combustible mix is the ongoing power struggle that has been raging in recent years among possible successors to Abbas.

Many of Abbas’s critics point out that he led himself to this junction through several critical mistakes. The most prominent of these is his public, celebratory call for holding elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council [originally scheduled for May 22,] as well as elections for the PA’s Presidency and the PLO’s National Council. The elections were canceled by Abbas due to a well-founded fear of a Hamas victory. Abbas justified his reversal using the pretext of Israel’s refusal to allow elections in East Jerusalem.

These actions created a vacuum, which Hamas rushed to fill without hesitation. Hamas seized on the opportunity to present itself as Jerusalem’s defender and projected its patronage over the Al-Aqsa Mosque.

After Operation Guardian of the Walls ended, a bitter struggle raged between Fatah and Hamas over who would manage and allocate funds intended to develop civilian infrastructure in Gaza. 

The PA’s image on the Palestinian street was dealt a severe blow, and Ramallah is today widely seen by Palestinians as a corrupt authority seeking to use Palestinian funds for its narrow interests. The PA has lost control over much of the social media narrative, and Hamas has gained the upper hand.

This has allowed Hamas to present the PA as a corrupt entity that uses its security forces to cooperate with Israel and repress the Palestinian population.

This development demonstrates clearly that no power vacuum in the Palestinian street remains unfilled: When the PA weakens, Hamas grows stronger.  When waves of angry demonstrators rise up against the PA, clashes can also quickly turn against Israel in the form of violent disturbances and terrorism.

The PA’s management of the Banat affair was a poorly calculated maneuver that could turn out to be one mistake too far. Banat was able to remain an opposition figure without affiliating himself politically. He did not hesitate to use social media to blast the PA and its leaders, the Fatah movement, and the PA’s security forces. He was also extremely critical of a deal reached between the PA and Israel over the use of coronavirus vaccines that were set to expire.

Banat’s death opened a pandora’s box within the PA. Accusations have been flying between senior officials over who was responsible. Various security forces are trying to evade direct responsibility for the incident. Abbas is trying to contain the public anger, reinstate calm and stability, and thereby lengthen his political life, in the wake of the demonstrations against him.

He has sought to do this through the official announcement, publicized by Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayyeh, on the setting up of a committee of investigation (PA security force members who were allegedly involved are in custody), and through the intention to replace key position holders in the security establishment (in the Preventative Security Force, Military Intelligence, and the Palestinian police), as well as among district governors (Ramallah and Hebron) and the diplomatic senior staff (PLO ambassadors abroad).

In this context, it now seems unlikely that Abbas’s initial intention to replace Shtayyeh will go ahead (Shtayyeh was seen as having ministerial responsibility due to his position as Minister of the Interior). This is in light of support by sections of Fatah for Shtayyeh.

At the same time, former PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s intention to return to public life, through the setting up of a new ‘compromise government,’ has been blocked  

Hussein El Sheikh, PA Minister for Civilian Affairs, and Majed Faraj, head of the General Intelligence Service, both of whom are in Abbas’s inner circle and wield major power in the PA, have also been involved in the political mix in the aftermath of the Banat affair. They have pushed aside potential rivals and worked to consolidate their position in the Palestinian leadership.

This has occurred as other senior Palestinian figures opposed to Abbas’s rule have been active to promote their agendas too, including Muhammad Dahlan, Marwan Barghouti, and Nasser Al-Qidwa.  

In this context, Azmi Bishara, a former Israel Knesset Member from the Balad party, pulled strings from afar from his Qatari exile (where he fled after being suspected of espionage and assisting Hezbollah during the Second Lebanon War). Operatives close to Bishara were recently arrested by PA security forces in the West Bank.

The PA has in recent weeks taken steps to stabilize the situation and has been able to significantly reduce public rage over the incident.

Despite the decrease in protests, the PA’s investigation into the affair is unlikely to truly calm the thousands of people who took part in demonstrations across major West Bank cities, foremost among them, Ramallah, the seat of government, and in Hebron, Banat’s home city.

To further calm the situation, PA security forces have avoided direct clashes with protesters and deployed only at the entrances to cities.

The PA is keenly aware of the potential far-reaching consequences that could develop from this affair, and fears for its legitimacy and ability to function.

Ultimately, Abbas has been able to contain the crisis so far, and restore a level of calm, while maintaining a ‘business as usual approach by visiting Jordan’s King Abdullah, and President Erdogan in Turkey.

Yet a scenario of renewed rallies and calls for Abbas’s departure could certainly return.  Should that occur, the pressure, together with Abbas’s advanced age, poor health, and many would-be successors, could spell the end of his rule.

In summary, the protests against the PA and the calls that have been made in recent weeks during demonstrations for Abbas’s exit from power are not accumulating at this time into a critical mass. At the same time, the assessment that the Palestinian arena is witnessing the twilight of Abbas’s rule is growing stronger.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Israel, Cyber Sabotage and International Law

By Gary Corn

In April of this year Iran’s ability to enrich uranium and move closer to producing nuclear weapons suffered a significant setback when its Natanz uranium enrichment site experienced a power failure caused, apparently, by an explosion.  Without offering much detail, Iran accused Israel of authoring the power outage in an act of “nuclear terrorism.” At the same time, reports surfaced alleging the explosion was the result of an Israeli cyber operation. Although facts substantiating this claim are sparse, in an unusual step, Israel imposed no censorship restrictions on coverage of the incident.  Further, in the face of reports by Israel’s public radio that the Mossad had been involved, the Israeli defense chief, Aviv Kochavi, said the country’s “operations in the Middle East are not hidden from the eyes of the enemy.” Some have taken this as a less-than-veiled admission.

If true, it would not be the first time that Israel has acted preemptively to impede its adversaries’ efforts to develop nuclear weapons.  Some of these operations have been open, acknowledged, and quite kinetic, such as the 1981 airstrike on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor. And if one accepts common lore, Israel has also reached into its impressive cyber toolkit on more than one occasion to covertly thwart its enemies’ nuclear ambitions. The notorious 2010 Stuxnet operation against the Natanz facility, as well as an alleged cyber operation in 2020 that led to a fire in the main hall at Natanz, being popularly (but not officially) attributed at least in part to Israel. 

Although frequently conducted in the shadows, States have long employed sabotage—intentional actions aimed at weakening another state by impeding through interference, obstruction, damaging or destroying, the development of its military or other potentially threatening capabilities—as a tool of statecraft.  These actions, often taken in a preventive framework, have ranged from overt, highly destructive operations like the Osiraq airstrike, to far more subtle, covert operations.  When conducted in advance of a perceived threat actually manifesting, sabotage raises challenging issues of international law.  If the recent Natanz explosion was indeed the product of an Israeli cyber operation, how would it square with Israel’s international legal obligations? 

Despite a long and steady drumbeat of accusations to the contrary, Israel’s overall track record is, albeit imperfect, one of respect and support for the international legal order.  It’s approach to assessing its international legal obligations is no doubt pragmatic, and at times discordant with the general views of the international community and international law experts.  But this is a reflection of the unique and challenging security posture Israel has found itself in since its founding as a State, not a manifestation of general disregard of international law as is often alleged.  It’s no surprise, therefore, that Israel is one of the few States to publicly affirm international law’s applicability to cyberspace and to expound on its views of how that law regulates its cyber operations.

In particular, at the end of last year Israeli Deputy Attorney General (International Law), Dr. Roy Schöndorf, gave an important speech at the US Naval War College detailing Israel’s views on the application of international law to cyber operations.  Not surprisingly, it reflected a thoughtful and practical approach to applying extant law to new technologies and circumstances. Relevant to any discussion about the legality of preventive or preemptive cyber sabotage, Dr. Schöndorf  made clear Israel’s view that cyber operations can amount to uses of force subject to the UN Charter’s general prohibition against the threat or use of force in international relations.  As with more traditional uses of force, Israel recognizes that any cyber use of force must be conducted pursuant to a Security Council authorization, the consent of the targeted State, or in the legitimate exercise of self-defense pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. Otherwise, cyber uses of force are internationally wrongful acts, whether conducted as sabotage or otherwise.

So what of the alleged cyber operations against Natanz?  Again, assuming the reports to be true, each of the alleged operations manifested in some degree of physical harm—from the extensive damage to centrifuges in the case of Stuxnet, to the more limited explosion reported in the most recent event.  This begs the question of whether these operations amounted to a use of force, and if so, whether they were justified pursuant to the international legal right of self-defense.

Whether a particular action amounts to a use of force is a highly contextual question, and not every operation resulting in physical damage will qualify.  For example, although commentators frequently point to Stuxnet as a rare example of a cyber use of force, to date no State has made that claim.  But Israel appears to be unusually forthcoming on how it assesses what qualifies as a use of force. According to Dr. Schöndorf, cyber operations “expected to cause physical damage, injury or death, which would establish the use of force if caused by kinetic means,” fall into this category. Furthermore, Israel does not exclude the possibility that “operations not causing physical damage could also amount to a use of force.”  Therefore, if Israel in fact authored some or all of these reported acts of cyber sabotage, it is possible it did not consider them as amounting to uses of force.  But based on Dr. Schöndorf’s speech, self-defense is the more likely Israeli legal justification for engaging in such operations.  This presents its own difficulties, however. 

Absent from Dr. Schöndorf’s remarks was a discussion of Israel’s views on the law of anticipatory self-defense, a doctrine that Israel, like the United States, has long embraced.  Since at least the early 1980s, Israel has not shied away from testing, and perhaps resetting, the international legal boundaries of engaging in sabotage as a tool of national security under the umbrella of the inherent right of self-defense.  Immediately after the airstrike on the Osiraq reactor, then Prime Minister Menachem Begin acknowledged the attack, justifying it morally and legally as an operation intended to prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction that would present an existential threat to Israel.  Setting out what became known as the Begin Doctrine, he noted that the airstrike was an act of “anticipatory self-defense at its best” that should be understood as setting down precedent for how Israel would approach such threats going forward.

International condemnation of the Osiraq attack was swift, nearly universal, and grounded in the assertion that Israel had violated international law.  Israel’s invocation of self-defense to justify the attack was roundly rejected as a misapplication of the doctrine and the generally recognized strict imminence standard derived from the famous Caroline affair, which requires that threats must be “instant, overwhelming, and leaving no moment of deliberation” to justify such anticipatory uses of force.

Notwithstanding this international condemnation, Israel again took forcible preventive action against a potential nuclear threat in 2007 when it conducted a similar raid on the al-Kibar nuclear reactor in Syria.  In contrast to the Osiraq attack, this time international reaction was far more muted.  Syria itself offered no condemnation, downplayed the strikes and sought to cover up any traces of the nuclear facility.  Neither the UN generally, nor the Security Council specifically, took up the matter or offered any rebuke.

Although these two operations were quite similar in execution and result, myriad reasons might account for the markedly different reactions to the two events.  Some have pointed to, inter alia, the al-Kibar reactor posing a greater threat, different regional and international political considerations, and the failure of either party involved to openly acknowledge the open secret of the strike. 

Others argue that the different reactions reflect an evolution in the view of states with respect to the standard of imminence required for a state to use force in anticipation of a threat manifesting, at least in the case of nuclear weapons and perhaps other weapons of mass destruction.  Owing to the destructive nature of these weapons, and the compressed decision timelines to counter them, States may be more tolerant of uses of force intended to pre-empt threats that cannot be said to meet the strict Caroline standard.

Israel does not stand alone in seeking to evolve the notion of imminence to better reflect the realities of modern weapons technology and national security threats. For example, the so-called Bush Doctrine, first articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, sought to move the needle in light of modern weapons technology, signaling a broadened aperture for assessing what qualifies as imminent within the meaning of international self-defense law, “even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.” And although this shift met with criticism, especially after it was viewed at least in part as a misapplied justification for the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, it retains currency to this day in the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement’s pronouncement that “[i]mminent does not necessarily mean immediate or instantaneous.”  However, whether this broader view of imminence has gained currency as a matter of customary international law is far from clear.

In his speech, Dr. Schöndorf signaled an understandably cautious approach to applying existing international law to the new and distinctive domain of cyberspace.  Given its unique and precarious security situation, this should not be surprising.  Israel can ill afford to stand idly by while Iran or other regional threats seek to develop nuclear weapons.  There is little indication that Israel will shelve the Begin Doctrine any time soon, and it appears that it is deftly leveraging cyber capabilities as another, and potentially more precise and artful arrow in its sabotage quiver. But Israel is far from alone in facing emerging threats of great magnitude that produce substantial stress on the logic of strict imminence reflected in the Caroline doctrine. Other states may share an interest in a more forthcoming discourse on how the justification of individual and collective self-defense can keep pace with a rapidly evolving threat environment.   

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Gary Corn is the Director of the Technology, Law & Security Program and Adjunct Professor of Cyber and National Security Law at American University, Washington College of Law; a Senior Fellow in Cybersecurity and Emerging Threats at the R Street Institute. Read full bio here.

Media Must Improve Conflict Coverage

By Geoffrey Corn

PROFESSOR OF LAW, SOUTH TEXAS COLLEGE OF LAW. US ARMY (RET.)

As the saying goes, “no good deed goes unpunished.” When considering media coverage of the conduct of hostilities during an armed conflict, it may be hard to imagine the relevance of this saying, but . . . The media narratives arising out of the recent bout of hostilities between Israel and Hamas illustrate the applicability of this saying to such a context.

Let’s start with stating the obvious: war is awful. The loss of life, physical and psychological injuries, and destruction of property resulting from states or non-state armed groups resorting to the force of arms is something we should all lament. This is especially true when the victims of wartime violence are not participants in hostilities. Yes, it is unfortunate when the fighting members of opposing groups are killed or wounded; no one should celebrate such human loss. But participating in hostilities carries with it the risk, if not expectation that such may be the result of conflict. For civilians and others who don’t fall into this category – to include wounded, sick, and captured members of opposing armed groups – such suffering is as tragic as it seems inevitable.

It is for this reason international law, and more specifically the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), imposes obligations on the groups engaged in armed conflict. This law is truly as old as organized warfare itself, although obviously it has evolved substantially throughout history. At the core of the law are obligations established to mitigate the risk to civilians, other individuals not actively engaged in the conflict, and civilian property. This ‘package’ of obligations is often characterized as ‘targeting’ law, because it imposes legally binding regulation on the process of deciding who, when, where, and with what to attack an enemy.

Pursuant to this law, it is always unlawful to deliberately attack civilians or civilian property. As a result, any person employing force must constantly distinguish between enemy personnel and objectives and all other persons, places, and things. Importantly, the law does not prohibit the result of inflicting such casualties; if they are an incidental consequence of an attack on a lawful target and were not assessed as excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by the attack, they qualify as lawful consequences.

The law also imposes an obligation on both sides of the fight to take constant care to mitigate the risk to civilians and to implement all feasible precautionary measures to mitigate civilian risk arising in the conduct of hostilities. For the attacking force, this means considering a wide range of risk mitigation measures. These range from efforts to verify the true nature of a proposed target and to assess the risk to civilians and civilian property, to adjusting the timing and tactics of an attack to mitigate risk, to issuing pre-attack warnings and encouraging civilian evacuations. And this is not an exhaustive list; commanders are expected to constantly explore measures that will mitigate civilian risk without significantly compromising their military advantage.

But this obligation is not unitary; it also extends to a force that anticipates it will be attacked. To that end, the law imposes an obligation to endeavor to avoid locating military assets amongst the civilian population. Even more importantly, the law categorically prohibits using individual civilians or the presence of a civilian population in an effort to shield military objectives from enemy attack. Known as human shielding, this pernicious practice is all too common in contemporary conflict where a tactically inferior force seeks to level the equation by deliberately comingling its vital personnel and assets amongst civilians and civilian property.

Sadly, it is equally common that attacking forces encounter an enemy that ignores these obligations – that embeds military assets amongst the civilian population, uses civilian structures to house military assets, or uses civilians as human shields. In such situations the enemy violation does not release the attacking force from its obligations to mitigate civilian risk. But the effort to exploit the civilian population to gain some shielding advantage does not immunize the enemy from attack. When civilian property – such as an apartment building, or a school, or a bus or car – is used by the enemy as a military asset, the law provides a test for when that use essentially transforms the place or thing into a military objective within the scope of permissible attack authority. And when such an attack will result in incidental injury to civilians or destruction of civilian property, the law permits such attack so long as the attacking commander’s assessment is that the civilian harm will not be excessive in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage, the so-called proportionality rule.

Unfortunately, there seems to be little interest in the true nature of this targeting legality equation when reporting on contemporary conflict that results in the almost inevitable tragedy of civilian suffering. To be fair, it is to a certain extent understandable why the media and the public gravitate instinctively towards the images of destruction and suffering; as noted above we should all be saddened and bothered by this. But the flaw in the common narrative is to instinctively conflate the results of combat action with legal responsibility for this suffering. It is, of course, easy to identify the direct cause of death, injury, and destruction in war: the party that drops the bomb or launches the attack. But assessing legal responsibility for that destruction – especially when it adversely impacts the civilian population – is more complex.

And here is the true irony reflected in the latest conflict in Gaza: the party to the conflict that appears to have endeavored in good faith to comply with the law of targeting and its civilian risk mitigation imperative is consistently condemned, while the party that consistently and blatantly violated this law is treated as the victim of illegality. Two iconic examples stand out that illustrate this distortion.

First, The New York Times cover page showing photos of children killed in Gaza during hostilities. The tragedy of this loss is undeniable, but so is the invalidity of the suggestion that the Israeli Defense Force bears responsibility for this tragedy. Instead, that responsibility almost certainly falls at the feet of Hamas because of its deliberate effort to use the presence of civilians as human shields. And even that is being forgiving, for there is good reason to believe that shielding its targets from attack is not the ultimate objective when Hamas exploits its own civilians to get between its assets and IDF attacks; that what Hamas really wants is to force the IDF into inflicting those casualties so that they may be leveraged in the international information space to delegitimize Israel. The New York Times front page is all the evidence needed to understand why Hamas would engage in such tactics.

The second is a New York Times report of its investigation into the destruction of two apartment buildings in Gaza. A video goes to great lengths to establish that it was IDF precision-guided 2,000-pound bombs that destroyed these buildings. But the video also acknowledges that the targets of those attacks may have been the underground tunnel network running beneath the street in front of these buildings. But what about the law? First, the report erroneously states that the IDF was “obligated” to issue a pre-attack warning to the civilians placed at risk. This is a clearly erroneous statement of the warning obligation, which is not required when the operational circumstances indicate it will compromise the effect of the attack. Second, the report condemns the use of the munition based on a statement by the International Committee of the Red Cross that such ‘wide area effect’ weapons should not be used in urban areas. Setting aside the invalid suggestion that the ICRC is somehow the final say on what is or is not legal in conflict (it plays an important and influential role but is not the final say), the report’s failure to consider the ‘legality impact’ of the fact that the munitions were precision guided; and the fact that the use of these munitions may have been calculated to avoid the need to conduct a 2014-type large scale ground incursion into Gaza to destroy tunnels reveals how deeply misleading the inference of illegality is.

And then there is the ultimate manifestation of distortion: at one point in the report, the narrator notes that Hamas tunnels did in fact run under the street in front of both of these buildings and that large subterranean explosions may have been the cause of the collapse. Unfortunately, the report offers no discussion of why those tunnels would have been assessed as vital military objectives; of why aerial attack to destroy them would have been assessed as a tactic creating a substantial reduction in danger to civilians than the alternative of a ground incursion; of the IDFs process of collateral damage estimation, and how that process would have informed the commander as he made the difficult assessment of proportionality; or of the dilemma the tactic of running tunnels under densely populated civilian areas creates for the attacking commander. Instead, all the report acknowledged was that, “Doing this under a civilian neighborhood likely breaches international law.”

There are countless other examples that illustrate the distorting effect of this type of ‘effects-based condemnation.’ Yes, it is true that Israeli attacks resulted in loss of civilian life and destruction of property. But why were those lives exposed to the consequences of attacks? And why is that more pernicious than the efforts of Hamas to deliberately attack Israeli civilians using inherently indiscriminate weapons, not to mention the willingness of Hamas to deliberately expose its own civilians to this tragic suffering.

The media has to do better. It may be the case that aspects of the IDF operation crossed the line of legality, but the suggestion that the IDF is the pervasive law-breaker and Hamas is somehow understandably incapable of complying with the law is corrosive. The mere fact that the IDF was able to achieve its military objectives without resorting to a full-scale ground operation – with the ultimate result of a 10-fold reduction in casualties in Gaza compared to the 2014 operation – reflect a nation and a military committed to the imperative of balancing military necessity with civilian risk mitigation. But if all that the media gravitates toward is effects, illicit groups like Hamas will have all the more incentive to violate this law and to create situations that will inevitably exacerbate instead of mitigate the risk to their own civilians. And when those casualties and that destruction are reported in the future, it will be the media itself that shares responsibility for that tragedy.

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Geoffrey S. Corn is the Gary A Kuiper distinguished professor of National Security Law, at South Texas College of Law, Houston, and a retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Read full bio here.

Long-Form Analysis: Conveying Israel's Victory Over Hamas

BY Grisha Yakubovich

 The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and its aftermath have demonstrated that victory is very much in the eye of the beholder. In this case, Israel and the Palestinians each view themselves as the victor, and both sides use very different definitions to reach their conclusions.

This means that the ability to declare ‘victory’ in the modern age of war depends, to a great extent, on the ability of each side to build and maintain a narrative, and to influence reality in a way that lines up with that narrative.

Since taking over Gaza in a coup in 2007, Hamas has built a narrative of victory that disregards Israel’s own victory narrative: Israel, unfortunately, has yet to fully internalize how to influence Hamas’s internal narrative to its advantage.

Israel defines victory in military terms. Hamas translates victory as an ability to fire rockets from the start of a conflict to its end, and it sees its very ability to carry on the fight as victorious.

Hamas has been able to effectively market its own version of success against Israel, rallying the Gazan people to its side – despite Israel’s military achievements.

The sign of how deep the gap is between the Israeli and Hamas definitions of victory can be seen in how they describe the same conflict. Israel shared details of how it tracked down and destroyed Hamas’s ‘metro’ underground tunnel network, and killed its weapons engineers – all undoubtedly military achievements, enabled by first class intelligence. Between rounds of conflict with Hamas, Israel created an intelligence superiority that not only led to high value strikes, but also to relatively little collateral damage in Gaza.

Israel exhibited a world-leading surgical strike capability during the May conflict with Hamas. In eleven days, it fired the same quantity of explosives at enemy targets as it did in 52 days in the 2014 conflict. It was able to map out Hamas’s tunnel system in Gaza without being there on the ground, hit high level targets, and disrupt Hamas’s offensive systems.

Now, Israel’s core challenge is to translate these accomplishments into an ability to change Gaza’s own victory conception. So far, Israel has struggled to do so, for several reasons.

A missing strategic mechanism

The first is the lack of a fixed, permanent Israeli strategic body whose job is to spend every day analyzing Israel’s ability to shape consciousness in Hamas and Gaza. It is from this body that negotiations teams should emerge, able to simulate various scenarios, and analyze Israel’s geo-political environment on a daily basis.

Israel has so far relied on ad-hoc, opportunistic negotiators, who come together at the last minute and in a fairly arbitrary manner. Led by senior defense officials who are guided by defense perspectives, these negotiators have held indirect talks with Hamas via Egypt in an ad-hoc manner, and not as a permanent analytical creative agency.  

This lack of a professional agency has created numerous problems for Israel in its dealings with Hamas. Israeli negotiations teams are constantly changing over, and the Israelis who head to Egypt to conduct indirect talks with Hamas are not the same people who were there a few years ago.

The lack of a permanent mechanism means there is little strategic planning on how to convert Israeli military gains into leverages that can chip away at Hamas’s narrative.

Compare this with Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, both of whom are heavily invested in being able to strategically maneuver vis-à-vis Israel. The PA has a strategic body that knows how to dispatch high quality negotiating teams. This body advises its negotiators based on a deep analysis of the PA’s interests.

Hamas, for its part, consistently thinks about how to use all events – military and political – to further its interests. This thinking is built-in to the organization’s daily activities, meaning that its negotiating abilities are highly developed.  Hamas issues clear demands that are based on prior analysis of both its situation and Israel’s. It developed this ability because of its status as an infant entity striving to become the legitimate Palestinian ruling entity. As a result, its negotiations strategy is always forward-thinking.  

How Hamas has successfully promoted its victory definition

Following the 2014 Operation Protective Edge, after 52 days of combat, during which Israel struck Hamas hard, Hamas was internally and genuinely convinced that it had won.

This is because Hamas defines victory as the ability of a powerful non-state terror army like itself to stand up to a regional power, and activate attack systems – primarily rocket fire – until the very last minute of the conflict as a key component of its negotiations approach.   

This same ‘victory logic’ held up during the latest conflict between Hamas and Israel. Not only was Hamas able to keep firing throughout the conflict until the last moment, it also harnessed world opinion to its side, and was able to cause international opinion to view Israel as a bully. Strategically, de-legitimization of Israel is an important part of Hamas’s arsenal, and the use of media to draw attention to dead children and civilians is part of this strategy.

During the fighting, there was not a single international media image of an armed Hamas operative, and this is a major media achievement for Hamas. Instead, the only scenes broadcast were of Gazan hospitals and dead and wounded civilians. 

Meanwhile, Hamas’s popularity among Palestinians in the West Bank and in east Jerusalem increased significantly, causing major political damage to its arch-competitor for power, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority.

Thus, while Israel’s achievements are limited to the military field, Hamas was able to shape the perception of the Palestinians, much of the region, and the international community.

Hamas was able to position itself as the leading force in the Palestinian arena, and place Jerusalem as a center stage issue on the international agenda. This has led to significant pressure building up against Israel.

Israel’s concept of victory is rooted in the clear-cut Western notion of it being something that is obvious and visible to all.

In Arab culture, victory is often a far more flexible concept. Hamas declared a ‘divine’ victory at the end of Operation Guardian of the Walls despite lacking any major practical victory.

The marketing of itself from day one as the “Defender of Jerusalem” earned it broad support from the Palestinian street.

So long as the military campaign continued, this met Hamas’s criteria of ‘defeating the enemy,’ because the definition of success has been adapted to fit the current conditions – firing rockets at Israel throughout every day of the conflict.  

Even though Hamas lost militarily, it was therefore still able to declare a victory, and to believe in this genuinely. The military reality on the ground became irrelevant.

This is a deep cultural gap that the Western world struggles to grasp. Yet Hamas has been using this flexible framing since it seized power in 2007 in Gaza, and Hamas is not the only entity in the Arab world to utilize this flexible definition of victory.

Hamas keeps coming out on top in the victory narrative struggle

In the first days of the Hamas regime, following the 2007 coup that brought it to power, the Islamist terror movement understood that it needed to create a new dynamic if it wished to remain in power. This led to the 2008-2009 conflict with Israel, which Hamas framed as a small Palestinian enclave resisting the powerful Jewish state. It was then that Hamas began to successfully anchor its narrative.

The Goldstone Report that followed the conflict and demonized Israel in the international community, together with the Israeli commando raid on the 2010 Turkish-backed Marmara flotilla to Gaza acted as boosters to Hamas’s narrative.

While Israel faced constant criticisms, no one in the international community was disturbed by Hamas’s executions of Fatah members, its fundamentalist anti-Westernism, homophobia, or systematic repression of women’s rights.

 This same pattern has played out repeatedly since 2007. The fact that Hamas proved adept at negotiations means that it has been better able to shape reality in line with its narratives after rounds of conflict with Israel. For example, after Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012, which began with a successful Israeli assassination of Hamas’s deputy military wing commander, Ahmed Jabari, Hamas learned how to effectively make demands of Israel via Egyptian mediators.

It also got used to seeing those demands met. As someone who took part in some of those negotiations, I was witness to this process on multiple occasions. Hamas kept improving its ability to issue demands and extort Israel.

The 2012 post-conflict talks with Israel via Egypt were a turning point in Hamas’s ability to master the negotiations process. It used the talks to improve Gaza’s economic situation to a certain degree. At that time, Hamas was not very dependent on Israel for Gaza’s economy, as the extensive and flourishing ‘tunnel economy,’ made possible by a network of smuggling tunnels linking Sinai to Gaza, meant that Gaza’s markets lacked nothing.

 The big change came in 2013, when the Islamist Egyptian President, Mohamed Morsi, was ousted by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who then proceeded to seal off the smuggling tunnels.

It was then that Hamas found itself relying on the PA, which had been sending 45% of its budget to Gaza, and it had to begin dealing more intensively with Israel and the international community. Over the years, Abbas’s sanctions on Gaza meant that significantly fewer PA funds reached Gaza, turning up the pressure on the Hamas regime.

In response to this new challenge, Hamas developed a multi-arena strategy, in which the ability to manage high level negotiations in line with key Hamas interests was identified as a core capability.

Hamas learned how to master negotiations, and used this skill in the years that followed the 2014 Operation Protective Edge to issue new demands, impose new equations on Israel, and to be clear on where it is willing and unwilling to compromise.

Between 2014 and 2021, Hamas directed its efforts towards a clear objective: Ending Gaza’s humanitarian crisis while paying a relatively low price for this. Instead of tackling Gaza’s economic and humanitarian problems by itself, Hamas gambled on outside players doing so, and for this to happen without Hamas answering Israeli calls for the disarmament of Gaza, or Israel’s call for a freeze of Hamas’s force build up process.

Hamas understood that Israel’s demand for demilitarization would be part of any solution for Gaza’s economy that would involve Israel. To get around this obstacle, Hamas found new ways to pay a smaller price for easing restrictions on Gaza.

Hamas understood that it can always find elements  outside of Gaza to solve the Strip’s water, electricity, and sewage problems, but it had to find a way to do this without agreeing to Israel’s demands of zero attacks from Gaza and an end to its military build-up.

Hamas concluded that Israel wanted it to remain as the ruler in Gaza – strong enough to contain other armed terror factions, but weak in relation to Israel (this is based on Israel’s conclusion that there is no alternative ruler for Gaza).

Hamas’s demands included Israel enabling some 1,000 trucks carrying goods to enter Gaza daily via Kerem Shalom crossing, an improvement in water supply systems, and electricity grid upgrades. It got all of its demands.

But Hamas then thought ahead, and realized that after the next war, Israel will demand more firmly that it stops building its military force.

To get around this problem, it introduced new, low-cost bargaining chips, in the form of ‘popular resistance.’ This ingenious solution saw the introduction of incendiary and explosive balloons and kites, and the nighttime units that harasses southern Israeli communities with the sounds of explosions and border rioting.

In exchange for agreeing to end this cheap attrition against Israel, Hamas got yet more water arrangements, more approvals for Gazans to enter Israel for trade, and it ploughed ahead with its rocket construction industry, with no one stopping it. All it had to do was stop the low-cost measures at the border, stop its ‘return march’ rioting, stop the balloons and kites, and Israel’s demands evaporated.  

Now, after the latest conflict, Hamas’s main demand is for Qatar’s cash to reach Gaza, so long as this does not happen via its rival, the Palestinian Authority. Hamas is prepared to accept a third party like the UN allocating the cash – just not the PA.

This strengthens the assessment that Hamas is fighting to disengage from the PA and to be an independent entity. It is working in an organized manner to receive legitimacy as an independent actor, able to point to cooperation and talks with the UN, Qatar, Saudi Arabia – and even Israel.  All of this gives Hamas the international legitimacy it seeks. Every minor contact with an important outside actor is a further achievement for Hamas.

Based on these achievements, Hamas’s ambitions grew, as its victory narrative continued to grow in strength.

Israel is beginning to improve, but not fast enough

In its well-thought-out negotiations stance, Hamas has insisted on separating two issues during indirect talks with Israel. The first issue is the need to solve Gaza’s civilian infrastructure, and the second is finding an arrangement to release the remains of two Israeli MIA soldiers and two captive civilians. Hamas has consistently tried to separate the two issues, while Israel is constantly linking them.

Israel has not allowed Hamas to uncouple the two issues and is finally taking the right approach to talks with Hamas: Biding its time, and not rushing to solve problems. This indicates that Israel has begun to slowly learn lessons on maneuvering vis-à-vis Hamas – though the learning curve remains too slow. Furthermore, the reason for Israel’s improved negotiations steps stem from the wrong reason: Israel’s focus on the MIA and captive civilian issues, rather than Israeli realization that it can use a post-conflict period to slowly rob Hamas of its achievements.   

When PA President Mahmoud Abbas – who continues to rule despite all of Hamas’s efforts to undermine him –called off scheduled Palestinian elections earlier this year, Hamas immediately began planning out how it can gain when he finally departs the scene.

Hamas planned on entering the next struggle for the next Palestinian elections as 'defenders of Jerusalem. It planned an escalation that would last for a few days, and assessed that a major conflict was unlikely. Hamas didn’t take into account Israel’s intelligence readiness, or that Israel would view long-range rocket fire as an opportunity to act.

In Israel, the defense establishment did not appear to be taking into account how Hamas could use the cancellation of the elections to gain new achievements. Even if such an analysis did take place, there is no evidence that Israel planned to do anything to deny Hamas such achievements.

Part of this unsatisfactory performance by Israel is the lack of a skilled, permanent Israeli strategic body that includes negotiations teams, and which can simulate scenarios and challenge the assumptions that are common in Israel.

The weeks that followed Operation Guardian of the Walls have seen Israel expand Gaza’s fishing zone from six to nine miles, approve the entry of raw material to Gazan factories, and approve the transfer of fuel to Gaza’s power plant.

These developments have nourished Hamas’s claims of victory. Had Israel established a permanent, professional negotiations mechanism, it would have been able to torpedo Hamas’s claims of victory signs and avoid this trap.

For the reality is that Israel has the opportunity to deny Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar from enjoying the fruit of his ‘divine victory.’ It can maneuver in such a way so as to trap Sinwar in his own ‘victory.’

This has in fact begun to happen due to the slow ‘crawling’ pace of the negotiations.

In the initial weeks following the conflict, it looked as if Israel had finally woken up to the need to do this. It held back the Qatari money until an arrangement that cut Hamas out of the allocation process could be found. It didn’t rush to repair electricity grid infrastructure. It was not deterred by Hamas’s threats of a new escalation. It responded to incendiary balloons with air force strikes: Hamas didn’t launch a single mortar attack in response.

Driven by its MIAs and the issue of captive civilians – and not because of the realization of the benefits of slow-moving negotiations, which takes away achievements from Hamas  –  Israel had begun to change Sinwar’s equation and to shape it in its own favor.

Time is on Israel’s side. It is Hamas that is facing pressure domestically from Gazans for an improvement in their daily lives. Understanding this will help Israel to defeat Hamas’s ‘victory’ maneuvers.

It is time for Israel to not only be militarily prepared – which it excels at doing – but also to be prepared with a cognitive campaign and a skilled strategic system that specializes in strategic maneuvering and negotiations.

Such a system would weigh events in-depth, examine options, and analyze the dynamics that best benefit Israeli interests.  These are necessary functions for Israel as much as having combat battalions ready to go into battle at any time.

This readiness should also include the establishment of an ‘army of cognitive campaigners,’ meaning the supply of Israel supporters with relevant and authentic information, and to effectively act on social media networks.

Ultimately, the gap between Israel’s military capabilities and its ability to influence Hamas’s victory narrative is glaring. If Israel starts to close this gap,  it will then  be able to create victories that cannot be questioned by Hamas or by Israeli citizens. When that happens, victory will no longer be in the eyes of the beholder. It will be apparent to all.

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Colonel Grisha Yakubovich serves as a policy and strategy consultant to various international NGO's. He concluded his military service in 2016 as the head of the civil department for the Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.).

Soldiers must defend civilians, not the other way around

By Shahaf Segal

Israel views IDF soldiers as the nation's collective sons and daughters. While this may be a noble worldview, it also runs the risk of creating confusion over who is supposed to defend whom. Hamas maliciously takes advantage of this sentiment to employ it against Israel. 

The Israeli public has on multiple occasions pressured the government to rescue Israeli soldiers (and civilians) from enemy captivity at the cost of releasing scores of dangerous terrorists from prison. Israel historically yielded as if there was no alternative. However, we must remember that the release of prisoners is not the final “cost:” Israel pays that with the blood of its citizens. 

As a member of the Golani Reconnaissance Unit, where I served as a medic and sharpshooter, like many other soldiers I  endangered my life to protect civilians on the home front. That is how things should work: Soldiers should protect civilians.

During Operation Cast Lead (2008 – 2009), my comrade in arms, Staff-Sergeant Dvir Emanuelof and I were shot at by Hamas terrorists emerging from a tunnel in the Gaza Strip. The terrorists sought to kidnap Dvir: I ran toward him and opened fire in an attempt to save him. In the process, I sustained a severe bullet wound to my arm.

Dvir paid the ultimate price in defense of Israel. Despite my efforts, he did not survive the gunshot wound to his head.  I embarked on a five-year journey of extensive surgery and physical therapy to regain partial use of my arm. 

Soldiers are aware of the risks. We are willing to endanger and sacrifice ourselves for Israel and its people if necessary. Israel's government and society must remember this going forward. 

Hamas has maintained a long-standing strategy of kidnapping soldiers and using them as bargaining chips to secure the release of dangerous prisoners, many of whom have blood on their hands. 

Through this extortion, Hamas was able to secure the release of 1,027 terrorists in exchange for the release of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit in 2011, who was held captive for over five years. One of those released was Yahya Sinwar, who now heads Hamas  Gaza. Sinwar's release is perhaps the most salient example of the dangers of Israel's willingness to save soldiers at the expense of civilians. 

The actual price of past prisoner releases has been intolerably high. According to various sources, between 40 to 80 percent of the prisoners released by Israel returned to active terrorism within our borders, leading to civilians and soldiers paying with their lives. 

Additional examples of convicted Hamas operatives released in 2011 include Ziad Awad, who shot and killed a police officer, Chief Superintendent Baruch Mizrahi, during a 2014 West Bank shooting. Mahmoud Kawasma, who was involved in the 2014 kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank, was another of those released in the Shalit deal.  

Now, Hamas is demanding the release of 1,111 security prisoners in exchange for the remains of Israeli MIAs Lt. Hadar Goldin and Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul (killed in Operation Protective Edge in 2014) and two Israeli civilians being held after entering Gaza. 

Israel must recognize that a prisoner release of this scale is no longer a feasible solution. 

When I insisted on joining a combat unit, my goal was to protect Israeli civilians. For this reason, I signed a document alongside other soldiers and officers, declaring my refusal to be released – dead or alive –  in exchange for terrorists. 

None of this is to say that Israel does not have a duty to work for the release of soldiers kidnapped by enemy forces. However, the right way to execute this obligation is to place conditions on Gaza's reconstruction. Israel has the power to pursue this struggle with determination and good judgment.  

The motto for this policy is simple: The restoration of Gaza must be subject to the  release of the captives.

While Israel is obligated to do its part to prevent any humanitarian disaster in Gaza, that does not mean large-scale reconstruction. Israel ensures that trucks with essential goods enter the Strip while working to help keep electricity and water supplies running. The rest must be conditioned on Hamas releasing the Israelis it holds captive. 

Israel is the powerful party in its relationship with Hamas, and this means it has alternatives to caving into dangerous extortion. If Israel proceeds to give in to demands for mass prisoner releases, it will perpetuate this never-ending cycle.

After Operation Cast Lead, Gaza was in desperate need  of reconstruction. Simultaneously, Hamas held Gilad Shalit captive. Israel missed the opportunity to negotiate Shalit's release in exchange for reconstruction, and instead agreed to the empty promise of a ceasefire. Within a short time,  Hamas received the freedom of its leaders, the reconstruction of Gaza, and hundreds more operatives who were released from Israeli prisons and joined the Hamas terror factory. Israel received more bloodshed, kidnapped soldiers, and outrageous demands.

It did not work before, and it will not work now as we once again walk off the battlefield, seemingly to return later. As it is written in Ecclesiastes,  “That which has been is that which shall be.” I call upon the Israeli government and the nation to break this paradigm, to stand firm, as our soldiers do, and put a new equation on the table: the reconstruction of Gaza for the freedom of our captives. Even at the price of renewed armed conflict.

Shahaf Segal was a sharpshooter and a combat medic in the elite anti-terror unit - Sayeret Golani. Shahaf was wounded in operation "Cast Lead" while saving his sergeant's body from being kidnapped through a terror tunnel into Gaza.. Read full bio here.

COVID-19 disease strategies – The Israeli experience

By Dr. Daniel Suez

The Covid-19 Pandemic caught the world unprepared. Even though world health organizations have a relatively good understanding of common pandemic viral diseases such as the influenza viral infections originating from Asia on an annual basis with new variants/mutations, the scientific world was caught unprepared for this rapidly developing viral disease. The lack of preparedness, both from a point of view of mitigation and lack of available basic therapy, the rate of viral spreading, and the severity of disease complication and mortality, led to significant confusion among the scientific community and particularly among the population at large.

 Adding to the confusion were the frequent social media misinformation and politicization of the matter due in part to a significant global financial burden caused by the pandemic. Leadership was necessary to forge a working strategy to save countless lives from this serious disease.

Early on, and as the disease progressed rapidly, it was apparent that the best approach to stop its progression – other than mitigation strategies that lead to economic devastation –  would be to put significant resources in to developing strategic vaccination approaches, using our advanced know how and current biotechnologies in doing so.

Israel is a small country of some nine million inhabitants, with an excellent social medical system.  The medical authorities along with the political leadership understood the danger of such a serious viral pandemic and the need to institute aggressive mitigation strategies. They did  not hesitate to employ, among other measures, the Shin Bet Israel Security Agency to enforce mitigation policies and minimize viral spread.

Furthermore, as soon as vaccines were available, the authorities were successful in purchasing  sufficient stocks ahead of time and launched a mass vaccination drive that was well received by the  population. The policy achieved a high rate of vaccination in an orderly fashion, to include first the most vulnerable population, i.e., the elderly and people with underlying medical conditions.  The results were quite impressive with the rate of viral spread dropping dramatically over a relatively short period of time and consequently a significant reduction in new cases, hospitalization and mortality.  Within few months the country went from full shut down status to almost complete openness and normal daily activities.

The issue of the more recent events of few focal cases of a rebound of variant forms of COVID-19 merits further discussion.

The Pfizer and Moderna vaccines used in Israel, were proven quite effective against COVID-19 variants such as the English (Variant A), the South African (Variant B), the Brazilian (Variant C) and even the new Indian Variant (Variant D).  The original vaccination studies were shown to be quite effective (>94%) for reducing dramatically the rate of serious COVID-19 disease, rate of hospitalization, and mortality.

These studies did not evaluate the rate of viral transmission by both study populations – the immunized patients versus non immunized.

As the different variant forms developed, these vaccines appeared to be protective against them. Recently with the emergence of the Delta Variant (the Indian Variant), it was noted that transmissibility of this variant is much higher compared to the original virus, yet, this variant does not appear to be more aggressive or to increase hospitalization or to be associated with higher mortality.

The main idea of the vaccination is to protect the most vulnerable population from serious complications and mortality. We know that the majority of the young population have either asymptomatic occurrence (meaning being tested positive yet with no symptoms) or having mild symptoms for a short period of time. 

Side effects post vaccination have been recorded, most of which are relatively benign.  However, more recently, a serious side effect was noted in immunized young adolescents who developed acute myocarditis, which is an inflammation of the heart muscle.  Even though there were fewer cases than 1 in 10,000 immunized adolescents who developed this serious condition post immunizations, some of these cases were fatal.

It is obvious that one need to weigh in the risk to benefit ratio.  Today, there is little doubt that immunizing the majority of the adult population is largely beneficial to the entire population by reducing the number of new cases, the development of severe disease, hospitalization and mortality, which allow us to return to normal life and daily activities. Yet, vaccination in adolescents, even though proven to be effective and with minimal side effects as reported by the pivotal vaccination studies prior to the FDA approval,  should not be mandated in my opinion. 

We should not forget that these vaccines received approval only on an emergency basis and did not yet gain full approval, something that usually requires several years of experience.  We should also keep in mind that adolescents may either have no symptoms or only develop a minor flu like disease in the majority of cases, and that the main goal is to protect the vulnerable population.  Since the quasi majority of the vulnerable population have already been vaccinated in Israel, there is a small risk that the immunized vulnerable population may suffer serious consequences. 

In addition, due to the geopolitical location of Israel among other reasons, Israelis frequently travel outside of the country for a variety of reasons – primarily for tourism.  The COVID-19 pandemic era led to the entire country being almost  shut down for most of 2020 and early 2021.  Following opening of the country, Israelis have started traveling again, while many travel destination countries have continued to have pandemic related restrictions, which result in a significant social pressure on these adolescents in Israel due to travel restrictions if they do not get immunized.

Hence, in my opinion, the risk/benefit ratio should be left to the parents to decide without a mandate, which is the case today in Israel.   My prediction is that a significant number of the adolescents will be immunized and will contribute to an overall feeling of security but I do not believe that it is a crucial element at this time and probably does not constitute a very significant factor.

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Dr. Daniel Suez, MD. received his medical degree from Paris Descartes University, Paris France, in 1975. He completed his Pediatric Residency in 1981, training first at the Versailles Medical Center in Versailles, France, then subsequently at the Barzilai Medical Center in Ashkelon, Israel.. Read full bio here.

An almost optimistic take on Israel’s new coalition

By Justin Pozmanter

I have previously written my cynical take on Israel’s elections. The elections were heavy on personality and light on substance, and it is easy to predict the current government will fall quickly under the weight of its own ideological contradictions.

The primary purpose of this coalition was, and remains, removing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from power. Netanyahu served as prime minister for longer than anyone before him. He is a singularly talented politician and, if it turns out that he has served his last day in the Prime Minister’s office, he will have left behind a legacy of significant accomplishments for the state of Israel.

Despite this, or perhaps because of it, a national obsession has developed around his rule. Israel has reached a point where neither Netanyahu’s supporters nor opponents are able to objectively analyze his leadership or actions. No matter how brilliant, how committed, or how capable, it is highly problematic for any democracy to have a leader become the sole focus of public debate.

There are those who honestly believed Israel would have failed as a democracy, potentially as a state itself, had Netanyahu won another term. And there are those who genuinely believe Bibi, and only Bibi, can lead.

Israel will go on without him, even if it is difficult to imagine the country without the man who has dominated its politics for 12 years. Israel survived when David Ben Gurion left, survived when Menachem Begin left, survived when Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated and when Ariel Sharon suffered a stroke, and it will survive the generation of leaders who will follow Netanyahu, beginning with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett.

The new Bennett/Yair Lapid government makes little sense on paper. There are right wingers, left wingers, religious Jews, secular Jews, and an Islamist Arab party (Ra’am) most closely aligned with the far left on security and with the ultra-Orthodox on social issues. Bennett must find a way to navigate all those differences with the slimmest of majorities – 61-59. Using even the most generous analysis, the coalition may well quickly fall, sending Israel back to the divisive business of electoral politics. But what if it doesn’t?

If this coalition can defy the odds and govern effectively, it might be the harbinger of a new political reality. The entire world, Israel included, has reached a point of ideological absolutism. The ideological poles are further apart than at any time in recent memory and those on opposite sides of the spectrum can barely maintain friendships, or have a civil conversation, let alone run a country together. But here in Israel, the right-wing, religious, former head of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria) is leading a coalition that cannot stand without the participation of Israel’s most left-wing and devoutly secular party (Meretz).

When the government was announced, and it became clear Israel would have its first religious Zionist, kippah-wearing leader, right-wing religious Jerusalem mourned, while left-wing secular Tel Aviv celebrated. This can largely be attributed to the horror, or euphoria, of Netanyahu leaving office, but it also speaks to the confusion and uncertainty over what this government might be.

It is still entirely unclear. However, if the coalition is successful in managing COVID, bringing down housing prices, improving the economy and healing some of the divisions between Jewish and Arab Israel, among many other issues, known and unknown, it may have an impact on how Israelis of different ideologies and backgrounds view one another.

At present, right-wing and left-wing Israelis tend to see the other’s worldview as an existential threat. The right and left governing together could change that. It is very unlikely there will be breakthroughs on major issues related to the Palestinians or the fundamental divisions between religion and state. However, working constructively together, for the first time in a generation, would hopefully bring the right and left to the point where they can acknowledge that political opponents, extremists aside, are not looking to harm the country.

Israeli Arabs generally view the government with suspicion at best, and with outright hostility at worst.

If Ra’am can achieve results on economic development, education, and bringing down the rate of crime in Arab communities, it would begin to remove the view of many Arab Israelis that they have nothing to gain from working with the Jewish majority and fully participating in the political process. And if Jewish Israelis see an Arab party playing a constructive role in governing the country, it could lessen some of their trepidation related to the goals of Arab political activism and leadership.

I do not believe this coalition will last. However, despite my strong misgivings about at least half of its parties, I hope it does. Israel has had enough elections. Israel has had enough of the perpetual divisions between right and left, religious and secular and Jewish and Arab.

Israel has never had a government quite like this. Previous governments, left-wing, right-wing, and unity alike, have succeeded in building the world’s sole Jewish state into an economic and military power, but they have not managed to heal Israel’s internal divisions. Maybe this one can. The opposition should be vocal and demanding, but this government has the backing of a majority of the Knesset, making it as legitimate as any other. It has earned the opportunity to prove what it can do.

Justin Pozmanter is a former foreign policy advisor to Minister Tzachi Hanegbi. Before making Aliyah, he worked at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and practiced law. Read full bio here.

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BDS has no place in schools

By Mark Goldfeder

Last month, in the aftermath of the most recent conflict in Israel, the general assembly of United Educators of San Francisco (UESF) became the first K-12 teacher's union in the United States to approve a resolution endorsing the antisemitic Boycott Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. A similar resolution is now making its way through the United Teachers Los Angeles union.

Aside from the fact that both resolutions are offensively antisemitic, rife with inaccuracies, and morally reprehensible in their defense of terrorism, they are also problematic from a legal perspective.

To be clear, the freedom of speech – even offensive speech – must be protected. But as the United States Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights has made clear, there are times when even speech can cross over into harassment and invidious discrimination. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in federally assisted programs and activities, on the basis of race, color, or national origin. A violation of Title VI may be found if discrimination is encouraged, tolerated, not adequately addressed, or ignored by administrators, and complaints alleging a violation of Title VI may be filed with the US Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights or in the federal district courts.

Under Executive Order 13899 (Combating Anti-Semitism), when evaluating potential Title VI claims, the government uses the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism. Per the IHRA definition, it is antisemitic to apply a double standard to the Jewish state. As it relates to these resolutions, perhaps the most telling aspect of the underlying hatred behind them is what they glaringly don't say. In the entire retelling of events, in both resolutions, there is not a single mention of Hamas, the terrorist organization that instigated the conflict by attacking Israeli civilian populations.

It is true, and tragic, that many Palestinians have been killed or wounded, and it is horrifying that some, as the resolutions point out, were mere children. But Israel does not target Palestinian civilians or children; in fact, Israel warns people in advance to evacuate the areas it plans to strike as it seeks to protect its citizens, both Jewish and Arab, from Hamas' indiscriminate attacks.

Meanwhile, it is Hamas that actually targets innocent civilians while at the same time using its own population as human shields and its civilian institutions, including schools, mosques, and hospitals, as places to hide weapons and stage military operations. The resolutions demand that Israel ceases striking Gaza, but not that Hamas cease striking Israel; that is definitionally antisemitic.

But if the narrative antisemitism was not clear enough, the resolutions also openly support the demonstrably dangerous and discriminatory BDS movement. There are thousands of readily available, easily accessible, examples of BDS leaders and activists crossing the line into unmitigated antisemitism without even the pretext of anti-Zionism, and there is also clear evidence that the antisemitic discrimination in the BDS movement disparately impacts Jewish people, leading to harassment and physical attacks. That is part of the reason why California, which is home to both of these unions, is among the majority of states that have passed anti-BDS bills- protective anti-discrimination laws which these resolutions call on people to ignore.

It is critical that these divisive resolutions do not find their way into any classroom, and that the school districts in San Francisco and Los Angeles not tolerate any resulting or connected discrimination or harassment on the part of their teachers who are members of these unions. It should be obvious that a school district that chooses to ignore an open call by its teachers to discriminate on the basis of national origin would be exposing itself to potential liability if students were to feel negatively affected, and according to reports, the resolutions are already contributing to Jewish students feeling unsafe and unwelcome at school.

Aside from the Title VI concerns, any negative repercussions against Jewish and/or Israeli students stemming from the resolutions could also well violate the anti-discrimination provisions of the state's Education Code (in particular section 220, which, among other things, forbids discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, ethnicity, and religion), and subject these districts to even further liability.

As the worldwide surge in antisemitic incidents continues, it is morally incumbent upon school officials to quickly and publicly distance themselves from the kind of hateful and inflammatory resolutions that these teachers' unions are promoting, and to make sure that their Jewish students feel supported. It should never have to come to this, but if there is any moral hesitation on the part of school officials to speaking out against antisemitic hate, then the administration should also be on notice that under Title VI they have an affirmative legal obligation to protect their Jewish students- even from their own teachers and their unions if need be.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

Seeking justice in the wrong places: Why Rep. Omar’s premise is wrong

By Yochai Guiski

Rep. Ilhan Omar embroiled herself in yet another controversy recently when she asked Secretary of State Anthony Blinken about the United States position on the International Criminal Court, and subsequently tweeted: “We must have the same level of accountability and justice for all victims of crimes against humanity. We have seen unthinkable atrocities committed by the U.S., Hamas, Israel, Afghanistan, and the Taliban. I asked @SecBlinken where people are supposed to go for justice.”

Seeking justice for victims of war crimes is a noble cause. As the grandson of Holocaust survivors, whose family endured some of the worst the Nazis could devise, making sure those who perpetrate crimes against humanity are brought to justice touches upon a powerful personal and national experience.

But this is as far as my agreement with Rep. Omar goes. The rest of her underlying premise about seeking justice in the international arena is highly questionable. As I am not qualified to talk about the U.S. experience, I will instead focus on the Israeli one.

For starters, her claim that she has not seen any evidence that Israeli courts “can and will prosecute alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity” is inaccurate to say the least. Israeli courts, and especially Israel’s Supreme Court, have heard thousands of cases of Palestinians who claimed they were wronged by the Israeli authorities. In many cases the courts intervened, changing a would-be course of action by the state, provided restitution, or even led to a rethinking of policy. Not all cases are heard and not all claims are accepted, but many, if not all significant legal cases are brought to judicial review.

In addition, Israel has another mechanism - the formation of commissions (by the government or the parliament), which have the authority to summon witnesses, examine evidence, report publicly (with confidential annexes) and make recommendations (some of which may be binding). For example, The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010 (The Turkel Commission) was tasked with addressing “Israel’s Mechanisms for Examining and Investigating Complaints and Claims of Violations of the Laws of Armed Conflict According to International Law”. The committee’s recommendations were mostly adopted and enhanced the way Israel deals with its compliance with International Law.

But that is only part of the issue, as one needs to look at the “justice” mechanisms that the international community applies to Israel:

·     When Israel pioneered the use of drones in counterterrorism operations to apply force accurately and reduce civilian injuries and deaths, it was accused by UN rapporteurs and many international human rights groups of extrajudicial killings.

·     When the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was tasked by the UN General Assembly to address the legality of the barrier Israel was building around the West Bank and in Jerusalem, the Court overwhelmingly found it to be illegal, and even went as far as denying Israel’s right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN charter (ostensibly since “Palestine” was not considered a state at the time). The only dissenting voice was the American judge Buergenthal who dissected the decision and showed the glaring flaws in adopting sweeping findings based on little factual basis.

·     On that matter, detractors of Israel have claimed that Israel could have built the security barrier on its own territory and thus avoided the problem. Furthermore, they used that logic to “prove” Israel was just executing a land grab. However, if one looks to Israel’s northern border, that was exactly the course of action that Israel took when it built the security technical fence south of the “Blue line”, the internationally recognized border between Israel and Lebanon, within its own territory. The outcome of the decision was claims from the Lebanese side that Israel was violating its sovereignty every time Israeli forces crossed the technical fence, including an incident in 2010 in which an Israeli officer who was on a mission to cut a tree near the fence was shot dead. So, Israel cannot win no matter where it builds a security fence.

·     The UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has singled out Israel for scrutiny (including its infamous Item 7, a permanent agenda on Israel, and the only one devoted to a specific country), while taking little notice of flagrant human rights violators across the world. To that extent the HRC has commissioned “Fact Finding Commissions” after every escalation in Gaza, which were almost exclusively tasked with evaluating Israel’s actions, while the actions of terror groups operating out of Gaza were pursued far less rigorously. And even putting at the head of its investigation into the 2014 Gaza war, a Canadian academic who had previously done work for the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and later resigned after the conflict of interest was revealed.   

But the International Criminal Court seems to take things even further:

·     When the Comoros Islands asked the court to examine the incident aboard the “Mavi Marmara”, the Prosecutor’s Office declined to open an investigation on the grounds of “gravity” (the alleged crime was not of the severity that requires the intervention of the court, as it was a single incident in which 9 people died). In an unprecedented move, the judges of the court challenged the prosecutor’s independence and ordered its office to reevaluate its position on not going forward with a prosecution. The prosecutor eventually reaffirmed its decision on the matter, but the proceedings dragged on for several more years.

·     On the Palestinian issue, the prosecutor (and eventually the court) decided to recognize Palestine as a state and accept its accession into the “Rome Statute” based upon the non-binding decision of the UN General assembly on the matter. The prosecutor than decided to open an investigation into the situation in the West Bank and Gaza (including Jerusalem) on its own.

So which kind of justice is preferred? The kind that makes sweeping findings with little factual evidence to support them, the kind where you single out a country for scrutiny while taking little stock of the actions of its enemies, the kind where the judges urge the prosecutor to press charges, the kind where application of the law is based on flimsy grounds but is politically popular?  

From the above precedents alone, there is compelling evidence which shows that looking for justice in these places is neither just, nor fair, and that in most cases robust, independent, and professional judiciaries who are scrutinized by democratically elected officials is the best remedy. It may not be perfect, but it is far better than the alternative.  

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LT. Col. Yochai Guiski is a 23 year veteran of the IDF. He retired in 2020 as a Lieutenant Colonel after serving in the Israeli Military Intelligence. Yochai served in various roles including: Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (C.O.G.A.T.), Strategic Planning Division and the Ministry of Defense (politico-military directorate). Read full bio here.

Improved Iron Dome stands up to tougher, newer challenges

By Shachar Shohat & YAIR RAMATI

The recent round of escalation between Israel and the Gazan terror factions, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), saw Israel’s Iron Dome air defense system intercept a variety of rockets and drones, in an extremely high stress environment.

Based on the available information and reports by the IDF Spokespersons Unit, it is possible to observe the improved performance of this unique air defense system,  which only recently celebrated a decade since its first real-world interception.

Hamas and PIJ launched some 4,360 rockets, at least six attack drones and many mortar shells at the State of Israel within a relatively short time frame –  just 11 intensive days.

Their fire rate averaged at around 400 rockets per day, most through intensive salvos, designed to overwhelm and defeat the Israeli Iron Dome batteries. This seems to represent a new threat era, with the recent conflict being a microcosm of the coming decade’s global threat and response trends.

Unlike previous conflicts in which standard rockets with low-lethality warheads were launched at Israel, this time the threat we saw was upgraded with domestically developed and produced rockets, carrying medium-weight warheads.

One of the important lessons that emerged from Operation Guardian of the Walls is that Hamas and PIJ have been able to establish a local rocket production capability,  clearly based on Iranian know-how. The enemy arsenals also included a few high precision drones whose design originates in Iran. None however were able to successfully hit Israeli territory.

Hamas and PIJ sought to saturate Israeli air defenses with large salvos fired rapidly, in some cases with around 100 projectiles in the air simultaneously. They fired from different azimuths at the same time, and used depressed trajectories with lower flight altitudes and shorter routes to targets in Israel.

Defending most of the Israeli civilian population and critical defense sites against such salvos, at various ranges, day and night, was no simple task for Israel’s air defense systems.  

The question of whether other air defense systems can cope with a quantitively similar threat, and also reach a reasonable performance within budget limits is very much an open one for all Western observers.

An additional and key aspect of defending air space in this conflict was the challenge of managing the air-situation picture.

Managing this complex, crowded event was made possible by an array of advanced sensors, radars, electro-optical devices, and sophisticated battle management algorithms, which meant that the IDF could deal with time-critical scenarios.

 As the rocket salvoes flew to their intended civilian targets in Israel, and many thousands of debris pieces created by previous interceptions fell from the sky, over 160 airborne platforms were flying nearby.

Fortunately, there was only a single report of an incident of Israeli friendly fire at an air platform (a drone), while the air defense batteries successfully conducted dozens of simultaneous rocket interceptions.

 Some observers attribute this success to the coherent, advanced, and centralized engagement structure of the Israeli air defense system, and the utilization of robust multiple sensors.

Quantitative figures published by the IDF spokesman, can be summarized by the following analysis: Despite the tragic cases of Israeli casualties in this conflict – 11 dead from rockets, many wounded, and some physical damage, this translates into roughly one casualty for every 400 launched rockets/mortar shells.

In light of the extent of the threat, the role of Iron Dome in preventing hundreds of casualties is obvious.

Nevertheless, the casualty count does not reflect the terror experienced by the civilian population in Israel. Millions of Israelis were forced to seek shelter from incoming rockets during day and night hours, while also dealing with physical damage and economic losses.

The combination of active air defense and passive defense (the latter made up of accurate warnings for the general population and compliance with those warnings by heading to safe zones) was a key factor for minimizing loss of life in Israel.

Some 15% of the rockets fell within Gaza, reflecting poor local design and production. These failed launches killed around 25 Gazans. 

Iron Dome, which is programmed to only intercept projectiles heading to populated areas, ended up engaging almost half of the rockets fired into Israel. This reflects an improvement in the accuracy of enemy rockets. During the 2006 Second Lebanon War, a quarter of Hezbollah’s rockets reached built up areas.

All of the drones launched at Israel were intercepted by Iron Dome or air-to-air missiles fired by the Israeli Air Force, or other ‘soft defense’ means.

At the end of the conflict, Iron Dome was able to keep up its unmatched 90% kill rate. Iron Dome has now intercepted over 4,000 projectiles since first becoming operational in 2011.

Maintaining a robust inventory of interceptors has been proven to be a key capability in dealing with the new projectile threat.

It is fair to assume that the latest conflict with Hamas and PIJ will not be the last. As a result, Israeli air defense systems must remain on the path of ongoing upgrades, and to systematically remain a step ahead of the enemy.

The combination of professional air defense teams, support from the United States Missile Defense Agency, and local creative industry solutions mean that this is a mission that can be met.

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Brigadier General Shohat concluded his service in the IDF as the Commander of the Israel Air Defense Forces. During that command position he oversaw the air defense component of Operation Protective Edge, 2014. Prior to that, he served as the Head of the IDF Reorganizational Efficiency Project from 2011-2012. Read full bio here.

Yair Ramati concluded his four-year service as Director of IMDO, the government agency charged with the development, production, and the delivery of missile defense systems including: Iron Dome, David's Sling and the Arrow weapons system, to the State of Israel. Mr. Ramati received his Bachelor's degree in Aeronautical Engineering. He earned a Master's Degree in Science and Engineering from the Technion, Israel. Read full bio here.

Hamas is turning military damage into political advantage

By David Hacham

A month after the conflict between Israel and Hamas, the Palestinian Islamist movement that rules Gaza has experienced a dramatic rise in popular support, both in the coastal Strip and in the West Bank.

On the other side of the fence, Hamas’s rival, the Fatah-run Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, is seeing a visible drop in support.

Hamas absorbed a serious military blow during Israel’s Operation Guardian of the Walls last month, a conflict that was labelled Sword of Jerusalem by Hamas. Yet in the weeks that have passed, Hamas is working to consolidate a picture of political ‘victory’, irrespective of events on the ground, and it has done so with a significant degree of success.

During the hostilities in May, Israeli air and artillery strikes degraded many key Hamas capabilities, although this blow was not decisive enough to prevent Hamas from recovering in a relatively short amount of time.

Following the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel mediated by Egypt’s General Intelligence Directorate, Hamas’s political bureau chief in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, has been working hard to shape Palestinian-Arab and international perception, and to transmit the message that Hamas is continuing to function as a strong, stable, undisputed regime. Hamas has been able to transform its image, and is now perceived as an element in the Palestinian arena that cannot be ignored. At the same time, it has revived the centrality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Hamas is now pursuing a strategic objective designed to gain maximum political benefits from the post-conflict era.

It is seeking to cash in on its image as a Palestinian movement that did not surrender to Israel, and it even claims to have ‘come out on top’ during the clash with the IDF, able to withstand the Israeli war machine.

To drive home this message, Hamas held victory marches, military parades, and memorial ceremonies for those killed in Gaza, while its commanders made many media appearances.

It is Sinwar who is personally orchestrating this political and PR campaign, which is helping him to consolidate his position at the apex of Hamas’s leadership.

Sinwar is well known to the Israeli defense establishment for his cruelty, even before Hamas was founded. During his time in the Al-Mujama Al-Islami organization, a precursor to Hamas, he was arrested by Israel before the start of the First Intifada and sentenced to five life sentences for murdering Palestinian collaborators with Israel. Behind bars, Sinwar was well known for his willingness to employ violence in his relations with other prisoners when he thought this was necessary.

In recent weeks, Sinwar has delivered impassioned, fiery speeches, claiming that Hamas came out as the winning side, and employing psychological warfare by claiming that Israel will crumble against Palestinian ‘resistance.’ He ensured that a photograph showing him sitting confidently outside of his destroyed office made the rounds.

Sinwar’s propaganda efforts stand in stark contrast to reality. Hamas absorbed far more damage than it inflicted on Israel, and dragged Gaza’s long-suffering residents into another destructive, bloody war. The military balance sheet is obviously in Israel’s favor.

Still, Hamas’s large rocket arsenal and variety of projectiles, and its ability to set up a joint command center with Gaza’s other armed terror factions, served its political consolidation campaign. The dominance of Muhammed Deif, commander of Hamas’s military wing, and Sinwar’s brother, Muhammad Sinwar, another senior military wing commander, both of whom are close to Hamas’s political leadership, served it well too.

Sinwar’s image was boosted significantly following the conflict, and Hamas’s overall political bureau chief, Ismael Haniyah, and its overseas political bureau chief, Khaled Mashaal, do not currently enjoy the same level of support.

This is all due to the confidence that Sinwar was able to exhibit following the conflict, when he was seen wondering Gaza’s streets without fear, looking unconcerned and carefree, and speaking cordially to passers-by.

Thus, while Israel was able to degrade Hamas’s military-terrorist capabilities, and employ targeted killings effectively, targeting mid-level and field operatives, the conflict regained the international community’s attention, and placed the Palestinian issue squarely back on the American agenda. This has contributed to Hamas’s growing self-confidence, which has been visible since the end of the conflict. Even before the conflict, Hamas’s confidence had been growing, as seen in its decision to fire rockets on Jerusalem and issue ultimatums against Israeli actions in Jerusalem.

Hamas has excelled in promoting itself as the ‘Guardian of Jerusalem,’ and is continuing to act in this capacity these days, issuing new threats against Israel.

PA, Hamas in power struggle over funds

It is now clear that the conflict has caused significant harm to PA President Mahmoud Abbas, whose image following the Gaza conflict is one of a marginal element in the Palestinian arena, lacking influence and real power, and of being someone who failed to play any significant role during the conflict.

Abbas is also facing accusations in the Palestinian arena of refusing to take part in the nationalist wave following Israeli actions in Jerusalem. In reality, Abbas has no significant influence in Jerusalem, in Gaza, or among Israeli Arabs.

The PA President’s main role is limited to defending his rule in the West Bank, and continuing security coordination with Israel. He has also been engaging in legal and diplomatic warfare on Israel through the ICC and the court of international public opinion. His ability to prevent a security deterioration in the West Bank last month is noteworthy and important.

Currently, Hamas is focusing its efforts on attempting to take control of Gaza reconstruction money. Many have pledged to flood Gaza with cash, including Egyptian President Abd Fattah Al-Sisi, who promised half a billion dollars toward this goal, and Qatar, which immediately matched the Egyptian pledge.

A long list of additional countries soon appeared, promising funds as well. Egypt sent trucks into Gaza via its Rafah border crossing filled with humanitarian goods, and construction vehicles to reconstruct destroyed buildings. Gazans warmly received the Egyptian convoys.

The money being pledged to Gaza is supposed to go to rebuilding buildings that were destroyed in air strikes, particularly to high rise buildings, roads, water pipes, and electricity infrastructure damaged during Israeli strikes on Hamas’s ‘metro’ network of underground combat tunnels.

Intense competition between the PA and Hamas is now developing over who will control those funds. The PA is demanding exclusive control of the reconstruction process, as a reflection of its self-view as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Hamas, for its part, is demanding the same, based on its position as the exclusive ruling regime in Gaza.

The PA has correctly warned that should Hamas receive the money, some of it will be diverted to supporting Hamas’s armament program and military-terrorist activities, and that not all of the funds would further the objective of reconstruction.

As part of this competition, PA Prime Minister Muhammad Shtayah visited Gulf states to try and ensure that the PA and UNRWA receive the aid money rather than Hamas.

The PA’s Deputy Prime Minister, Ziad Abu Amr, a former resident of Gaza who has good ties with Hamas, met with the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate head, Maj. Gen. Abbas Kamel. The meeting is a strong indication regarding who Egypt thinks should be responsible for handling and allocating the reconstruction cash.

Kamel also held a series of official meetings with senior Hamas representatives, and stated that Cairo’s goal is to reach a long-term ceasefire that will include a prisoner and MIA swap between Israel and Hamas, but he also signaled that the two negotiation channels – one for a long truce and one for the swap – should not be dependent on one another.

Sinwar has called for no fewer than 1,111 Palestinian security prisoners to be released – a deliberate figure designed to remind Palestinians of the 2011 Schalit prisoner exchange, in which Israel released 1,027 prisoners (including Sinwar himself) for the captive Israeli soldier. The figure includes Schalit prisoners who have since been re-arrested by Israel.

Egypt’s rising influence on events in Gaza, meanwhile, became further apparent when the first construction work on a new Gazan neighborhood – built on the ruins of the former Israeli settlement of Netzarim in the southern outskirts of Gaza City, and named after Egypt – began in recent days. The ceremony was attended by PA and Fatah officials, including the Fatah Chairman in Gaza, Ahmed Hillis.

Meanwhile, Hamas is also aware that a new government in Israel, lacking in experience, will seek to avoid controversial dramatic steps that could lead to its own downfall.

The resistance by the international system to Israel’s positions regarding the Palestinian issue has also served to increase Hamas’s brinkmanship.

Meanwhile, Iranian assistance to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in funding, weapons know-how, and training looks set to continue. In the event of a new conflict with Israel, the scenario of Iran attempting to inject military advisors into Gaza, under false aliases, to assist Hamas attacks looks plausible.

As Hamas’s confidence continues to grow, the ability to deter it over a long-term period is in serious question.

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David Hacham served for 30 years in IDF intelligence, is a former Commander of Coordination of Govt. Activities in the Territories (COGAT) and was advisor for Arab Affairs to seven Israeli Ministers of Defense. Read full bio here.

Democrats must require Palestinian leaders to do better

By Mark Goldfeder

In early June, Democratic Rep. Jamie Raskin wrote a letter to Sen. Jim Risch, the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, asking him to remove a temporary hold on restoring Palestinian aid. That hold was put in place only until the United States can verify, with any sense of certainty, that the recipients will not directly or indirectly funnel the money to terrorists. Releasing it before that happens would be a terrible mistake.

The letter, which was signed by a group of Raskin’s Democratic colleagues, was misleading and generally reflective of a failed Middle East approach that they desperately need to abandon.

The letter was misleading because it is full of partial omissions and false promises. For example, it notes that this “humanitarian and development aid was passed in FY20 with bipartisan support and signed by the former President,” but completely fails to mention that there was also overwhelming bipartisan and executive support for the very limitations that Risch is trying to uphold.

Raskin claims that the money “is to be provided in full accordance with U.S. law. It is administered and overseen by our government and by trusted and vetted partners …. Hamas and other terrorist groups will not benefit from our humanitarian assistance.” The truth, however, is that during a May 24 special briefing, a senior State Department official publicly admitted that while the U.S. would be “working in partnership with the United Nations and the Palestinian Authority (PA) to try and channel aid there,” at the end of the day “there are no guarantees” it would not end up with Hamas.

It is also problematic and unlawful even to pretend (while noticeably declining to mention them by name) that the PA has suddenly become a “trusted and vetted partner” that the U.S. can work with on distributing aid in the region.

Setting aside the fact that as recently as May 19, during the conflict in Israel, the PA released a public statement calling for a unity government with none other than Hamas, the PA itself consistently calls for violent uprisings and intifada. The PA also doesn’t stop at merely glorifying violence; it literally pays for it by guaranteeing convicted murderers a monthly salary for life, with amounts increased according to the number of victims and the severity of the harm. It spends hundreds of millions annually incentivizing terror, much of it from international aid.

That is why the U.S. decided to stop sending the PA money in the first place — and in that regard, absolutely nothing has changed. In March, the State Department confirmed that “the PA has not revoked any law, decree, regulation, or document authorizing or implementing” the system of payments to terrorists. Raskin’s “trusted and vetted partner” remains forbidden by law even to benefit from American assistance, let alone help make decisions about where the money should be spent.

Raskin’s letter is so harmful because it removes the incentive to improve. Up until now, the hold on aid appears to have actually been working; only a few months back, the Palestinians were reportedly considering finally abolishing their pay-for-slay policy in order to get back in U.S. favor. But a principle-less shift that demonstrates a willingness to accept recalcitrant noncompliance instead of insisting on real progress sets that entire process back.

Yes, it is true that Hamas is even worse than the PA, but that is a very low bar to cross. And the United States should not use differences in degree of support for terror as a barometer to determine foreign policy shifts or to gloss over the PA’s own despicable and unlawful actions against both Israeli and American citizens. And yes, the PA could theoretically still develop into a government willing to distance itself from terror. But in the meantime, it has not changed and does not deserve this positive recognition and designation as a “trusted” partner, let alone any monetary aid.

On a broader level, Raskin’s letter reflects a desire to return to the paradigm of rewarding Palestinian intransigence, a strategy that has never actually brought anyone closer to peace. It is the PA, not Hamas, that has turned down multiple generous peace offers from Israel over the decades, and it is the PA, not Hamas, that has continued to pay terrorists, all for the same reason: because it knows that if it just waits long enough, and remains nominally better than the next guy, then the U.S. will eventually lower the bar for what constitutes a legitimate partner and redefine as “trustworthy” the guy who only pays assassins instead of actually pulling the trigger.

It is letters like this that have kept the peace process from ever moving forward. Instead of lowering our standards, the U.S. should keep its long-standing congressional commitments, which require Palestinian leaders to do better and hold them accountable when they don’t.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.

PODCAST: Jonny Gould's Jewish State - Upheaval: The Journey of Menachem Begin with the movie’s director, Jonathan Gruber

Jonny Gould's Jewish State podcast · 59: Upheaval: The Journey of Menachem Begin. Director Jonathan Gruber

Have the Democrats Finally Had It With Ilhan Omar?

By Mark Goldfeder

Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN) has gotten quite good at shifting the Overton window for what is acceptable to say as a member of Congress. At this point, she has a well-established pattern: First, throw out something remarkably offensive. Then, let other liberals rush to her defense, thereby confirming that they, too, are actually okay with what she said, before avoiding censure by finally offering a feeble/partial "clarification" or apology, for having been "misunderstood" or having misspoken.

This cycle played out again this week. On Monday, Omar proudly shared a tweet in which she implicitly equated the United States and Israel to the Taliban and Hamas, claiming that they had all committed "unthinkable atrocities."

On Wednesday, a dozen of her Democratic colleagues in the House issued a statement condemning her comments as offensive and misguided, and urged her to clarify her words. Almost immediately, Omar, along with fellow Squad members Congresswomen Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), rushed to smear anyone who dared take offense at being compared to terrorists as racist and Islamophobic. Congresswoman Omar herself remained defiant, calling the signatories of the letter—fellow Democrats—"shameful," and accusing them of constantly harassing and silencing her.

All of that was to be expected, as was Rep. Omar's subsequent clarification on Thursday morning, in which she suddenly changed her tune and tried to distance herself from the original tweet.

In the process, Rep. Omar also awkwardly distanced herself from the defenses of her fellow Squad members, who continued to defend her on substantive grounds by pretending that Omar was being vilified just because she was standing up for "human rights" or because she was Muslim.

Once again, as is her wont, having started a conversation that should have been dismissed as ridiculous out of hand—a conversation in which American politicians are debating whether it is racist to be offended by someone comparing the U.S. and its allies to terrorists—Rep. Omar took a quiet step back and feigned innocence. "To be clear: the conversation was about accountability for specific incidents regarding those ICC cases, not a moral comparison between Hamas and the Taliban and the U.S. and Israel," she conceded. "I was in no way equating terrorist organizations with democratic countries with well-established judicial systems."

This non-apology is unconvincing; her tweet speaks for itself: "We have seen unthinkable atrocities committed by the U.S., Hamas, Israel, Afghanistan, and the Taliban," Omar said very clearly.

Rep. Omar is sophisticated enough to make radical statements while also obfuscating their true nature by tying them to a conversation in which she says the same thing in a slightly less offensive context. In fact, she is genuinely good at this game of plausible deniability. She did something similar when she was called out for antisemitic comments in 2019.

But what was different this time was how the Democratic leadership reacted. It appears that Omar's provocations may have finally gone too far for the establishment to ignore.

And this is new. Over the years, Omar has had several close encounters with accountability. On multiple occasions, she has even been called out by members of her own party for her anti-American and antisemitic statements. But so far, she has escaped any real consequences for her actions, because each and every time the leadership of her party has backed down from offering a full-throated critique of her views, apparently deciding that the need for a united political front outweighed the necessity of calling out a problematic member.

This time, the entire leadership team of the Democratic Party issued a rare joint statement confirming that they do not stand with Omar on this issue, and that her statements are unequivocally unacceptable. In no uncertain terms, they wrote that "drawing false equivalencies between democracies like the U.S. and Israel and groups that engage in terrorism like Hamas and the Taliban foments prejudice and undermines progress toward a future of peace and security for all."

While the Squad will undoubtedly continue to cry foul with allegations of how Rep. Omar is being silenced, nothing could be further from the truth. The response by Pelosi and her team was entirely appropriate from a free speech perspective: No one silenced Omar, and no one made the claim that she should not be allowed to say whatever she feels, however repugnant. The Democratic leadership was correct to use its own counter-speech to educate their constituents about why what Omar said was so offensive, and therefore contradictory to Democratic values.

Offensive speech should never be silenced; it should just be labeled correctly, so that we preserve a sense of shared values.

Thank goodness the Democrats have finally taken a stand and done that. Let's hope they mean to keep doing so.

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Rabbi Dr. Mark Goldfeder, Esq. has served as the founding Editor of the Cambridge University Press Series on Law and Judaism, a Trustee of the Center for Israel Education, and as an adviser to the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations. Read full bio here.